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FOREWORD
In the spring of 1993, the University of Denver College of Law gradu-
ated its one hundredth class. As part of the centennial celebrations we
have included in this Issue articles and essays presented and discussed at
the Martin P. Miller Centennial Lecture, given at the University of Denver
College of Law on October 2, 1992. Also included are biographical
sketches of the federal and Colorado appellage judges who have gradu-
ated from the University of Denver College of Law (formerly Westminster
Law School).
The Martin P. Miller Centennial Lecture dealt with a common
theme-are there too many lawyers? Professor David W. Barnes begins
the discussion by asking the reader to accept that the United States does
have seventy percent of the world's lawyers and then asks-"So what? Is
this too much or too little?" In News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on
CivilJustice, Professor Marc Galanter provides a detailed refutation of the
statistical "facts" politicians, scholars, and commentators have used to ar-
gue too many lawyers exist. Professor George L. Priest then reviews and
criticizes the empirical studies that indicate overlawyering harms eco-
nomic growth. He also reviews the effects of modem tort law and environ-
mental regulation on the competitiveness of the United States and foreign
countries, and provides suggestions for reform to increase the wealth of all
nations.
Essays by Professors Burton F. Brody and Penelope Bryan offer addi-
tional insight on the question of overlawyering. Professor Brody notes
that one of the reasons lawyers exist is due to the American people's "na-
tional antipathy toward authority." This necessitates an increase in the
number of laws to restrict the acquisition and abuse of power and, thus,
more lawyers. Professor Bryan argues that what is left out of the discussion
of "overlawyering" is the many positive benefits the legal system provides-
e.g., validation of the rights of the poor and the facilitation of moral dis-
course on important legal issues. Professor Bryan concludes by noting
that, to the extent the powerful seek to retain their positions, an attack on
the legal system and lawyers would serve as an efficient means to further
restrict the evolution of substantive doctrines that would aid those "who
have yet to achieve equality." If these articles and essays share a common
theme, it is this-answering the question: "Are there too many lawyers?"
requires an analysis of many factors. A statement that the United States
has seventy percent of the world's lawyers, by itself, does nothing to answer
this question.
In addition to the discussion on overlawyering, the Review has in-
cluded four additional works. Author Thane Josef Messinger provides a
definitive discussion and analysis on the arguments for and against eutha-
nasia. After discussing the historical underpinnings of euthanasia, the au-
thor argues the current conflict can be reconciled through judicial
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expansion of the constitutional right of privacy. Professor Carl Tobias, in
a brief essay, discusses the decline in the appointment of minority judges
to the federal bench during the Bush and Reagan administrations, and
President Clinton's opportunity to correct this unfortunate trend. The
first of two student written pieces discusses the landmark Tenth Circuit
decision which recognized Colorado may enforce its EPA-delegated state
RCRA authority where a CERCLA cleanup is underway at a federal facility.
The second surveys and analyzes the current anti-stalking laws enacted by
various states.
In selecting articles and essays for publication, the Review attempts to
present articles that promote discussion of legal issues at the forefront of
discourse. We hope you will agree that we have met our goal.
Brian D. Lewandowski
EzekielJ. Williams
THFE HONORABLE LEWIS T. BABCoCK, JUDGE, FEDERAL
DIsTRICT COURT OF COLORADO
GARY Lozow*
Lewis T. Babcock was born in 1943 in Rocky Ford, Colorado. His
small town origins belie a keen intellect and sophisticated world view,
which have marked his quick rise through the state and federal bench. He
received his BA, cum laude in 1965 and his J.D. in 1968 from the Univer-
sity of Denver. In between his degrees, he married his high school com-
panion Judy, and has been blessed with two children, John and Katherine.
Judy is a teacher and administrator in the Boulder school system and a
fitting partner for this judge for all seasons. In 1988, Lew received an
L.L.M. from the University of Virginia School of Law. He is a member of
Phi Beta Kappa and the Order of St. Ives.
Lew began his legal practice in Rocky Ford, Colorado in 1968 where
he worked in a small general practice setting with Rex Mitchell. It is clear
that Rex honed the judge's legal acumen and took advantage of Lew's
fledgling golf game, gin rummy and cribbage skills. During his practice,
Lew served three years as the Las Animas City Attorney and six years as the
Rocky Ford City Attorney, and was also the part-time Assistant District At-
torney for the Sixteenth Judicial District. In 1976, Governor Richard D.
Lamm appointed him to the Colorado District Court for the Sixteenth
Judicial District, where he served until Governor Lamm appointed him to
the Colorado Court of Appeals in 1983. In 1988, Judge Babcock was ap-
pointed to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado by
President Ronald Reagan. Judge Babcock's meteoric rise through the ju-
dicial system came as no surprise to his law school classmates, such as
myself.
Judge Babcock's opinions, on both the Colorado Court of Appeals
and the United States District Court, are noteworthy for their rare combi-
nation of scholarliness and realism. His talent for simplifying complexity
and clarifying ambiguity is demonstrated by his use of strong language and
clear-cut analysis. Nor, as the cases discussed below reveal, has he shied
away from controversial issues or taken the path of least resistance. He
calls them as he sees them.
In Simkin v. Heil Valley Ranch,' Judge Babcock dissented from the ma-
jority's holding that an exculpatory agreement did not absolve a ranch
from liability to the plaintiff as a result of her fall from a horse. The ma-
jority held in accordance with prior Colorado Supreme Court precedent,
but the Colorado Supreme Court subsequently sided with Judge Babcock
* University of Indiana (BA. 1965); University of Denver College of Law (J.D. 1968).
1. 765 P.2d 582 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (Babcock, J. dissenting), rev'd, 784 P.2d 781
(Colo. 1989).
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and enforced the exculpatory agreement. Babcock's courage to eschew
precedent where common sense dictates, exemplifies both his willingness
to depart from the beaten path and his sense of fundamental fairness.
In Cook v. Rockwell International Corp.,2 a 1991 case thatJudge Babcock
decided while on the federal district court, the plaintiffs sued for "recovery
costs" associated with certain environmental hazards at the Rocky Flats Nu-
clear Weapons Plant, located northwest of Denver. Judge Babcock's thor-
ough opinion discussed the scope of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). This opin-
ion demonstrates his ability to explain an ambiguous and complex federal
environmental law in clear and simple terms.
In Sierra Club v. U.S. Department of Energy,3 another 1991 opinion from
the federal bench, the Sierra Club sought a permanent injunction under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), enjoining the De-
partment of Energy from resuming plutonium processing at the Rocky
Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant. Like CERCLA, RCRA is a complex environ-
mental law that allows private parties to bring actions to compel the
cleanup of environmental hazards. In his strongly worded opinion, Bab-
cock demonstrated his dedication to resolving legal disputes quickly and
fairly. Within one week after the injunction hearing, he had sifted
through the scientific evidence and RCRA morass to fashion final judg-
ment that balanced the public interest and continued operation of Rocky
Flats.
In Hansel v. Public Service Company,4 a sexual harassment action, Judge
Babcock gave form to the amorphous duty of an employer to seek out and
rectify sexual harassment occurring in the workplace. Babcock's opinion,
the first to address whether the 1991 Civil Rights Act applied retroactively,
set forth a bright line rule that the Act did not apply retroactively to cases
pending when it became law. Although some courts disagree with the
holding, the case has become a lightning rod for this controversial topic.
In Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta,5 Judge Babcock analyzed the im-
plied right to indemnity and contribution under the 1933 Securities Act
and the 1934 Security Exchange Act. Demonstrating his common sense
and judicious approach to unresolved issues of national dimension, Judge
Babcock meticulously reasoned that there is no right to indemnity under
the 1933 Act and, by implication, that contribution is prohibited under
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.
In Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Adventura Associates, L.P.,6 Judge
Babcock clarified the theory under which damages are recoverable for
negligent misrepresentation, an issue which was still being debated in Col-
orado state courts. Nevertheless, he held that the Colorado Supreme
Court would adopt the "economic loss rule" to measure damages recover-
2. 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo. 1991).
3. 770 F. Supp. 578 (D. Colo. 1991).
4. 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991).
5. 723 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1989).
6. 757 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Colo. 1991).
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able for a negligent misrepresentation claim. This opinion reflected his
realism and business sense - qualities that are often lost in legal analysis.
In recent months, Judge Babcock has demonstrated courage, fairness
and respect for the integrity of the judicial process by dismissing charges
against criminal defendants when the government has failed to meet its
burden of proof. His years of practice as a government lawyer prior to his
appointment to the bench only served to heighten his belief in the most
fundamental concept in the criminal justice system: that the prosecution
should be put to its proof. Perhaps these decisions, more than any others,
demonstrate Lew Babcock's reverence for the law.
For example, in United States v. Forbes,7 Judge Babcock granted a mo-
tion to dismiss a prosecution for distribution of a purported analogue of a
controlled substance. In dismissing the case, he held that the statutory
definition of a controlled substance analogue was unconstitutionally vague
as applied to the drug at issue, and that a drug may be an analogue only if
it meets both the chemical structure and pharmacological effects prongs
of the statutory definition. Forbes was the first case in which the govern-
ment prosecuted the distribution of the drug under the controlled sub-
stance analogue statute. More recently, in a stock fraud prosecution,
Babcock granted the defendants' motion for judgment of acquittal at the
end of the government's case, holding that the government had failed to
raise ajury question whether defendants were "constructive insiders" who
had a duty to disclose under federal securities laws.
8
Judge Babcock's opinions are flavored by his rural background, a life
of practicality and humble interests illuminated by a rare intellect. A mar-
athon runner, photographer, reader and lover of American Southwest In-
dian art, Lew has traveled far from the concerns of his rural origins, but
has never abandoned their bedrock values.
I must confess a certain reverence when Lew has the time to opine on
some of the important aspects of thejudiciary's obligations. He views his
role as a servant to the public. He fulfills that role with intellect, clarity,
integrity and an unyielding work ethic. The message that reverberates in
his court is driven by his commitment to equal justice. All fellow lawyers
and laymen who pass through the portals of his courtroom are treated
fairly during their journey.
7. 806 F. Supp. 232 (D. Colo. 1992).




THE HONORABLE JOHN A. CRISWELL,
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
MELMNDA S. MosEs*
SHEPARD H. ENGLANDER*
Judge John Albert Criswell was born May 13, 1932 in Phoenix, Ari-
zona. His father was a colorful man who at the age of fourteen, left his
home in Texas, took refuge in a bordello, and a year later, found himself
living in the raucous mining town of Creede, Colorado where he sup-
ported himself as a butcher by day and as a card dealer by night. Judge
Criswell's mother was the daughter of a railroad worker. The couple met
in Alamosa and married in 1919. They moved to Phoenix for a short time
and settled in Pueblo, Colorado when the Judge was six months old.
The family's circumstances were modest. They bought a three room
house in Pueblo, which remained the home of the Judge's mother until
she passed away at the age of 91. However, despite his family's hardships,
Judge Criswell has many fond memories of growing up in Pueblo.
High school, in particular, profoundly impacted the Judge. He de-
scribes this period in his life as a time of intellectual and self growth, much
of which he attributes to H.H. Bisel, his history teacher and debate coach
at Centennial High School. During this time, Centennial had a champion-
ship debate team under Bisel, and the Judge continued the tradition as a
junior, by helping his team win a three-state championship. The Judge's
high school involvement, however, did not end with debate. He served as
senior class president and forged strong friendships with his classmates
whom he described as a unique group of ambitious, bright, and accepting
individuals.
One of the topics the Judge debated was whether a world government
should be created. This piqued the Judge's interest in foreign affairs and
he attended the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Hav-
ing no scholarship or financial aid, he worked his way through college.
This led to the what theJudge has described as his most "enjoyable job"-
being an elevator operator in the House Building of the United States
Congress. This job paid so well that the Judge was able to share the job
with a buddy and work only every other month. Unfortunately, however,
the job, which was a patronage position, disappeared when the Republi-
cans won control of Congress in 1950. Thereafter, theJudge was relegated
to a "less glamorous" (and lower paying) job in the Georgetown Library.
* University of Colorado (BA. with distinction 1982); University School of Law (.D.
1988); current judicial law clerk to the Honorable Dale P. Tursi, Colorado Court of Appeals.
** Tufts University (B.A. Gum Laude 1985); Northeastern University School of Law
(J.D. 1992); current judicial law clerk to the Honorable John A. Criswell, Colorado Court of
Appeals.
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Judge Criswell describes his years at Georgetown as very stimulating.
History was taught in a different manner than he ever experienced-as a
tool for the decision-making of future statesmen. He lived off-campus in a
fraternity house with connections to prominent diplomats who would
often come to address the students. After two years, however, the Judge
concluded that, as a "small town guy who wore boots, had little money,
and did not like having to wear a tie everyday," any success with the State
Department would be hard won. Consequently, he revived a childhood
ambition to become a lawyer.
With that goal in mind, the Judge returned to Colorado to attend the
University of Denver. The day he arrived, his high school friends arranged
a blind date with Ann Jones. The pairing was a success, and an engage-
ment was announced three months later.
The Judge then had to finish another year of undergraduate curricu-
lum before beginning law school. He took the opportunity to have a "ren-
aissance year"-taking classes in American history, psychology and
undergraduate constitutional law. He also joined the R.O.T.C. program
since this was during the Korean war and he already used his student
deferment.
He began law school at the University of Denver (DU) in 1953. At
that time, the law school had only five full time professors: (1) Dr. Tom
Marsh, who taught real estate and torts; (2) Vance Dittman, who taught
procedure and evidence; (3) Charles E. Works, who taught probate, es-
tates, and trusts; (4) Harold Hurst, who taught administrative and consti-
tutional law; and (5) Wilson Hurt, who taught corporations, agency, and
partnerships. Of these men, the Judge was particularly influenced by Dr.
Marsh, a man with exceptional intelligence and an admirable ability to
relate to all types of people.
Judge Criswell graduated cum laude from DU Law School in 1956.
He was a member of the Order of St. Ives, the Student Work Editor of the
Law Review, which was then known as DICTA, and treasurer of his class.
He respected his talented classmates, many of whom have since become
leaders in the profession. They include Walter Gerash (prominent Denver
criminal defense attorney), Mike McKevitt (former Denver district attor-
ney and United States Congressman), Anthony Vollack (Colorado
Supreme Court Justice), Don Smith, (retired Colorado Court of Appeals
Judge), Gaspar Perricone (a Jefferson County District Court Judge), and
Ray Turner, (partner, the law firm of Sherman and Howard).
Upon his graduation, Judge Criswell was thrust into the "real world"
with unusual force. His first child was due the first day of the Bar Exam
and the Judge was ordered to report for active military duty in the Air
Force six months later. Needless to say, besides mounting pressure to pass
the bar, the Judge faced a difficult financial situation. He will always be
grateful for the six month employment that Sherman & Howard, then
known as Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, graciously extended to
him. Not only did it provide him the means to support his family, but it
also exposed him to interesting projects and eminent practicing attorneys.
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His time in the Judge Advocates General Corps of the Air Force, as a
military attorney, was also important to his professional development. It
provided him with the unique opportunity to try courts martial both as a
prosecutor and as a defense counsel. In addition to the extensive trial
experience he gained, Judge Criswell also started an income tax school on
his base so the airmen, many of whom recently left home for the first time,
could obtain the advice needed to complete their tax returns.
After leaving the military, Judge Criswell joined a firm formed by his
classmates, Bill Myrick and Don Smith. The two established, through hap-
penstance, a relationship with a local Teamster's union and developed a
practice in labor law. They also developed an expertise in municipal law.
In 1963, the firm added Joseph P. Branney, one of the state's promi-
nent personal injury litigators, and emphasized all aspects of trial work
-before the courts and numerous administrative agencies. The Judge also
taught contracts classes at DU Law School during the 1960 and 1961 aca-
demic years.
The Judge's municipal law practice grew, and he was appointed city
attorney for Englewood in 1965. Much of his involvement with the city
focused on the development of Cinderella Shopping Center, which at the
time, was the largest shopping center in the world under one roof. Local
residents mounted opposition to the development. Extensive litigation
ensued, including a petition filed with the United States Supreme Court,
before the litigation was settled and the shopping center built.
During this same period, Judge Criswell began to represent more un-
ions, including several in the newspaper industry. He also became known
as a leading appellate advocate. Appellate work was very rewarding for
him because he felt that with each case precedent, he created something
with a lasting effect that would benefit society as a whole.
The law firm of Myrick, Smith, Criswell and Branney dissolved in
1970. The Judge continued his private practice and later became associ-
ated with Gary Patterson, John E. ("Pat") Myles, Beverly Ballantine, John
M. McNamara, and Gary Bell.
He continued to practice labor law, and, in later years, he developed a
civil rights practice, with an emphasis on prosecution of claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. One of the Judge's most memorable and challenging of
these cases was when he represented several members of the faculty of
Colorado Women's College who were terminated shortly before that insti-
tution was closed.
Judge Criswell was appointed to the Colorado Court of Appeals on
September 10, 1986 by then Governor Richard D. Lamm. As a jurist,
Judge Criswell is guided by a personal respect for the history and integrity
of legal doctrine. He believes ajudge should not be unduly influenced by
his or her own personal perspectives or politics. Radical departures from
the past, in Judge Criswell's view, should be accepted only when estab-
lished legal precedent cannot be used to provide a workable solution to
modem problems. Consistent with this philosophy, Judge Criswell sees his
most important role as one of a leveling influence on different views.
1993]
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Influenced by his professional experience before he assumed the
bench, Judge Criswell's more notable opinions have related to civil rights,'
constitutional law2 and tort law.3 He has, however, also written upon im-
portant issues of criminal law.4 As a current and former law clerk to
Judge Criswell, we both have benefitted from the Judge's exhaustive
knowledge of legal doctrine, his razor-sharp powers of analysis, and his
passion for his work. He reads the briefs of his cases for the coming week
at home every Saturday morning-he often reads 10 sets over a weekend.
He arrives on Monday morning with a thorough grasp of the facts and
every legal argument on both sides of every case. To our astonishment, he
can then sit down and draft a complex legal opinion in two hours. These
opinions never stray from his standards-they are precise, concise and yet
eloquent, reflecting his love for writing.
Judge Criswell has also acted as a mentor to us. He was always inter-
ested in and gave careful consideration to our ideas and analyses. From
our exchanges, we learned how to dissect a case, identify the issues the
court should not address, and then solve the problems that were left. Both
of us know that we will continually draw on these skills and are grateful for
the time and care Judge Criswell took in cultivating our legal abilities.
The relationship the Judge developed with us is symbolic of his ap-
proach to his work and to the world. He is not only a very disciplined man
who takes his responsibilities seriously, he also holds a deep regard for the
law which he transmits to those that he works with. His active involvement
as chair of the Judicial System Personnel Board of Review and the
Supreme Court's CivilJury Instruction Committee evidence that regard as
does his commitment to the legal community.
However, Judge Criswell is not all work. He is a vigorous, witty, and
entertaining man. He has many outside interests including birding, ski-
ing, cycling, and traveling. He has competed in running races and has
ridden his bicycle in mountain tours. He rewards his hard work by spend-
ing as much of his free time as possible skiing or hiking at his mountain-
side cabin. He is also dedicated to his wife Ann, their five children, and
six grandchildren.
The Judge appears always mindful that many people and experiences
contributed to his ability to surmount his modest beginnings to become a
distinguished jurist. This fuels the dignity and respect with which he ap-
proaches both the law and his legal comrades.
1. Montoya v. Colorado Springs, 770 P.2d 1358 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (sets forth under-
lying principles for § 1983 action).
2. Lucchesi v. Colorado, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (authorizing taxpayer
action to recover ad valorem taxes alleged to violate state constitution).
3. Sewell v. Public Service Co., 832 P.2d 994 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (jury must decide
any disputed facts that may be relevant for court to determine legal question of existence of
duty).
4. People v. Atkins, - P.2d - (Colo. Ct. App. 89CA0950, June 4, 1992) (criminal
defendant cannot be convicted of both murder after deliberation and extreme indifference
murder).
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THE HONORABLE SHERMAN G. FINESILVER, FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT OF COLORADO
ANN MESMER DIEnucH*
If one were to summarize Sherman Finesilver's life, it is one of service
- service to Denver, to the Colorado law community, to his country. In-
deed, his resume shows a truly distinguished career of service; we who live
in Colorado are fortunate to have this dedicated, caring man among us.
The following abbreviated biography of his life in public service hardly
does justice to Judge Finesilver's outstanding career.
Sherman Glenn Finesilver was born on October 1, 1927 in Denver,
son of Rebecca and Harry M. Finesilver. He attended college at the Uni-
versity of Colorado. While in college, he began a lifelong career of teach-
ing citizenship to local students at the Denver Opportunity School. After
finishing college, he attended law school and received his law degree from
Westminster College at the University of Denver.
From then on, Judge Finesilver chose to dedicate his career to the
public. He first served as a Denver Assistant City Attorney. While practic-
ing at the City Attorney's office, he married Annette Warren, and their
family grew with the birth of three children, Jay, Susan and Steven. Attor-
ney Sherman Finesilver practiced law for only four years before being ap-
pointed as a judge in the Denver County Court at the ripe old age of
twenty-eight.
Judge Finesilver promptly established his view that judges have re-
sponsibilities not only to the court, but also to the broader community. As
a traffic court judge, Judge Finesilver studied the legal rights of the deaf
and physically impaired and developed model safety programs for adult
deaf drivers, older drivers, and handicapped drivers.' He also wrote arti-
cles on driver education, deaf drivers and drunk driving for popular jour-
nals.2 While distinguishing himself as an authority among municipal
judges, he continued his work promoting citizenship as co-chair of the
Colorado Bar Association's American Citizenship Committee.
Judge Finesilver served seven years on the Denver County Court
bench. In 1962, at age thirty-five, he was appoinied judge of the Second
Judicial District of Colorado. During the next nine years, he continued his
traffic safety work by founding and directing the Denver Driver Improve-
ment School. This work grew in scope as his model safety programs were
* University of Williams College (BA 1983); Boston University School of Law (J.D.
1989); former judicial law clerk to the Honorable judge Finesilver (1989-1990).
1. See SHERMAN G. FINESmVER, AN ANALYriCAL REPORT ON DpvER IMPROVEMENT
ScHooLs wITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING TRAmc SAE= (1958); Sherman G.
Finesilver, They Can't Hear But They Get The Message, TR =c SAFnr MAG., Aug. 1962.
2. See Sherman G. Finesilver, Driver Education-Is It a Fril?, TR.Amc SAFETY MAC., Nov.
1958; Sherman G. Finesilver, Menace of the Drunk Driver, XII VrrAL SPEEcHEs MAG. (1958).
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adopted nationwide. Judge Finesilver served as a consultant to the United
States Department of Health, Education & Welfare, which resulted in two
publications on disabled drivers, driver records and safety education.3 In
addition, he edited a AAA book on safe driving4 and chaired a United
States Department of Transportation, ad hoc committee on effective adju-
dication of traffic offenses.
Judge Finesilver's understanding of individuals with special needs
spilled over into other areas. In 1968, he authored a model law for inter-
preters in court proceedings. 5 In 1970, he received an honorary doctorate
of laws from Gallaudet College in Washington, D.C. for his substantial
work promoting the needs of deaf individuals. His work in this area has
since contributed to developing closed-captioned television for hearing
impaired individuals and greater insurability and employment of those
who are deaf and physically challenged.
At the same time, Judge Finesilver forged bonds between lawyers and
the larger Denver community by chairing the Denver Citizenship Day
Committee. He developed the Model Law Day Program and served on the
Denver and Colorado Bar Association Law Day Committee, formed in part
to provide public information about law to Denver citizens. The program
has since been honored by the American Bar Association and the Free-
doms Foundation.
As a Colorado district court judge, Sherman Finesilver developed a
deep interest in the ethical and legal aspects of medicine. He wrote several
articles and lectured on the need for interdisciplinary responsibility in or-
gan transplantation. 6 After President Nixon named Sherman Finesilver to
a life appointment as a United States District Court Judge in 1971, 7 the
judge's interest in medical/legal issues intensified. Judge Finesilver's pre-
cedent-setting contributions in this area of the law are widely recognized.
Early in his federal career, Judge Finesilver decided a controversial case
granting underage pregnant teenagers the right to an abortion without
parental consent.8 His knowledge of medicine assisted him in adjudicat-
ing the first case in the country involving toxic shock syndrome.9 In 1981,
because of his contribution in the area of law and medicine, Judge
Finesilver was named an honorary fellow of the American College of Legal
Medicine.
3. See U.S. DEP'T. HmTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, DEAF DRIVERS IN UNITED STATES,
DRIVER RECORDS AND SAFrTy EDUCATION (1964); U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARI,
STUDY ON DRvERs' RECORDS, LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND INSURABIITrY OF PHYSICALLY IM-
PAIRED Dr ERs, (1970).
4. AM. AUToMoBILE ASS'N., TEACHING DRIVER AND TRAFFIC SAFETY EDUCATION, (Sher-
man G. Finesilver ed., 1965).
5. SHERMAN G. FNESrLVER, MODEL LAW FOR INTERPRErORS IN COURT PRoCEPIaNns
(1968).
6. See SHERMAN G. FINESILVER, ORGAN TRA~SPLAN. S: MODERN MIRACLES - LEGAL AND
MEDICAL CHALLENGE, DENVER MED. BuLu. HANDBOOK (1969).
7. At age forty-four, he was one of the youngest judges appointed to the federal bench.
8. Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975) (declaring the Colorado statute
unconstitutional insofar as it requires parental consent before a minor may obtain an
abortion).
9. Lampshire v. The Procter & Gamble Co., No. 80-F-1567 (D. Colo. June 1, 1982).
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After his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Finesilver also be-
came active in matters involving the federaljudiciary. He participated for
three years as a member of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Courts, the
highest policymaking body of the federal courts, and served on the com-
mittee to celebrate the Bicentennial of the Constitution. He has served on
the committee to study qualifications of attorneys to practice in federal
courts,10 and teaches an annual seminar to local attorneys on federal prac-
tice. He chaired the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council from 1988 through
1992, and has been a member of the Committee on Administration of the
Federal Probation System for ten years. As a faculty member at the Advo-
cacy Institute for federal judges, he presents seminars for the judiciary,
covering not only his knowledge on medical/legal. subjects, but also the
rules of evidence and various techniques to effectively manage an onerous
caseload."'
Indeed, since his appointment as Chief Judge in 1982, Judge
Finesilver has implemented these skills broadly in federal district court
proceedings in Colorado. Judge Finesilver's leadership in serving both the
intellectual, as well as the efficiency demands ofjustice, mark his tenure.
His expertise at managing complex and difficult cases is renowned. He
presided effectively over one hundred twenty-five cases arising from the
swine flu vaccination program. 12 Virtually all later cases built on this pre-
cedent.' 3 More recently, Judge Finesilver handled a major airplane crash
case involving twenty-eight fatalities .and numerous injuries.' 4 The case
was concluded within twenty-five months of the date of the accident. 15
The multi-faceted Silverado litigation was brought to settlement within
twelve months of filing.16 Recently, a 1992 criminal drug case involving
twenty defendants was concluded within six months from the date of
filing.
17
Judge Finesilver has maintained his active commitment to community
affairs. During the 1980's, Judge Finesilver received an Honorary Doctor-
ate of Laws from the University of Colorado and from Metropolitan State
College of Denver for his continuing interest in legal education. In 1986,
Judge Finesilver was presented the Maimonides Award by the University of
Denver Jewish Law Students for his outstanding contributions to law and
10. See Sherman G. Finesilver, Proposed CriteriaforAdmission of Attorneys to the Registy of
Trial Attorneys of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 14 CoLo. LAw. 1387
(1985).
11. Sherman G. Finesilver has published extensive works: Perspectives on Federal Rules of
Evidence, Fan. PuB. DEFEmERs INST. (1976); Selected Notes for New Federal Judges, FED. JuD.
CENTER (1977);Judicida Techniques toEffedtively Manage Trials, Fma.Jun. CENrR (1978); Update
on Federal Rules of Evidence and New Approaches to Hearsay Rule, FED. JuD. CENTER (1980).
12. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Products Liability Litigation, 495 F. Supp. 1185
(W.D. Okla. 1980); Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188 (D. Colo. 1980); Unthank v.
United States, 533 F. Supp. 703 (D. Utah 1982), aftd, 732 7F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984).
13. Id.
14. In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989).
15. Id.
16. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Colo. 1991).
17. United States v. Dago et al, 813 F. Supp. 736 (D. Colo. 1992).
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the Jewish community. For nine years he chaired the committee to pres-
ent the Minoru Yasui Community Volunteer Award in Denver.' 8
Even today, Judge Finesilver particularly enjoys performing the citi-
zenship tasks of his judgeship, whether they be the swearing in ceremony
for new American citizens, or a "mock trial" to determine who stole the
Halloween pumpkin for a local group of first graders. These are the acts
of not only a judge, but also of a "citizen" in the best sense of the word.
Congratulations on a lifetime of achievement, and thank you, Judge
Finesilver!
18. Minoru Yasui is a Colorado native who was quarantined during World War II be-
cause of his Japanese descent. He violated a curfew during this time, and was sentenced as a
criminal. Recently, the United States Supreme Court vacated his sentence through a writ of
coram nobis, which effectively erases the case from legal history. Yasui v. U.S., 320 U.S. 115
(1943).
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THE HONORABLE JOHN L. KANE, JR., FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT OF COLORADO
E. M cHAEL CANGES*
John L. Kane, Jr., has a fascinating background, indeed. He did not
follow the customary route to the bench. His legal career includes a posi-
tion as deputy district attorney, a stint as a real estate and farm lawyer in a
semi-rural community, Colorado's first public defender, house counsel to
a water company, partner in the largest law firm in the region, visiting
lecturer at Trinity College, Dublin, and now a federal judge.
He has travelled to 37 countries, some as remote as Moldova and
Mongolia. As a Peace Corps staff member in India, the young Kane
showed a flair for public service, which is a continuing theme in his career.
The United States Information Agency has dispatched him as a lecturer to
all parts of the globe. The State Department has asked him to assist third
world and formerly Soviet dominated countries in establishing viable legal
systems which emphasize human rights.
His interests are diverse and eclectic. He has taught a myriad of sub-
jects at the University of Denver College of Law, Denver University, Metro-
politan State College, and Trinity College, Dublin. Author of numerous
professional and secular articles, he is an accomplished cook, literary
critic, operatic tenor, outdoorsman, historian, humorist and thespian. A
devotee of baseball and football, by his own admission his interest far ex-
ceeds his ability.
As a new federal judge, he ordered the Colorado State Penitentiary
closed for numerous federal constitutional violations.' When the state leg-
islature threatened to ignore his order assessing attorney fees against the
State, Judge Kane let it be known that he would consider a writ of execu-
tion against the gold dome of the state capitol. He sentenced a defendant
to 325 years of confinement,2 but granted probation to individuals in cases
which outraged the government. He found the recently enacted federal
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional,8 but upheld the government's
right to subpoena financial information from lawyers concerning payment
* Mr. Canges is a practicing trial attorney and partner in Canges and Iwashko. He
graduated from the University of Denver with a BA in 1962 and University of Denver Col-
lege of Law with aJ.D. in 1965. He has taught trial tactics at the University of Denver College
of Law , and is presently active on the faculty of the National Institute of Trial Advocacy
(NITA). He is an initial member of the William E. Doyle Inn of Court. He is a member of a
variety of professional and bar organizations and has been selected as a member of the Amer-
ican Board of Trial Advocates.
1. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp 122 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd in par set aside in part, 639
F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. United States v. O'DriscolI, 586 F. Supp 1486 (D. Colo. 1984), afd, 761 F.2d 589
(10th Cir. 1985).
3. United States v. Smith, 686 F. Supp 847 (D. Colo. 1988).
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of cash fees.4 He has decided a significant number of cases of first impres-
sion involving subjects as diverse as federally reserved water rights,5
searches involving private air carriers6 and competing forfeiture claims by
diverse branches of federal and state governments.
7
Neither conservative nor liberal, most assured not statist and some-
times a libertarian, he defies political labeling. He is devoted to tradi-
tional values. Judge Kane's judicial philosophy is profoundly simple: he
believes that his primary obligation is, to keep government off the backs of
the people. He is held in national esteem for his insightful opinions and
his wit and his extensive contributions to profession and community.8
John L. Kane, Jr., was bom in Tucumcari, New Mexico in 1937. His
family moved back to Denver when he was two years old. His late father
was a pharmacist and state legislator from Adams County. His mother was
an accountant. He has worked since the age of nine when he set pins in a
bowling alley. He has been a cady, a constructor and even a railroad
gandy dancer. Judge Kane was educated in local parochial and public
schools and graduated from the University of Colorado at Boulder. There
he majored in philosophy and literature. He was active in the theater, a
talent that he employed throughout his legal and judicial career.
After graduating from college in 1958,John Kane attended D.U. Col-
lege of Law, then located in downtown Denver across from Sullivan's Bar
on Court Street. He clerked for noted trial lawyer Walter Gerash. He dis-
tinguished himself academically as the Editor-in-Chief of the University of
Denver LawJournal. He attained first place in both the Kingsley All-Uni-
versity Oratorical and Pattison Law Oratorical contests. His ambition was
to become a good trial lawyer.
Kane was admitted to the Bar at the age of twenty-two. He joined the
Brighton law firm of Gaunt, Byrne and Dirrim. There, his primary tasks
were examining abstracts and rendering title opinions. He later became a
deputy district attorney, then a part-time position which allowed a private
practice.
Judge Kane has always had a love affair with the courtroom. As a
young lawyer, he followed the great trial lawyers of Denver to watch them
work their craft in court. Upon hearing that Fred Dickerson, Tony
Zarlengo, Bob Kingsley, Fred Winner or Irving Andrews (his mentor and
later his partner) were in trial, Judge Kane would watch and learn. His
dedication to trial skills required him to fulfill his private practice tasks at
night and on weekends.
The seduction of a full-time trial practice became irresistible when
Irving Andrews suggested a partnership. The firm of Andrews and Kane
4. United States v. Saint-Veltri, unpublished opinion.
5. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
6. United States v. Andrews, 474 F. Supp 456 (D. Colo. 1979).
7. Eggleston v. Colorado, 636 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Colo. 1986).
8. Judge Kane has been featured or written of in publications as diverse as The New
Yorker, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The National Law Journa, The Washington
Post The San Francisco Chronick and The Irish Times.
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(affectionately referred to as Sunshine and Soot and the first racially inte-
grated law firm in Colorado) established offices at 2130 Downing Street
near the heart of Denver's black community. The flavor of those days is
best expressed in the following vignette. A gentlemen, having just robbed
a bank, heard the sound of sirens approaching. He thereupon proceeded
directly to the offices of Andrews and Kane. Upon arriving, and in justifi-
able haste, he blurted out to Irving Andrews that he has just robbed a
bank. "Fool," retorted lawyer Andrews, "You don't even know the constitu-
ent elements of the crime. Until you do, you haven't robbed anything."
The police arrived shortly thereafter. While being led off in handcuffs, he
told the police, "Mr. Andrews thinks maybe I'm innocent."9
In 1964, Adams County established Colorado's first public defender
office. John Kane was selected as the first Public Defender in the State of
Colorado. His deputies included Phil Roan, now an Adams County Dis-
trict Judge, Morgan Smith, now Director of the Colorado International
Trade Office, and noted defense attorney Mike Bender, then a student
public defender intern.
Although the workload was enormous, to Public Defender Kane it was
a labor of love. Then, as now, the office was underfunded and understaf-
fed. Nevertheless, his office established a formidable presence and be-
came the prototype for the state public defender system.
The caseload of serious felonies was formidable. The success rate was
exemplary. However, the pressures of the office took their toll. Kane, hav-
ing established the office and being pleased with its staff, decided to ac-
cept a different challenge.
Always mindful of the obligation of public service, he joined the
Peace Corps. He became a deputy director and, with his family, went to
Calcutta for two years. The poverty, inhumanity and suffering he observed
left a lasting impression. The dignity and culture of the Indian people
profoundly influenced his values and self-awareness.
After India, Kane returned to Denver. Unable to find work as a trial
lawyer, he accepted a position as general counsel to a water company. In
1970, the late Pete Holme offered him a position with Holme Roberts &
Owen, then, and now, one of the largest law firms in the region. There
Kane distinguished himself as a consummate civil trial lawyer.
During his years with Holme Roberts & Owen, he was elected a fellow
of the International Society of Baristers, the International Academy of
Trial Lawyers, and numerous other prestigious organizations. As a lawyer
he taught, authored and lectured extensively. His clients were as diverse
as his interests; from the friendless indigent to the high public official-
the obscure to the famous.
In the early 1970's, Kane's interests included the future of the legal
profession. At a general meeting of the Board of Governors of the Colo-
rado Bar Association, he spoke about a number of issues about the com-
munity and the future practice of law. He opined, to the unbridled
9. Discussion with Judge Kane many years ago in an unnamed saloon.
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laughter and derision of his audience, that within the next ten to twenty
years legal fees would exceed $200 per hour, law firms would exceed one
hundred lawyers, the sole practitioner would ultimately become virtually
extinct, legal research would require a computer, gasoline would cost
more than $1.00 per gallon, industries would be deregulated, real prop-
erty would increase five-fold due to inflation, and Colorado would have
branch banking. In sum, he suggested, were a lawyer to travel twenty years
ahead, he would recognize virtually no aspect of the practice of law.
In 1978, Senators Gary Hart and Floyd Haskell established a commis-
sion of distinguished lawyers and citizens to recommend to the President
applicants for the opening on the federal bench for the District of Colo-
rado occasioned by the retirement of Chief Judge Alfred A. Arraj. John
Kane was appointed by President Carter on December 16, 1977. He be-
came a Senior United States DistrictJudge in 1988.
As a trialjudge, he has authored more than 725 published opinions.' 0
His cases range from significant constitutional issues to essays on the ob-
scure. For example, he closed the prison at Canon City until the State of
Colorado established that it met minimal constitutional standards." He
has dismissed cases when he is shown governmental overreaching or mis-
conduct.' 2 He does not abide any party or lawyer to take unfair advantage
in his court. He recognizes that the majesty and responsibility of a federal
judicial office require adherence to a standard. He abhors secret proceed-
ings. When asked to review documents in camera, he stated: "Both the
reliability of the information and the public acceptance .... could be
enhanced by subjecting the process to public scrutiny. Because an in cam-
era investigation both demeans the judicial systems and distends an al-
ready cloyed review of an essentially meaningless document, I refuse to
undertake it."
1 3
He expends whatever time and effort he believes necessary to per-
form his duties. Upon passing sentence for a series of vicious crimes, he
felt obliged to explain, in an extensive opinion, the necessity for imposing
the harsh sentence. He said:
I know of no more excruciating decision for a judge to make
than whether to confine and, if so, for how long and under what
terms and conditions.
I am keenly aware of the imperfections of the judicial pro-
cess and my own fallibility of perception when called upon to
impose a final and awesome judgment. I can deal only with the
defendant who stands before me and not with the society that
helped to form and nurture him.... As best as I am able, I must
10. The second most prolific author in the District of Colorado was the late ChiefJudge
Alfred A. Arraj. He authored 379 written opinions between 1957 and 1992.
11. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979).
12. United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp 1324 (D. Colo. 1984), rev'd, 821 F.2d 1456
(10th Cir. 1987), a ffd sub norm. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988);
United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp 223 (D. Wyo. 1983), reo'd, 778 F.2d 602 (10th Cir.
1983); United States v. Haggerty, 528 F. Supp 1286 (D. Colo. 1981).
13. Lorenz v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 516 F. Supp 1151, 1155 (D. Colo. 1981).
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purge myself of any inappropriate emotions or motivations. No
sentence which is imposed for the purpose of vengeance or to
satisfy a public demand for vengeance is worthy of respect.
Justice consists in meting out a sentence which is threatened
by law and deserved by the guilt of one who voluntarily ran the
risk of conviction. It is, therefore, the responsibility of ajudge to
sentence not for the sake of the individual, but for the sake of
justice-to carry out the threat of the law and to deter others
from committing the same or similar acts.... The law's warnings
must be real. The grim consequence of imprisonment must be
shown to be inevitable. To do otherwise is to trivialize the seri-
ousness of crime and depreciate the humane principles by which
integrity and dignity are recognized in all of us.
1 4
A master at using the simple sentence and avoiding unnecessary pro-
lixity, his writing is cogent and direct. It is understood by the public as
well as the bar, although frequently sending anxious lawyers to their dic-
tionaries. He believes that non-lawyers are entitled to understand the how
and why of judicial decisions. He prefaced a lengthy decision with, "I
apologize for [this opinion's] length. I simply didn't have the time to write
a shorter one."15 When the City of Denver refused a parade permit to a
group who wished to celebrate a Mexican holiday, except after normal
work hours, Judge Kane observed that:
To one not familiar with the Denver area, this regulation might
appear as one which reasonably confines public processions to
certain times and places, but, for better or worse, Denver's is one
of those downtown areas where the workday population greatly
exceeds the population which remains after 6:00 p.m. and on
weekends.... Indeed, one could roll a bowling ball down 17th
Street after 6:00 p.m. and not hit anyone.
16
When angered, he is quick to let the offending party know. For exam-
ple, when visited with a proposal by the government to accept a vehicle in
exchange for a plea bargain, he said:
This is perhaps not the most appropriate case in which to analyze
all of the outrages visited upon the criminal justice system by plea
bargaining. Suffice it to say that the foregoing reference to an
exchange of criminal charges for used cars is made without any
accompanying sense of shame or embarassment. Such insouci-
ance suggests that we are fast approaching our own
gotterdammerung.
17
He is ever vigilant protecting the citizens from the government. He
no longer hears criminal cases so long as he is bound by the sentencing
guidelines. Because of the guidelines, Kane perceives that the role of the
federal judge in criminal cases has become little more than a "clerical
14. United States v. O'Driscoll, 586 F. Supp 1486, 1486 (D. Colo. 1984).
15. United States v. Price, 448 F. Supp 503, 503 (D. Colo. 1978).
16. Sixteenth of September Planning Committee v. City and County of Denver, 474 F.
Supp 1333 (D. Colo. 1979).
17. United States v. One 1982 Audi, 577 F. Supp 1004, 1005 (D. Colo. 1984).
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function." He has publicly stated that he "will not be a conductor on a
train to Auschwitz at the behest of the government."
While his decisions often contain weighty and serious legal discus-
sions, they are not without wit and humor. His opinions include an analy-
sis of ecdiasty (striptease,18 if you please), baseball,
19 prison cuisine,2 0
defamation (of sorts), 21 and intentional torts, 2 2 to name but a few. When
a plaintiff sought payment from the defendant's homeowner's insurance
policy by asserting negligence when his nose and ears were bitten off,
Judge Kane observed: "After the fashion of William of Occam, preference
should be given to a test of known quantities: three bites do not a negli-
gence case make." 23 When a tax protester appeared as "counsel" for a
fellow protestor, Judge Kane inquired if "counsel" were a member of the
bar of the Court. "Counsel" replied that he was a member of the court of
God. The Judge promptly replied that while he respected counsel's cre-
dentials, "the rules of our Court require local counsel."24 When asked in a
pre-trial motion to "not refer to the parties by their first names during
trial,"Judge Kane stated: "I so advise. I hope they don't because to do so is
very tacky."
2 5
Judge Kane has been honored by diverse groups for his contributions.
He was the first Martin P. Miller Distinguished Visiting Professor at the
College of Law; St. Thomas More Award, Outstanding Contributions to
the Law, Religion and Country, Catholic Lawyers Guild; Evans Award to
the Outstanding Alumnist, University of Denver; LifetimeJudicial Achieve-
ment Award, National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys; Award
of Merit, U. S. Information Agency; B'nai B'rith Annual Civil Rights
Award; and Honorary Life Member, American Board of Trial Advocates,
to name but a few.
He was a visiting Lecturer in Law, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland,
and is the first Harry Silverstein Adjunct Professor of Law, University of
Denver, College of Law. At the request of the U.S.I.A. and the State De-
partment, Judge Kane has taught and explained our system of law and
government in many countries. He has assisted leaders of emerging coun-
tries in establishing and reforming judicial systems. He is regarded as one
of the foremost authorities on comparative judicial and legal systems.
Judge Kane does all of us-the College of Law, the legal profession,
and our system ofjustice-proud by his presence and contribution.
18. Tavern Talent v. Charnes, 607 F. Supp 1415 (D. Colo. 1985).
19. King v. Burris, 588 F. Supp 1152 (D. Colo. 1984).
20. Tuggle v. Evans, 457 F. Supp 1015 (D. Colo. 1978).
21. Williams v. Bums, 540 F. Supp 1234 (D. Colo. 1982).
22. West Am. Ins. Co. v. Maestas, 631 F. Supp 1565 (D. Colo. 1986).
23. Id. at 1566.
24. United States v. Hudler, unpublished decision (1978).
25. Elliott v. The Aspen Brokers, Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Colo. 1993).
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THE HONORABLE ROBERT H. McWILLIAMs, JR.,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
TENTH CIRcurr
DoRis B. TRHLAR*
The nicest, most unassuming person around on the federal bench is
Bob McWilliams-more properly known as the Honorable Robert H. Mc-
Williams, Jr., Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Judicial
Circuit. I was a law clerk for Bob in 1980-81, in one of the best years of my
legal career, and a time I will always cherish for the fond memories I have
of "the Judge."' This Article is not a dispassionate, unbiased profile.
Rather, it is a tribute to an outstanding man who has served as ajudge for
more than forty years.
Bob is a 1941 honors graduate of the University of Denver (DU) Col-
lege of Law, and also received his Bachelor of Arts degree from DU in
1938, with honors. Additionally, he received an honorary degree from DU
in 1971. One of the most loyal, devoted alumni of DU, Judge McWilliams
serves his alma mater in various ways, living out a life of public service that
makes him one of the University's most distinguished graduates.
When I told Bob I was honored'with a request by the DU Law Review
Editor-in-Chief, Diana A. Cachey, to write this article for the Centennial
Issue of the Denver University Law Review, I also commented to him that I
would write that he was an "honorable guy," which he should take a great
compliment. His response, pure Bob McWilliams: "Well, I'd hate for you
to tell them I'm dishonorable."
2
The "honorable guy" description is, in my Way of thinking, praise of
the highest sort. It describes a man who is intelligent, well-rounded, loves
life, treats others with courtesy and consideration, and is respected
throughout his community and nation. Bob is an individual who has
earned the respect, praise and admiration of his colleagues. He wrote ap-
proximately eleven hundred opinions since President Nixon appointed
him to the federal appellate bench in 1970,3 and is known for his ability to
* University of Missouri School ofJournalism (Bj. 1967); University of Denver (MA.
1976, J.D. 1980); partner Truhlar and Truhlar, Littleton, Colorado.
1. Judge McWilliams was "surrounded" by women that year. Rema Batson, now Rema
Rickman, was, of course, his secretary, as she is today. My co-clerk was Maureen Reidy, now
Maureen Witt, a partner at Holland & Hart. It was a wonderful year.
2. Bob himself has been known to describe himself in somewhat similar terms. In a
quote in The Denver Post in 1984, Bob stated, "I guess all I can hope for is that people will say,
'He did the best he could with a degree of intelligence and common sense. Some people
may think I was over my head in the municipal court.'" TiE DEvE Posr, Sept. 3, 1984, at
B-3, col. 3.
3. Counting the opinions he wrote on the Colorado Supreme Court, where he was a
Justice and ChiefJustice, he has written close to 1,600 appellate opinions. This count does
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say a great deal in a simple, concise style, using a minimum amount of
words and avoiding legal mumbo-jumbo or lengthy dissertations.
4
Putting aside his credentials as a outstanding jurist, it's no exaggera-
tion to say that Bob is beloved. Those fortunate to be counted as among
his many friends and colleagues universally describe Bob as fair-minded,
even-tempered, good-natured, patient, tolerate, honorable and even
extraordinary.
Bob also contributed to the community in many little-known ways. It
takes nine index cards in the morgue5 at The Denver Post to summarize all
the articles that have appeared in The Post over the years, chronicling his
achievements and career. For example, he served as the President of the
Denver Rotary Club, a group in which he remains very active, and has
been the Keynote Speaker for Denver Law Day. He served as President of
the Colorado Tennis Association and DU Alumni Association. Bob was a
past recipient of the DenverJunior Chamber of Commerce Good Govern-
ment Award. He also was a vocal and outspoken proponent of our current
judicial selection system, which replaced a system of judicial elections.
These achievements are intended only as examples-it would take much
more space than allotted here to describe everything Bob accomplished
in his career.
The oldest child in a family of three sons, Bob was born in 1916 in
Salina, Kansas. Most Coloradans have forgiven him for his accident of
birth long ago,6 even when he insists on watching the Kansas football
games on Entertainment & Sports Programming Network (ESPN). We
were informed, however, that his loyalty to his adopted state of Colorado is
complete-he cheers for the Buffs, not the Jayhawks, in games between
University of Colorado and Kansas. His late-in-life love of ESPN is a reflec-
tion of a lifelong devotion to sports, both as a participant and a spectator.
Bob and his son make a trip together every summer to Chicago, Illinois, at
a time when both the White Sox and the Cubs are in town, so they can see
several baseball games, hopefully more than one a day.
At the age of 11, Bob moved to Denver, Colorado when his father
became chairman of the Department of Sociology at the DU. 7 Bob's
childhood and teenage years were happy ones. Graduated from South
High School in Denver in 1934, he distinguished himself as an outstand-
ing athlete, as well as a bright student who excelled academically and was a
leader among his fellow students.
not, of course, include any of the decisionsJudge McWilliams made during his years as a trial
court judge.
4. Judge Logan noted in his remarks of July 27, 1990, that Bob's word processor is
reputed to have a nine-page maximum.
5. An old-fashioned, newspaper word for library.
6. Apologies to Judge Logan.
7. Bob's dad was a popular Denver City Councilman for eight years, from 1947 until
1955. He died in 1959. Bob considered following in his father's footsteps, by becoming a
professor. Fortunately for the profession and the bench, he was attracted to the law and
decided to attend law school. He has ties to academia, however, serving as a part-time and




After South High, Bob went on to DU, where he majored in political
science, graduating in 1938. He took only one course from his father,
criminology, and made an "A." He wasJunior Class President and student
body President in his senior year of college. Also during his senior year,
he won a law essay contest, in constitutional law, which netted him the
then-princely sum of $200.8 A brilliant undergraduate student, he also
excelled at tennis and basketball.
In 1941, Bob graduated with honors from DU College of Law9 and
also was admitted to the bar, ranking first in the bar examination that
year. After admission to the bar, Bobjoined the Denver District Attorney's
office, where he remained until 1949, except for his military service. Bob
was a sergeant in the United States Army, assigned to the Office of Strate-
gic Services from 1945 until 1946. He served as a special agent with the
Office of Naval Intelligence from 1942 to 1945.
In 1949, he entered private practice in Denver, while also serving part-
time as a Municipal Court Judge. In January, 1949, Bob and Ray Danks
had opened their law offices in the Majestic Building in downtown Denver
when Mayor Quigg Newton's administrative aide, Ralph Radetsky, called
to offer Bob an appointment as a full-time municipaljudge. Bob accepted
the offer and has been on the bench continuously since then.
"The Judge," as he is known to the dozens of law clerks who work for
him over the years, was at the Denver Bar Association picnic in June 1952
when he learned that Governor Dan Thornton was trying to reach him.
This time, the telephone call was for a promotion-from municipal court
to Denver District Court. Two years later, he ran for election for his first
full term on the district court, along with all the Denver District Judges,
and won. He later served as Chief'Judge of the Denver District Court, and
was elected by his fellow Colorado Judges to President of the Colorado
District Judges Association.
Elected as Justice on the Colorado Supreme Court in 1960, Bob won
the biggest victory of any Colorado political race that year, outdistancing
the margins for the Presidential candidate, the United States Senator run-
ning for re-election, and all the United States Congressional races. In-
deed, Bob did very well in elections, garnering the support of virtually all
lawyers in Colorado, according to his long-time friend, Bill Steele. The
only close race Bob ever ran was the one in 1954, two years after he was
appointed to the Denver District Court when he ran for his first full six-
year term. He came in ninth of the nine winning candidates. At the time,
he vowed not to run again in a Denverjudicial race and he didn't. He ran
8. The essay contest was part of Denver's sesquicentennial celebration of the signing of
the United States Constitution.
9. The University of Denver College of Law Class of 1941 was truly outstanding. In
addition to Bob, the class included former Colorado GovernorJohn A. Love, Supreme Court
Justice Leonard B. Sutton, and National Labor Relations Board Judge Howard Jenkins, Jr.
The class roster reads like a Who's Who of the legal profession. Additionally, the graduates of
the Class of 1941 were S. Leonard Berenbeim, Robert M. Bowen, Robert L Hartman, Charles
J. Higson, Mack L. Kennedy, Elizabeth L. Kofoed, James H. Mosley, A. William Prior, J.
Woodson Railey, and Peter S. Razatos, and Roy 0. Samson, Jr..
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for the Colorado Supreme Court in 1960 when his six-year term was up on
the District Court.
Bob was ChiefJustice of the Colorado Supreme Court for three of his
ten years on that court, including a stint as Chief from 1969 until his
appointment to the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1970.
During the time he served as Chief Justice, he was also elected as a Vice
Chairman of the National Conference of ChiefJustices.
As many have noted, Judge McWilliams is known for his direct, con-
cise writing style. He always believed that the task of an appellate court is
to decide cases fairly and quickly, without writing a treatise.10 He seldom
writes dissents, having written fewer than 20 dissents or special concur-
rences during his 22 years as a United States Court of Appealsjudge. Bob
says, in deciding whether to dissent, the question is whether his indigna-
tion would overcome his inertia-and it seldom does.
No matter how great his contributions as a jurist, it is as a human
being that Bob excels. His personal life, and his approach to it, make him
outstanding. He is neither condescending nor arrogant. He makes
friends and keeps them for life. Bob's sense of humor is well honed. He is
known among his colleagues on the appeals court as, in Judge Logan's
words, "a remarkable human being."1 Judge McWilliams enjoys life-he
swims and walks for physical exercise every day, and seems many years
younger than his chronological age. Judge Logan, who recently turned
63, remarked, "I'm planning to model my 'older years' after Bob-he
doesn't seem old. It's hard to believe he's 76. He really is a remarkable
human being."
Bob's personal life included devoted, loving relationships within his
family. In 1941, the same year that he was graduated from law school and
was admitted to the bar, Bob was traveling on a train from Colorado to the
West Coast for a shipboard trip to Hawaii to a sporting event. 12 On board
the train, he met a young woman, Catherine Cooper, a native Coloradan,
who was also Hawaii-bound. Bob and Catherine always remarked on the
fact that, although both of them were from Colorado, they managed to
avoid meeting each other until they were both on a train outside of the
state.
Catherine was making the trip to visit another young man to whom-
as rumor has it-she was practically engaged. By the time their ship ar-
rived in Hawaii, however, the other suitor was-according to McWilliam's
legend-entirely out of the picture. Bob and Catherine were married in
1942.
10. Until about twelve years ago, he did not use any footnotes in his opinions. There are
probably about five times as many footnotes in this profile ofJudge McWilliams as he ordina-
rily uses in his lengthiest opinion. Bob, this is intended as an example of reasonable use of
footnotes-sort of a model for your reference in writing opinions.
11. The Honorable James L Logan, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. Judge Logan presides in Kansas.




Catherine and Bob had one son, Edward, who they named for one of
Bob's brothers,' 3 who lost his life during World War II. Bob's son, Ed,
possessed the good sense not to become a lawyer-he's a successful real
estate broker. Ed's wife Marilyn, however, is an attorney, having gradu-
ated from the DU College of Law in 1991. Ed and Marilyn have three
daughters. Family being very important to Bob, he treasures his grand-
daughters. Visitors to his chambers in the Denver federal courthouse are
often shown pictures of granddaughters, Catherine, Sarah, and Anne,
three delightful, charming young women.
Bob's wife Catherine died in 1984, after two very difficult illnesses.
Bob and Catherine were married for forty-two years. Judge McWilliams
was a loving, devoted husband to Catherine through her difficult illnesses
leading up to her death.
Bob was subsequently fortunate enough to find another lovely and
talented Colorado woman with whom to share his life. In 1986, he mar-
ried Joan Harcourt Cady, one of his former law clerks. Joan, formerly a
partner at Gorsuch Kirgis Campbell Walker and Grover, actively practices
law in Denver, concentrating in alternative dispute resolution, an area in
which her colleagues recognize her as practitioner, expert and teacher.
14
Joan describes her husband, Judge McWilliams, as extremely easy to live
with, a good cook and one of the most flexible human beings she's ever
met.
Joan sums up her husband in a sentiment that reflects the feelings of
the many friends and colleagues who are fortunate enough to count Bob
as a friend: "He's a giftl"
Joan, plenty of us agree!
13. Surviving brother David McWilliams lives in Denver, and he and Bob maintain a
close relationship. Bob was the oldest, Ed the middle and David the youngest.
14. Joan is an Adjunct Professor at the DU College of Law.
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THE HONORABLE KAREN S. METZGER,
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE VAXSDAL SMTH*
If asked to describe her finest accomplishment, Karen Metzger will
not name any of the hundreds of opinions she authored while serving on
the Colorado Court of Appeals. She will not call attention to her service as
one of Colorado's first deputy state public defenders or to her varied
teaching career. Instead, Karen points to her long marriage to her hus-
band, Roger, and the accomplishments of her three children. Karen's re-
sponse is typical of Karen's view of the importance of children and family
and the independence of thought that characterizes Karen as a person, a
lawyer, and a judge.
Karen was born to John and Betty Metzger in Denver, Colorado in
1945. John Metzger, who later became Attorney General of the State of
Colorado, never encouraged Karen to become a lawyer. Instead, he en-
couraged her to understand what the practice of law was all about. When
Karen did not have school, she went to her father's office or to court with
him. He encouraged her to develop those skills necessary for a lawyer:
reading comprehension, speech and debate. By engaging in "debates" at
the dinner table, which were frequently not resolved until the encyclope-
dia came out, he also encouraged her to think for herself and look for
holes in any argument. Karen's mother, Betty, a teacher and career wo-
man in her own right, taught Karen to stick to a task until it was com-
pleted, even if that meant staying up all night to finish the project. Betty
also encouraged Karen to search for creative solutions rather than follow-
ing the trails blazed by others. Betty was also Karen's toughest critic, so
much so that pleasing Betty often meant guaranteed success of any given
project, be it a speech, a paper or other task.
After receiving her bachelor's degree from Colorado College in 1967,
Karen went to law school at the University of Denver (DU) College of Law.
When Karen went to law school, however, it was for her own reasons,
rather than those of her parents or anyone else. Karen went because she
thought that the practice of law was "the most wonderful thing in the
world." Karen had seen her father resolve both small and large problems
through his practice. She saw her father become friends with his clients
and saw his friends become clients. She observed how the resolution of
problems allowed her neighborhood and acquaintances to settle back
down into their daily lives. The opportunity to be a problem solver-a
lawyer-brought Karen into this profession.
* University of Wisconsin-Superior (B.S. 1980); University of Denver College of Law
(J.D. 1984); Litigation Associate, Kobayashi & Associates, P.C.
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After graduation with herJuris Doctor in 1970, Karen's firstjob was as
a Denver public defender, working for Ed Sherman. Shortly thereafter, in
1971, Colorado first established its statewide public defender system.
Karen then became a deputy state public defender, working for Rollie
Rogers. As a public defender, Karen advocated most strongly for the
rights of children. Karen's uncompromising defense of childrens' rights
once led to her arrest. One Friday morning, when Karen was the only
public defender in the office, Juvenile Hall (the Hall) called and asked for
a public defender to come and supervise a lineup identification for ajuve-
nile accused of rape. When Karen arrived, she discovered the police of-
ficer conducting the lineup was using other children from the Hall for fill-
ins in the lineup. These children had not been convicted of any offense:
rather, some were pre-trial detainees, held for psychiatric evaluations as to
competence and psychological condition, while others were clients of the
public defender's office charged with but not convicted of non-bondable
offenses. In spite of the risk to the rights of these children stemming from
their participation in the lineup, which Karen pointed out to the police
officer, he would not obtain a court order allowing it to go forward. Con-
sequently, Karen instructed the children selected for the lineup not to
follow the police officer's instructions during the lineup; instead, they
were to follow only Karen's instructions. As Karen was the only woman in
the room, it was not difficult for the children to know who was speaking.
When the lineup took place and the children did not cooperate, the po-
lice officer in charge began berating one child to try to force compliance
with the instructions. Karen informed the officer of her instructions to
the children, which resulted in the cancellation of the lineup, and she
went home to wait for events to shake themselves out. On Monday morn-
ing, Karen was served a summons to appear for an ordinance violation for
interference with the police. (She later learned that on the previous Fri-
day, the police intended to arrest her for felony obstruction of justice.)
An immediate hearing was scheduled. When Karen explained the events
to district judge Burnett, including her instructions to the children, the
charge was dismissed on the theory that Karen had properly selected the
lesser of two evils.
Shortly thereafter, Karen left the public defender's office and Colo-
rado and went to Harvard University, obtaining her Master of Laws in
1973. Karen attended Harvard as a student and as a teaching fellow in the
law school for the first-year research and writing program. She was not,
however, content with that limited role, particularly after her experiences
as a public defender. Therefore, in the Spring of 1971, Karen started a
clinical program for second and third-year law students in criminal law, in
conjunction with Gary Bellow, a litigator who represented Caesar Chavez
and other "Bellows Fellows." With the aid of the Massachusetts' Public
Defenders Office and under Karen's supervision, Harvard students were
permitted for the first time to appear in the criminal division of the
Dorchester District Court-the equivalent of Denver County Court-to
defend individuals charged with various felonies.
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Karen left Harvard and briefly returned to Colorado in 1973, but left
again to become an Associate Professor at the University of Utah College
of Law. Karen agreed to teach wills, estates and trusts as her assigned cur-
ricula. Once again, Karen asked for and received permission to expand
her teaching duties well beyond the assigned areas. Karen created and
taught a course in juvenile law and also was instrumental in developing
and teaching a course on post-conviction remedies for prisoners. In the
context of criminal law and criminal procedure development, both were
new and innovative courses, as the United States Supreme Court had only
recently recognized constitutional rights both of children in a criminal
setting and of convicted individuals.
Finally, in 1974, Karen returned to Denver, Colorado to develop her
law practice and to start her family with her husband, Roger. She was not
long in private practice. In 1977, Mayor William McNichols, Jr. appointed
Karen to serve on the Denver County Court bench. She served there until
1979, when Governor Richard D. Lamm appointed her to serve as a Den-
ver District CourtJudge, succeeding then Judge, nowJustice, Luis Rovira.
In 1983, Governor Lamm appointed Karen to serve on the Colorado
Court of Appeals. Karen is now the most senior woman on the state appel-
late court bench and one of its more senior judges.
Her return to practice and appointment to the bench did not stop
Karen's teaching career. Since 1977, Karen has taught courses in law and
ethics as an adjunct Professor at the University of Colorado School of
Nursing. She has also been an active lecturer for continuing legal educa-
tion courses. Her courses have dealt with issues ranging from ethics, fam-
ily and juvenile law to appellate practice.
During her years as a practicing lawyer and judge, Karen has also
been active in the Catholic Lawyers Guild, the Colorado and American
Bar Associations and served on the Governor's Commission on Children
and Families. She also served on the Supreme Court's Committees on
Public Education and Criminal Jury Instructions. She is a member of the
Board of Directors of the Colorado Judicial Institute.
I came to know Karen Metzger in the Spring of 1987, when I became
her law clerk. During my tenure, I learned some of the lessons that
brought success to Judge Metzger as a lawyer and a jurist. Judge Metzger
worked as hard and diligently as her law clerk (and I worked hard). In
addition, I also learned the importance of critical editing and reevaluation
of ideas and analysis. It was not unusual for an opinion to go through
many successive drafts. I came to regard some opinions as curses because
it took so much time and redrafting to reach a final outcome that satisfied
her both intellectually and technically. It was not unusual to change the
disposition of a case when the logic of the written opinion developed and
the correct outcome could finally be discerned.
As her law clerk, I also came to understand howJudge Metzger views
her role as a judge on the court of appeals. Her judicial philosophy re-
quires adherence to the limited role of the court of appeals in the scheme
of this state's appellate system: she also strongly believes, however, that the
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court's function can only be served by the most stringent intellectual per-
formance and integrity. The three fundamental tenets she follows in car-
rying out that function can be summarized as follows: (1) always read all
of the relevant portions of the record, beginning with volume one, (2) the
court of appeals is to review the decisions of trial courts and other tribu-
nals to determine whether errors of law affecting substantial rights had
been made, not simply to reach out and make law, regardless of the temp-
tation to do so, and (3) if the court has to make law, then the analysis must
be thoroughly reasoned and explained. An examination of a few of her
more recent opinions demonstrates Judge Metzger's consistent adherence
to this philosophy and these tenets.
Judge Metzger's insistence on complete review of the record is exem-
plified in the decision in People v. Fell' There, the defendant was con-
victed of first and third-degree sexual assault and two counts of incest. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in not responding
to the jury's request for clarification of an instruction regarding the term
"sexual penetration." The majority opinion agreed the court had improp-
erly responded to the jury's inquiry in that the court should have provided
additional information, but the error was harmless. In her concurrence,
Judge Metzger pointed out the trial court did not err because the record
compiled at trial contained no evidence concerning the issue that formed
the basis for the jury's inquiry. Therefore, the trial court was not obligated
to answer a jury's inquiry by giving additional instructions when the re-
quest pertained to matters not in evidence.
Judge Metzger's insistence that the court of appeals correct substan-
tial errors of law, not simply reach out and make law, is also reflected in
the opinions she writes. In Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n.,2 the
court of appeals reviewed a trial court order dismissing the claims of three
employees, who all asserted their employment was wrongfully terminated.
The claims ranged from breach of an implied employment contract to
tortious interference with contract to outrageous conduct. In construct-
ing her opinion, Judge Metzger answered precisely the question posed in
the context of the appeal: did the trial court err in granting the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgement, thereby dismissing the employ-
ees' claims? The opinion concluded that in many respects, the trial court
erred because the judge resolved disputed issues of fact, which did not
comply with the dictates of Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 56.3
A relatively straightforward decision on its face, a portion of the opin-
ion created something of a stir among lawyers practicing in the field of
employment law. That part of the opinion dealt with the question of
1. 832 P.2d 1015 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (Metzger, J., specially concurring).
2. 765 P.2d 619 (Colo. CL App. 1988).
3. CoLO. R. Civ. P. 56 states in relevant part:
(H) DETERMINAMON OF A QUES ON OF LAw. At any time after the last required
pleading, with or without supporting affidavits, a party may move for determination
of a question of law. If there is no genuine issue of any material fact necessary for




wrongftl termination, wherein the employees claimed that they were dis-
charged for refusing to violate identified portions of the Public Utilities
Code. The court of appeals' analysis did not include a standard for judg-
ing the reasonableness of the employees' belief that they were being termi-
nated for those reasons. Some practitioners criticized the opinion on that
basis. However, the issue was not addressed in the opinion because it was
not addressed by the parties and was not necessary to resolve the questions
presented by the appeal. Thus, in spite of the obvious gap in the analysis,
the issue could not properly be decided by the court of appeals. That
issue remained undecided until recently when in Martin Marietta v. Lorenz4
the Supreme Court specifically adopted the result and reasoning of Cronk,
adding the standard of "objective reasonableness" for the analysis of the
wrongful termination claim.
Finally,Judge Metzger's insistence on thoroughly reasoned and docu-
mented opinions in the role of lawmaker is also evident from her opin-
ions. Indeed, Judge Metzger applies this rule to opinions dealing with
procedural as well as substantive matters, both being equal in her mind.
For example, in Moore v. Grossman,5 the plaintiff brought a product liabil-
ity action against the manufacturer of a catheter, contending that the cath-
eter had failed one week after surgery, thereby causing the plaintiff's
injuries. The manufacturer named the attending physician, Dr. Gross-
man, as a non-party having fault, pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes
§ 13-21-111.5.6 Plaintiff then filed a motion to file an amended complaint,
seeking to name the doctor as an additional defendant. The plaintiff also
caused the motion, amended complaint and summons to be served on the
doctor. Shortly thereafter, the statute of limitations passed. Because of
various rulings by the trial court, the doctor ultimately succeeding in ob-
taining a dismissal on the theory that the plaintiff had failed to file the
claims prior to the passage of the statute of limitations and should have
proceeded by way of independent action rather than a motion to amend.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the filing of the motion to
amend, combined with service on the doctor, served to toll the statute of
limitations.
Because this issue was not previously decided by any Colorado state
court, it was necessary for the court of appeals to "make law" regarding the
procedures to be followed under Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
15(a). 7 In the opinion written by Judge Metzger, she carefully docu-
4. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
5. 824 P.2d 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
6. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987).
7. CoLO. R. Cry. P. 15(a) states in relevant part:
(A) AMEN aimnS. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
any time before a responsive pleading is filed or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it any time within twenty days after it is filed. Otherwise,
a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall
plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response
to the original pleading or within ten days after service of the amended pleading,
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
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mented the rationale for each step of the analysis. The opinion relies not
simply on the words of the rule at issue but also sets forth policies the rule
is designed to serve ("to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action") as well as rulings of federal and state courts that
previously passed upon similar factual and legal circumstances. Each link
in the chain of logic leading to the conclusion is fully set forth. This short,
three-page opinion is a model for the type of opinion writing at which
Judge Metzger excels. The culmination of these judicial philosophies can
be seen in opinions like Amax, Inc. v. Water Quality Control Commn 8 and its
conceptual companion Board of County Comm'nrs v. Water Quality Control
Comm'n.9
In her years of practice, Karen Metzger has dedicated herself to the
finest traditions of the legal profession: intellectual independence and in-
tegrity as well as service to the profession as a teacher, practitioner and
judge. Karen's career exemplifies what a lawyer can do if that lawyer be-
lieves the practice of law "is the most wonderful thing in the world" and
takes the steps necessary to keep it that way. In these days of harsh criti-
cism of legal practice and bum-out among lawyers, Karen Metzger's career
is a powerful example of the possibilities given to those who chose to prac-
tice faithfully in this profession.
8. 790 P.2d 879 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), modif'vA, March 29, 1990 (consideration of fu-
ture uses when setting water quality standards was proper and methodology used was reason-
able and appropriate).
9. 809 P.2d 1107 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (water quality standards could be revised ac-
cording to statute that did not require findings of inconsistency, court could consider com-
mission's deliberations when conducting review and methodology used was incompatible
with water quality data).
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TnE HONORABLE JOHN P. MOORE, UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT
Domis G. KAPLAN*
In its innocence, the "P" interposed between John and Moore offers
no particular insight into the bearer's identity. Unmasked, however, the
"P" stands for Porfilio, the essential link to John Moore's heritage, the
essence of his character, and his love of good food and music. More im-
portantly, it explains his otherwise cryptic musing that if he hadn't been a
judge, he would have sung opera at the Met.
While one can only speculate about his operatic career, concrete and
enduring accomplishments mark his tenure with the federaljudiciary. To
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' bench, he brings experience from
private practice, state government, the United States Bankruptcy Court
and the United States District Court As if this were not sufficient, his
presence is an amalgam of all those straight paths and turns in the process
of his personal growth.
'Born in Denver, Colorado, on October 14, 1934, John Carbone
Porfilio was raised by his mother, Caroline, after his father, Edward, a
pharmacist, died suddenly before John's sixth birthday. In 1948, his
mother married Robert M. Moore, who adopted John and ostensibly hy-
bridized his Italian heritage with that of the fair nation of Ireland.
Moore graduated from the Colorado Military Academy in 1952 and
attended Stanford University, majoring in chemistry in anticipation of a
career in medicine. In 1954, however, after transferring to the University
of Denver, where he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in chemis-
try with minors in physics and zoology, two events changed his direction.
Dr. Zeiner, a member of the Zoology Department and his advisor,
summoned Moore during the Spring quarter of his senior year and forth-
rightly counseled his student that he was not "dedicated enough" to finish
medical school and should step aside for another who was. As Judge
Moore recalls, "I was blessed with an advisor who was smarter than I and
who knew me better than I knew myself."
The second event, according to Judge Moore, was enrolling in Dr.
Otto Freitag's course, The Constitution and American Government. In-
trigued by both the subject matter and the professor, Moore recognized
his career plans had been permanently altered. To this day, Judge Moore
credits these two teachers with redirecting his course from one for which
he was purportedly unsuited to one destined to be the perfect fit.
* Doris G. Kaplan (BA, summa cum laude, University of Rochester 1967,J. D. Uni-
versity of Oklahoma 1983) has served as Permanent Senior Law Clerk to Judge John P.
Moore since 1985.
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Moore entered the University of Denver Law School in 1956, having
not even taken the LSAT until after he matriculated. Graduating from
D.U. in 1959, where law school was "one of the most enjoyable exper-
iences of my life," Moore began practicing law with his uncle, Arthur S.W.
Carbone, and Henry Walsmith, both of whom were D.U. graduates. He
learned quickly that the practice of law was whatever walked in the door.
Their general practice, emphasizing wills and estates, real property, and
agricultural and commercial law, also brought him into the justice courts
for collections work, "great courtroom training, but a job for which my
nature betrayed me." His reluctance to force debtors into payments, he
recalls, cost the firm a substantial client and resulted in his assignment to
other areas of the practice.
In-October 1962, Attorney General Duke Dunbar hired Moore to fill
a temporary position in the legislative reference office where he drafted
legislation at the request of members of the General Assembly. Soon after,
Attorney General Dunbar, concerned with the influx of criminal appeals,
offered Moore a permanent position he created to represent the State in
these criminal appeals. For the next six years, Assistant Attorney General
Moore appeared before the Colorado and federal appellate courts and the
United States Supreme Court. This considerable exposure to appellate
practice confirmed his law school interest in one day becoming an appel-
late jurist, Judge Moore acknowledges.
These responsibilities were extended further when Duke Dunbar ap-
pointed Moore Deputy Attorney General in 1968. In that capacity, he rep-
resented the State on diverse matters before courts throughout Colorado.
When Attorney General Dunbar died in 1972, Governor John Love ap-
pointed Moore to fill out the term. Defeated in his first and only political
race to retain the office of Attorney General, Judge Moore found himself
"looking at an uncertain future which, fortunately for me, turned out far
better than I expected."
As he explains, in the early 1970's Colorado's bankruptcy court faced
one of its periodical spurts in the growth of its case load. "Unbeknown to
me and others," Judge Moore recalled, "Judge Arraj, who as Chief Judge
was responsible for the appointment of bankruptcy judges, had squirreled
away a position which he did not fill for a number of years. The serendip-
ity of need and availability worked to my advantage." OnJanuary 15, 1975,
the late ChiefJudge Arraj administered the oath, and United States Bank-
ruptcyJudge Moore began a career on the bankruptcy court, often guided
by hectic on-the-job training, and always, he would say, filled with many
lessons in human nature. "I learned more about life as well as the craft of
judging as a bankruptcyjudge than at any other time in my professional
career."
This experience became the foundation for Judge Moore's subse-
quent appointment to the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado on July 2, 1982, where the cases and questions before him in-
stantly expanded to fill the entire plate of federal jurisdiction. On the
district bench, Judge Moore was respected for conducting proceedings ef-
[Vol. 71:1
1993] JUDGE MOORE 35
ficiently and fairly, courteous to attorneys appearing in his courtroom, but
always direct with those in need of guidance.
His many decisions span a range of issues. In Helminski v. Supreme
Court of Colorado,' Judge Moore struck down Colorado's residency require-
ment for admission to the bar on the ground it improperly discriminated
against nonresidents in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of
the United States Constitution. When plaintiffs James Brady, Timothy Mc-
Carthy, and Thomas Delahanty, who were shot and seriously injured in the
attempted assassination of President Reagan, sued John Hinckley's psychi-
atrist in the District of Colorado, Judge Moore had to decide whether Col-
orado law permits third parties to sue a psychiatrist based on a legal duty
arising between the patient and therapist.2 Judge Moore reluctantly con-
cluded, "[u]nless a patient makes specific threats, the possibility that he
may inflict injury on another is vague, speculative, and a matter of conjec-
ture."3 He observed, "[Plaintiffs'] plight as innocent bystanders to a bi-
zarre and sensational assassination attempt is tragic and evokes great
sympathy. Nevertheless, the question before the Court is whether Dr.
Hopper can be subjected to liability as a matter of law for the injuries
inflicted upon plaintiffs by Hinckley."
4
In Ayala v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,5 Judge Moore held the heirs and
representatives of fifteen miners killed in a mine accident near Redstone,
Colorado, could properly assert a claim for breach of warranty under the
Colorado wrongful death statute against the manufacturers of mining
equipment. Later, he concluded in Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc.6
that the children of a woman who died of toxic shock syndrome could
maintain an independent claim for loss of parental consortium and com-
panionship under Colorado law.
Two and a half years afterjoining the district court, President Reagan
nominated Judge Moore to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals where he
has served since his investiture on May 14, 1985. In stark contrast to his
daily interaction with litigants and their litigators in the trial court, life on
the appellate bench is marked by long hours of record and case study,
careful attention to written opinions destined to fill volumes of the Fed-
eral Reporter for years to come, and the camaraderie of his colleagues on
the Tenth Circuit. In each area, Judge Moore brings his daunting intelli-
gence and judicial experience, his sense of fairness and belief in the adver-
sarial system, his insight into human behavior, and his grand sense of
humor. While he may quip, "I may not be right but I'm never in doubt,"
and "experience has taught me when not to make the same mistake twice,"
on the bench, he is steadfastly motivated by his deep sense of commitment
to the public he serves. "I don't write for the law reviews," he will say,
1. 603 F. Supp. 401 (D. Colo. 1985).
2. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983).
3. Id. at 1338.
4. Id. at 1339.
5. 580 F. Supp. 521 (D. Colo. 1984).
6. 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985).
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convinced that direct, readable legal prose that resolves the problems
before him best assists the "real people" whose lives are affected on the
other side of the decision.
To date, Westlaw lists 381 decisions, published and unpublished,
which Judge Moore has authored on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
His decisions in criminal appeals reflect his concern that the rights of
criminal defendants are assured under the Constitution. For example, in
United States v. Padilla,7 in response to defendant's contention he was im-
properly permitted to proceed pro se Judge Moore underscored the court
should conduct a meaningful inquiry to assure a criminal defendant has
knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
In Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools,8 Judge
Moore revisited one of the central issues in desegregation litigation, what
a school board must show in order to dissolve the injunctive decree gov-
eming a school desegregation plan. Although the Supreme Court re-
versed that decision, applying newly articulated principles of injunctive
remedies,9 Judge Moore believes his analysis under settled injunctive prin-
ciples properly preserved the rights of the plaintiffs and held the defend-
ant school board to its duty under the Constitution. In Melton v. Oklahoma
City,' 0 Judge Moore held when the allegedly stigmatizing statements are
true, a public employee does not establish a violation of his liberty interest.
He wrote, "In structuring the parameters of constitutional guarantees, we
must be mindful that our zeal for the protection of individual right does
not lead us to absurd conclusions."
11
In addition to his service on the bench, Judge Moore participates on
several national committees involved with the federal judiciary. For exam-
ple, as a member of the Automation and Technology Committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, he has overseen the many tech-
nological advances implemented in the federal courts. He also served on
the Chief Justice's Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom,
which created a pilot program for allowing news cameras into the federal
courts.
Judge Moore and his wife, Terni, currently live in Evergreen, drawn
not only by their love of the mountains but also the golf course, which
increasingly fills their summer leisure. By his admission, they are avid, if
not able golfers. Together, they enjoy four children, Edward,Joseph, and
Jeanne Moore, and Katrina Smith. His mother, Mrs. Caroline Moore, who
attended each ofJudge Moore's investitures to the federal bench, remains
his most loyal fan. At home, few recipes have escaped his creative flair in
the kitchen. There he enjoys relaxing while concocting Italian dishes in-
spired by childhood memories of his grandmothers' cooking.
7. 819 F.2d 952 (loth Cir. 1987).
8. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989),
9. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
10. 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991).
11. Id. at 932.
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Except for his culinary virtuosity, Judge Moore insists he manages his
judicial duties and the many difficult decisions he faces by not taking him-
self too seriously. In truth, he has secured a sure place for himself in the
federal judiciary through his commitment to public service and devotion
to the law. Hisjurisprudence shall continue to mature, reflecting his solid
legal scholarship and broad understanding of the human experience.

TiE HONORABLE PETER NEY,
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
EDWIN S. KAHN*
Judge Peter Ney's judicial opinions strike the reader much like com-
plex renaissance paintings. In the background are the landscapes of the
times-the trees and rolling hills comparable to the general subject matter
of criminal law, local government, commercial transactions, and family
law. In the middle range lies the city, town, or specific building-much
like the facts of the case. And in the foreground is the specific subject of
the painting-a particular individual or group of persons-much like the
people and interests that come into play in a trial. When one views a series
of cases, like a series of paintings, common themes are visible. The grand
dominant theme in Judge Ney's opinions is that arbitrary governmental
action is properly and rightfully limited, and that, on those occasions
where individual liberties or powers are improperly limited, the individual
must prevail. A second related theme is that the rights of the less powerful
must be carefully protected by the law in operation.
Before turning to an examination of some particular cases, I would
like to tell you something ofJudge Ney's background. Peter Ney was born
in 1931 in Nuremberg, Germany. At the age of seven, due to Nazi intimi-
dation of Jews, he emigrated to England without his parents, who were
required to stay in Germany for more than six months after he left. His
emigration was made possible by an English organization to rescue chil-
dren endangered by the Nazis. He attended boarding school in England,
and in 1940, with his parents, emigrated again, this time to the United
States. His family settled in the Philadelphia area. He attended public
schools, and entered the Philadelphia College of Art. He obtained a bach-
elor of fine arts degree, majoring in product design. Thereafter, he
worked in industrial design.
After a two-year stint in the Army in the mid-1950s, he returned to the
field of industrial design. Russia's launching of Sputnik sparked his inter-
est in work in the space program. In 1959, he joined the Martin Company
in Baltimore to work on human factors connected to space capsules. In
1960, he and his family moved to Denver, where he continued to work in
the field, becoming head of the department of human engineering at
Martin in 1965. Meanwhile, motivated by intellectual curiosity, in 1963 he
enrolled in night classes at the University of Denver Law School. He grad-
uated in 1966.
* University of Colorado (BA cum laude 1958); Harvard Law School (L.LB. cum laude
1965); partner of Kelly, Haglund, Garnsey & Kahn; fellow of the American College of Trial
Lawyers; specialized in commercial litigation with an interest in constitutional litigation; for-
mer visiting lecturer at University of Colorado Law School (1985).
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After law school graduationJudge Ney opened a solo law office in the
Littleton-Englewood area, and in 1967 also worked part-time as an Arapa-
hoe County deputy district attorney. He practiced solo for twenty-two
years, with most of his cases involving criminal defense, personal injury
law, and domestic relations. He handled numerous cases pro bono for the
American Civil Liberties Union, including the representation of University
of Denver students expelled for on-campus demonstrations, and also han-
dled First Amendment cases challenging various obscenity statutes for
booksellers' associations and the Tattered Cover Bookstore. In a case with
echoes from his own youth, he successfully represented a Vietnamese
mother seeking the return of her four-year-old son from adopting parents
who had obtained the boy shortly after the fall of Saigon in 1972.
In 1988, after twenty-two years of solo practice, Judge Ney was ap-
pointed by Governor Roy Romer to the Colorado Court of Appeals.
Nine cases serve to illustrate both the range ofJudge Ney's work, and
the dominant theme of balancing individual rights against the coercive
power of government.
1. Criminal Law Cases
In People v. Sprowi, the police obtained a court order for a wiretap,
and, as a result of information obtained therefrom, obtained arrest war-
rants for twenty-six individuals, including the defendant. When the police
officer appeared at defendant's residence, defendant agreed to speak to
the officer, but first excused himself and closed the doors to several
rooms. Defendant then returned to speak to the officer and closed the
front door behind him. The officer arrested the defendant and entered
the house to determine whether another person was inside. Once inside,
the police officer heard what he thought was a fan and a pump, the sound
emanating from the basement. The officer obtained a search warrant, and
found numerous marijuana plants and over twelve grams of cocaine.
On defendant's motion, the trial court ruled the evidence obtained
from the wiretap inadmissible, and also ruled the initial warrantless search
unlawful. The People appealed, and after certain other proceedings re-
sulted in a conviction, the issue before the court of appeals was whether
the evidence obtained as a result of the search should be suppressed as the
illegal fruits of the initial entry.
In the court of appeals opinion, Judge Ney first carefully set out the
controlling standard, relying on Murray v. United States.2 "a search pursu-
ant to a warrant cannot be considered an independent source of evidence
if the decision to obtain the warrant was prompted by observations made
during a prior illegal search, or if information... was presented to the
magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant."3
1. 790 P.2d 848 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
2. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
3. Sprow=4 790 P.2d at 850.
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Judge Ney then scrutinized in detail the affidavits supporting the war-
rant to see if the standard had been met. There simply was insufficient
information presented, apart from the tainted material, to support the
warrant, he concluded. The court determined the evidence was inadmissi-
ble and reversed the conviction. Judge Van Cise dissented with conclusory
remarks indicating that the untainted information, in his view, was suffi-
cient. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In People v. Smith,4 it was the right of confrontation that was at issue
rather than the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
There, three individuals were investigated for the shooting of a victim
sometime after an argument. Two co-defendants gave statements to the
police and ultimately pleaded guilty to second degree murder and re-
ceived an agreed-upon sentence. Each refused to testify at the trial of the
third defendant, Smith. The trial court admitted portions of the co-de-
fendants' statements, excising those portions where their statements dis-
agreed with each other.
In the court of appeals opinion, Judge Ney, citing Lee v. Illinois,5
noted that under controlling United States Supreme Court standards, a
co-defendant's out-of-court statement is admissible if it bears sufficient in-
dicia of reliability to overcome a presumption of untrustworthiness. He
also noted, however, that in Lee the defendant had made a statement of his
own to which the co-defendant's statement could be compared. Here,
there was no such statement and no such "interlock." Moreover, here the
co-defendants' statements were obtained only after they were told another
defendant had implicated them, and in an attempt to curry favor with the
police. In addition, material differences in the co-defendants' statements
supported the presumption that a co-defendant's statement is not trust-
worthy. Under these circumstances, the court reversed the conviction.
Judge Ruland dissented, pointing to specific factors he thought showed
the reliability of the statements. The Colorado Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
In People v. Auld,6 the Court was faced with an extraordinary situation
where a zealous prosecutor had filed a fictitious criminal complaint
against an imaginary defendant in order to determine whether a defense
lawyer was engaging in drug activity. The lawyer was charged with illegal
weapons dealing, and upon a motion to suppress, the trial court dismissed
the charges, citing "outrageous governmental misconduct." The court un-
equivocally rejected the district attorney's contentions that the dismissal
violated the separation of powers doctrine, that there was no prejudice to
the defendant, and that dismissal was too severe a sanction. In the opin-
ion of the court, the prosecutor, by filing a false complaint, made the
4. 790 P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied 1990 Colo. LEXIS 291 (Colo. Apr.
23, 1990).
5. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
6. 815 P.2d 956 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 1991 Colo. App. LEXIS 12 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1163 (1992).
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court an unwitting accomplice for the prosecution. Once again, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
2. Other Governmental Activity
In People v. Buchol;,7 the court faced the difficult issue of whether the
government under the Care and Treatment Act may compel a person who
is expected to become gravely disabled without medication may be com-
pelled to take medication before actually reaching that condition. Noting
that the statutory definition controlled, Judge Ney pointed out that a
"gravely disabled" person is defined as one who is unable to take care of
basic needs or is irrational due to mental illness. He also noted that the
Colorado Supreme Court had held the Care and Treatment Act must be
liberally construed because of the curtailment of personal liberty involved.
Judge Ney's opinion, reversing the trial court, stated that the future possi-
bility of grave disability was insufficient to uphold the trial court's certifica-
tion. The opinion cited California authority to the same effect.
Colorado's Care and Treatment Act had been modelled on a California
statute.
In Denver Publishing Co. v. University of Colorado,8 the court was faced
with determining the reach of Colorado's Open Records Act. The Univer-
sity of Colorado (CU) had terminated the employment of Galen Drake as
Chancellor. The dispute was arbitrated and a settlement agreement was
reached. Denver Publishing (the Rocky Mountain News) sought all
records regarding Drake, all contracts with Drake, all policies regarding
leave for administrators, and all contracts with other chancellors. CU re-
fused to provide most of the information.
The trial court held that certain of the documents withheld had been
improperly classified as personnel file documents, and were, therefore,
subject to disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Drake's
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contractual documents must yield
to the "clear intent of the Open Records Act,"9 and that the public interest
is served by disclosure.
The university argues that disclosure, contrary to the expecta-
tion of parties, of the terms of the settlement of a controversy
may chill its future ability to resolve internal matters of dispute,
thus effectuating a substantial'injury to the public interest. While
such an effect is possible, the public's right to know how public
funds are expended is paramount considering the public policy
of the Open Records Act.'0
Christy v. Ibarra1 1 presented questions of statutory construction of fed-
eral statutes. Plaintiffs brought the action to compel the State's Home
7. 778 P.2d 300 (Colo. CL App. 1989)
8. 812 P.2d 682 (Colo. CL App. 1990)
9. Id. at 685.
10. Id.




Based Care System under Medicaid to provide benefits to them. There
was no dispute that plaintiff; were eligible in fact; however, they lived in
counties which had no agency to provide the individual needs assessment
required as a prerequisite to receiving care. The Department of Social
Services contended that it was "in effect" in compliance with the federal
Medicaid statute that requires that a state plan for medical assistance
"shall be in effect in all political subdivisions of the state," even though no
services are provided in certain parts of the state, because there are proce-
dures and requirements established for certification of management agen-
cies throughout the state. The state argued it had no further obligation.
The appeals court noted that the state could fill the gap services provi-
sion'when counties do not provide services. It also found that, under the
existing system, a recipient might lose services simply by moving from one
county a few miles to another county. "We conclude," the court held,
"that this results in a plan to provide medical assistance which is not 'in
effect' statewide," 12 contrary to federal regulations. Judge Ney noted that
remedial legislation such as the Social Security Act is to be liberally con-
strued. However, the court also held that only uniformity was required,
not an increase in the level of services afforded eligible recipients already
receiving services or those who would benefit from the court's ruling.
The court also reversed the trial court's dismissal of parallel claims under
other portions of the Medicaid statute.
3. Commercial Disputes
In Mineral Deposits Ltd. v. Zigan,13 the court was faced with defining
the reach of trade secrets and unjust enrichment law compared to the pro-
exploitation of knowledge and technology policies underlying patent law.
There, Mineral had developed a spiral concentrator, a device for recover-
ing gold particles from sand and gravel. It was patented in Australia.
Zigan contacted Mineral's sales representative and said he was interested
in purchasing up to 200 machines, and the representative agreed to lend
Zigan the machine for Zigan to test its efficiency. Zigan removed the pat-
ent label, and gave the machine to another person who took the machine
apart and then proceeded to make copies. Mineral demanded damages in
the amount of profits it would have made had it sold the number of ma-
chines defendants used or sold to others (170). Had the device been pat-
ented in the U.S., a patent infringement suit presumably would have been
brought.
Judge Ney ruled that a trade secret does not lose its character simply
because it is offered for public sale. Here, the device was lent for testing
for possible sale; not for duplication and possible re-sale. Thus, the court
affirmed the finding of liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.
The court applied the principles of the Restatement of Torts, sec. 757 to
this situation. The damages award also was affirmed. A finding of fraud as
12. Id. at 364.
13. 773 P.2d 606 (Cola. Ct. App. 1988).
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to defendants other than Zigan was reversed, due to the lack of misrepre-
sentations by them.
In Denver West Metro. Dis. v. Geudner,14 a metropolitan district had con-
demned a right of way over land owned by Geudner. The trial court deter-
mined that the condemnation action was brought in bad faith because
there was no public necessity for condemnation-rather the land was be-
ing sought to facilitate the sale of property owned by relatives of the con-
trolling district's board members. The court noted that the board
members' disclosure of an interest did not limit the court's review of the
"bad faith" character of the condemnation. The court also held that an
incidental public benefit does not control a finding that the essential pur-
pose is or is not a public benefit. The appeals court affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that the essential purpose was to assist another land-
owner in concluding a commercial transaction and thereby advance the
private interests of the District's officers. Based on substantial evidence
supporting that conclusion, the trial court's ruling was affirmed. 15
4. Family Law
In the case of In re the Marriage of Bookout,16 the court faced the diffi-
cult issue of determining whether in a divorce proceeding involving a pro-
fessional practice, maintenance based on the value of the practice may be
awarded in addition to the division of property based on the capitalization
of earnings involved. The husband in Bookout was a physical therapist who
had established a practice with ten employees. The wife had recently be-
come employed as an interior designer at a very modest salary. The trial
court ordered the husband to pay over to the wife substantial sums, based
on a marital estate over half of which was represented by the husband's
practice. Noting the wife's living needs were substantially greater than her
income and that payments from the husband's practice would be de-
ferred, the trial court also ordered the husband to pay maintenance and
child support to the wife. The husband argued this amounted to a double
recovery, and also attacked the trial court's findings of valuation of the
practice, based on the wife's expert's testimony.
Judge Ney first rejected the attack on the expert testimony for wife
and the trial court's reliance thereon. Then, he turned to the critical is-
sue. He noted that goodwill of a professional practice is an asset acquired
during the marriage. Maintenance and child support, in contrast, are
based upon a prospective difference between the two persons in earning
power. Goodwill supplements the earning power of a business or practice
and is not the earning capacity itself, he ruled. Judge Criswell specially
concurred, suggesting that a deduction must be applied to husband's in-
come for that maintenance attributable to the share of goodwill husband
had been required to transfer to the wife.
14. 786 P.2d 434 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
15. Id. at 437.
16. 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
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All of the foregoing decisions pay careful attention to the trial court
record and reasoning. They display a faithfulness to United States and
Colorado Supreme Court decisions as binding precedent. The decisions
also present a reasoned articulation of principles underlying a sound ap-
plication or distinction of those precedents. They display attentiveness to
the importance of each lawsuit to the individual or governmental entity
involved. None of these cases has been reviewed or reversed by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court. Peter Ney is a judge's judge, in whose hands the
most difficult cases may be put for fair and principled decision-making.

THE HONORABLE LEONARD P. PLANK,
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
LYNNE MooRE SIEGEL*
PERSONAL BACKGROUND
Judge Leonard P. Plank of the Colorado Court of Appeals was born
on the Fourth of July-a fitting birthday for this highly spirited man. At
the time of his birth in 1932, Plank's family lived in Gunnison, Colorado,
on the Western Slope. Several years later, they moved to Denver, where
Plank has lived most of his life.
Plank's father was an eminent Denver surgeon, while his mother
worked in their home raising five children and devoting extensive time to
community and church activities. Plank and his four siblings were a lively
bunch, but their feisty mother kept everything running smoothly. The
Judge's upbringing was typical of a traditional Irish-Catholic family of the
time. Church, hard work and ajoy of life influenced the young boy.
After attending Regis High School, Plank continued his education at
Regis College. Involved in politics on campus, he was student body presi-
dent during his senior year. In 1954, the Judge obtained his degree in
history. After college, Plank was drafted into the army.
While in the military service, Judge Plank married his high school
sweetheart, Patricia Ann Fallon. He and Pat have six children, Mary Pat,
Leonard, Marty, Kathleen, Paula and Nancy. The Judge is a devoted fam-
ily man whose six children were already born when he began his judicial
career. Once when Plank was asked "What is it like to have six children?,"
he responded with a laugh. "The only people in the world that would un-
derstand it are those that have five teenagers at once. Nothing more
needs to be said."
EARLY LEGAL YEAS
During his time in the army, the Judge seriously contemplated the
career he wished to pursue. He decided on law, in part owing to his inter-
est in history. Judge Plank thought the concept of precedent in the law
gave society the opportunity to govern itself today based on the lessons of
yesterday.
Plank attended night classes at the University of Denver College of
Law and worked during the day in the clerk's office in Denver District
Court to support his young family. In time, he became the substitute divi-
sion clerk and worked with each of the judges then sitting in Denver Dis-
* Colorado College (BA, 1979); University of Denver (J.D., 1983); private practice
(1983-89). The author was a clerk to judge Plank in Denver District Court and the Colorado
Court of Appeals.
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trict Court. This experience later influenced Plank's decision to become a
judge as well as how he would conduct himself in court.
Plank graduated from law school in December of 1960. He took the
bar exam the following February and as soon as the bar results were re-
leased, he became a Denver deputy district attorney. During his four years
with the District Attorney's office, Plank prosecuted criminal cases that ran
the gamut from murder to larceny. A judge that Plank appeared before
praised him as a well-prepared gentleman in court.
After only eighteen months at the District Attorney's office, Plank ex-
perienced his first major encounter with the press while prosecuting a test
case involving a new antipornography law. In preparation for trial, Plank
checked out the allegedly lewd movie from the police evidence room.
When the movie could not be produced at the time of the trial, the case
was dismissed. Fingers pointed at the young deputy district attorney with
the insinuation that he "lost" the evidence. After much ado in the newspa-
pers, a humiliated police chief issued a public apology to Plank when a
red-faced police custodian admitted he misfiled the film in the evidence
room. From this embarrassing experience, Plank learned an important
lesson that would serve him well in the years to come. He recognized that
one must be unfazed and unswayed by public clamor, a fear of criticism
and partisan interests.'
From August 1965 untilJune 1970, Plank practiced in the private sec-
tor, first as an associate at the firm now known as Zarlengo, Mott, Zarlengo
& Winbourn and later as a staff attorney for CF&I Steel Corporation. One
of Plank's superiors wrote that Plank possessed the legal ability, integrity
and judicial temperament required of an excellent judge.
THE JUDICARY
In the Spring of 1970, Plank was selected by then Mayor William Mc-
Nichols and sworn in as a Denver County Courtjudge. This appointment
was the first step in a successfuljudicial career that now exceeds twenty-two
years. Throughout his time on the bench, Plank has enjoyed immense
popularity with attorneys, jurists, witnesses, litigants and jurors and is
known for his knowledge of case law, excellent judicial demeanor, com-
passion and humor.
Plank heard an enormous variety of cases during his tenure in Denver
County Court. Among those were cases involving a motorcycle-riding dog
and seven parents who pled no contest to false imprisonment and conspir-
acy charges as the result of two young women being forced to meet with a
cult deprogrammer.
In 1974, then Governor Vanderhoof, noting that the Judge possessed
a distinguished judicial record, appointed Plank to the Denver District
Court bench to fill a vacancy created by the resignation of Judge Merle
Knous, a candidate for attorney general. Plank flourished in the fourteen
1. MODEL CODE OFJUmCiAL CoNvuar Canon 3.B(2) (1990).
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years he spent in Denver District Court, becoming well known for his emi-
nently fair handling of cases, including several highly sensitive trials. At
the district court level, Plank heard cases in all divisions: criminal, domes-
tic and civil. Over the course of several rotations through the divisions, he
acted as the chief presiding judge of the criminal division. In this role,
Plank answered many questions related to sentencing patterns and crime
in Denver. Known for both giving an alleged criminal "his day in court"
and giving tough sentences, Plank encouraged and supported the Denver
Anti-Crime Council's review of criminal sentences, believing that a coun-
cil of judges, public defenders, private lawyers, citizens and elected offi-
cials could most effectively study the complex issues involved in crime and
punishment.
Judge Plank believes all cases demand equal attention, but it would be
a loss not to mention a few of the cases Plank heard during his tenure in
one of the busiest courts in the state. In 1976, Plank presided over the
first death penalty hearing after the death penalty was reinstated in Colo-
rado in 1974.2 Toby Lee Romero was accused of the mutilation slaying of
a young mother of three children. An important evidentiary ruling made
by Plank was the admission of expert testimony by a serologist concerning
the statistical frequency of the victim's blood characteristics. In People v.
Romero,3 the Colordo Court of Appeals upheld Plank's ruling admitting
the expert's testimony, because as an evidentiary foundation, it is suffi-
cient to establish the fact that the expert witness based her testimony on
tables regularly relied on by professionals in her field and created by ex-
perts too numerous to call as witnesses. Plank sentenced Romero to life
imprisonment because the jury was not unanimous in deciding that death
was appropriate.
4
In 1977, ChiefJustice Edward Pringle of the Colorado Supreme Court
appointed Plank to hear the bombing-plot trial of Crusade for Justice ac-
tivist John Haro. This highly publicized trial occurred when Denver suf-
fered from the dubious distinction of being the nation's bombing capital
of the 1970s.5 The tense three-week Ham trial encompassed three threats
of mistrial, swarms of reporters and spectators and intense security. There
were bomb-sniffing police dogs, spectator and witness searches, shotgun-
carrying guards and 24-hour police protection for Plank's family.6 Plank
conducted the trial in a conscientious and imperturbable manner. Ulti-
mately, the jury acquitted Haro of all charges.
Four years later, Plank heard another highly emotional and publi-
cized case. James Lowe was accused of brutally murdering an eleven-year-
old girl. Plank heard the case after the original judge, Joseph Quinn, was
appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court. Because of Quinn's ruling
2. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986).
3. 593 P.2d 365 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
4. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(2) (d) (1986).
5. DALE TooLEY, I'D RATm BE iN DEER 149 (1985) [hereinafter Tooley].
6. Year in Reiew, DaivER Posr, December 28, 1977 at 4.
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suppressing certain physical evidence and statements made by Lowe,7 the
case was already controversial. The furor continued under Plank because
he prohibited the introduction of a picture of the deceased, taken about
one week before her death. Plank ruled that there was no probative value
in pictures of the girl before her death, but ruled admissible pictures and
a video movie of the deceased girl at the murder site. In another eviden-
tiary ruling in Lowe, Plank admitted a letter written by the defendant con-
taining an admission that Lowe killed the victim. The Colorado Supreme
Court upheld this ruling in People v. Lowe,8 a lengthy analysis of Colorado
Rule of Evidence 4019 regarding a trial judge's discretion in determining
the relevant and prejudicial effects of tendered evidence. Ultimately, the
court affirmed Lowe's conviction.
In Dale Tooley's autobiography, I'd Rather Be in Denver, Tooley took
the opportunity to commend people he considered to be "unsung heros"
who "contributed much to Denver and made it a decent place to live." 10
Plank was among those lauded. Tooley said of Plank and other good
judges in general, "Watching a good judge in action is like seeing a fine
symphony conductor perform. The best judges are relatively passive in
court and are able to move proceedings along with ease.. .Judge Leonard
Plank has a knack of handing down a stiff sentence in so nice a way that
the defendant is appreciative."" The case of Lauren Watson bore out
Tooley's assertions. 12 The ex-Black Panther member was convicted of
shooting an off-duty fire fighter, but acquiesced because he was satisfied
that Plank had been as fair as he could be under the circumstances.
Stating that Plank was a strong and respected leader of the bench,
Governor Roy Romer appointed Plank to serve on the Colorado Court of
Appeals in 1987 as one of three appointments at that time, increasing the
appellate court from ten to thirteen judges. By the time this profile is
published, Judge Plank will have been responsible for nearly 500 Colorado
Court of Appeals opinions. A brief article cannot completely analyze
either the philosophy or scope of Plank's Court of Appeals effort. It is
accurate to say, however, that the subject matter of the Judge's cases re-
flect many of the difficult issues of this time: drug testing, child abuse, the
relative rights of a defendant and victim.
Plank's opinion in People v. Walters'5 concerned such a balancing of
defendant's and victim's rights. This case involved a rape conviction
where the alleged victim was not present at the trial. The trial court al-
lowed the admission of hearsay testimony giving the alleged victim's ver-
sion of the events without establishing her unavailability. Applying Ohio v.
7. Judge Quinn's rulings were later afiirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Peapl
v. Lowe, 616 P.2d 118 (Colo. 1980).
8. 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1983).
9. CoLo. R. Evm. 401.
10. Howard Pankratz, Dale Toley's Memoirs, Dr svER PosT, Jan. 5, 1986 at 17.
11. Tooley, 111-12 (1985).
12. People v. Watson, 671 P.2d 973 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
13. 765 P.2d 616 (Colo. Ct App. 1988), ceyt denied, 821 P.2d 887 (Colo. CL App. 1991).
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Roberts,'4 the Judge held that the defendant's constitutional right to con-
frontation was violated, reasoning that when the prosecutors knew the al-
leged victim was missing for months prior to the trial, it was unreasonable
for the prosecutors not to subpoena the alleged victim once she was lo-
cated. Plank concluded that the State failed to demonstrate that the wit-
ness was unavailable and therefore the hearsay testimony was
inadmissible.
15
In a very different but difficult case, Plank affirmed a trial court's de-
cision that denied the priority of an attorney's lien over a prior recorded
third-party bank's deed of trust in Cottonwood Hil, Inc. v. Ansay.16 Plank's
opinion considered whether the attorney's lien priority as to third-parties
is based on when the legal work began or the date of notice given. The
Judge distinguished two prior decisions17 ruling that priority was deter-
mined based on the date work began and concluded that the statutory
intent was that an attorney's lien priority as to third-parties fixes when no-
tice of the lien is properly given.
Later in 1989, Plank wrote an opinion with an exhaustive analysis of
federal and state securities regulations, demonstrating the love Plank has
for the history of law.18 In this dispute, the seller of securities sued the
buyer for breach of an express oral contract to purchase the securities with
the buyer counterclaiming against the seller, alleging violations of securi-
ties law. The buyer also sued his accountant on a third-party claim for
fraudulent representations. The trial court directed a verdict against the
buyer on the counterclaims and third-party claim and entered judgment
under a jury verdict for seller. Plank reversed and remanded on- all but
one of the directed verdicts, carefully laying out the purposes of the vari-
ous sections of the securities regulations, guiding the reader through the
logic of his holdings. The same patience that was seen in Plank as a trial
judge is evident in this map through the securities law jungle.
In this same scholarly manner, Plank's opinion in Tucker v. Ebogen'9
expanded Colorado partnership law. Among other issues, Plank discussed
the five years it took the managing partner to wind up the partnership.
During this period, this partner did not give a final accounting, allowed oil
and gas leases to expire and did not take any steps to resolve a partnership
bank debt. Plank rejected the proffered justification for delay and con-
cluded that the partner responsible for winding up the partnership has an
affirmative duty to wind up the partnership affairs as expeditiously as
possible.
One quality so greatly appreciated in Plank is his willingness to find
humor in the law and his work. One day in a complicated corporate case,
the Judge leaned too far back in his chair, flipping both the Judge and
14. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
15. Wa/tm, 765 P.2d at 617.
16. 709 P.2d 62 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
17. Colins v. Thuringer, 21 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1933); Board of County Comm'rs v. Berkely Vil-
lage, 580 P.2d 1251 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
18. 791 P.2d 1139 (Colo. C. App. 1989).
19. 793 P.2d 592 (Colo. Ct App. 1989), cert denied, 1990 Colo. LEXIS 466 (Colo. 1990).
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chair onto the floor. After composing himself, Plank announced, "I may
have lost my dignity, but not my jurisdiction. You'll have to continue."
When the Judge was introduced at a public function as "the bestjudge on
the bench," Plank agreed, but only if the person making the introduction
meant the bench at the softball field.
The irony of this outgoing and funny man is his great modesty.
Although the Judge will talk about cases for hours, it is impossible to get
him to talk about himself. This profile had to be pieced together from
newspaper clippings, memorabilia, case law and interviews with others.
THE REST OF Hs Lu
The Judge's obvious love of young people extends beyond his own
family. He participated in Denver's Adopt-a-School and Save our Society,
where he had the opportunity to interact with students. On a regular ba-
sis, he has taught law at the high school and college levels. Many lawyers
graduating from the University of Denver College of Law also had one of
their first legal writing assignments critiqued by Plank.
Plank remains faithful to his commitment to the extended legal com-
munity. He served as president of the Colorado District Judges Associa-
tion and the State Council of Trial judges Association and has served on
the Civil Rules Committee for the past ten years. He actively participates
in the Colorado and Denver Bar Associations by holding offices and sitting
on a myriad of committees. He has been an active participant in the Den-
ver Anti-Crime Commission, Community Corrections Board and Samari-
tan Shelter. The Denver Bar Association honored Plank with its first-ever
Judicial Excellence Award and the Catholic Lawyers' Guild awarded Plank
the St. Thomas More Award for outstanding contributions to profession,
community and religion.
Not surprisingly, another judge once paid a painter to add the title of
"Mr. Wonderful" to the door of Plank's chambers while he sat as a Denver
District Court judge. He did it to tease Plank about Plank's consistently
high evaluations from lawyers in the Denver Bar Association poll. Plank
never saw the sign, however, because the presiding chiefjudge ordered it
removed. Although Judge Plank never saw the painted door, now he can
see the printed word-Your Honor, you truly are "Mr Wonderful." I thank
you for your dedication to your family, friends, the law and your
community.
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THE HONORABLE HARoL D. REED,*
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
PHIuP G. DuFroRD**
THE EARLY YEARS
Harold Reed was born on March 4, 1923, in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, one
of two identical twins so identical that even his mother could not tell them
apart. The heavier baby was named Harry and the lighter baby was named
Harold. To try and distinguish between the two, the parents put different
colored rings on the babies; these often becoming mixed up, the parents
went back to the distinction based on weight. At the age of one year, both
of children became ill and one twin died. It was believed then that the
deceased child was Harry, but there is no confirmation of that fact-and
so the question remains whether Judge Reed is Harold or Harry Reed.
At three, the Judge's father died from tuberculosis, contracted during
World War I. When his mother contracted the disease she moved to Den-
ver with her child to a home south of Washington Park. Judge Reed was
educated in the Denver Public Schools, attending Steele Elementary
School, Byers Junior High, and South High School, where he graduated
from in 1942. He then enrolled at the University of Denver but six
months later enlisted in the Army Air Force as a meteorology cadet and
was transferred to Hamilton College in upstate New York. At the pro-
gram's termination in 1944, Reed went from the rank of cadet to the rank
of private and transferred to the South Pacific, where he served in New
Guinea, the Admiralty Islands, Biak and the Islands of Leyte and Luzon in
the Philippines.
THE FAMILY
Judge Reed and his wife, Betty, were married in 1962. They have one
daughter, Holly, now 29 years old, who lives in Cozumel, Mexico, where
she and her fiance run a deep sea diving school and underwater photogra-
phy classes and also operate a camera shop. Judge Reed's hobbies
throughout his adult life have been hunting and fishing, although those
activities have been somewhat curtailed recently because of an injury to his
hip.
THE LAWYER
Reed returned to the University of Denver in the spring of 1946 and
graduated in 1948 with a Bachelor of Science in Law and a Bachelor of
* Judge Reed will retire in January 1994.
** University of Colorado (J.D., 1952). Judge, Colorado Court of Appeals, 1970-72.
Currently partner at Dufford & Brown, Denver, Colorado.
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Laws (the equivalent of today's Juris Doctor). The Carnegie Foundation
awarded Reed a graduate fellowship and he enrolled in a government
management program, for training either as an advisor/assistant to a state
governor or as a city manager. Upon completion of that program, Reed
received a Master's Degree in 1950.
While enrolled in his graduate fellowship, Reed began practicing law
and upon receipt of his Master's Degree, he opened his office as a sole
practitioner in Denver. His practice consisted primarily of personal injury
work and frequently worked as "of counsel" with other attorneys with ap-
pellate matters pending before both the Colorado Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court. During his practice, he handled the trials
or appeals of several significant cases, including the strict liability case of
Hiigel v. General Motors Corp.1 In Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,2 one of the
early decisions of the reactivated Colorado Court of Appeals, Judge Reed
was counsel for the plaintiff there and in the Colorado Supreme Court.
He was trial and appellate counsel in both City of Littleton v. Employers Fire
Insurance Co.3 and Miller v. First National Bank of Englewood.
4
TH JuRIsr
In 1976, then Governor Lamm appointed Reed to the district court
bench for the City and County of Denver, where he sat until his appoint-
ment to the Colorado Court of Appeals in 1988. After his appointment to
the district court bench, Judge Reed acted as a roving judge and handled
various cases out of different divisions of the district court. Soon after he
was appointed to that capacity, however, Judge Robert McLain died and
his docket was transferred to Judge Reed. At the time of his death, Judge
McLain was assigned to the civil division, and it was that litigation that
Judge Reed assumed. Reed served in the domestic relations division,
among other divisions. He still feels that the domestic relations court is
the most underrated of all the divisions in our court system and that it
should receive the best talent available. As he put it, "The cases that are
decided in those divisions affect many lives for a long time, and the effect
upon those lives is more significant than the money matters involved in
the other civil cases."
While on the district bench, Judge Reed received the nationally
known "Batey case." 5 In this case, a child was stolen by his mother in Cali-
fornia and brought to Colorado because the father, who had been given
temporary custody of the child, was a homosexual. Two years later, police
located and arrested the mother in Colorado, where she was charged with
kidnapping and the father filed several motions for custody. This case
came before Judge Reed, who ruled that Colorado had temporary and
1. 525 P.2d 1198 (Colo. Ct App. 1974) re-'d 544 P.2d 983, (Colo. 1975).
2. 474 P.2d 796 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970), adfl 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971).
3. 453 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1969).
4. 435 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1968).
5. See, e.g., Fugiqive Boy to Surrender, Wash. Post, Apr. 24, 1984, at A4; Son of Gay Dad
Turns Himsefln, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Apr. 24, 1984, National, at 6.
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emergency jurisdiction over the child. The custodies of both parents were
terminated and the child was returned to California. A California court
then determined the custody question.
6
Judge Reed also heard several other interesting cases as a trial judge.
In City and County of Denver v. District Court7 thejudge considered the so-
called "Christmas Eve massacre" of Denver firemen; Rathke v. MacFarlanad
denied a preliminary injunction for a dealer in precious metals who was
affected by the Precious Metal Dealers Statute.9 When the Eighth Avenue
viaduct needed to be rebuilt and the City of Denver ordered .various rail-
road companies to pay for the rebuilding, Judge, Reed f6und that the city
was acting without authority and prohibited the city from proceeding.10
In Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center," Judge Reed sustained terminable-
at-will employment. Judge Reed also analyzed whether a discharged em-
ployee could recover damages for mental anguish resulting from his dis-
charge.12 In a decision of great interest to the local ski industry, Judge
Reed rejected an extra-hazardous standard of care for ski operations.'
3
Another case decided the liability of tavern owners when one intoxicated
customer is injured in an automobile accident where another intoxicated
customer is the driver.
14
During the 1970s, three cases were filed in Judge Reed's court by my-
self and Greg Ruegsegger acting under appointment from the Colorado
General Assembly. These cases challenged the constitutionality of actions
taken by then Governor Richard Lamm in vetoing line items and foot-
notes in the legislative appropriation bill,15 his procedure of transferring
funds between different state departments in contravention of the appro-
priation bill' 6 and his supervision and use of federal block grants to the
state.17 All were highly complex constitutional cases, and numerous ex-
hibits and witnesses Were presented during the trial. It was during the trial
of these three cases that both Greg Ruegsegger and myself came to admire
and respect Judge Reed, not only for his outstanding rulings on eviden-
tiary and procedural questions, but also because of his wonderful judicial
temperament and the courtesy he extended to legal counsel and "wit-
nesses. I still feel that the trial of those cases in Judge Reed's court was
6. See People v. Batey, 228 Cal Rptr. 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 932
(1987). See also, e.g., Batey in California Awaiting Custody Decwion, UPI, May 2, 1984, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; Gay Father Wins Fiht For Custody, Aiz. Rxi'tmuc, June 30,
1986, at D8.
7. 582 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1978).
8. 648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982).
9. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-16-101 to -110 (1986).
10. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co.'v. Denver, 673 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1983).
11. 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. Apo. 1978).
12. Adams v. Frontier Airlines Fed. Credit Union, 691 P.2d 352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
13. Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 682 P.2d 64 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
14. Thomas v. Pete's Satire, Inc., 717 P.2d 509 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
15. Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985); House Bill No.
1284 (1982). Ch. 1, § 1, 1982 Colo. Sess. Laws 1.
16. Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985).
17. Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 738 P.2d 1156 (Colo..1987).
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one of the most wonderful and reassuring experiences of my career as a
lawyer.
In July 1988, Judge Reed was appointed by Governor Romer to the
Colorado Court of Appeals. Since that timeJudge Reed has either written
or participated in several significant and precedent-setting decisions.' 8
From a philosophical and jurisprudential standpoint, Judge Reed has
been and is a conservative. He feels that appellate law must be clear and
short enough to be read and that it must set forth a truly usable rule.
Judge Reed feels that if precedent exists, that precedent should be
adopted in any case, without a long discussion as to why the rule is right.
Where precedent exists, it is a waste of time and effort to reinvent the
wheel.
Judge Reed does miss the contact he once had with the practicing
bar. He sees progress in that the judges on the Colorado Court of Appeals
are developing ways in which they can have more contact with the practic-
ing bar and not show any bias or favoritism to any segment of that bar.
18. Harrison v. Smith, 821 P.2d 832 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (when does a claim become
groundless because of a lawyer's dereliction); McGee v. Hyatt Legal Sere., 813 P.2d 754
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (scope of lawyer's duty to his client and her child in dissolution of
marriage); Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez School Dist. RE-i, 809 P.2d 1010 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990) (lawfulness of strike by state employees and damages recoverable) affd in part and rev'd
in par4 Nos. 90SC562, 90SC568, 1992 WL 303274 (Colo. Oct. 26, 1992); Williams v. Farmers
Group, 781 P.2d 156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (whether personal injury protection is the exclu-
sive coverage and excludes claims of bad faith); In re Marriage of Vogt, 773 P.2d 631 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989) (use of "reserve jurisdiction method" for marital dissolution division of con-
tingent fees).
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THE HONORABLE DONALD P. SMITH, JR.,
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS*
JON J. WALKWrrZ**
Judge Donald P. Smith, Jr. was appointed to the Colorado Court of
Appeals in the fall of 1971 and sworn in January 1972. The contemporary
court of appeals is Colorado's third and was created by statute pursuant to
section 1 article VI of the state constitution in 1969.1 The state's first inter-
mediate appellate court was created in 1891 and consisted of three
judges; 2 it was abolished in 1905.3 The second court, established in 1911,
had a statutorily specified term of existence of only four years, and was
thus dissolved in 1915.4 The present court began, pursuant to its enabling
statute, on January 1, 1970, and was originally composed of six judges with
statewide jurisdiction over only civil appeals.5 Judge Smith's appointment
as Governor John A. Love's first merit appointee to an appellate court
from the district court bench followed the resignation of Judge Phil Duf-
ford and marked the beginning of twenty-one years of distinguished ser-
vice as a respected, energetic and vigorous appellate jurist.
Judge Smith brought to the appellate bench a wealth of experience.
His years in private trial practice included broad and diverse representa-
tion of clients in many areas of civil and criminal law and he developed
particular expertise in the areas of real estate, municipal law and the law
of eminent domain.
In 1964 Judge Smith was elected to the Arapahoe County District
Court bench (Eighteenth Judicial District), presiding over civil, criminal
and juvenile proceedings. Combining service as a trial and appellate
judge with service to the bench and bar, he served as Secretary and Vice
President of the Colorado DistrictJudges Association and as its legislative
chairman. He was also a founder and member of the Colorado Council of
Juvenile Court Judges. Convinced of the value of continuing legal educa-
tion, he was a faculty advisor at the National Judicial College located in
Reno, Nevada in 1969 and while an appellate judge, he served on the
faculty of that college from 1979 to 1982. He also lectured at the Univer-
sity of Denver and at various judicial conferences in other states.
* Judge Smith recently retired from the Colorado Court of Appeals.
** University of Colorado (B.A., 1971; J.D. 1978; MA 1980). Senior Staff Attorney,
Colorado Court of Appeals. The author was a law clerk to judge Smith in 1978-79.
1. 1969 CoLo. SFss. I.Aws 106 §§ 37-21-1 to -265.
2. 1891 CoLo. SEss. LAws § 2.
3. CoLO. CoNsT. art VI, § 8, as amended by 1903 CoLo. SEss. LAws 149.
4. CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 1439 - A (West 1911).
5. The court was increased to 10 judges in 1974, and to 16 effective July 1, 1988. The
court's jurisdiction has been expanded to include criminal cases, agency review and workers'
compensation claim review. Coro. Ray. STAT. §§ 13-4-102 to -103 (1987).
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During his service on the court of appeals, Judge Smith was named
chairman of the ColoradoJudicial Planning Council in 1979, a position he
held for five years. Under his leadership, the council recommended,
among other things, an in-state system for the training and education of
the judiciary and proposed the creation of ajudicial retention review and
recommendation system. Both of these ideas were ultimately adopted.
Further service to the judiciary included chairmanship of Colorado
Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Retirement and in 1987-88, chair-
manship of the Committee to Review and Redraft the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Judge Smith recognized early the value of technology and computer-
ization to the efficient administration of courts. He strongly and ardently
advocated computerization and served as the Chairman of the Colorado
Bar Association Committee on Law and Technology in 1977-78. He was
instrumental in initiating and directing the computerized printing of Col-
orado Supreme Court and Court of Appeals reports from 1975-1980 and
instituted a computerized legal research system for the Colorado judiciary.
He has lectured and consulted throughout the country on court-technol-
ogy matters.
Although consistently devoted to assisting and serving the profes-
sional needs of the bench and bar, Judge Smith firmly believes that in
order to win and maintain the public's respect for the legal system, judges
must not divorce or seclude themselves from the problems and concerns
of society. This conviction led him to assist in founding the "Inter-Faith
Task Force" dedicated to the performance of charitable good works in
Arapahoe County. Concerned with the needs of children and their wel-
fare,Judge Smith, together with other district courtjudges, was instrumen-
tal in creating the Arapahoe County Juvenile Evaluation Center and
Children in Need of Supervision ("Chins") home.
I. PROFFSSIONAL BACKGROUND AND PRIVATE PRACTICE
Judge Smith attended public schools in Denver and upon graduation
attended Colorado State University. He obtained his law degree from the
University of Denver College of Law in 1956. After graduation, he opened
a law firm in Englewood with classmates William Myrick andJohn Criswell
(now also ajudge on the Colorado Court of Appeals). The firm expanded
to include Joseph Branney and the firm's practice emphasized plaintiff's
personal injury claims, real estate and other civil matters. Judge Smith
acquired a notable mastery of municipal law and he was retained by the
cities of Sheridan as City Attorney and Englewood as an Assistant City
Attorney.
In the late 1950's, the state began constructing the Colorado portions
of Interstate Highways 25 and 70. At the request of Colorado Attorney
General Duke Dunbar, Judge Smith took a two-year leave from private
practice to conduct condemnation trials for the acquisition of the re-
quired highway rights of way throughout the state. After his return to the
firm, he was appointed a special assistant attorney general for the purpose
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of drafting a recodification of the State's motor vehicle laws for the
legislature.
II. THE DisTRIcr COURT
Judge Smith's election to the Arapahoe County District Court in 1964
brought him responsibility for a varied and extensive civil and criminal
docket. Hisjudicial demeanor and recogniz6d administrative ability led to
his selection in 1968 as PresidingJudge of the Eighteenth Judicial District.
Having earned a reputation as one who has a particular concern for juve-
nile matters and solidly committed to the community welfare, he was re-
tained in 1970 for another six year term by the vote of the people. He
continued as a district court judge until his appointment to the appellate
bench.
III. THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Donald P. Smith, Jr. was appointed as ajudge to the Colorado Court
of Appeals in 1971 by Governor John A. Love. He was retained in 1974,
1982 and 1990. He is, as of the date of this writing, afterJudge Charles D.
Pierce, the senior member of the court.
A. Significant Opinions
1. Real Property
Judge Smith's opinions in the field of real property reflect a firm
knowledge of English common law and history as well as a command of
how those sometimes seemingly arcane doctrines can be adapted to meet
the needs of modern life, all without sacrificing the value of precedent or
the import of long-accepted principles. His opinions recognize contem-
porary practice and problems but are written within the settled bounds of
Colorado and Anglo-American law.
In Brundage v. Peny,6 Judge Smith addressed the effect of the "rule
against perpetuities" as it related to a conditional option to repurchase
certain realty. The seller attempted to repurchase the property and the
buyer refused, arguing that the option was void as an impermissible re-
straint on alienation and additionally was violative of the rule against per-
petuities.7 In reversing the trial court's judgment declaring the option
void, Judge Smith noted that while options in gross to purchase realty are
subject to the operation of the rule against perpetuities and must conform
to the vesting requirements of that rule, exercise of the option at issue,
despite the fact that it inured to successors and assigns, was specifically
limited to a fixed six year period without reference to a measuring life in
being at the creation of the interest.8 The "rule" was thus inapplicable
since any interest created by the option must have vested, if at all, within a
6. 41 Colo. App. 526, 592 P.2d 6 (1978), afl'd 200 Colo. 229, 614 P.2d 362 (1980).
7. Id. at 528.
8. Id.
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six year term in gross. The analysis contained in this opinion continues to
provide guidance to the resolution of future "rule" cases.
In refusing to void the option on the grounds it impermissibly re-
strained alienation Judge Smith concluded that, in the commercial con-
text involved, the option was supported by sufficient consideration and,
consequently, did not operate as an impermissible contractual abdication
of the buyer's power to alienate the property.9
2. Conflict of Laws
Few areas of the law are so esoteric yet so frequently determinative of
a litigant's substantive rights and case procedure as the resolution of con-
flict of laws questions. In SabeU v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,10 the
plaintiff, a Colorado resident, was injured in a motor vehicle accident in
Iowa and brought suit in Colorado alleging negligence against the defend-
ant, a corporation authorized to do business and also resident in Colo-
rado." Judge Smith determined that the specific choice of tort law
principles of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws should be applied in
ascertaining whether Iowa or Colorado traffic regulations should apply in
determining the standard of care and whether Colorado's comparative
negligence statute 12 or Iowa's contributory negligence doctrine was appli-
cable. In evaluating and analyzing the "significant contacts" choice of law
rule in a multi-state tort controversy, Judge Smith concluded that the lex
loci of the jurisdiction where the injury and its causal conduct occurred
should determine the standard of care, but that the comparative negli-
gence law of Colorado should be applied to fix the liability between the
two Colorado residents.'" The analysis of the principles of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws and the insightful discussion of policy considera-
tions in Sabel remain fundamental to an understanding of this state's posi-
tion in this difficult area of practice and stands as an excellent precedent-
setting dissertation on the appropriate parameters to be employed in
resolving choice of law problems.
3. Evidence
In Coon v. Berger,14 an action for professional malpractice was brought
against an attorney. The first trial was reversed on appeal and remanded
for a new trial,15 which resulted in a deadlockedjury. Prior to a third trial,
the defendant attorney died and the administrator of the estate moved for
summary judgment relying upon the testimonial preclusion of the "Dead
Man's Statute."16
9. Id.
10. 36 Colo. App. 60, 536 P.2d 1160 (1975).
11. Id. at 63.
12. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973).
13. 36 Colo. App. 70-71, 536 P.2d 1166-67.
14. 41 Colo. App. 358, 588 P.2d 386 (1978), a.f'd 199 Colo. 133, 606 P.2d 68 (1980).
15. Coon v. Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973).
16. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-102 (1973).
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Judge Smith, in a tight, well reasoned opinion, concluded relative to
this issue of first impression, that equality of the parties was best served by
allowing either party to introduce the decedent's prior transcribed testi-
mony into evidence and then permitting plaintiffs to testify on their own
behalf, provided such testimony was limited to relevant and competent
matters raised by the decedent's recorded testimoriy.17 To do otherwise,
Judge Smith concluded, would thwart the purpose of the statute, which
seeks to prevent the living party from exercising unfair advantage over
decedent's estate by putting both on an equal footing. Refusing the dece-
dent's recorded testimony under the factual circumstances present would
not, Judge Smith reasoned, advance justice or the equality the statute in-
tended to promote.' 8
In its decision upon certiorari, the Colorado Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld this decision. In approving his reasoning, the supreme
court noted that a contrary result, as reasoned. by Judge Smith, "would
place justice in imbalance rather than balance."19
4. Criminal Law
The court of appeals in People v. McPherson2" ruled that an unloaded
rifle is not a deadly weapon and that a defendant's use of an unloaded
weapon could not sustain a conviction for felony menacing under the
criminal law.21 Judge Smith, in his dissenting opinion, reasoned that it is
immaterial whether the rifle was loaded or not, since the essential element
of the offense is complete when the defendant commits an act or com-
municates a threat using a weapon in implementing his intent to cause
fear in the victim.22 The dissenting opinion recognized that the culpable
conduct rested in the intended provocation of the victim's fear and was
not dependent upon the defendant's actual 'ability to consummate the
threat.23
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted this reasoning and reversed
the court of appeals decision. 24 Echoing Judge Smith's rationale, the
supreme court concluded that the specific intent of the defendant to
cause fear is the gravamen of the offense. A weapon, unloaded or not,
when used and accompanied by the intent to place another in fear of im-
minent serious bodily injury, is sufficient grounds for conviction.
25
CONCLUSION
Judge Smith has authored more than sixteen hundred opinions while
an appellatejudge. He has substantially contributed to Colorado jurispru-
17. Berger, 41 Colo. App. at 360-61, 598 P.2d at 388.
18. Id.
19. Berger v. Coon, 199 Colo. 133, 135, 588 P.2d 386, 387 (1980).
20. 43 Colo. App. 96, 601 P.2d 355 (1979), 'd, 200 Colo. 429, 619 P.2d 38 (1980).
21. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-3-206 (1973).
22. McPhersmon, 41 Colo. App. at 99-100, 601 P.2d at 357-58 (Smith, J. dissenting).
23. Id.
24. 200 Colo. 429, 619 P.2d 38 (1980).
25. Id.
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dence and has actively promoted the professional competence and caliber
of the bench and bar, while striving to maintain the public trust in the
administration ofjustice. Although Judge Smith has announced his inten-
tion to retire from the bench effective January 31, 1993, he will continue
to apply his reasoned judgment and administrative talent to the judicial
process as a senior appellate judge serving by assignment of the ChiefJus-
tice.2 6 The appellate court will continue to benefit from his years of expe-
rience as a lawyer, trial and appellate judge and from his unfailing
devotion to the highest and best principles of public service.
26. See CoLo. CoNsr. art. VI, § 5(3) and CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-51-1105 (1988).
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THtE HONORABLE DANIEL B, SPARR,
FEDERAL DisTRiCT COURT OF COLORADO
DIANA A. CAcHE
At my first American Inn of Courti (AIC) dinner, I metJudge Daniel
Sparr among the many judges and practicing attorneys2 who selected
"pupils" to learn about client advocacy and the promotion of professional-
ism within the legal community. These AIC dinners and pupilage meet-
ings increase legal skills and professionalism "by passing down from one
generation to another the best of American litigation ... by furnishing
role models, in our masters, of proper civility, ethical conduct, and skills
... by bringing together people who litigate against each other to break
bread and to discuss these issues with one another."3 The Honorable
Daniel B. Span, one of the more prominent "role models" and members
of the William E. Doyle Inn, acted as vice-president of the Inn for a second
consecutive year. Judge Sparr previously served as secretary in 1988 and as
treasurer in 1988, and is currently an emeritus member of the Doyle Inn.
Judge Daniel Span and other AIC judges, barristers and masters
teach in the traditional English way-by discussing trial techniques and
legal strategies over dinner. Judge Sparr sat at my dinner table the eve-
ning of my first AIC, so I asked him whether he received a letter regarding
a biographical article that would feature his career in the Denver University
Law Review. Judge Span merely nodded and replied "I think so" with no
apparent eagerness to be chronicled in The Review. As an AIC member,
Judge Span helped sponsor student participation in the Doyle Inn pro-
gram; as an officer, he gave much to us law students before we even met
him.4 To give something back, I now honor him in an article profiling his
notable legal career.
* Grinnell College (BA. 1980); University of Denver College of Law (J.D. 1993); cur-
rent law clerk to the Honorable Karen S. Metzger of the Colorado Court of Appeals and an
associate barrister for the William E. Doyle Inn of Court.
1. Established in 1985, the American Inns of Court Foundation is dedicated to the
promotion of "the ideals of excellence and professionalism, the exercise of civility and court-
room competence, the spirit of mutual cooperation and camaraderie, and the adherence to
legal ethics." AME-CAN INNs OF COURT FOUNDATION, THE FrvE YEAR PLAN (on file at the
American Inns of Court National Headquarters, 1725 Duke Street, Suite 630, Alexandria, Va.
22314).
2. Each AIC is comprised of a group ofjudges, lawyers, law professors and law students
who meet once a month to "break bread" and discuss matters relating to ethics, professional-
ism and lawyering skills.
3. Cohn, Sherman L., From the President, THE BENcm, Dec. 1992, at 2.
4. The educational benefit of AIC membership:
is measured in several ways. We hear anecdotes from judges who report on the
perceptible improvement in the practice of law before them: in the increased effi-
ciency, and hence, economy, as well as the increased level of civility, when Inn mem-
bers are involved in litigation. And we see the increased number of Inns, often
growing out of an already existing Inn.
DENVER UN-VERS!TY LAW REVIEW
Since I only metJudge Sparr last October, I began the task of acquir-
ing information regarding the judge's life and career by contacting his
colleagues, particularly the other members of the Doyle Inn. There was
no dearth of testimonials to Judge Sparr's character, ethics and profession-
alism-several attorneys and judges quickly volunteered to help chronicle
his estimable career. A picture ofJudge Sparr as a distinguished legal pro-
fessional soon formed.
Daniel B. Span, born in Denver on June 8,1931, lived most of his life
within the borders of our mountainous state. Being a native Coloradan,
it's no surprise thatJudge Sparr is an avid water and snow skier and enjoys
boating and fishing. As a law student and attorney, and more recently as a
state and federal judge, his career location allows him to enjoy his passion
for the outdoors. Of the twenty-seven years that he has served as a profes-
sional in the legal communityJudge Span spent all of these years living in
Colorado.
Educated exclusively at the University of Denver (DU), he received
his Bachelor's of Science degree in Business Administration in 1952. After
graduation, Judge Span served as a Captain in the United States Air Force
from 1952 until 1955. As an air force officer, he held assignments at Ed-
ward Air Force Base in California and Hill Air Force Base in Utah. He also
served in the Korean Zone of Operations in Kunson and Tagu6 City,
Korea.
In 1955, Judge Daniel Sparr began working as a staff technician and
service representative for Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Company in Denver. He stayed with Mountain States through March,
1963, eventually becoming the Traffic Chief for its Colorado Springs of-
fice. After many years, Span left Mountain States to become Sales Admin-
istration Vice-president for Brad Wolfe Construction Company of
Lakewood. This move was occasioned by his desire to return to Denver
and attend law school.
Eleven years after receiving his undergraduate degree, Span returned
to DU to study law, where he graduated from its College of Law in 1966.
Daniel Span excelled as a law student, finishing his final year on a part-
time fellowship.
Shortly after his graduation, Daniel Span began practicing law as an
associate for the law firm of White and Steele. There Span practiced in-
surance defense law for several years, then returned briefly to Mountain
States to work in the Office of General Counsel. Eventually he made part-
ner at White and Steele in 1971. Several years later, he decided to start his
own practice in Denver.
Judge Span practiced as an attorney-at-law in Colorado for over a dec-
ade-from 1966 until 1978. That year, twelve years after his law school
graduation, Governor Richard D. Lamm appointed him to the Colorado
District Court for the SecondJudicial District for a term beginning March
Id. The AIC environment is an educational experience for all participants who mutually
benefit from one another's backgrounds and insights.
[Vol. 71:1
DANIEL B. SPARR
1, 1977. Judge Sparr served for thirteen years as a trialjudge in Colorado.
In 1981, the United States Senator William Armstrong nominated Daniel
B. Sparr as a federal districtjudge. President George Bush thereafter ap-
pointed him to sit on the United States District Court in Colorado, where
he presides today.
In addition to his dynamic law practice, his involvement in the Doyle
Inn and his tenure on the Colorado and federal courts, Judge Sparr re-
mains active in several legal and civic organizations. Judge Sparr has
served on the Board of the American Board of Trial Advocates since 1987
and has acted as treasurer and vice-president. He also served on the advi-
sory boards of the Denver Paralegal Institute, Arapahoe Community Col-
lege, Metropolitan State College, Boy Scouts of America and the national
certification board of the National Legal Secretaries Association. Addi-
tionally, he has held positions on the faculty at both Arapahoe Community
and Metropolitan State Colleges.
Evidenced by his life and legal career, Judge Sparr most assuredly was
worthy of the role he assumed as a model of "proper civility, ethical con-
duct and skills" for the students and young attorneys of the Doyle Inn.5
We younger members of the Doyle Inn certainly hope to continue his tra-
dition of excellence and professionalism, 6 with his distinguished example
as our guide.
5. The first Denver AIC was named after the Honorable William E. Doyle, deceased
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Doyle Inn was the only AIC
in Denver until recently when members of the Doyle Inn helped form several more Inns
includidng one one honoring the late Alfred J. Arraj, Seniorjudge, United States District
Court, District of Colorado and another in honor of the late Thompson J. Marsh, Denver
University law professor.
6. Designed to improve the practice of law, the American Inns of Court concept
adopted the traditional British model of legal apprenticeship and modified it to fit the Amer-
ican legal system's specific needs. Cohn, Sherman L., From the Prsident, THE BENCHER, Dec.
1992, at 2. In the American versionjudges and attorneys act as Barristers and Master Bench-
ers to pupils in a mock apprenticeship program, which serves "[tihe central purpose of the
AIC concept.., to raise the standards of the legal profession." Id.
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THE HONORABLE ANTHONY F. VOLLACK,
COLORADO SUPREME COURT
MARK D. SuLivAN*
Since his admission to the Colorado bar in 1956, Justice Anthony F.
Vollack has shown an unwavering commitment to the State of Colorado
and its legal community. His hard work, dedication and fair approach to
the disposition of legal disputes made him a successful attorney, state sena-
tor and trial judge, and now make him an effective and distinguished
Supreme Court Justice.
Justice Vollack was born in Cheyenne, Wyoming. In 1944, his family
moved to Fort Collins, where he graduated from Fort Collins High School
in 1947 and Colorado State University in 1951. Before beginning law
school and his notable legal career, Justice Vollack served two years in the
United States Air Force during the Korean War. After his military service,
Justice Vollack entered the University of Colorado law school. At the end
of his first year, Justice Vollack, who worked his way through law school,
discovered he could not attend school in Boulder and earn a living at the
same time. In 1954, he transferred to the University of Denver law school.
At that time, the law school was located in downtown Denver on
Court Place across the street from Sullivan's Bar, a favorite student hang-
out. Justice Vollack remembers that the law school building was located
between two parking lots because every time a car backed into a wall in
one of the lots, plaster would fall off the walls and ceiling in the law school
building. This location allowed Justice Vollack to attend classes in the
morning and work in the afternoon and evenings. Like many of his class-
mates, Justice Vollack would leave the law school every day at noon and go
to work. He worked for a finance company in the afternoon, and in ex-
change for room and board, he worked as the admissions officer at Denver
Juvenile Hall every other evening. When not admitting juveniles, he could
be found reading his law books. In his "spare time," he was a process
server for two attorneys.
Justice Vollack graduated from the law school with a Bachelor of Laws
(equivalent to a Juris Doctor) in 1956. He began his legal practice as a
sole practitioner with an office in the old "Majestic" building and devel-
oped a general practice in both state and federal courts. In 1960, he
worked as a deputy district attorney, part-time while maintaining his own
private practice.
In 1957, United States Estes Kefauver, who had been the Democratic
vice-presidential candidate with Adlai Stevenson in the 1956 presidential
election, introduced Justice Vollack to his wife, Imojean. They were mar-
* Furman University (BA., 1983); University of Maryland (J.D., 1991); Associate,
Pryor, Carney &Johnson. The author was a law clerk to Justice Volack in 1991-92.
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tied in 1958. Justice Vollack and Imojean have since raised a daughter
and a son. Imojean Vollack is presently working as the Associate Director
for Management Services for the Department of Institutions.
Justice Vollack was a sole practitioner for the next twenty years. In
1963, he moved his practice to Golden, remaining there until his appoint-
ment to the judiciary. During his years of private practice, Justice Vollack
served on numerous bar association committees, including a term as presi-
dent of the First Judicial District Bar Association. In addition to his grow-
ing legal practice, Justice Vollack was elected to the Colorado State Senate
in 1964, where he served for eight years. He represented District Thirteen
in Jefferson County from 1964 to 1968 and District Sixteen in Jefferson
and Adams Counties from 1968 to 1972. With the knowledge gained as a
state senator, Justice Vollack returned to the University of Denver law
school as a part-time instructor from 1971 to 1974, a class in legislative
procedures and bill drafting.
During his service in the Senate, Justice Vollack participated in the
passage of many important pieces of legislation, chairing the Highway
Safety Interim Committee during the 1965-66 session. In this time, the
committee introduced and passed twenty-two highway safety bills. One bill
created the new offense of "driving while ability impaired."1 The new of-
fense resulted in better reporting of repeat offenders by establishing an
alcohol-related offense less serious than driving under the influence.
2
Due to the severity of the driving under the influence offense, many de-
fendants would plea bargain for a lesser offense, resulting in no record of
an alcohol-related problem. With the enactment of the driving while abil-
ity impaired offense, a defendant could still plea bargain for a lesser of-
fense, but future courts would be notified that the person had previous
alcohol-related problems. Several other states followed Colorado's lead
and adopted similar legislation. The committee also lowered the legal
presumption of being under the influence of alcohol, and enacted a
motorcyle helmet law which has since been repealed.
InJanuary 1977, then Governor Richard Lamm appointedJustice Vol-
lack as a DistrictJudge in the FirstJudicial District to fill a vacancy created
by the retirement ofJudge Roscoe Pyle. Justice Vollack heard many cases
as a district judge, from the highly publicized to the mundane. To Justice
Vollack no case was more important than any other. In every case he was
concerned that each person who brought a dispute before him received
his or her fair day in court.
The National Center for State Courts awarded Justice Vollack the Paul
C. Reardon Award in 1981, based on a paper he authored entitledJudicial
Control Management.3 The paper discussed a judicial docket management
1. S. Bill 32, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 356.
2. Driving under the influence results in the revocation of a person's driver's license.
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-122(1) (B), -(1) (g) (1984 & Supp. 1992); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-
122.1(1.5) (a) (I) (Supp. 1992). Prior to the driving while ability impaired offense, driving
under the influence was the only alcohol-related offense.
3. Anthony F. Vollack, Keeping Abreast of the FRood: How Judges Can Control Caseload, 5
STATE CT.J. 8 (1981).
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system which became known as the Vollack System. The Vollack System ad-
dressed the basic inequity that delay results in the denial of justice and
favors those who can afford to wait. The system offered an alternative so-
lution to the problem of judicial backlog, while ensuring fairness to all
parties.4 In 1978, the Vollack System was implemented in the FirstJudicial
District, Division Four. Within two years, the system dramatically reduced
the backlog of cases. In October 1980, Division Four's open cases were 7%
of cases assigned compared with an average of 43% in four other compara-
ble judicial divisions.
An example of the system's success is found in one state grand jury
indictment assigned to Justice Vollack in the district court. People v. Casey
was a highly publicized case which involved seventeen defendants who had
been part of an international drug operation. The case was assigned to
Justice Vollack on July 13, 1979. Justice Vollack established a predeter-
mined schedule accepted by all seventeen defense counsel. By November
29, 1979, all seventeen defendants had either entered into a plea bargain
or received their jury trials. Very few defendants appealed their convic-
tions, and none of the court's orders, including an order denying defend-
ants' request for suppression of wiretaps, were reversed on appeal. 5
In 1986, Justice Vollack's dedicated service to the judicial community
and the State of Colorado received the highest complement when then
Governor Lamm appointed him to fill a vacancy on the Colorado
Supreme Court created by the retirement ofJustice William D. Neighbors.
Since his appointment, Justice Vollack's opinions and dissents have re-
flected a common-sense approach to the law developed from the wealth of
experience he has obtained throughout his career. Shortly after his ap-
pointment, ChiefjusticeJoseph Quinn selected him to chair the Supreme
Court Delay Reduction Committee. This committee recommended man-
agement standards for the entire state judiciary. The final committee re-
port adopted many standards found injustice Vollack's "Judicial Control
Management" system.
Justice Vollack is a firm believer in the well-worn legal cliche that "jus-
tice delayed is justice denied." He has made it his duty, as both a private
attorney and a member of the judiciary, to ensure that all litigants in any
type of proceeding receive a timely and fair disposition of their dispute.
His work as a Supreme CourtJustice, a districtjudge and private attorney
reflect this commitment.
4. Id. The system incorporated a four phase program that mandated a strict policy
against continuances; transfer of control of a case from counsel to the court; a schedule for
the pretrial and trial procedures; and case categorization to improve the utilization of court
time by assisting the clerk in setting the appropriate court time for trials and motions. The
system also applied to criminal cases, but incorporated additional scheduling requirements
that are constitutionally and statutorily mandated in criminal cases.
5. See, e.g., Peacpke v. Cobus, 626 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1980).
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THE LITIGATION CRISIS: COMPETITVENESS AND
OTHER MEASURES. OF QUALMY OF LIFE
DAVID W. BARNES*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is alleged that there are too many lawyers,1 that there is too much
litigation,2 and that legal costs are too high.3 America, it is alleged, has
seventy percent of the world's lawyers.4 In a recent ten-year period, it is
alleged, product liability suits increased eight hundred and fifty percent 5
The legal system, it is alleged, costs $300 billion a year.6 Professor Ga-
lanter challenges some of these numbers, but I urge you to assume they
are true and to then ask: SO WHAT? IS THIS TOO MUCH OR TOO
LITTLE?
H. COMPETIrTrENEss
An alarm sounds in my brain when I am forced to deal with "too
much" questions like these. I need to know "too much compared to
what?" The topic for this discussion of overlawyering and competitiveness
provides one framework for discussing what is the optimal number of law-
yers or amount of litigation. Relating overlawyering to global competitive-
ness, as the organizers of this program did, suggests that laws, lawyers and
lawsuits interfere with America's ability to compete with other countries.
Being competitive apparently means keeping production costs down in
the United States in order to beat-out foreign goods in the international
marketplace. Charging lower prices expands the market share of domes-
tic corporations, increases employment, and makes us wealthier at the ex-
pense of others. This results in increased economic growth (in the United
States, at any rate), which sounds pretty good. If the only purpose of law-
yers is to contribute to competitiveness, then the optimal number of law-
yers must be the number that leads to the greatest increase in economic
growth.
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, A.B., 1972, Dartmouth Col-
lege; J.D., 1979, University of Pennsylvania Law School; MA, Ph.D., Economics, 1980, Vir-
ginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
1. Stephen P. Magee, How Many Lamyers Ruin an Economy, WALL ST.J., Sept. 24, 1992,
at A17.
2. Marc Galanter, Address at the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 1, 1992).
3. See Michaelj. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System - and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L REv. 1147, 1152-53 (1992).
4. Galanter, supra note 2.
5. Saks, supra note 3, at 1162-66 (discussing the basis for such a claim while not neces-
sarily agreeing with it).
6. Galanter, supra note 2.
DENVER UNIVERS!TY LAW RV!EW [
If competitiveness is our concern, we are fortunate that Professor Ste-
phen Magee from the University of Texas Business School has calculated
the optimal number of lawyers.7 The "Magee Curve" is a rainbow arching
from the point of no lawyers and relatively low economic growth up to a
peak of high economic growth and the optimal number of lawyers, and
ending down at the point of low economic growth and too many lawyers.
You may be fascinated to know that the optimal number of lawyers - the
peak of the rainbow - is twenty-three lawyers per thousand white collar
workers.8 We have thirty-eight lawyers per thousand in the United States, 9
a surplus of lawyers who apparently only interfere with the quality of life.
Shakespeare said, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."10 If
he had been an economist, he might have said, "Let's kill fifteen of every
thirty-eight lawyers." (Not iambic pentameter, but it might maximize
growth rates.)
III. OTHER PUPOSES FOR LAW4ERS
The "Magee Rainbow" seems to confirm the suspicion that there are
too many lawyers, but it also focuses our attention on why lawyers exist at
all. Is the purpose of lawyers to generate economic growth? If so, we can
cancel two-thirds of the law school curriculum. We'lljust teach contracts,
commercial law, and corporations. Naturally, we'll do away with tax, labor
and environmental law, torts, and a hundred other offerings.
But somehow I had the impression that clients hired lawyers to vindi-
cate their rights. I thought litigation was the means by which American
citizens kept the government from exceeding its constitutional authority.
I thought tort law was to deter wrongdoers," to furnish compensation 12
and to provide us with a civilized outlet for our anger at those who cause
injury.' 3 What happened to these purposes of the law? Another author,
complaining about the costs of litigation, raises the ultimate horror.
"[L]ife would be intolerable," he says, "if every man insisted on his legal
rights to the full."1 4 The Insurance Information Institute complains that
"the civil justice system is being used to right every imaginable wrong."
15
How rude that people in a civilized society should resort to the courtsl
They should be in the streets, throwing bombs, assassinating public offi-
cials, and blowing up police stations!
7. Magee, supra note 1, at A17.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. WLLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2.
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14 (4th ed. 1992).
12. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 5-6 (5th
ed. 1984).
13. Id. at 16; see also ROBERT L. RABrIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw 1 (1976).
14. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LTmGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UN-
LEASHED THE LAwsurr 223 (1991) (quoting Frederich Pollock, JusPRUDENCE, but not citing
any identifiable source), quoted in Randy M. Mastro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60
FoAmnHt, L. REVIEw 199, 200 n.18 (1992) (book review).
15. Saks, supra note 3, at 1157.
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IV. GROWTH VERSUS () QUALIY OF LIFE
When thinking about how much litigation is "too much," we should
think in terms of the broader goals of a legal system and a set of legal
doctrines. Proponents of rules facilitating recovery by torts plaintiffs, for
instance, particularly in the products liability area, come from both liberal
and conservative political perspectives. The liberals' main concern is fair-
ness in sharing the burden of accident costs16 and promoting safety.
17 Im-
posing liability on manufacturers addresses these concerns because
manufacturers can sometimes spread the costs to customers, and, where
they cannot, they can explore and implement safety measures. 18 The con-
servatives' main concern is maximizing society's wealth, which imposing
liability on the manufacturers would do, at least whenever manufacturers
can avoid the risks of a product at the lowest cost.19 Whatever their goals,
all would agree that making some manufacturers of defective products pay
for injuries caused by their products improves what they perceive as the
quality of life in America.
It is hard to escape the fact that quality of life has a variety of dimen-
sions. Tangible increases in wealth or Gross Domestic Product appeal to
conservatives concerned with efficient shifting of risks among those in-
volved in accidents. Intangible improvements in victims' ability to redress
wrongs and redistribute wealth appeal to liberals. But the national debate
over the litigation crisis and competitiveness ignores the fundamental pur-
poses of litigation, the fundamental goals underlying the purported ex-
pansion of legal doctrine, and the fundamental tradeoff between tangible
and intangible well-being. Even though compensation by defendants may
interfere with increases in economic growth, a rational society could still
desire compensation.
Many social goals may, in the short run, interfere with global competi-
tiveness, but that does not mean we should abandon those goals. The
large number of lawyers may very well decrease the rate of economic
16. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDuc. 3,
31-32 (1988).
17. SeeEscolav. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard
against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot .... Against such a risk there should
be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such
protection."). Id. at 440-41.
18. Id. at 441.
19. See, e.g., Guimo CALABRxsi, THE CosrS OF AccmuDNrs, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
sS 26 (1970). According to Calabresi:
Apart from the requirements of justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principle
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs
of avoiding accidents. (Such incidental benefits as providing a respectable liveli-
hood for a large number ofjudges, lawyers, and insurance agents are at best benefi-
cent side effects.)
Id. See also STEVEN SHAVEu., ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF AccmENrT LAw 298 (1987). Shavell states:
Whether liability can be so justified for a particular area of accident is a question
that will merit careful consideration in view of the opportunity to employ safety
regulation and other approaches for controlling risk, in view of the administrative
costs of the liability system, and especially in view of the difference between the
social and private interest in using the liability system ....
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growth, but the number of lawyers is partially a function of the increased
law school enrollments of women and minorities. Should the growth rate
in the legal community of those disempowered groups be curtailed in or-
der to reach some optimum and increase global competition? The opti-
mum must take into account such side-benefits associated with the
increased number of lawyers.
V. NUMBERS MAY NOT TELL ALL
It would not be surprising to find more lawyers per capita in the
United States if Americans truly had more legal rights, more protection
from public or private actors and a higher level of intangible well-being
than people in other countries. If it takes lawyers to create this well-being
and to protect those rights, then some countries may possess more lawyers
because they want to protect more rights - a consideration independent
of a country's desire for economic growth. In searching for standards for
how much lawyering is "too much," Professor Galanter looks to other
places and other times, comparing the number of lawyers in various coun-
tries and at other times in our country.
2 0
Why not look instead at the quality of rights in other countries and
see how that relates to litigation rates in those countries? In which coun-
tries would you guess people possess rights most like our own? Perhaps
those reflecting the British common law system, the "Anglo-American" sys-
tem ofjurisprudence. In which industrialized areas would you guess litiga-
tion rates are in the same range as our own? England, Australia, and
Canada. 2 ' The similarity cannot simply be cultural because European, Af-
rican, and Asian cultures enrich our country. It is because our structure of
legal rights is so fundamentally British.2 2 Perhaps having more rights does
require more lawyers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Priest treats tort law as if the only goal worth worrying about
is minimizing the costs associated with risks.23 Imposing strict liability for
injuries from products, for instance, shifts the risks to manufacturers, who
then have an incentive to avoid the risks or to insure against them. Be-
cause society wants to minimize costs and because people can insure them-
selves less expensively than manufacturers can insure them, Priest argues,
there is too much risk-shifting.24 But there is more to tort law than the
attempts to minimize costs by shifting risks. The desire to effectuate rights
and compensate victims coexists with the desire to shift costs onto those in
20. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Alegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 51-61
(1983).
21. 1d. at 52.
22. HARRY W. JoNEs ET A., LFGAL METHOD, CASEs AND TExT MATERLAlS 5 (1980).
23. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
LJ. 1521 (1987); George L. Priest, The New Legal Structure of Risk Contro, DAEDALus, Fall 1990,
at 207.
24. Priest, supra note 23, at 1524-25.
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the best position to minimize them. The goals of minimizing conflict, in-
ternalizing costs, compensating victims, and creating incentives for acci-
dent cost-minimization all figure into the optimallevel of lawyering and the
optimal legal doctrine.
If lawyers and the law serve goals other than economic growth, per-
haps we should be pleased we have more than the economically optimal
number indicated by Magee's Rainbow - the more lawyers, the more ser-
vice to society's noneconomic goals. The pot of gold is never at the top of
the rainbow, anyway. It is at the end. So as you listen to arguments about
whether there is "too much" lawyering and '!too many" rights, think about
whether there is more to law than promoting economic growth.

NEWS FROM NowHERE: THE DEBASED DEBATE
ON CIVIL JUSTICE*
MARc GALANTER**
Public discussion of our civil justice system resounds with a litany of
quarter-truths: America is the most litigious society in the course of all
human history; Americans sue at the drop of a hat; the courts are brim-
ming over with frivolous lawsuits; courts are a first rather than a last resort;
runaway juries make capricious awards to undeserving claimants; immense
punitive damage awards are routine; litigation is undermining our ability
to compete economically. Each of these is false, but in a complicated way;
so let me address this structure of myth, starting with some of the more
specific assertions and moving on to the sweeping generalities.
I. Too MANY LAwYERs?
The first example is the assertion that the United States is home to
seventy percent of the world's lawyers. Dropped casually by Vice President
Quayle in his August 1991 speech to the American Bar Association (ABA),
it was parroted by President Bush, Cabinet members, members of Con-
gress and media experts, and became a familiar factoid in the rhetoric of
the 1992 campaign.'
This is certainly an alarming figure. It suggests a monstrous deviation
from the rest of the world and insinuates that lawyers are a kind of cancer-
ous excrescence on American society. As someone who has studied law-
yers comparatively, I wondered how this percentage was determined.
Looking at the supporting Council on Competitiveness documents, I
* Copyright © 1993, Marc Galanter. The Martin P. Miller Centennial Lecture,
delivered at the University of Denver College of Law, October 2, 1992.
** Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, Director of the Institute
for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am grateful to Charles R Epp for
making available his work in progress, to J.T. Knight (University of Wisconsin Law School,
class of 1993) for able and dedicated research assistance, and to many colleagues who gener-
ously shared information and insights.
1. Vice President Dan Quayle, Address before the American Bar Association (transcript
available in Federal News Service, Aug. 13, 1991). In addition, Vice President Quayle's ac-
ceptance speech highlighted the 70 percent figure. Excerpts From Vice President uayle's Address,
N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 21, 1992, atA15. Meanwhile the Republican Platform inexplicably reverted
to the predecessor two thirds figure. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. Whether this
item will outlive the political era that spawned it remains to be seen. In a post-election round-
up for British readers, columnist George Will noted as one of "the nation's most pressing
problems... the suffocation of economic and social energies by regulations, and by litigation
from the 70 percent of the world's lawyers who are Americans." George F. Will, Clinton: If He
Succeeds, It Wldl BeDespite Himself TiH DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 12,1992, at 17. More
recently, television news host Barbara Walters solemnly reported that "70 percent of all the
lawyers in the entire world are in this country." Nightline, Aug. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, ABCNEW file.
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could find no sign of anything that could be called a calculation. 2 The
seventy percent figure seems to.be a retread of an item that surfaced a
decade ago, having no apparent terrestrial origin, that the United States
had two-thirds of the world's lawyers. 3 The two-thirds item was retailed by
ChiefJustice Burger as part of his indictment of litigious America.4 It was
subsequently used by Justice O'Connor and others,5 and became part of
the speeches of Governor Lamm of Colorado about America's descent to
doom.6 After the round-up to seventy percent in 1991,7 the two-thirds fig-
ure dropped out of use, apart from a reappearance in the Republican
Platform.8
Counting lawyers cross-nationally is a daunting undertaking, plagued
by poor data and a bushel of apples and oranges problems. 9 However
2. The President's Council on Competitiveness did not include the seventy-percent fig-
ure in its agenda [PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON CoMPETIvENEss, AGENDA FOR CIVILJUsTICE RE-
FORM IN AlmEUcA, (1991) (hereinafter AGENDA)], but apparently there had been some
consideration of it in the preparation of the Vice President's August 13 speech, for a week
earlier "a Quayle spokesman" was reported as having "noted that the United States has 70
percent of the world's lawyers, and that the rising tide of litigation 'is a burden on our econ-
omy.'" Saundra Terry, Quayle ABA Speaker, WASH. PoSr, Aug. 12, 1991, at F5.
3. Among the earliest sightings were a newsmagazine report that "[tihe U.S. has
610,000 lawyers, two thirds of the world's total.... About 70 percent are in private practice."
Special Section: the ABCs ofjustice, U.S. Nms AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 1, 1982, at 55. [Could
this be the origin of the seventy percent figure?] A few months earlier, James Spensley, a
lecturer at the University of Denver Law School, was quoted as saying "The United States has
become the world's most litigious society, employing over two thirds of the world's lawyers."
David F. Salisbury, Colorado's Quality of Lffe Fades in a Changing West CHmsrirA SC. MON.,July
30, 1982, at 4. When I contacted Mr. Spensley on the telephone in January, 1992, he could
not recall the source of this information.
4. ChiefJustice Warren E. Burger, Annual Message on the Administration of'Justice at
the Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, February 12, 1984, at 2. "It has been
reported that about two-thirds of all the lawyers in the world are in the United States and of
those, one-third have come into practice in the past five years." Id. A very similar item ap-
peared a few months earlier in a contribution to Legal Times by New York lawyer Peter
Megargee Brown: "Two-thirds of all lawyers in the world are in the United States. One-third
of the lawyers in this country have been in practice less than five years." Profession Endangered
by Rush to Business Ethic, LEA. TmrEs, Sep. 23, 1983, at 10.
5. Milly McLean, Sandra Day O'Connor. Some Advice for Young People, U.P.I., April 10,
1984. Cf Ernest Gellhorn, Too Much Law, Too Many Lauyers, Not EnoughJustie WALL ST. J.,
June 7, 1984, at 28 (a law school dean's op-ed reads "[t]wo-thirds of the world's lawyers now
practice in this country, and one-third of these were graduated during the past five years.").
6. E.g., John J. Sanko, Governor Addresses Businessmen, U.P.I., Nov. 3, 1983; Richard W.
Larsen, Time to Restore Logic to Public Policies, SEATrLE TrmEs, Oct. 14, 1990, at A18.
7. One failed bid for a yet higher portion was the attempt of a Reagan White House
staffer who proclaimed that "familiar" statistics showed that "[tihe United States has more
than 90 percent of the world's lawyers...." Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., The Young Must Lead In
Repair and Reform, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 18, 1986, at S-13.
8. The Vision Shared: Uniting Our Family, Our County, Our World: The Republican Platform
1992 75 (1992) [hereinafter Republican Platform]. A portent of renewed growth, combined
with a daring cosmological speculation, appeared in a letter to the editor "This country is
home to 75% of all the lawyers in the universe. There are more of them in one building in
Seattle than in all ofJapan." Mark Gorney, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 22, 1992, at A15.
9. The United States' "percentage of the world's lawyers" cannot be calculated mean-
ingfully because legal professions in various countries are not exact counterparts of one an-
other, but cousins more or less distant and bearing greater or lesser resemblance. See infra
note 10 (noting the difficulties of counting lawyers). Given these differences, there is no
single right answer to the "what percentage" question. Any answer must be based on some
explicit or tacit notion of who is to be counted. For example, one might adopt a formal
definition such as persons entitled to appear before the courts. But such a standard would
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these are resolved, it is clear that the seventy percent figure is very far from
the mark. An informed guess would be:something less than half of that.
Counting conservatively, American lawyers make up less than a third and
probably somewhere in the ,range of one-quarter of the world's lawyers,
using that term to refer to all those in jobs that American lawyers do (in-
cluding judges, prosecutors, government lawyers and in-house corporate
lawyers) .10
eliminate English solicitors as well as most of the various sorts of practitioners inJapan, much
of whose work is similar to the work of American lawyers. We could, instead, adopt a func-
tional definition. But those who are called lawyers perform many functions in some places
and few functions elsewhere. In the light of the purpose at hand, it seemed appropriate to
identify, as far as the sources permit, the counterparts of the broad, inclusive, multi-func-
tional category of lawyer in the United States.
10. Although there are certainly defiiencies and gaps in the sources, it is possible to
assemble enough data of reasonable credibility to establish that the United States had no
more than thirty-five percent of the world's "lawyers" (defined in the inclusive American
style) and possibly as low as twenty-five percent or a bit less if complete information were
available. This is a rough calculation based upon an eclectic, common sense strategy of esti-
mation, relying on a university library, on-line data services, and a network of acquaintances
familiar with legal professions in various countries., The results are presented in Appendix I.
Professor Ray August arrives at a much lower figure (9.4%) by extrapolating from
UNESCO figures on law student enrollments. The Mythical Kingdom of Lauyers, AB.A. J. 72
(Sept. 1992). But the portion of law students who graduate and the portion of graduates who
end up spending a lifetime providing legal services vary widely from country to country. To
ascertain the number of "law providers" would require detailed assessment of the linkages in
each country.
Professor August does not claim to have undertaken such an inquiry. Instead, he tells
us, he "'massaged' the [UNESCO] data statistically to determine how many 'law providers'...
there are in the world." The figures resulting from this process grossly overstate the "law
provider" population in many countries where we have reasonably reliable counts. In Ger-
many, for example, his figure is almost twice as high as David Clark's estimate, which is based
on a count of all lawyers in private practice, notaries, judges, government lawyers, corporate
lawyers, and law teachers. David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability ofJudges in West Ger-
many: Implementation of a Rechtsstaa4 61 S. CAL. L Ray. 1795, 1807-1808 (1988).
In many countries, the connection between law study and law practice is quite attenu-
ated. For example, Professor August credits India (with whose legal system I have some famil-
iarity) with the world's largest group of law providers, apparently over 800,000. This is more
than three times the number of enrolled advocates in India. Law colleges in India are plenti-
ful and large numbers of white collar workers and unemployed youths attend evenings or
part time in order to obtain an additional credential. Many do not graduate. Of those who
do, many do not enroll as advocates. Few engage in legal work for their employers. Of those
enrolled advocates, an unknown but significant portion are eventually occupied otherwise
than as providers of legal services. In other countries, too, the figures generated by Professor
August's assumptions simply strain credibility. It takes considerable conceptual perseverance
to conclude that Uruguay has more than six times as many law providers per capita as the
United States. In this as in other cases, the totals appear to reflect the educational structures
of particular countries more than their occupational structures. The rankings derived from
these totals are, of course, vitiated by the same problems.
I The myth that the United States has most of the world's lawyers is a baseless fiction
promoted by people who should know better, many of whom probably do. By contrast, Pro-
fessor August's estimate, arrived at systematically and conscientiously, does have a genuine
informational base. But unfortunately it is so deeply flawed that in the end his conclusion
that the United States has only nine percent of the world's lawyers, is no more worthy of
belief than the Vice President's seventy percent.
Notwithstanding their infirmities, the August figures were brandished by beleaguered
defenders of the civil justice system in the same credulous and uncritical way as the Quayle
seventy percent figure was used by those attacking it. "You all play fast and loose with the
facts. It's 9.8 percent." Bob Beckel, Crossfire (Cable News Network television broadcast, Aug.
27, 1992) (transcript #648). "In fact, the United Nations itself has a list of how many lawyers
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Is that too many?" It is roughly the United States's proportion of the
world's gross national product (GNP)12 and less than our percentage of
the world's expenditures on scientific research and development.'
3
America is a highly legalized society that relies on law and courts to do
many things that other industrial democracies do differently.14 For a long
time the United States has supported far higher numbers of lawyers per
capita than nations with comparable economies. There is no reason to
think American lawyers are less efficient than their counterparts else-
where, although it appears they are called upon to do more than lawyers
elsewhere. This is perhaps due to the dispersal of wealth, the fragmenta-
tion of authority, the absence of traditional elites or other reasons. In the
past generation the number of lawyers increased dramatically from
285,933 in 1960 to 655,191 in 1985-an increase of 129%. But this recent
growth is not a distinctly American phenomenon. The number of lawyers
has been increasing everywhere-in many places at a faster rate than in
the United States. For example, in the same period the number of lawyers
increased by 147% in England and by 253% in Canada,' 5 while the
number of private practitioners in Germany increased by 156%. 16
What is striking about the seventy percent figure is not that the esti-
are in each country. The United States falls behind on per capita lawyers-behind Japan,
behind Germany, behind France." Ralph Nader, News Conference with Coalition of Consumer
Groups, FED. NEws SERV., Sept. 2, 1992, at 4.
11. Even if we could count all the persons who go to work in the morning to provide
legal services, we would need to know more than the number of workers to ascertain the
portion of a nation's effort that is consumed in provision of legal services. And if we could
measure that, we would come up against profound differences in the ways that "legal service"
was defined in various countries and in the need or desire for law generated in different
societies.
12. The United States' GNP for 1985 was $4,215.7 billion, or 30.3% of the world's total
GNP for that year. WORLD TABLES 1992, 629.
13. The United States' expenditure on scientific research and development was $70 bil-
lion in 1980, or 56.9% of the $123.074 billion spent on scientific research and development
worldwide. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS, Fig. 0-1;
GEORGE THOMAS KURtAN, THE NEw BOOK OF WoRLn RANKINGS tbl. 299 (1984).
14. WERNER PFENNiS-TORF & DONALD G. GIrFORD, A COMPARATIVE SrUny OF LIABmrT
LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEmEs IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 129 (1991)
(hereinafter PFENNiGsTORF & GrORD) (less frequent resort to tort system in other industrial-
ized democracies is due to presence of public entitlement systems or to public and private
insurance; these "alternative compensation sources do much of the work that is accom-
plished under the tort system in the United States." On the scantier coverage and lesser
coordination of American social security schemes, see John M. Grana, Disability Allowancesfor
Long-Term Care in Western Europe and the United States, 36 INT'L SOC. SEC. REV. 207 (1983); P.R.
KAI M-CAuDLE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL PoucY AND SOCIAL SECURiy (1973). Cf ALFRED KAHN,
SOCIAL SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE thl. 2.2 (U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ. and Wel-
fare, 1976).
15. Marc Galanter, Law Abounding. Legalization Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. Riv.
1, 4 (1992) (detailing the figures and sources on England and Canada).
16. See Erhard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profes-
sion, in 2 LAwYEs IN Soc=T. THE Civi. LAw WORLD 124, 150 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C.
Lewis eds. 1988) (increase in number of advocates from 18,347 in 1960 to 46,927 in 1985).
The increase in lawyers is not confined to the wealthiest countries. For example, the
number of lawyers in China multiplied many times over in the 1980s; from 1986 to 1990 it
more than doubled from 22,147 to 47,461. Hao Pan, Lawyers and Law Firms in Contemporaty
China-Toward aFramewor* of Interpretation, 7 (May 28-31, 1992) (Paper presented at the 1992
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Philadelphia).
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mate was so overblown, but that those who peddled it had reason to know
it was a tall tale' 7 and that neither Vice-President Quayle nor anyone else
who thought it was a relevant fact deemed it important to make an in-
formed, rather than a wild, guess.
18
However, the United States' lawyer totals compare with those of
others, we do have more lawyers and many lament this condition. The
President's Council on Competitiveness deplored the "baleful effects" of
having too many lawyers. The principal intellectual foundation for the
view that lawyers hurt the economy is the work of University of Texas fi-
nance professor Stephen Magee. Magee has tried to show that the coun-
tries with the highest lawyer populations19 suffer from impaired economic
growth. Magee's conclusion is wrong. His first version was shown to be
false20 and his latest version is no stronger. The best research on the topic
reaches entirely different conclusions.
21
In Magee's first take on this issue, he claimed that all lawyers are eco-
nomically destructive. Apart from being silly on its face, that conclusion
resulted from an empirical analysis containing major methodological er-
rors. His analysis compared the lawyer populations and economic growth
rates of 34 countries, and concluded that the more lawyers a country has,
the lower is its rate of growth.2 2 That analysis is shot through with
problems. First, Magee relied on poor lawyer data-his lawyer figures for
several countries were substantially incorrect. Second, he employed a pe-
culiar research design that used lawyer data in 1983 to predict economic
growth from 1960 to 1985-even though his own figures showed that the
number of lawyers in 1983 bore little relation to the number in 1960.
Third, Magee's research did not take into account ("control for") any
17. The drafters of the Council's AGENDA had reason to know that seventy percent was a
falsehood. On page 1 of the AGENDA, there is an approving reference to, but no citation for,
"a recent report by a Professor of Finance at the University of Texas... estimated that the
average lawyer takes $1 million a year from the country's output of goods and services."
What the report referred to is Chapter 8 of Stephen P. Magee et al., BLACK HOLE TAurIS AND
ENDOGENOUS Poucy THEORY. POLrniCAL ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQummRM (1989). That
source contains an incomplete listing of the number of lawyers in some 34 countries as of
1983. Even this inadequate enumeration showed American lawyers as just forty-five percent
of the total. One can conclude that the Council staff either did not examine the source they
approvingly cite or that they were aware that there was good reason to believe the seventy
percent figure was spurious.
18. Just a few weeks before he repeated the seventy percent figure in his speech ac-
cepting the vice presidential nomination, Vice-President Quayle brushed off criticism of its
accuracy with the ad hominem observation "Only those who benefit from the squandering of
litigation resources are attempting to calculate to the decimal the total costs of all lawsuits or
to determine whether Japan's scriveners should be counted in a census of the world's law-
yers." Dan Quayle, Too Much Litigation: True Last Year, True Now, NAT'L L.J. 17 (Aug. 10,
1992).
19. In Magee's research, the lawyer population is measured as a ratio to either doctors
or white collar workers, which are both' taken to reflect the size of the productive work force
of a society.
20. Frank B. Cross, The Frst Thing WeDo, Let's KillAll the Economists: An Empirical Evalua-
tion of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70 TEx. L Ray. 645
(1992).
21. Charles R Epp, Do Lauyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAw & Soc. INQURY 585
(1992); Cross, supra note 20.
22. STEPHEN P. MAGE Er Ar, supra note 17.
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other known influences on economic growth, including such powerful in-
fluences as a country's level of political instability. Finally, the conclusion
resulted in large part from the coincidence of low economic growth rates
and high lawyer populations in two "outliers" (Argentina and Nepal),
whose legal systems and economies bear little relation to our own.
After critics pointed out those failings, Magee refurbished his re-
search, and now claims that only lawyers above a certain optimal number
hurt an economy.23 Stated that simply, the view has an intuitive plausibil-
ity: surely if all Americans were lawyers and did nothing else, our economy
would have problems. Magee's leap to the conclusion that there are, in
fact, too many lawyers in the United States is a different matter.
Like his first version, Magee's latest research is deeply flawed and
probably would not merit discussion were it not receiving so much public-
ity. In attempting to determine the economic effect of lawyers, he now
takes into account known influences on economic growth. But his conclu-
sions still depend primarily on 1983 lawyer data for predicting prior eco-
nomic growth, and they still rest on flawed lawyer data. For example, he
estimates that there are 43,100 lawyers in West Germany; but if we include
not only lawyers in private practice but also government lawyers, corporate
lawyers, judges and law teachers-all included in the United States lawyer
count-the total number of German lawyers in 1985 would have been
115,900.24 That produces a lawyer-to-white collar worker ratio of 29 per
thousand, not the 11 per thousand that Professor Magee asserts. Inaccura-
cies of that magnitude are not minor details. In his most recent response
to these criticisms, he declares that lawyer data corrected for such errors
still support his conclusion. 25 This is true, however, only if the lawyer data
are used to "predict" prior economic growth, an unjustifiable research
strategy. The same data contradict Magee's results when they are em-
ployed in analysis of subsequent economic growth.2 6 In addition, Magee's
latest conclusion, like his earlier one, rests on the coincidence of slow
growth and high lawyer populations in a few idiosyncratic countries, now
Uruguay and Chile.
As a corollary, Magee claims that lawyers have captured the United
States' political system, evidenced by the fact that forty-two percent of
United States Representatives and sixty-one percent of Senators are law-
23. According to Magee's calculations, the optimal number in 1983 was 23 lawyers per
1,000 white collar workers; the United States had about 38/1,000 in that year. Stephen
Magee, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1992, at A17.
24. Clark, supra note 10, at table 1.
25. Stephen P. Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRy 667 (1992). In that article, Magee also presents statistical results using lawyer data
for a number of countries from 1975. Epp shows that those results are very tenuous, depend-
ing on one outlier (the United States); if that outlier is removed from the sample of coun-
tries, Magee's discovered relationship between lawyers and growth disappears-yet one
country cannot justifiably be used as the basis for statistical conclusions. Epp also shows that
Magee's 1975 lawyer data are largely Magee's own creation, and are "no better than a guess."
See Epp, supra note 21.
26. Epp, supra note 21; Charles R. Epp, Toward Future Research on Lawyers and Fconomic
Growth, 17 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 695 (1992).
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yers. This hardly means, however, that the legal profession has captured
the political system: those lawyers in Congress are Democrats and Republi-
cans, liberals and conservatives, proponents of regulation and enemies of
regulation. As a bloc, they share no discernible interest; a range of stud-
ies finds no difference between the voting patterns of lawyer-legislators
and those of nonlawyer-legislators.
2 7
Careful analyses of the effect of lawyers on the economy find no sup-
port for the Magee hypothesis; indeed, they find that lawyers have no sig-
nificant effect at all on overall economic growth.28 The Magee analysis
rests on many of the familiar but unproven contentions about the civil
justice system. He assumes that the presence of "excess" lawyers is evi-
denced by the presence of "predatory" litigation, as distinguished from
justified or beneficial litigation. But he provides no evidence of the fre-
quency of bad litigation independent of the conclusion that there are too
many lawyers.
II. THE CoST OF THE L GAL SYSTEm
Another count in the indictment of the civil justice system is its exces-
sive cost. Vice-President Quayle reported that "the legal system... now
costs Americans an estimated $300 billion a year. ... "29 This figure seems
to derive from the Agenda for Civil Justice Reform of the President's Council
on Competitiveness, which starts its accounting of litigation costs by
stating:
A recent article in Forbes estimates that individuals, business and
governments spend more than $80 billion a year on direct litiga-
tion costs and higher insurance premiums and a total of up to
$300 billion indirectly, including the cost of efforts to avoid
liability3 0
Forbes didn't actually conduct any analysis of its own: the authors of a story
on plaintiffs' lawyers cited publicist Peter Huber who, they recounted:
focused attention on the total 'tort tax' on the economy. Huber
estimates that individuals, businesses and governments pay at
least $80 billion a year directly, in such ways as litigation costs and
higher insurance premiums, and a total of $300 billion indirectly,
counting the cost of efforts to avoid liability.3 '
27. See Epp, supra note 21. The explanations for why we have so many lawyer-legislators
in the United States have little to do with lawyers' ostensible interest in "capture;" rather,
lawyers enter politics to a greater degree in the U.S. than elsewhere because in this country
political involvement helps lawyers' careers and because the structure of our party system
does not exclude entrepreneurial politicians (like lawyers) as do party systems in many other
countries. See id. for a survey of the research on lawyers in legislatures.
28. Epp, supra note 21; Cross, supra note 20.
29. Remarks by Vice-President Quayle at the American Business Conference, Oct. 1,
1991, FED. NEws SERv. The same figure reappears in the Fact Sheet, Access to Justice Act, 1992,
Office of the Press Secretary (Feb. 4, 1992).
30. AGENDA, supra note 2, at 1.
31. Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Plaintiff Attorneys' Great Honey Rush, FoRBms,
OCt. 16, 1989. An earlier Forbes story had cited the eighty billion figure as including indirect
as well as direct costs. The president of the Defense Research Institute was reported as noting
that
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Huber proffered these figures in his 1988 book in the course of equating
tort liability with a
tax [that] directly costs American individuals, businesses, munici-
palities and other government bodies at least $80 billion a year, a
figure that equals the total profits of the country's top 200 corpo-
rations. But many of the tax's costs are indirect and un-
measurable.... The extent of these indirect costs can only be
guessed at. One study concluded that doctors spend $3.50 in ef-
forts to avoid additional charges for each $1 of direct tax they
pay. If similar multipliers operate in other areas, the tax's hidden
impact on the way we live and do business may amount to a three
hundred billion dollar annual levy on the American economy.
3 2
Huber's eighty billion figure is considerably higher than several systematic
estimates of tort costs published in the years preceding the appearance of
his book.3 3 (These in turn have been often misrepresented by partisans
experts estimate that the total costs associated with tort liability exceed $80 billion
annually. These costs include not only lawyers' fees, court costs and damage awards
but also the much greater amount of money that corporations and individuals in-
vest in efforts to avoid being dragged into court in the first place.
Ronald Bailey, Mr. Tort Reform, FoRsES, Dec. 12, 1988, at 276.
32. PE=ER W. HUBER, IrABurrJ. THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4
(1988).
33. For the most prominent of these, seeJAmS S. KAxAUK & NICHoLAS M. PACE, CosTs
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LmGATON (1986). The authors conclude that total ex-
penditures for all tort litigation terminated in 1985 was between $29 and $36 billion, includ-
ing "compensation paid to plaintiffs, legal fees and related expenses for both plaintiffs and
defendants, insurance company claims-processing costs for claims in suit, the value of liti-
gants' time spent, and the costs of operating the court system for these cases." Id. at vi-vii. It
should be noted that this estimate includes only claims in which suit was filed in a court of
general jurisdiction. The authors estimate compensation paid in tort claims in courts of
limited jurisdiction was $1.8 billion, not counting legal fees and expenses. They report that
"[c]ompensation paid on liability claims that did not involve lawsuits was an estimated $22
billion in 1985." Id. at 66.
Another study estimates the amount paid to claimants by the tort system (which would
include most of plaintiffs' costs, but not those of defendants or courts) in 1984 at $39 billion,
plus non-automobile self-insurance costs which were not calculated. Since it includes all pay-
ments, notjust those in lawsuits in courts of general jurisdiction, the addition of the missing
costs would bring this in the vicinity of the ICJ figures. Jeffrey O'Connell &James Guinivan,
An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance and Contraction of Loss
Insurance, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 759 (1988). This may have appeared too late to have come to
Huber's attention before the publication of his 1988 book. A year earlier, the senior author
of this study published a comparable estimate of tort system payouts of $31.3 billion for 1982.
Jeffrey O'Connell & Jay Barker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: An Update of the Conard-
Morgan Tabulations, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 913, 921 (1986).
A contemporaneous study by two New York University economists estimated that the
administrative costs of the tort system in 1984 were somewhere between $15 and $20 billion,
very close to Kakalik and Pace's estimate of $16 to $19 billion. ANnanw SCHOTTER &JANUsz
ORDOVER, THE COST OF THE TORT SysrEm (1986).
A study of tort costs by a leading actuarial consulting firm, commissioned by the Ameri-
can Insurance Association, estimated the costs of the system in 1984 as $66.5 billion. ROBERT
W. STURis, THE Cosr OF Tm U.S. TORT Svsim 22 (1985) (Updated and expanded versions
of this compilation were issued by Tillinghast with no author listed. See infra note 42.)
In response to critical assessment of his research practices, Huber has disavowed the
Malott quote as the source of the $80 billion figure, contending that when researching Liabil-
ityin 1987 he "had before [him]" two articles from the Wall StreetJournal one from the Econo-
mist; one from Forbes, all dated 1986, and the Scotter-Ordover study. Peter Huber, Huber
Responds, Letter to the Editor, TEXAS LAw., Feb. 8, 1993, at 2. One of these Wall StreetJournal
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eager to minimize the costs of the system.)3 4
Huber does not report any investigation or analysis of his own. In-
stead, he cites two sources. For the eighty billion direct cost figure he gives
a citation to Chief Executive magazine that turns out to be a round table
discussion among executives. In the course of that discussion, Robert Ma-
lott, chairman and CEO of FMC, and a prominent Republican fundraiser
and the Business Roundtable's "point man on product liability,"35 devoted
a single sentence to the magnitude of liability costs:
It's estimated that insurance liability costs industry about $80 bil-
lion a year, roughly the equivalent of the profitability of the top
200 corporations in the U.S. The number of liability lawsuits has
risen over 10 years by 600 percent.
3 6
articles (Stephen Wermiel, The Costs of Lawsuits, GrowingEver Larger, Disrupt the Economy, WALL
ST. J., May 16, 1986, p. 1, col. 6) and the Forbes article (just The Facts, Please, FORBES, Oct. 27,
1986, at 10) cite the Sturgis [Tillinghast] study's figure of $66.5 billion as the cost of liability
insurance in 1984. The other two (David B. Hilder, Insurers'Push to Limit CivilDamage Awards
Begins to Slow Down, WALL ST.J., August 1, 1986, p. 1, col. 6; The guilty parties in the great liability
insurance crisis, THE EcoNosssr, Mar. 22, 1986, at 23) refer to $70 billion as the previous
year's cost of resolving liability claims (possibly a very different number). Although these
numbers seem to derive from the Sturgis figure, there is no specification of a source or
indication of what is included.
Anti-litigation publicist Walter Olson, in defense of Huber, insists that "[t]he $80 billion
figure... came from the widely publicized Tillinghast/Towers Perrin studies" which he at-
tests "had been widely if not universally reported in the press .... " Walter Olson, Defending
Huber, Letter to the Editor, TEXAS LAw., Feb. 8, 1993, at 2. As indicated in note 42 infra,
there never was a Tillinghast $80 billion dollar figure.
Whatever was "before" Huber at the time, there is no indication in his book that he
examined any of the then extant sources: Kakalik and Pace, Sturgis [Tillinghast], O'Connell
and Barker, Schotter and Ordover. The last word is likely to remain Huber's observation that
"[a]ny half-competent student of tort liability in 1987 knew that liability insurance costs were
then running somewhere in the $80 billion range." Huber, supra, at 2. Huber's citation
practices are addressed at length in Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk
Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1637 (1993).
34. Typically this is done by presenting the Rand estimate for the cost of litigated cases
as the cost of the whole system. Tom Gibbins, Propositions Built on Myth, NAT'L L J. 17-18
(Oct. 7,1991);Jamie S. Gorelick, A Profession underAttack from Without and Within, WASH. LAW.
6 (Sep.-Oct., 1992); Mark Green, Bush and Quayle's 'Legal Reform:'A Hoax, NEWSDAY, OCt. 14,
1992, at 87.
35. Paul Merrion, Fresh Faces Animate GOPFund-Raising, CRArN's Cm. Bus., Aug. 15, 1988
(fund-raising); John S. Mclenahen, Whatever Happened to The Corporate Statesman? Irmus.
Wx., Nov. 6, 1989, at 55 ("point man").
36. How Do You Cope When Coverage is Unaffordable or Unavailable, CHIEF ExucutrvE (Sum-
mer 1986). No source or basis for this "estimate" is provided. From the context, it is unclear
whether Mr. Malott is presenting this as the cost of product liability or of the entire tort
system. The reference to a 600% increase of"liability lawsuits," echoing then-prevalent alarm
about the rising number of product liability cases filed in the federal courts, suggests that it
was product liability that he had in mind, not all tort cases.
Whatever its source, the figure must have come to Mr. Malott's attention not long before
the round table, for the published version of a talk delivered Oct. 10, 1985, at Northwestern
University Law School's Corporate Counsel Institute on "America's Liability Explosion: Can
We Afford the Cost?" contains no estimate of overall costs.
One possible source of Mr. Malott's figure is the estimate of tort system costs in an
address by Robert W. Sturgis of Tillinghast, Nelson and Warren, a leading actuarial consult-
ing firm, to the Annual Meeting of the American Insurance Association in Chicago (Nov. 14,
1985). Reporting the results of a study commissioned by the Association, Mr. Sturgis esti-
mated the costs of the tort system in 1984 at 66.5 billion. ROBERT W. STUaGS, THE COST OF
THE U.S. TORT SvswM 22 (1985). "Eighty billion" might represent a bit of rounding up for
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The eighty billion figure has enjoyed continuing use, often linked
with the nugget, which Huber tsakes from Malott, about the profits of the
two hundred largest corporations. It appears prominently in a long-run-
ning advertisement by the American International Group insurance com-
panies, entitled "Why reforming our liability system is essential if America
is to succeed in overseas markets."31 Some temporal elaboration is offered
by Susan Engeleiter, then Administrator of the Small Business Administra-
tion, in a 1990 op-ed piece that reports "[e]xperts estimate that the total
cost of product liability lawsuits between 1973 and 1988 was $80 billion
each year-a sum equal to the combined profits of the 200 largest corpo-
rations in the United States."38 In this branch of the eighty billion tradi-
tion, it is put forward as the cost of product liability, while Huber takes
that amount as the cost of the entire tort system.
For the move from eighty to three hundred billion, Huber multiplies
eighty billion by three and half - and rounds up. The three and half
multiplier is taken from an editorial in the Journal of the American Medical
Association that refers to a study of practice changes attributed to malprac-
tice by physicians surveyed in 1984.39 Thus Huber's "estimate" consists of
multiplying the undocumented surmise of Mr. Malott by the ratio of physi-
cian-reported changes to malpractice insurance premiums. There is no
discussion of the representativeness of this species of liability, of this seg-
ment of time, or of the suitability of this measure.40
Even though Malott (and following him, AIG and Engeleiter) appears
growth during the intervening year and a half. But it is dear that the Sturgis figure is for the
entire tort system, notjust product liability.
37. The earliest of these in my possession is from the N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 25, 1990 ... it
has been estimated that this hidden [liability] tax amounts to $80 billion a year-a sum equal
to the combined profits of the nation's 200 largest corporations.") The same text is found in
a version that appeared in THE NEW YoaRxa, Feb. 10, 1992, at 54-55. An earlier AIG advertise-
ment approvingly cites Huber's book, suggesting the possibility that the $80 billion figure
may have been borrowed from that source. The Liability Lotty: We All Lose, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 1989, at A12-A13.
38. Product Liability Laws: The Economy is the Victim, Says Small Business Administration's
Engeleiter, PR NsvswmE, Dateline: WashingtonJuly 24, 1990, in WASH. TrmEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at
F3; METALWORmNG NEws, Aug. 13, 1990, at 15. So far no reformer has seized the opportunity
offered by Ms. Engeleiter to escalate the costs of product liability alone over the trillion mark
(16 years x 80 billion = 1.28 trillion).
39. Jeffrey E. Harris, Defensive Medicine: It Costs, but Does it Work, 257JAMA 2801 (1987).
The editorial refers to a study that finds that physicians who reported an average increase of
$1300 to $8400 in the cost of their malpractice insurance also "reported changes in their
medical practices that were worth an additional $4600 per physician per year." From this
finding the authors of the study calculated that "each $1 of malpractice risk-as gauged by
insurance premiums-induces $3.50 in defensive medicine expenditures." Id.; see Roger A.
Reynolds et a4 The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257JAMA 2776 (1987).
40. For some of the implausible assumptions built into Huber's unexplained multiplier
move, see Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN.
L. Rzv. 539, 549-50 (1990). When the President of the American Bar Association cited the
Hager article, Huber berated him for relying "on an obscure 1990 law review piece that
extols the virtues of health care in Cuba, quotes Karl Marx with grave respect, and, oh yes,
heatedly attacks my book." Peter Huber, Dan Quayle, the Lawoyers and the AIDS Babies, FoRams,
Oct. 28, 1991, at 194. The relevance of Huber's response may be judged by noting that the
reference to the achievement of high life expectancies in Cuba takes up nine lines in a forty-
one page review. The respectful quotation of Marx consists of two lines containing the fa-
mous aphorism that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.
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to have addressed the costs of product liability, Huber adopted his figure as
an estimate of the direct cost of all tort litigation. When the estimate, if
that is the term, was adopted by the Forbes writers it was as the cost of all
torts. The Council on Competitiveness and Vice-President Quayle, who
purported to address the entire civil justice system, present these bor-
rowed figures as the cost of all civil litigation to the United States economy.
Finally the Republican Platform adopted "$300 billion a year" as the cost
of "our legal system."4 1 Proponents of these wider usages never indicate
whether they scaled down Huber's tort estimate (or Malott's product lia-
bility estimate) to make room for the costs of the far more numerous non-
tort cases and many non-litigation parts of the legal system or whether they
concluded that non-tort litigation and non-litigation is costless. Indeed,
the Vice-President and the White House compressed Huber's eighty bil-
lion of direct costs and three hundred billion of indirect costs for torts
alone into a total cost of three hundred billion for the whole legal
system.4 2
In the heat of the 1992 presidential campaign, a year after Vice-Presi-
dent Quayle's address to the ABA, a new cost figure was projected into the
national debate. In the midst of a discussion of "our crazy, out of control
legal system" that focussed on mounting and burdensome litigation, Presi-
dent Bush referred to a new study by the National Association of Manufac-
turers, reporting that "American consumers and companies will spend up
41. Republican Platform, supra note 8, at 76.
42. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Huber was proud to acknowledge paternity
of the Vice President's $80 billion dollar figure. A few months after Quayle's speech, he wrote
that the "spat" between Vice-President Quayle and ABA President D'Alemberte about tort
costs "apparently derives from a number noted briefly in my 1988 book Liability." Peter Hu-
ber, Dan Quayle, the Lawyers and the AIDS Babies, FoRBEs, Oct. 28, 1991, at 194. But a subse-
quent Forbes article, by one of the authors of the 1989 article that cited him, announced a
revised genealogy for its $80 billion figure that omits Huber. Now "[t] hat figure was based on
a study by Tillinghast, a Hartford-based actuarial consulting company." Leslie Spencer, The
Tort Tax, FoRBEs, Feb. 17, 1992, at 40. Spencer notes that this figure "represented lawyers'
fees, payouts to claimants and insurers' administrative costs in 1985." But the 1989 article
never referred to Tillinghast and specifically credited the figure to Huber, who makes no
mention of Tillinghast in the references to his book. An earlier Forbes story had noted the
Tillinghast estimate, which it gave as $68 billion, for 1984. Just, the Facts, Please FoRBEs, Oct.
27, 1986, at 10. The $80 billion figure, however, does not correspond closely to any annual
figure published by Tillinghast. See Sturgis, supra note 33, at 22. Tillinghast estimates for the
cost of the tort system are:




Tillighast, Tort Cost Trends: An International Perspective 1989, at A4. These were the most up-to-
date figures published by Tillinghast prior to the release in October, 1992 of its further up-
date, entitled Tort Cost Trends: An International Perspective 1992 [hereinafter Tillinghast 1992).
That publication revised and extended the earlier estimates as follows:
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to 200 billion dollars on legal services this year-200 billion dollars." This
figure was introduced as revealing "what this litigation explosion costs our
economy."
43
Two hundred billion as the cost of litigating lawyers would presuma-
bly escalate total direct costs far beyond the eighty billion or even the
three hundred billion that figured in earlier estimates. The Presidential
conflation of lawyer costs with litigation costs is understandable since the
NAM report is misleadingly entitled The Cost of Litigation44 The report is
based on Department of Commerce data on expenditures on lawyers' serv-
ices. Most of the direct cost of litigation is the cost of lawyers, but it does
not follow that most of the spending on lawyers is for litigation.4 5 No one
knows just what portion of these expenditures on legal services are con-
nected with litigation.4 6 It is surely less than all and probably far less than
most. In any event, the NAM document makes no attempt to distinguish
litigation costs from other legal costs. Even as an estimate of total legal
services costs for 1992, the NAM's $200 billion figure is deeply problem-
atic. Its largest component is a rather precarious projection from the De-
partment of Commerce's 1982 and 1987 figures;4 7 and those figures seem
to have been misread.
48
43. President George Bush, remarks at a Labor Day Picnic in Waukesha, Wisconsin
(Sept. 7, 1992) FED. NEws SERv. [hereinafter Labor Day].
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACruRERS, THE Cosr OF LITIGATION: A NEW PER-
SPECTIVE WrrH SELECT BMUOGRAPHY, (1992) [hereinafter NAM].
45. See the Civil Litigation Research Project's study of "ordinary" litigation, "[flees paid
to lawyers (including expenses charged) make up 99% of the out-of-pocket costs in the me-
dian case for individual clients, and 98% in the median case for organizations." DAVID M.
TRUBEK Er AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT FINAL REPORT Pt. A, 11-9.
46. Some legal costs are not included in these Department of Commerce figures such as
the cost of in-house counsel, some of whose expertise is attributable to litigation.
47. Based on Department of Commerce's Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the United
States, the NAM estimates that in 1992, consumers will spend $53.4 billion legal services and
that business will spend an additional $148.1 billion, for a grand total of $201.5 billion. See
NAM, supra note 44, at 8-12.
The estimate of business spending is a projection from 1982 and 1987 figures. It is based
on the assumption that business spending increased at the same rate in 1987-92 as in the
previous five year period. This is problematic, for consumer spending, which business spend-
ing closely tracked in the first period, increased at a much lower rate over the second period.
(We know this because the consumer expenditures are reported annually, while the business
expenditures are reported only at five year intervals.) For this reason, NAM provided a sec-
ond estimate of business expenditures of $110 billion, based on the known rate of increase of
consumer spending over the second period, which would reduce the total to $163.4 billion
for 1992.
48. Even NAM's revised estimate is suspect because it appears that in reading the tables
on expenditures for 1982 and (possibly) 1987, NAM inflated the total of business expendi-
tures by double-counting personal expenditures. NAM, supra note 44. In 1982 the Depart-
ment of Commerce's Table 3 (The Use Table for Commodities), which lists the value of
commodities and the industries that use them, reports the total value of commodity 73.0301
[legal services] as $39.421 billion. U.S. DMARTsmENr OF COMMERCE, THE 1982 BENCHMARK IN-
ptrr-Otrrptrr Accou-rs OF THE UNrr.D STATES tbl. 3, 180 (1991) [hereinafter BENCHMARK].
This total is then broken down, "using industry" by "using industry." Among the list of users is
91.0000 [personal consumption], which is listed as using legal services valued at $18.3706
billion. Id. at 181. This corresponds to the $18.4 billion reported by NAM as Personal Con-
sumption Spendingfor LegalSevicesin 1982. NAM, supra note 44, at tbl. 1. NAM reports business
expenditures on legal services for 1982 of $38.3 billion, although according to the Bench-
mark table, the total value of legal services in that year was $39.4 billion. See id., at 12. Appar-
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Quite apart from their origin in conjecture and the vacillation about
just what is being measured, most "cost of litigation" figures have two
deeper and more significant flaws. First, they conflate costs and transfers.
A significant portion of the wealth that flows through the litigation system
is compensation delivered to creditors and wronged parties to which they
are entitled under the going rules.49 This half (or more) of the supposed
cost is a cost to defendants, but it is not a cost of the system or a cost to the
country, for the wealth is not lost but only transferred to different hands.
That it costs so much to effectuate these rightful transfers is a scandal-
but controlling these transaction costs should not be confounded with re-
ducing the rights of claimants. Second, they talk about costs in isolation
from benefits.50 Our accounts should reflect not only the costs but the
benefits of enforcing such transfers, which afford vindication, induce in-
vestments in safety, and deter undesirable behavior. For instance, the
sums transferred by successful patent infringement litigation are not only
not lost, but maintain the credibility of the patent system which in turn
creates powerful incentives. To put forward estimates of gross costs-even
ones that are not make-believe-as a guide to policy displays indifference
to the vital functions that the law performs. America's institutions of rem-
edy and accountability and the lawyers that staff them are portrayed as
burdensome afflictions. They are viewed as costs and thus as deadweight
losses.
In connection with this second point, it should be noted that the costs
ently in arriving at its estimate of business expenditures, NAM omitted to remove personal
consumption expenditures from the total, thus greatly overestimating business expenditures
in that year.
Once this is corrected, the otherwise anomalous NAM totals accord roughly with pub-
lished Census data on the receipts of the legal services industry, which listed total receipts in
1982 of $34.325 billion, of which $15.270 billion was received from individuals and $16.699
billion was received from businesses. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU oF THE CEN-
sOs, CENsus OF SERVICE INDUnSmrs: LEcAL SER ICES, 1982 Table 30.
I am not in a position to perform a similar analysis of the 1987 data since these are not
yet published. NAM reports that it relied upon preliminary estimates obtained from the
Commerce Department. See NAM, supra note 44, at 11-12.
If we reduce the totals to eliminate the double-counting, business expenditure on legal
services in 1992 would be some $62 billion rather than the $110 billion projected by the
NAM (on the assumption that growth tracked the growth of consumer expenditures) and the
total expenditure on legal services would be $115 billion instead of $163 billion.
49. The Institute for Civil Justice estimated that the net compensation to plaintiffs in
tort cases in 1985 was roughly half of the dollars spent on tort litigation. But the portion
received by plaintiffs varied with the type of litigation: it was fifty-two percent in automobile
torts, forty-three percent in non-automobile torts, and only thirty-seven percent in asbestos
cases. DEBORAH R. HENs=rm Er Ai., TRFDs iN TORT LrGATION: THE STORY BEHiND THE STA-
TIsTcS 29 (1987). I know of no data about the ratio of recoveries to total expenditures in
non-tort litigation.
50. Thus, Huber labels the gross cost of the tort system a "tax" and implies that it is a
deadweight loss. In contrast, both the Harris editorial and the original Reynolds study (the
sources of his indirect cost estimate) acknowledge that there are medical benefits or deter-
rence effects of these additional expenditures that remain unmeasured. Similarly, Robert
Sturgis, the source of the Tillinghast estimates of tort costs, reminds his audience that "we
have settled upon a definition of gross cost without regard for the social and economic bene-
fits that may be derived from the system." Robert W. Sturgis, Address before the American
Insurance Association (Nov. 14, 1985).
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attributable to present institutional arrangements are made to loom men-
acingly large by ignoring the costs of alternative arrangements for ob-
taining equivalent benefits. For example, if we were to forego the tort
system's contribution to accident prevention, presumably people and busi-
nesses would make other expenditures to prevent and minimize injury.
The savings from completely abolishing the tort system would not be all
the billions that flow through it-nor even all the billions spent on it, but
only that increment beyond what would be spent on the alternative means
of protection. So a genuine assessment of the legal system would have to
consider not only its costs, but the benefits it produces and the cost of
producing such benefits by alternative means.51
Sadly, the discourse about the cost of litigation is as flawed as the
discourse about the abundance of lawyers. Each is marked by an utterly
cavalier treatment of facts, a use of sources that would shame any first year
law student, and an absence of any serious attempt to make a disciplined
assessment of what is going on in the world.
III. THE COMPETrVENESS CHARGE
Many nasty effects have been attributed to lawyers and litigation. Ear-
lier critiques of the civil justice system focussed on the erosion of commu-
nity, the decline of self-reliance, the atrophy of informal self-regulatory
mechanisms, and the fostering of a corrosive adversary culture.5 2 In the
latest round, these have been eclipsed by concern that the civil justice sys-
tem is undermining the country's economic performance. The Vice-Presi-
dent's engagement with civil justice emerged from his leadership of the
President's Council on Competitiveness. Although that Council's Agenda
and its polemical progeny spoke of litigation in broad terms, it is product
liability litigation that is the essence and model of the problem. As Presi-
dent Bush recently put it, "[o]ur product liability system is killing our eco-
nomic competitiveness .... 53 Escalating product liability litigation is
blamed for undermining competitiveness by raising costs, diverting invest-
ment, and discouraging innovation. That product liability litigation is in-
creasing inexorably, driven by the greed of entrepreneurial lawyers, the
wrongheadedness of activistjudges, and the rising litigiousness of ordinary
Americans is a key count in the indictment of America's civil justice
system.
Figure One displays the number of personal injury product liability
filings each year from 1985 to 1991 (the last year for which published in-
formation is available.) 54 The total is broken down into asbestos cases and
51. Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theoy, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990) (comparative institutional analysis); cf. Peter L. Kahn, Pricing the U.S.
Legal System, CnusrtA ScI. MoN., Sept. 11, 1992, at 19.
52. For a catalog of these charges, see Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Diputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 U.C.LA. L. REv. 4 (1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
53. See Labor Day, supra note 43.
54. All years referred to are Statistical years used by the Administrative Office of the
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all other product liability cases. Figure One presents a massive surge in
asbestos filings accounting for all of the increase in filings in the product
liability category. Indeed, if we look at the remainder, which includes
cases involving every other product save this one, we find that the total of
non-asbestos products liability filings has shrunk from 8268 in 1985 to
5263 in 1991-a decrease of thirty-six percent.
Is it legitimate to "put aside" asbestos cases? Asbestos litigation is a
painful problem that displays much of the worst about our system of litiga-
tion-high costs, repetitive litigation, severe delays, and inconsistent
awards. Asbestos litigation presents a problem of assuring justice to vic-
tims (and to their injurers). It also presents a problem of congestion in
many courts. But each of these-the justice problem and the congestion
problem-is quite distinct from the supposed problem of excessive prod-
uct liability litigation debilitating the American economy.
Asbestos cases are a distinctive population of cases. For the most part,
these cases deal with events that happened decades ago. They are typically
complicated by the presence of multiple defendants-about twenty in the
typical case. They arose from the use of a product of unparalleled deadli-
ness, to which there was massive exposure that continued long after the
dangers of its use were suspected. As a report from the Federal Judicial
Center put it:
During a period of increasing use, asbestos manufacturers sup-
pressed knowledge about the dangers of exposure to asbestos fi-
bers. The result was a further accumulation of potential cases
and a factual foundation for punitive damages. A by-product of
suppression of unfavorable information was that companies
failed to improve safety standards and communicate warnings
that might have mitigated the dangers ....- 55
The report concludes that the convergence of these factors made asbestos
litigation unique with "no historic analogues and no projected recurrence
of similar phenomena."56 Eventually, there will be no more asbestos cases,
as the pool of victims is depleted. This is due first to the deadly effects of
asbestos, and secondly to the powerful preventive effects produced by the
asbestos litigation. No one can say that we cannot have another such epi-
demic about another product. But if we did it too would be distinct from
the pattern of ordinary product liability litigation. It would have no effect
on the fortunes of the companies that make the tens of thousands of other
products.
If we turn to those other companies, it would appear that they have
experienced a significant decrease in their exposure to product liability
cases. 57 It is possible, of course, that product liability claims increased
Courts, ending on June 30th of the named year. The choice of 1985 is dictated by the fact
that it was the first full year in which asbestos cases were counted separately from other
product liability cases.
55. THOMAS E. Wiu.crNc, FEDERA.JunIciAL CENTER, TRa ms IN AsBsros LrrrAMroN xi
(1987).
56. Id. at xii.
57. Of course, such exposure is not spread evenly across all companies. Product liability
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even while case filings decreased-because more claims are paid without
the filing of a lawsuit or because larger numbers of claims are combined
into single filings. But those who point to the burden of product liability
law have provided no evidence that either of these eventualities has oc-
curred.58 It might be objected that our figures are only for filing in fed-
eral courts. It is well known that the vast majority of civil cases are brought
in state courts. The federal court data is not necessarily representative of
trends in the state courts, where the great bulk of cases are brought.
No one knows the total amount of product liability litigation in the
state courts. Only a handful of states count these cases separately on a
regular basis. There is some scattered evidence, however, from which we
can derive a rough sense of the presence of product liability claims in the
state courts. We do know that product liability is much less prominent in
state court dockets than in the federal courts. Several studies suggest that
cases are highly concentrated in a small number of industries. An Institute of Civil Justice
study identified the first named defendant in all of the product cases filed in federal court
from 1974 to 1986. Eighty companies were the defendants in half of those cases: the defend-
ants in the other half were some nineteen thousand companies. T. DuNWORTH, PRODUCr
LimLrr AmD THE BusINFss SECTOR: LinGATioN TRENDs uN FEDERAL COURT 25 (1988).
Dunworth notes that similar concentration is present in non-asbestos suits as well as asbestos.
Id. at 26. Within industries, there was a significant degree of concentration in the motor
vehicle and pharmaceutical/health product industries but considerable dispersion in other
industries. Id. at 28.
58. As an insurance industry study indicates, most sizable claims of the type that make
up federal court cases are pursued through the filing of a lawsuit. In a study of claims in
excess of $100,000 closed in 1985, only four percent of the claimants had not filed a lawsuit.
L. SouLAR, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUC LIABmtr CLAiMs CLosED uN 1985 (1986).
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product liability cases make up only two or three percent of the tort cases
in state courts. For example, a National Center for State Courts study
found that in one month in 1988 product liability made up 2.1% of tort
filings in twenty-four large urban trial courts.59 That year product liability
cases were thirty-six percent of tort filings in the federal courts.
60
We can infer that a sizable portion of product liability litigation takes
place in the federal courts. The prominence of federal courts in the world
of product liability is shown by a General Accounting Office study that
examined product liability litigation for the years 1983 through 1985 in
five states. It found that forty-six percent of the cases tried to verdict were
tried in the federal courts.6 1 It appears that federal courts are the site of
one third or more of all product liability litigation.62 Since the federal
cases on the whole involve higher stakes, it is probable that most of the
money that is awarded in product liability cases is awarded in the federal
courts.
It is possible that while federal filings have been going down, state
filings have increased. Again, the available information is extremely
sketchy. The best account of the relation between federal and state filing
rates was an earlier study by the General Accounting Office, comparing
data on two products and on two states, concluding that "state court filings
matched federal court filings in the direction of change" and that there
was "a trend toward filing in federal court[s]. 63 I know of no reason to
believe that these observations are atypical or that this pattern has
59. David Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial Court Informa-
tion Network, 14 STATE CT.J. 4, 8 (1990). In 1986, product liability cases were 2.3% of the tort
filings in the Florida courts. Donald G. Gifford, Litigation Trends in Rorida: Saga of a Growth
State, 39 U. FLAL. Ra,. 829, 849 (1987). That year product liability cases made up 27% of the
federal tort filings. A recent study of tort cases tried to verdict in 36 urban state trial courts
showed 3.4%. Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Does Plaintff and Defendant Status Matter? A
Comparison of Outcomes in Tort Litigation, National Center for State Courts (1991). Product
liability cases were 2.9% of tort filings in Iowa. Robert Tobin et. al., Iowa Tort Liability Study
(National Center For State Courts, 1986) (copy on file with the author).
60. It should be noted that these comparisons do not separate out asbestos cases, since
none of the state figures enable us to make such a separation-but if we restricted our count
only to non-asbestos product liability cases, these made up some twelve percent of all federal
tort filings in 1988.
61. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LwBiLrr. VERDICTs AND CASE RESOLU-
TION IN FIVE STATES (GAO/HRD-89-99). Asbestos cases were less than one percent of the
verdicts. Id. at 90. An earlier GAO study found that federal cases were thirty-two percent of
the product liability filings in Connecticut from 1979 to 1986 and twenty-two percent of those
filed in Iowa in three years from 1981 to 1985. U.S. GENERAL ACCOuNiNG OFFICE, PRODUCT
LkBxiur EXTENT OF "LIrAnON EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED, 36-38 (GAO/
HRD-88-36BR) [hereinafter LrGATION ExpLosION].
62. Extrapolating from the 1988 Trial Court Information Network terminations, Profes-
sors Eisenberg and Henderson estimate that federal courts account for about thirty-nine per-
cent of all product liability terminations. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr.,
Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 731, 739 (1992).
63. "We had sufficient data to compare trends in state courts and federal courts for cases
related to Dalkon Shield and Bendectin filed nationwide, all product liability cases filed in
Connecticut, and all product liability cases (other than those related to contracts) in Iowa.
For all four sets of data, state court filings matched federal court filings in the direction of
change (that is, whether they increased or decreased), but not necessarily in the rate or
extent of growth. A trend toward filing in federal court was apparent." LrnGATION EXPLO-
SioN, supra note 61, at 32.
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changed and that filings in state courts are now moving in the opposite
direction from those in federal courts.
Two sets of figures compiled by the National Center of State Courts
confirm this impression. The first are figures for product liability filings in
courts in five states for varying periods since 1985 that reveal no general
upward trend or downward trend in state filings.64 The second set of
figures traces separately the number of automobile torts and non-automo-
bile torts filed in the courts of seven states from 1985 to 1990. Again, the
number of non-automobile torts, which includes all product liability cases,
is essentially flat, while the number of automobile torts increased over this
period.65 Although the evidence is fragmentary, it provides no support
for the view that there has been a significant increase in product liability
filings in state courts.
In the federal courts, which have been the heartland of product liabil-
ity litigation, there has been a significant decline in filings relevant to the
vast majority of companies. There is no evidence from which to conclude
that there has been an offsetting increase in product liability claims in
state courts. The decline in product liability filings fits together with a
number of other things that suggest that the world of product liability
claims is contracting rather than growing. First, Professors Henderson
and Eisenberg found that after the early 1980s plaintiffs were less success-
ful at trial and defendants secured favorable opinions from courts in an
increasing portion of cases.66 Second, Professors Rustad and Koenig, trac-
ing the number of punitive damage awards in product liability cases in
both state and federal courts, discovered that there were many fewer puni-
tive awards in product cases than is often assumed. They also found that
the number of punitive awards have followed the same pattern as federal
court filings. From the early 1980s (1981-85) to the late 1980s (1986-90),
the number of known punitive damage awards in asbestos cases increased
64. Communication from Dr. Brian Ostrom, Director, Court Statistics Project, National
Center for State Courts. The five states are Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
Ohio. These are the only states for which product liability is separated out from other tort
filings. These state figures include asbestos as well as other product liability cases. In four of
the five states the 1991 figure was lower than the first year in the series. In the fifth state,
Florida, a substantial 1991 increase (from 1300 in 1990 to 2472) was attributable to a batch of
1113 asbestos cases filed together by a single attorney.
65. The states in this compilation are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Mary-







During this period automobile tort filings rose from 113,924 to 150,116. Figures supplied by
Dr. Brian Ostrom, Director, Court Statistics Project, National Center for State Courts.
66. James Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability:
An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990). They adduce further evi-
dence of these trends in Theodore Eisenberg &James Henderson, Inside the Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L Rxv. 731 (1992). "[T]he major story in our data [is] the
steadily declining [plaintiff] success rates, the level median pretrial awards, and the post-1985
declines in awards, expected returns, and sums of awards... "Id. at 789.
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by 265% (from twenty to ninety-five); but known awards in non-asbestos
cases decreased thirty-four percent (from 119 to seventy-eight) in those
same years.
67
Third, there are not only fewer awards and fewer lawsuits; there are
fewer claims. A report by the General Accounting Office finds that the
number of claims per $100,000 of product liability premiums dropped
from 32.9 in 1984 to 17.1 in 1988, a forty-eight percent decrease. 68 Fi-
nally, a recent insurance industry study found that the rate of expansion of
paid claims under general liability coverage dropped from 21.1% annually
from 1978 to 1985 to 7.8% in the 1986-1990 period, a rate close to the rate
of growth in costs, such as medical care, which increased at a 7.5% rate
over the same period.
69
These studies depict a sustained contraction of product liability expo-
sure rather than the runaway expansion that alarms adherents of the jaun-
diced view of civil justice. Apart from calling into question the supposed
mounting litigiousness of the American people, this contraction should
induce skepticism about the asserted role of product liability litigation in
undermining the competitiveness of Arnerican business.
It is possible that the civil justice system undermines the competitive-
ness of American business even though product liability is contracting.
Suppose that the burden imposed by the civil justice system is such that
even in this reduced state, it causes American industry to be less competi-
tive. Is there any direct evidence of a connection? So far, serious investi-
gation has found little evidence of any significant effect on America's
prosperity.
70
67. MIcHAEL RusTAD, DEMySTrFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LLmrfnry CASES: A
SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDITS (1991) This research was also presented in
Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes With
Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. Ry. 1 (1992). See also, Product Liability, Hearings on S.640 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 144-152 (1991) (statement of Michael Rustad, Professor of Law, Suffolk University
Law School).
The researchers compiled data on all punitive damage awards in product liability cases
on the basis of a search of "all available computer-based statistical sources, regional verdict
reporters, law review and other scholarly sources, state products liability practice guides, gen-
eralized case-reporting services, court records, asbestos reporters and media reports. In addi-
tion... all attorneys in reported cases were surveyed, to locate further cases." Id. at 146-47.
They located a total of 355 punitive damages verdicts in state and federal courts. Id.
Despite the admirable thoroughness of these researchers, no doubt they missed some
punitive damage awards. But since their method makes it more likely that cases would be
missing in the earlier period than in the later, the reliability of their non-asbestos trend data
is strengthened rather than weakened by the missing data.
68. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LTABiLrr?. INSURANCE RATE LEVELS AND
CLAiM PAYMENTS DURING =a 1970s AND 1980s (GAO/HRD-91-108) (1991).
69. S. MooNEY, CRIsIs Am REcOvER. A REvIEw OF Busrmss LIaBmrY INSURANCE IN Tm
1980s 16 (1992).
70. Product liability and civil justice do not loom large in the general literature on com-
petitiveness. In his 831 page opus, THE COMparrlvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS, Michael E.
Porter devotes less than half a page to product liability, observing that
A prominent example of an area where regulatory policy can work for or against
national advantage is product liability. Product liability laws can benefit competitive
advantage by acting like a sophisticated buyer to encourage the development of
better products.
19931
DENVER UNIVERS12Y LAW REVIEW
Reviewing the available data on the relation of liability to trade per-
formance, Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution identified two major
lines of argument: (1) that liability adds to the cost of doing business, and
(2) that "[tihese costs, coupled with uncertainty over outcomes of tort liti-
gation... [deter introduction of] new products or cost-saving production
technologies."
7 1
Litan concludes that it is difficult to know the magnitude of the net
cost of liability but estimates that "[a] t most that [cost] on average could be
as high as 2 percent of the cost of all products and services sold in the
United States. The effects on individual products could be much
greater."72 Although "it could affect the composition of United States
trade," he reports that "[i] t is highly unlikely that the 'liability tax,' however
large it is, materially or permanently affects the overall U.S. trade
balance."
78
Litan himself assembled data on the total "share of revenues [spent by
particular industries] devoted to paying for and avoiding 'risk.'"74 These
risk costs vary widely from industry to industry and they vary over time.
Notably, the overall expenditure on risk costs as a share of revenues de-
dined from a total of .58% (fifty-eight one-hundredths of one percent) of
total revenues for the whole set of industries in 1978 to .50% (fifty one-
hundredths of one percent) of total revenues in 1984.7 5 It should be re-
called that the mid-1980's was just when non-asbestos product liability liti-
gation was at its peak.
To see whether differences in risk cost can account for "any of the
cross industry variation in export performance" Litan tests the correlation
for "the seven industries for which both export and risk cost data are avail-
able" and finds no statistically significant relationship.7 6 Litan observes
He continues, without providing any supporting evidence:
In the United States, however, product liability is so extreme and uncertain as to
retard innovation. The legal and regulatory climate places firms in constant jeop-
ardy of costly and, as importantly, lengthy product liability suits. The existing ap-
proach goes beyond any reasonable need to protect consumers, as other nations
have demonstrated through more pragmatic approaches.
MicHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETrrrvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 649 (1990). A 1991 report of
the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, analyzing the competitiveness of Ameri-
can manufacturing, doesn't even mention product liability. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPETING EcoNomsss: AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE PACIFIC RIM, (OTA-
ITE-498) (1991).
71. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Real-
ities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTr. COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WEL-
FARE 127, 128 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). Studies of the impact of liability in five industries
are in THE LAiLrrv MAZE: THE IMPACr OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFEry AND INNOVATION (Peter
W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds., 1991).
72. See Litan, supra note 71 at 128-29. It is estimated, however, that all product liability
insurance premiums in 1991, adjusted to include self-insurance and other risk mechanisms,
added up to about .21 (twenty-one one-hundredths of one percent) of the total retail sales of
products in the United States in 1991. NATIONAL INSURANCE CONSUMER ORGANIZATION, PROD-
UCT LIABLrry. 1991 CALENDAR YEAR EXPERIENCE 3-4 (1992).
73. See Litan, supra note 71, at 128.
74. Id. at 140.
75. Id. at 141. The information is taken from the table on page 141. The data in the
table is misreported in the first full sentence of page 142.
76. Id. at 143.
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that "[i] t is not surprising that there is little connection between liability
costs and export performance by industry" since differences in risk costs
are "rather minor" and can easily be swamped by other effects, such as
changing energy costs. He notes, too, that "foreigners may be willing to
pay for the added safety that may be built into U.S. produced goods as a
result of the deterrence features of our tort system."
77
Litan suggests that the effects on innovation "are potentially much
larger but much more uncertain" than the direct cost effects.78 An analy-
sis by Viscusi and Moore found that product liability actually had a positive
net effect on innovation:
This effect is not uniform and may reverse once the liability costs
become too great. At low product liability cost levels, increases in
liability costs foster innovation. Extremely high liability costs de-
press innovation once the disincentive effect on new product in-
troductions becomes dominant. For industries with extremely
large liability costs.., the net effect of product liability is to de-
press innovation, whereas for the great majority of firms with
lower liability costs, it has a positive effect.79
Litan examined the relation of research and development expendi-
tures as a percentage of sales (a surrogate for innovation) for all United
States industries and for the four industries that were the target of the
largest number of federal product liability suits from 1974 to 1986. He
reports that the results:
[d]o not support the alleged innovation-liability link. R&D-to-
sales ratios for all industries increased rather substantially during
the 1980s ... significantly, that ratio more than doubled in the
drug industry, where product liability suits have been especially
prevalent. Both the industry-wide and pharmaceutical-specific
trends are inconsistent with claims that liability fears have damp-
ened innovative activities.
8 0
Litan also refers to "[s]urvey evidence [that] suggests that the negative
effects [of the tort system] on innovation are significant."8 1 Apparently he
is referring to a much-ballyhooed 1988 report of the Conference Board,
an item frequently used as a principal exhibit of the adverse effects of
product liability litigation. (For example it was put forth by the Council on
Competitiveness as its prime example of "the adverse effects of uncon-
Among the seven industries for which both export and risk cost data are available,
there is a small, but statistically insignificant, positive correlation between the
change in exports between 1978 and 1984 (either in absolute dollars or in percent-
age terms) and the change in the risk cost as a percentage of sales in those indus-
tries during this period. In other words, increases in risk costs tend to be associated
with an improvement in export performance, although again this effect is not statis-
tically significant.
Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id. at 129.
79. W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship between Product
Liability and Innovation, in TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTERESr1, COMPETITION, INNOVATION
AND CONSUMER WELFRE 105, 123 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
80. See lAtan, supra note 71, at 145-46.
81. Id. at 129.
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strained litigation.")82
It should be noted that there were two Conference Board surveys on
product liability that appeared in rapid succession in 1987 and 1988. The
first of these (the Weber report) was a survey of "the risk managers of 232
major U.S. corporations... each having a minimum annual sales revenue
of $100 million ... .a8 Written in November 1986-at the very height of
the furor about insurance coverage and cost 4-- the report took a cool,
detached view, totally rejecting the notion that there was a major liability
crisis. It reported its "most striking finding is that the impact of the liability
issue seems far more related to rhetoric than to reality."
8 5
For the major corporations surveyed, the pressures of prod-
uct liability have hardly affected larger economic issues, such as
revenues, market share, or employee retention. Liability lawsuits,
which are indeed numerous, are overwhelmingly settled out of
court, and usually for sums that are considered modest by corpo-
rate standards. As a management function, product liability re-
mains a part-time responsibility in most of the responding firms.
Where product liability has had a notable impact-where it has
most significantly affected management of decision making-has
been in the quality of the products themselves. Managers say
products have become safer, manufacturing procedures have
been improved, and labels and use instructions have become
more explicit.
The findings of the present survey also refute the general
contention of a severe and deepening crisis in tort liability and
insurance availability, at least for the nation's large corporations.
The impact on the general economy, likewise, is believed to have
been minor.
8 6
Surprise with the sanguine response of the Weber respondents (and
of Weber) led the Conference Board to undertake "a broader look at
the effect of product liability on overall company operations" by surveying
the chief executive officers of the 2,000 largest manufacturing companies
and a sample of smaller manufacturers.8 7 The resulting report (the Mc-
Guire report) was issued in 1988. In contrast to the risk managers, the
CEO's had a very dark view of the liability situation. Forty-two percent
reported that the product liability system had a major impact on their
firms;8 8 forty-seven percent report that they had discontinued product
lines, thirty-nine percent that they had decided against introducing new
82. AGENDA, supra note 2, at 3.
83. NATHAN WEBER, PRODuar LIABILITY. THE CORPORATE RESPONSE REPORT No. 893
(1987).
84. Robert Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony, and the
Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, in 11 STuD. iN LAw, Po.. & Soc. 95 (1991).
85. See WEBER, supra note 83, at 2.
86. Id.
87. E. PATRIcK McGurRE, THE IMPACT oF PRODUCT LABnTY. REPORT No. 908 (1988).
88. Id. at 6.
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products;8 9 and forty-nine percent reported a major impact on interna-
tional competitiveness.
90
How can we account for the startling discrepancy in perceptions re-
vealed by these two surveys of corporate actors? The range of corporations
was slightly different: the risk manager survey included some service cor-
porations as well as manufacturers; the CEO survey included small as well
as large corporations. Yet these do not seem to be the crucial factors. Both
surveys had very low response rates,91 so one possibility is that they exer-
cised contrasting selection effects, attracting sanguine :risk managers and
distressed CEOs respectively. Or perhaps they accurately reflected the
perspectives generated at different locations in the corporation. The CEO
figures probably represent sentiments that are widespread among Ameri-
can business executives. An early 1992 survey of executives by Business
Week found that sixty-two percent felt "that the U.S. civil justice system sig-
nificantly hampers the ability of U.S. companies to compete withJapanese
and European companies ... ."92 Of course these impressions are not in
themselves evidence of the existence or magnitude of these effects. But
they are part of the story. It is'entirely possible that this pessimism trans-
lates into lower expectations and less success. Which makes even more
remarkable the absence of independent evidence for the depressing
effects.
IV. THE MISSING KNOWLEDGE BASE
In the end the competitiveness argument only restates the question of
the performance of the United States liability system-a question about
the net cost of the system and its benefits and about the costs and benefits
of the realistic alternatives. We are in the dark-not because there are a
few missing items of information, but because we do not have the needed
knowledge base. The most basic data about our civil justice system are not
collected systematically and cumulatively. That baseless fictions about the
number of lawyers, cursory surmises about the costs of the civil justice sys-
tem, unfounded notions about product liability litigation and fables about
damaged competitiveness continue to be taken seriously testifies both to
the paucity of information and to a widespread disinclination to employ
the information we do have.
Why do we tolerate a knowledge base about the legal system that is so
thin and spotty? Compared to the economy or health care or education,
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 8.
91. The McGuire study received 270 usable responses from a mailing to the 2000 largest
U.S. manufacturing companies a-ad 280 responses from a separate mailing to 2000 smaller
manufacturers, for an overall rate of 13.8%. See McGumn, supra note 87, at ix-x. The Weber
study does not report its response rate. E. Patrick McGuire, who supervised the Weber study,
recalled that the response rate was about twenty percent. Telephone Interview with E. Pat-
rick Maguire (Jan. 28, 1988).
92. The Verdict from the Corner Offle, Bus. W, April 13, 1992, at 66. This was a survey
conducted by Louis Harris & Associates Inc., in early 1992, of 400 senior executives at corpo-
rations drawn from the "Business Week Top 1000" companies. Id.
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research about legal processes, especially civil, is ludicrously thin; so thin
that it is perfectly routine for far-reaching policy proposals to be advanced
on the basis of tendentious macro-anecdotes and voodoo numbers. The
fund of basic information that we take for granted in discussions of the
economy, health care or education simply does not exist. To maintain
credibility in public debate about education or health or defense, partici-
pants have to critically take account of a shared fund of information. Play-
ers in the legal policy arena, however, can with impunity disregard reliable
information, make up dubious facts and repeat discredited fables. Any-
thing goes, it seems.
The derelict state of the discourse about legal policy is surprising be-
cause lawyers, in their role as adversaries, are dogged in challenging and
dissecting evidence. But adversarial contention is not the same as delight-
ing in employment of the most severe critical standards. And acuteness in
dealing with evidence and inference in specific cases does not necessarily
carry over to analysis of large social aggregates. For example, a careful
study showed that South Carolina lawyers were not much better than the
state's doctors in estimating the number, size, and patterns ofjury verdicts
in that state.
93
But what about our vast archipelago of law schools, whose professors
and students fill hundreds ofjournals with the products of legal scholar-
ship? This great flood of scholarship does not provide an adequate knowl-
edge base, because, basically, it is not interested in the working of the legal
system. Speaking of the "extraordinary imbalance in academic legal re-
search," Judge Posner noted:
[A] n attitude of complete neglect to what is after all the great
story of American law in the modem era, and that is the ex-
traordinary growth in the size of the profession since 1960 ac-
companied by an extraordinary increase in the volume of
litigation and other legal activities. We do not have in the acad-
emy a significant, cogent body of thinking about why this had
occurred and what the consequences are.
9 4
We think of the contemporary legal academy as the inheritor of the
legal realist concern for the law in action, but the incorporation of legal
realist insights has been selective: legal scholarship fervently embraced the
critical deconstruction of texts,95 but remained diffident toward the inves-
tigative, empirical side of the realist legacy.
96
93. Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite
Perceptions Concerning Juy Verdicts, 39 S.C. L. REv. 585 (1988).
94. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Future of Legal Education, Address Before the Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (January 15, 1991) p. 6.
95. Some have voiced alarm at the textual deconstruction that has become increasingly
fashionable in the law journals. But post-modern fashions have made such headway not be-
cause of their difference but because of their kinship with mainstream scholarship with
which they share the premise that the main thing is to achieve the right verbal formula, as if
words control reality.
96. The patron saint of this side of our legal heritage is Louis Brandeis, whose devotion
to disciplined exploration of the world and disdain for speculation uninformed by such in-
quiry is displayed in an episode recounted by biographer Philippa Strum:
Brandeis recalled having told [Justice Oliver Wendell] Holmes "that if he really
[Vol. 71:1
NEWS FROM NOWHERE
Abetted by the bar, law schools have largely defaulted on their respon-
sibility to contribute to knowledge about the working of the legal process.
It is as if we had a medical establishment consisting entirely of practicing
physicians and theoretical biologists, with no research institutions like the
National Institutes of Health and no public health monitoring facilities
like the Centers for Disease Controll
Overall, legal institutions, including the legal profession, invest very
little in research and development. No one knows how much. In 1987 the
income of the legal services industry, as the Census refers to us, was sixty-
seven billion dollars-about one and a half percent of the Gross Domestic
Product.97 That does not include expenditures for in-house law depart-
ments or government law departments or for courts or law schools. How
much is spent each year on research about civil justice? There is no data
from which a reliable estimate can be derived. From very partial data and
with very crude assumptions, I have constructed a "guesstimate" of some-
thing like sixty-six million dollars that surely errs on the side of generos-
ity.98 That is less than one tenth of one percent of total expenditures on
legal institutions. And it is an even smaller fraction of the one hundred
fifty billion spent annually on research in this country.99
wanted to improve his mind" (as he always speaks of it) the way to do it is not to
read more philosophic books... but to get some sense of the world of fact. And he
asked me to map out some reading-he became much interested-and I told him
that I'd get some books, that books could carry him only so far, and that then he
should get some exhibits from life. I suggested the textile industry, and told him in
vacation time he is near Lawrence and Lowell and he should go there and look
about.
PHiPPA STRUM, Louis D. Bwinaxs: JusricE FOR THE PEonE 309-10 (1984). Holmes' re-
sponse was that "I have little doubt that it would be good for my immortal soul to plunge into
them [facts] ... but I shrink from the bore." Id. at 310. Like Holmes, the legal academy has
followed the enchantments of text rather than the Brandeisian imperative of disciplined ex-
amination of context. So law journals religiously check accuracy of quotations, but tolerate
casual assertions about the state of the world.
97. U.S. CENsus OF SERvICE ImusriEs, LEGAL SERvicEs, tbl. 42 (1987).
98. This very rough estimate was constructed in the following way. Under my supervi-
sion, J.T. Knight collected the latest available annual research budgets of most of the most
prominent (to me) public and. private funders of research on civil justice. We obtained
figures for the FederalJudicial Center ($2.3 million), the National Science Foundation Pro-
gram in Law and Social Science ($2.4 million), the National Center for Dispute Resolution
($0.8 million), the American Bar Foundation ($2.2 million), the National Center for State
Courts ($4.2 million), the Olin Foundation ($2.8 billion), the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation's Program in Conflict Resolution ($3.0 million), the Administrative Conference
of the United States (entire budget $1.9 million), RAND Institute for Civil Justice (entire
budget $2.3 million). The total for these nine institutions is $22.1 million. This total includes
the entire budget of several of these institutions; it is further exaggerated by the assumption
that all of this research is on civil justice and by the absence of any adjustment for the double-
counting that is involved when one of these institutions supports research by another.
I then make the extremely optimistic assumption that there is another set of non-univer-
sity institutions, less visible to me, whose annual spending is equivalent to this extremely
optimistic total for civil justice research expenditures by these nine institutions. I then make
the further extravagantly optimistic assumption that in law schools and other university set-
tings, there is a further equivalent expenditure on civil justice research that does not derive
from either of these two sets of institutions. (That this is heroically optimistic is indicated by
considering that $22 million would pay for well over two hundred full time equivalent senior
researchers.) With all these favorable assumptions, the total expenditure on civil justice re-
search would be a bit more than $66 million.
99. NATIONAL Sc:mENc BoARD, ScmNcE AND ENGNEEmuNG INDICATORs Fig. 4-1 (1991).
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Lawyers have created in the civil justice system a powerful engine of
remedy and change, but display little sense of collective responsibility to
support the knowledge base needed to modify and wield it for public
good. Such a knowledge base will not provide definitive answers to ques-
tions of policy, for lawyers reflect the conflicting views of their clients, so
we should not imagine that we can come up with neutral and purely tech-
nical answers. Civil justice issues involve value choices-and that means
political choices. But an enhanced knowledge base can rescue us from a
debate dominated by bogus questions and fictional facts.
It is not only about our own legal system that we lack information.
Much of the denigration of our system is couched in misleading compari-
sons. Detractors ignore differences in the institutional setting and role of
legal institutions. Trends that are widespread throughout the industrial-
ized world are treated as if they were peculiarly American and, moreover,
manifested pathological flaws in American society. Recent decades have
witnessed a dramatic worldwide legalization of social life, including an in-
crease in litigation and in the number of lawyers-even in Japan, which is
so often falsely portrayed as a land without litigation and lawyers. As
globalization proceeds, the legal systems of various countries will interact
more intensively. We need to develop a reliable knowledge base that will
enable us to make meaningful cross-national comparisons as well as track
developments in our own legal system.
Notwithstanding the deficiencies of our legal system, it is worth recal-
ling that one realm in which the United States has remained the leading
exporter is what we may call the technology of doing law-constitutional-
ism, judicial enforcement of rights, the organization of law firms, alterna-
tive dispute resolution and public interest law. For all their admitted flaws,
American institutions provide influential models for the governance of
business relations, the processing of disputes, and the protection of
citizens.
The legal system that we inhabit is expanding rapidly and is being
reshaped by both new technologies within, and the demands of a chang-
ing world without. The legal system is one of the mechanisms by which
society monitors and regulates the world of incessant change. The efficacy
of the legal response depends not only on the quality of our knowledge
about the world, but on our understanding of the legal system as well.
The absence of an adequate knowledge base not only impairs the optimal
use of the legal system, but also makes the legal profession vulnerable to
attack.
The hostility toward lawyers so much in evidence today has much
deeper sources than the deficiencies of our knowledge base. It is deeply
rooted in society's fundamental ambivalence about law and is accentuated
by the discomforts of the increasing legalization of society. Our system of
civil justice is beset by many problems, particularly problems of securing
justice cheaply and expeditiously for all Americans. But we should be
mindful of the accomplishments as well as the discomforts. Increasingly,
ordinary people can use this system to hold to account society's managers
[Vol. 71:1
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and authorities. It is this "litigation up" that fuels the sense of outrage of
so many well-placed critics by challenging the leeways and immunities en-
joyed by those in charge.
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APPENDIX
ESTIMATED LAWYER POPULATIONS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
MARC GALANTER AND J.T. KNiGHT*
The following table summarizes the number of lawyers in all countries
for which usable data could be found. Data was unavailable for many
countries, including much of Latin America, Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
Counting the number of lawyers in the world presents a difficult task
for several reasons. Not only is data unavailable for many countries, but
lawyers are defined differently from country to country. In some, there is
more than one professional group corresponding to the omnibus category
of lawyer used in the United States. Boundaries may be defined differ-
ently: in some places government legal officers, judges, prosecutors, law
teachers, and corporate law officers are considered "lawyers;" in others,
they are not. Totals from bar associations may be inflated or may exclude
non-members. Finally, it is difficult to account for retired lawyers and per-
sons with the requisite educational credentials not presently working in
recognized "lawyer" jobs, who are included in some counts but not in
others.
To maximize temporal comparability, we have used data for 1985 or a
year as close as possible to 1985. Obviously, these enumerations vary in
reliability as well as in coverage. Where more than one estimate was avail-
able, all are given. If there is a basis for preferring one source on grounds
of reliability or inclusiveness, it is indicated by bold type.
COUNTRY REPORTED DATE SOURCE
NUMBER OF
LAWYERS
Algeria 800 1983 A
Argentina 50,000 1983 A
Australia 23,000 1985 B
21,640 1985 C
7,068 1983 A
Austria 2,400 1987 D
2,200 1983 A
Bangladesh 15,000 1984 E
9,000 1983 A
Belgium 24,000 1984 F
21,104 1985 G
12,300 1983 A
(Source F is preferred because this source breaks down lawyers by
practice setting and includes government lawyers, judges, etc.)
* J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1993; Clerk to Magistrate Stephen Crocker, U.S.
District Court (W.D. Wis.), 1993-94.
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Brazil 168,245 1980 H
85,716 1981 G
500,000 1989 I
(Source I is not used in any estimate because this unconfirmed figure is
improbably large. See note 10, supra.)




(Source J is preferred because this source provides comprehensive
analysis of law practice in Canada including lawyers and notaries.)
Chile 12,300 1983 A
China 47,461 1990 L
30,000 1985-88 M
(Source L is preferred because this source distinguishes by types of
practice)
Costa Rica 1,959 1983 A
Denmark 3,000 1983 A
Egypt 30,000 1983 N
(Source N refers to members of the Egyptian Bar Association.)
England & 51,857 1985 0
Wales
45,500 1985 P
(Both sources include both solicitors and barristers.)
Finland 10,614 1983 B
9,000 1983 A
France 27,700 1990 G
27,215 1983 A
26,029 1983 Q
(Sources G and A include lawyers in private practice only. Figure Q
excludes notaries and bailiffs.)
Germany 2,035 1990 P
(East)







(Source R is preferred because this source is inclusive of all practice
settings.)
Hong Kong 1,800 1989 T
1,332 1983 A
1993]
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India 247,373 1983 U
225,000 1983 A
(Source U is information obtained from regional bar councils, including
members of the Bar Council of India)
Ireland 2,500 1983 A
Israel 7,500 1983 A
Italy 46,600 1983 A
46,401 1985 G
32,468 1982 V
(Sources A, G and V include lawyers in private practice only.)




Jordan 700 1983 A
Kenya 1,000 1991 AA
Malaysia 2,600 1988 BB
Nepal 1,000 1983 A
Netherlands 5,124 1986 CC
4,000 1983 A
New Zealand 4,149 1981 DD
4,149 1981 K
Nigeria 2,000 1983 A
Norway 6,572 1980 EE
4,412 1970 G
2,100 1983 A
(Source G is preferred because this source includes all practice
settings.)
Pakistan 70,000 1982 FF
22,000 1983 A
Panama 900 1983 A
Scotland 7,270 1982-84 GG
6,350 1985 G
(Sources GG and G include solicitors, advocates in private practice and
government lawyers)
Singapore 990 1983 A
South Africa 5,700 1986 HH
(The data for Source HH is incomplete.)
Spain 55,000 1983 A
34,234 1985 B
42,000 1982 II
(Source B is preferred because this source includes judges and
government lawyers.)
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Sweden 2,064 1964 B
(Source B includes private practice and government.)
Switzerland 3,688 1980 .3
3,300 1983 A
Turkey 22,395 1987 P
18,000 1983 A
United States 655,191 1985 KK
618,800 1985 LL
(Source KK is preferred because this source is an authoritative count
enumerating lawyers by practice setting.)
U.S.S.R 207,000 1986 MM
100,000 1989 NN
Uruguay 300 1983 A
Venezuela 31,400 1990 K (at n.7)
15,000 1980 00
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CALCUILATION OF UNITED
STATES' SHARE OF WORLD'S LAWYERS
Methodology of Calculations. The average of all available figures for each
country is used except in cases where one seems clearly preferable. "Best
available" figures are indicated in bold because those sources provide
more specificity about the nature of law practice in a particular country,
and/or provide a better basis for comparative analysis.
The average of available figures is calculated by dividing the sum of all
figures available for a particular country by the number of sources. The
"highest" estimate is calculated by using the highest reported figure for
each country. The "lowest" estimate is calculated by using the lowest re-
ported figure for each country.
For all estimates, the figure taken from source KK is the only United
States estimate used. In all calculations, the figure taken from source I
(for Brazil) is excluded.
ESTIMATE A.
NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON BEST AVAILABLE
FIGURES REPORTED
Total lawyers .......... 1,908,844 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total in U.S ....... 34.3% (without adjustment for unreported
countries)
Where there are multiple sources and none is preferred, computation is
on the basis of the average of available figures.
ESTIMATE B. NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON
AVERAGE FIGURES REPORTED
Total lawyers .......... 1,851,588 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total lawyers in the U.S ....... 35.4% (without adjustment for
unreported countries)
In all cases (other than the U.S.) where there are multiple sources, com-
putation is based on the average of available sources.
ESTIMATE C. NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON
HIGHEST FIGURES REPORTED
Total lawyers .......... 2,065,838 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total in U.S ....... 31.7% (without adjustment for unreported
countries)
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ESTIMATE D. NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN THE WORLD, BASED ON
LOWEST FIGURES REPORTED
Total lawyers .......... 1,646,573 (plus lawyers in unreported countries)
Percent of total in U.S. 39.8% (without adjustment for unreported
countries)
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LAw Rs, LiABIrrw, AND LAw REFORM: EFFCrs ON




This Article addresses in simple analytic terms the strong allegations
of recent years that various features of our modem legal system-an over-
supply of lawyers, increased litigiousness, expanded standards of liability,
and growth in governmental regulation-have reduced economic growth
and harmed American competitiveness in foreign and domestic trade.
Over the past few years, steadily accelerating complaints have been raised
about lawyers and about the structure and substance of American law, es-
pecially modem tort and environmental law. It is well known that, over
the past three decades, the absolute number of lawyers and the proportion
of lawyers per capita have increased substantially in the United States.'
Over the same period, courts have significantly expanded standards of tort
and environmental liability, increasing the liability exposure of virtually
everyone in the society, but especially of manufacturers, insurers and gov-
ernmental entities.2 Similarly, both state and federal governments have
expanded direct regulation of the environment and, in more limited
cases, of safety with respect to specific products.3 These legal develop-
ments have increased insurance costs and non-insured liability payouts as
well as the costs of regulatory compliance. Not surprisingly, there has
been increasing criticism of lawyers and serious opposition to the develop-
ing direction of the law. The most outspoken critics claim variously that
the expansion of liability and regulation levies a huge tax on American
enterprise, 4 reduces economic growth,5 and, more generally, diminishes
U.S. trade competitiveness. 6 Lawyers, obviously, are the instruments
through which this damage is inflicted.
* John M. Olin Professor of Law and Economics and Director, Program in Civil Liabil-
ity, Yale Law School. I am grateful to the Program in Civil Liability for support.
1. See infra text accompanying note 38.
2. For a description of these developments, see George L. Priest, The Invention of Enter-
prise Liability: A Critical Histoy of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 461 (1985) [hereinafter Priest, Invention] and George L. Priest, The New Legal Structure of
Risk Control, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990 at 207 [hereinafter Priest, Risk Control].
3. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitive-
ness, 102 YALE Lj. 2039 (1993).
4. PETER W. HUBER, LLrrni=. THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND rrs CONSEQUENCES 3-4
(1988).
5. Dale W. Jorgenson & Peterj. Wilcoxen, Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic
Growth, 21 RANDJ. ECON. 314 (1990).
6. RandolphJ. Stayin, The U.S. Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage to Foreign
Manufacturers, 14 CAN.-U.S. U. 193 (1988); Clarance E. Hagglund & Herbert A. Igbanugo,
Are US. Product Liability Laws Acting as a Trade Barrier to the Detriment of U.S. Companies?, 42
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Recently, these complaints have been raised with increasing empirical
sophistication. Several authors have argued that the large number of law-
yers in the United States (the United States has more lawyers than any
other country in the world) directly impedes economic development. 7 In
the most prominent of these studies, for example, Professor Stephen P.
Magee estimates that the number of lawyers in the United States is 40%
greater than optimal for economic growth. He estimates that this excess
supply of lawyers reduces U.S. Gross Domestic Product by somewhere be-
tween $300 and $660 billion per year (1990$).8 Separately, though in a
similar vein, the renowned economist Dale Jorgenson and Professor Peter
Wilcoxen estimate that U.S. environmental regulations diminish Gross Na-
tional Product .191 percentage points per year, more than 10% of the
share of total governmental purchases of goods and services.9 Other em-
pirical estimates of the costs imposed by our modem legal system are
somewhat more casual, but of equally astounding magnitudes.10
The sharp differences between the United States and virtually all
other developed nations in terms of the number of lawyers and of the
expansion of tort and environmental liability have generated increasing
concerns about the effects of these features of our legal system on U.S.
competitiveness abroad. Some authors claim that the mere mention of
U.S. product liability law "instills fear into" executives of both foreign and
domestic firms."1 They assert that modem U.S. law reduces the ability of
U.S. firms to compete effectively in overseas markets and, simultaneously,
creates an obstacle to the ability of foreign firms to provide low cost prod-
ucts and services to U.S. customers. 12 Although other commentators be-
lieve that effects on trade are modest,' 3 even some who defend the
general impact of product liability law on competitiveness complain about
the stifling effects of modem U.S. law on innovation. 14 The problems sug-
gested by these studies have prompted calls for widespread reform. For
example, concern about the oversupply of lawyers led the Dean of the
FEn. INS. & CORP. COuNs. Q. 347 (1992); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L Blaner, The
Anti-Competitive Impact of US. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own
Game?, 9J.L. & COM. 167 (1989).
7. SrmEN P. MAGEE Er AL., The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations: Laurters as Negative
Externalities, in BLACK HOLE TArms Am ENDOGENOUS Poucv THEOmr 111 (1989) (adapted
from William A. Brock & Stephen P. Magee, The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations, in
NEoci.sssicA. POLrlCAL ECONOMY 177 (David C. Colander ed. 1984)); Kevin M. Murphy et
al., The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth, 106 Qj.. ECON. 503 (1991); Stephen P.
Magee, The Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 L. & Soc. INQoUIY 667 (1992)
[hereinafter Magee, Optimum].
8. Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 673-74.
9. Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, supra note 5, at 315. Unlike MageeJorgenson and Wilcoxen
are measuring only the costs of regulation, not the benefits, about which they are agnostic.
Id. at 314.
10. See Huaaa, supra note 4, at 4 ($80-380 billion costs). These studies and many more
that I do not cite are effectively criticized in Marc Galanter, Too Many Lawyers? Too Much
Law?, 71 DENv. U.L. REv. 77 (1993).
11. Hagglund & Igbanugo, supra note 6, at 347.
12. See generally sources cited supra note 6.
13. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and Real-
ities, in TORT LAw AND THE PuBLIc IN-ERrsr 127 (Peter H. Schuck, ed., 1991).
14. MIcHAEL E. PORTER, THE CoMPETrrvE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 649 (1990).
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University of Texas Law School to propose reducing law school admissions
by 10-15%; for similar reasons, the Louisiana state legislature recently en-
tertained proposals that would have shut down the state's two public law
schools altogether.15 Others have proposed scaling back environmental
controls' 6 or substantially changing tort law, such as by placing strict limits
on punitive damages' 7 or amending substantive standards of liability.' 8
Still others, however, have opposed systematic reform, defending our sys-
tem of law and regulation as well as the current stock of U.S. lawyers.' 9
This Article attempts to cut through what has become an increasingly
acrimonious debate on these issues to define basic principles from which
to evaluate the effects of differing magnitudes of lawyers on a society's
economy as well as the effect of differing forms of law and regulation on
foreign and domestic competitiveness. It argues, first, that, notwithstand-
ing increasingly refined empirical demonstration, there is no adequate
theory for measuring the effect of the magnitude of lawyers on economic
growth. Because the number of lawyers itself derives from and does not
determine the substance of the law, the most plausible general conclusion
is that lawyers always contribute toward an increase in national wealth, ex-
cept under very specific conditions. It follows from this conclusion that,
for the United States and for most modem nations, the number of lawyers
is probably insufficient, rather than excessive. The more important ques-
tion, however, is not whether lawyers are too many or too few, but whether
the substance and structure of the legal regime enhances or diminishes
societal welfare.
The Article next addresses how to evaluate the substance of the law in
terms of its effect on national wealth, economic growth, and competitive-
ness. It clarifies when and under what conditions the law-whether in the
form of environmental regulation or products liability law-increases or
diminishes national wealth and harms or helps the competitiveness of U.S.
manufacturers in foreign or domestic trade. The Article shows why the
reform of punitive damages is of significantly greater import with respect
to the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers in foreign trade than other
tort reform issues. It also shows how modem doctrines of procedure and
jurisdiction can substantially distort competitiveness and reduce national
wealth, though courts have typically ignored such concerns. Finally, the
Article discusses the issue of the reform of tort law and punitive damages.
It explains how the increasing refusal of foreign courts to enforce U.S. tort
15. Arthur S. Hayes, Texas Law SchoolEnrollment is Targeted, WAu. ST.J., Sept. 29, 1992, at
B9. Very recently, the National Law Journal reported polls showing increasing popular con-
cem about the number of lawyers in this society. Randall Sambom, Anti-LawyerAttitude Up,
NAT. LJ., August 9, 1993, at 1 ("From 1986 to 1993, the percentage of people saying there
are too many lawyers, increased from fifty-five percent to seventy-three percent.").
16. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has
Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAN. L. REv. 1117, 1166-71 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Stayin, supra note 6, at 207-10.
19. Galanter, supra note 10, at 102. See also Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's
Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lauyers on the United States Economy
and Political System, 70 Tax. L. Ray. 645 (1992).
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law judgments actually benefits Americans in the aggregate, though dam-
aging to U.S. manufacturers. It also evaluates reform proposals from the
goal of increasing national wealth.
Part II reviews and criticizes the various empirical studies regarding
the alleged excessive supply of lawyers and evaluates the claim that exces-
sive lawyers harm economic growth. Part III describes the effects of mod-
em U.S. tort law and environmental regulation on foreign and domestic
competitiveness. Finally, Part IV summarizes the reforms necessary to in-
crease the wealth of all nations including the United States and, at the
same time, to improve American competitiveness.
II. THE ANALYTICS OF THE ALLEGED OVERSUPPLY OF LAwYERs
This Part criticizes recent studies claiming to demonstrate that the
number of lawyers in the United States is excessive and substantially di-
minishes U.S. economic growth. The Part argues that there are no sensi-
ble economic grounds for such a conclusion and, indeed, in terms of
economic analysis, there are strong reasons to believe that there is proba-
bly an undersupply, rather than an oversupply, of lawyers in the United
States and other modem countries. Section A reviews the current studies.
Section B explains why the number of lawyers in a society is only likely to
become "excessive" in economic terms where courts are substantially and
unexpectedly restricting the law, rather than expanding it as has been
characteristic of the past three decades. The Section implies, thus, that
the critics have the relationship exactly backwards. Section B, however,
also explains the more important point that, even if the substantive law or
the system of regulation diminishes economic growth, the role of lawyers
is likely to remain positive for a society, reducing the impact of the dimi-
nution. Though there may be instances in which the activities of lawyers
contribute nothing to society, the conditions for such effects are very diffi-
cult to define and are unlikely to hold for the broad range of legal services
provided in the United States today.
A. The Modem Debate over Lawyers and Economic Growth
The growing debate over the relationship between the number of law-
yers in a country and that country's rate of economic growth was initiated
by Mancur Olson in his book The Rise and Decline of Nations. Olson pro-
posed the striking theory that differential rates of national economic
growth over time were determined by the extent to which the energies of a
country's citizens were devoted to productive as opposed to redistributive
("rent-seeking") activities. In several passages, he suggested that much of
the effort of lawyers might best be regarded as rent-seeking, rather than as
contributing real production to the society.20
Olson's suggestion was first sharpened and formalized by Magee,
Brock and Young who purported to demonstrate that the United States
20. MANcup OLsoN, THE RisE AND DECLiNE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLA-
TION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 66, 70 (1982).
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suffers from an oversupply of lawyers that has substantially retarded eco-
nomic growth. These authors studied the relationship between the
number of lawyers and rates of change in Gross National Product for
thirty-four countries during the period 1960-1980.21 For each country,
they compared average changes in Gross National Product per capita to
the ratio of lawyers to physicians. 22 They found that GNP growth declined
sharply as the lawyer/physician ratio increased. Countries with relatively
low lawyer/physician ratios such as Saudi Arabia, Korea and Japan (.09)23
had relatively high per capita rates of GNP growth (Japan, 7.1%) while
countries with relatively high lawyer/physician ratios, such as Chile (2.14)
and Nepal (2.07) had relatively low per capita GNP growth rates (1.6%
and .2%, respectively). The United States had among the highest of law-
yer/physician ratios (1.29) and relatively modest per capita GNP growth
over the period (2.3%).24
Some years later Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny addressed the issue
with greater comparative precision. 25 Building on Robert Barro's highly
regarded growth model, 26 they compared relative college enrollments in
engineering versus the law with rates of growth of per capita Gross Domes-
tic Product for ninety-one and, separately, fifty-five larger countries. They
hypothesized that countries with relatively higher proportions of engineer-
ing students would have relatively higher growth rates reflecting invest-
ments in physical and human capital; in contrast, countries with relatively
higher proportions of law students, reflecting rent-seeking opportunities,
the reverse. They found a positive and significant relationship between
the number of engineering students and economic growth; a negative, but
statistically insignificant, relationship between economic growth and the
number of law students.2
7
In a more recent, though incompletely explained, study, Professor
Magee presents a different comparison with more vivid results. Magee
compares growth in per capita Gross Domestic Product to the number of
lawyers per 1,000 white collar workers for fifty-four countries over a twenty-
five-year period.28 In this study, the relationship is not continuously nega-
tive as in his earlier findings. Instead, as the number of lawyers per 1,000
21. MAGEE ET AT-, supra note 7, at 111.
22. Id. at 119. The authors employed the lawyer/physician ratio in order to control for
differing stages of economic development within countries.
23. Oddly, although the authors present a detailed table of data, they do not include
figures for Saudi Arabia or Korea. Other peculiarities of their data are described in Galanter,
supra note 10.
24. MAGEE Er A ., supra note 7, at 118-21.
25. Murphy et al., supra note 7, at 503.
26. RobertJ. Barro, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, 106 QOJ. EcoN. 407
(1991).
27. Murphy et al., supra note 7, at 524-25.
28. This study appears to have been first presented in a letter to the editor in the Wall
Street JournaL Stephen P. Magee, How Many Lawyers Ruin an Economy? WAU.L ST. J., Sept. 24,
1992, at A17. It has since been replicated in Magee, Optimum, supra note 7.
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white collar workers increases from zero,29 economic growth increases.
The increase in growth reaches a maximum at twenty-three lawyers per
1,000 white collar workers.8 0 After that point, as the lawyer/white collar
worker ratio increases still further, economic growth declines. According
to the study, the United States for this period possessed thirty-eight lawyers
per 1,000 white collar workers, well toward the end of the declining curve.
Professor Magee's estimate of the actual loss to the U.S. economy
from the oversupply of lawyers derives from this finding. First, he infers
that the United States possesses roughly 40% more lawyers than is optimal
for economic growth.3 l According to Professor Magee, these lawyers "sub-
tract value from the economy."3 2 Second, he concludes that, if the United
States were to eliminate these lawyers, it could achieve a rate of economic
growth equal to that of countries with the optimal supply (twenty-three
lawyers per 1,000 white collar workers), which is 12% higher than current
U.S. Gross Domestic Product for the period. Magee estimates from this
figure that the United States loses between $300 and $640 billion per year
(1990$) because of its excess supply of lawyers. More precisely, according
to Professor Magee, every excess lawyer himself or herself diminishes U.S.
productivity by at least $1 million per year:
Forty percent of US lawyers comes to about 300,000 too many
lawyers. Since they are knocking off $300 billion, this means that
the average of the 40 percent excess lawyers each knock $1 mil-
lion off of US gross domestic product every year.
53
Professor Magee's results, as might be expected, have been subjected
to strenuous criticism. In a Wall StreetJournal article, Professor Epp reports
the results of his work with Professor Galanter, presented more extensively
in this volume.3 4 Epp and Galanter have shown that the international
measures of the number of lawyers on which Professor Magee relies are
substantially deficient. Better measures do not confirm the sharp relation-
ship of decline in economic growth with increases in the number of law-
yers. They also emphasize that Professor Magee neglects careful
measurement of the contribution of lawyers to an economy, an element of
the analysis that Magee concedes in theory, but dismisses given his empiri-
29. In the studies published to date of lawyers as a proportion of white collar workers,
Magee does not present his figures, so that it is not clear which country most closely repre-
sents the zero lawyer/white collar worker ratio of the graph.
30. Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 670. Magee's approach is damaged because he
does not reconcile why his studies show economic growth increasing over a certain range as
the lawyer to white collar worker ratio increases, while economic growth declines continu-
ously with increases in the lawyer to physician ratio. MAcEE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 118-19.
31. That is, the fifteen extra lawyers per 1,000 white collar workers (thirty-eight minus
twenty-three) equals just less than 40% of thirty-eight.
32. Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 673.
33. Id. at 673-74. Professor Magee's $300 billion figure derives from the use of Professor
Galanter's data; Magee's own data suggest a $640 billion loss. Magee employs other data to
distinguish from among the $640 billion loss, $300 billion lost due to excessive numbers of
general lawyers and an additional $300 billion lost due to excessive lawyers in the Congress.
Id.
34. Charles R. Epp, Let's Not KillAll the Lawyers, WALL ST.J.July 9, 1992, at A13; Galanter,
supra note 10, at 81-83.
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cal findings.3 5 Separately, Professor Cross has criticized Magee's studies
on empirical grounds, and has presented additional information sug-
gesting a positive relationship between the number of lawyers per country
and various measures of political and human rights.3 6
As we have seen, much of the debate over the alleged oversupply of
lawyers has turned on the details of the empirical findings. The next Sec-
tion argues that the empirical studies themselves neglect simpler and
more basic propositions that suggest that the inquiry itself is misdirected.
None of the authors has presented a sensible principle for determining
how to evaluate in economic terms when the number of lawyers in a soci-
ety becomes "excessive." Section B addresses this issue with the hope of
redirecting the debate. It describes what an "excessive" supply of lawyers
means in economic terms, why it is highly unlikely that the current supply
of lawyers in the United States is "excessive" economically, why it is mis-
leading to claim without more that any supply of lawyers reduces rather
than increases economic growth, and why the more significant issues with
respect to economic growth are issues of law reform, rather than the mag-
nitude of the lawyer stock.
3 7
B. The Economics of the Alleged Oversupply of Lawyers
What does it mean for a country to have an oversupply of lawyers?
How might such an oversupply diminish economic growth? There is no
question that the number and proportion of lawyers in the United States
has increased dramatically over the past three decades. In 1960, there
were roughly 286,000 lawyers in the United States, equal to 1.58 per 1,000
citizens; in 1970, 355,000, equal to 1.73 per 1,000; in 1980, 542,000, equal
to 2.38 per 1,000; and, the most recent figure, in 1988, 723,000, equal to
2.95 per 1,000.38 Over the same period, U.S. economic growth has been
modest at best. The average annual percentage increase in real per capita
Gross Domestic Product (1987$) between 1960-70 was 2.55%; 1970-80,
1.72%; and 1980-90, 1.68%.39 The critics assume that lawyers (or at least
those that are excessive) are engaged in essentially redistributive activities,
not contributing to national economic growth. This assumption implies
that, as the number of lawyers increases relative to other more productive
occupations or increases over time, harm to economic growth increases.
40
It might seem to follow directly from these propositions that the steadily
decreasing rate of per capita Gross Domestic Product growth is related to
the steadily increasing number and proportion of lawyers.
35. Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 670.
36. Cross, supra note 19, at 645.
37. For an earlier, though very brief, statement of similar points, see Sherwin Rosen, The
Market for Lauyenr, 35J.L. & ECoN. 215, 243-44 (1992).
38. Derived from BUREAu OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEPARTmEr OF COMMER CE, STATISTICAL
ABsTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 1992 Table 2, at 8, Table 314, at 192 (1992). Note that this
statistic reports lawyers per 1,000 citizens rather than per 1,000 physicians or white collar
workers as in the Magee studies discussed. E.g., Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 672-73.
39. Derived from BUREAU OF THE CENsus, supra note 38, at 431 (Table 678).
40. See sources cited supra note 7.
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I believe that such an analysis, however, is simplistic. To the contrary,
in economic terms, the number of lawyers in the United States today is
almost certainly insufficient, rather than excessive. Indeed, although one
must be somewhat less confident about the conclusion, it is entirely possi-
ble that, even ignoring whether the expansion of liability has benefitted or
harmed social welfare, social costs would be reduced if the United States
had more, rather than fewer, lawyers. As a general matter, except under
very precise specifications, lawyers will benefit, rather than harm, an econ-
omy. Indeed, without more, it is plausible that those countries (including
the United States) identified by the critics as suffering high proportions of
lawyers and low rates of economic growth, would have had even lower
rates of economic growth if they had fewer lawyers. The critics of lawyers
are employing a normatively charged definition of "excessive" unusual to
economic analysis. Clarifying the economic analysis of when the stock of
lawyers might be regarded as excessive will indicate why their criticism is
misdirected.
In economics, the stock of any commodity can be regarded as "exces-
sive" if the price that the commodity attracts in a competitive market is less
than production costs. As an example, whatever inventories remain today
of mechanical calculating machines are surely "excessive" according to
this economic definition because the price a machine would command
(except perhaps to a collector) would be set with respect to our now much
cheaper electronic calculators, 41 thus, much less than the costs of produc-
ing the original machine. As another example, the stock of housing in a
given location can be regarded as "excessive" in economic terms if, to se-
cure a sale, the price of the house must be dropped below the sum of the
costs of inputs: the price of land and the costs of construction.
As in the calculating machine and housing examples, the number of
lawyers is "excessive" where the earnings that lawyers receive are less than
the full costs incurred in becoming lawyers. For the evaluation of lawyers,
the calculating machine and housing examples must be adjusted because
a lawyer's services are not sold at a one-time price, but generate a stream
of earnings over time. More precisely, legal education can be regarded as
an investment similar to other investments that might, but might not, in-
crease a person's wealth. The return on the investment equals the differ-
ence between the income of individuals with and without legal education.
The costs of the investment are law school tuition plus the foregone earn-
ings from postponing entering the workforce for three years of study.
42
Lawyers are "excessive" in the economic sense if the returns on the invest-
ment in legal education are less than returns from other available
investments.
Under what conditions would the number of lawyers be likely to be-
come excessive? We might first think about this question from the stand-
41. In fact, the price would have to be substantially cheaper because of the much lower
relative efficiency of mechanical to electronic calculators.
42. See B. Peter Pashigian, The Market for Lawyers. The Determinants of the Demand for and
Supply of Lawyers, 20J.L. & EcoN. 53 (1977).
[Vol. 71:1
LAWYERS, L!ABIL!TY, AND LAW REFORM
point of the individual making the investment in legal education. As in
other unrestricted markets, individuals choose to make investments ac-
cording to the returns they expect to receive. A decision to pursue a ca-
reer requires an estimate of the likely future demand for and thus return
from professional training. It follows that the number of lawyers will be
"excessive" in the standard economic sense chiefly where there has oc-
curred some reduction in the demand for lawyers that was unexpected by
those selecting legal training.
48
Is it likely that the stock of lawyers in the United States today is exces-
sive in this sense of the term? Almost surely not. As a general matter,
since 1970 the legal and regulatory regime has been expanded, not re-
stricted and, indeed, has been expanded dramatically.4 4 There perhaps
have been some specific legal specialties that have suffered decline such as
antitrust law; similarly, there have been greater and lesser waves of de-
mand over the last two decades for merger and acquisition work. These
variations, however, are hardly of the magnitudes of excess suggested by
the critics of the number of lawyers.45 Moreover, there are very few law-
yers so specialized in a subfield that they are unable to shift to substitute
fields where demand for their specialty has diminished. Of course, the
number of lawyers in the United States might be excessive even given the
expansion of liability if the rate of expansion were less than expected by
those entering law school. But this is unlikely to be true either; indeed,
the source of the great criticism of modem developments in the law is the
dramatic and unexpected character of the expansion of liability.
46
Scholars have developed other methods for estimating these dimen-
sions of change in the law and in the supply of lawyers. In a highly inter-
esting study, Peter Pashigian estimates returns to legal study from 1929-
1970 by deriving a figure representing the equilibrium number of lawyers,
defined in terms of the number that, if achieved, would reduce returns
from investment in legal education to competitive rates.4 7 Professor
Pashigian's estimates show that the equilibrium level oflawyers exceeded
the actual level increasingly from the late 1950s through 1970. According
to his estimate, in 1970 the actual earnings of lawyers were 29% higher
than the equilibrium level,48 indicating a severe deficiency of lawyers.
More recently, Sherwin Rosen has shown that the demand for lawyers in
the 1980s increased at even higher rates than during the 1970s, and that
lawyers' earnings increased substantially more than increases in the earn-
ings of all college graduates. 49 These findings are further evidence that,
43. Though unnecessary for this analysis, the reference to the demand for lawyers
should be interpreted broadly to acknowledge that law training and practice create a form of
versatility, applicable in many non-law occupations. Sherwin Rosen, employing Current Pop-
ulation Survey statistics, reports that, in 1987, 28.5 percent of lawyers were employed in non-
legal industry occupations. Rosen, supra note 37, at 220 (Table 1).
44. See genera/ly Priest, Invention, supra note 2.
45. See Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 667 (40% excess).
46. See sources cited supra note 6.
47. Pashigian, supra note 42, at 55-63.
48. Id. at 75 (Table 7).
49. Rosen, supra note 37, at 237-38.
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today and over the period studied by the critics, the United States has
suffered from a deficiency of lawyers, not an excess.
The critics of the number of lawyers in the United States, of course,
are not employing the term "excessive" in this standard economic sense.
For example, when Professor Magee claims that 40% of U.S. lawyers are
excessive, he does not mean that lawyers' current earnings are less than
the costs of the investments in legal training. Instead, Magee and the
other critics are using the term "excessive" as a normative allegation that
the work of 40% of modem U.S. lawyers is reducing rather than increasing
economic growth. According to this usage,50 these lawyers are engaged in
efforts that are redistributive-transferring money from one individual or
entity to another-without any productive contribution to the U.S.
economy.
The standard economic analysis of "excessive" supply, however, helps
to indicate the problematic character of the critics' allegation. To begin
the analysis, the Pashigian and Rosen studies, as described earlier, make
clear that U.S. lawyers today are earning greater than competitive returns,
which is to say that the demand for legal services exceeds the equilibrium
level of supply. What is the source of this demand? At the most general
level, of course, the demand for legal services is determined by the charac-
ter of the legal system. For example, the greater the requirements of gov-
ernmental regulation, the greater the demand will be for lawyers to aid in
compliance. Similarly, an expansion of standards of liability will create
greater opportunities for recovery of loss and, thus, the greater employ-
ment of lawyers skilled at seeking or opposing recovery.
According to this approach, it is immediately evident that the critics'
focus on the number of lawyers misses an important point. The number
of lawyers in any society will be determined by the need for legal services
and the opportunities for legal redress created by that country's legal sys-
tem. The number of lawyers will simply reflect the character of the legal
system. Thus, it is not the number of lawyers itself that increases or dimin-
ishes economic growth, but the legal system in which those lawyers oper-
ate. A country's legal system may encourage economic growth or diminish
it.5 1 The supply of lawyers, for better or worse, will be no more than deriv-
ative of the needs and opportunities created by a country's legal system.
This point is obvious, but it reveals the misleading character of the
critics' attack on lawyers. It makes no sense to claim that each lawyer or
each "excessive" lawyer diminishes economic growth by $1 million per
year, even putting aside the likely exaggeration of the estimate. If a coun-
try's legal system is characterized by excessive redistributional opportuni-
ties, the fault is that of the legal system, not of the lawyers working within
it. Indeed, given the character of the legal system, one cannot conclude
that lawyers' services themselves are unproductive.
50. Following OLSON, supra note 20, at 65-66, 70.
51. I shall address more fully how a legal system might diminish national wealth and
economic growth in the next Section.
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Some have argued that the number of lawyers itself can contribute to
the transformation of the legal system so that it becomes more redistribu-
tive in character. It has become a commonly heard criticism of the plain-
tiffs' bar that, variously, the existence of more lawyers, more aggressive
lawyers, or lawyers bringing more innovative cases will itself stimulate
judges to expand the law in redistributive ways.52 There is no strong evi-
dence of such an effect, and the basic mechanism of such influence re-
mains unexplained. 53 In the United States, judges define standards of law
and mustjustify those standards in their opinions. It is difficult to under-
stand how those justifications are influenced by the number of lawyers or
even by the number of lawyers raising particularly innovative arguments.
54
Moreover, in an adversary system, each case involves two parties present-
ing opposing theories of decision. By definition, therefore, judges are
presented theories that would expand the law equal in number to theories
that would restrict it.
Let us examine more carefully the normative characterization of law-
yers' services in the context of a redistributive legal system. Imagine, for
example, that some features of a country's legal system diminish economic
growth because they create excessive redistributional opportunities. Does
it follow that the number of lawyers in that country is excessive? Surely,
this is the sense in which the critics of the number of lawyers employ the
term.
This question cannot be answered generally. To determine the effect
of lawyers in even a clearly redistributive legal system requires a much
more precise specification of how the legal system impairs economic
growth. There are many ways in which some characteristics of a legal sys-
tem may impair economic growth, but where the contributions of lawyers
to that legal system are productive and increase national wealth. In such
contexts, to reduce the number of lawyers would further reduce economic
growth, rather than increase it.
A prominent recent example of the point is suggested by an ex-
traordinary book by Hernando de Soto, The OtherPath. De Soto describes
the legal regime of Peru, claiming that it derives from a tradition of redis-
tributive mercantilism designed to preserve the wealth of those with assets
52. For a related argument, seeJ. Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative
Law: The Effect of Cost, Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J.
LEGA. STUD. 451 (1988) (arguing that U.S. rules regarding contingency fees, class actions
and each party paying his own legal fees have importantly affected the expansion of substan-
tive tort law).
53. For a weak mechanism of case selection operating in the opposite direction, see
George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEcAL STUD. 65
(1977).
54. Sometimes this characterization of effect resembles the oldJerome Frankjoke about
being asked early in the evening by a dinner partner whether he knew a person he had never
heard of before, but after the third similar inquiry responding that the person's name now
was quite familiar. JEROME FRANF, COUmTS ON Tnmxi MwrH AND r IN AMmcAN JusTicE
viii (1950). Note that thejoke did not end with Frank admitting that the person was a mem-
ber of the family.
1993]
DENVER UATVERS!TY LAW REVIEW
by preventing competitive entry by fledgling entrepreneurs.5 5 De Soto
and his group found that, to comply fully with the laws and regulations of
Peru would require ten months at a cost equal to thirty-two times the
monthly minimum wage to start a business; eighty-three months to obtain
a permit to build housing on state-owned waste land; forty-three days to
open a retail store; seventeen years to open a market; and twenty-seven
months to gain an otherwise unused transport concession. 5 6 Regrettably,
de Soto does not report the number of lawyers in Peru, nor has the case of
Peru appeared in the various comparative studies of the relationship be-
tween lawyers and economic growth. Magee, Brock and Young have re-
ported statistics on three South and Central American countries whose
legal regimes may resemble Peru's: 5 7 Argentina, Costa Rica and Chile, all
of which have relatively high proportions of lawyers and relatively low eco-
nomic growth.5 8 Indeed, in both of Magee's studies, Chile represents the
single worst example, with the highest proportion of lawyers and among
the lowest rate of economic growth.
59
The important question suggested by the critics with respect to the
evaluation of lawyers, however, is this: If a country with a legal system like
that in Peru is characterized by a relatively high proportion of lawyers and
a relatively low rate of economic growth, can it be concluded that the
number of lawyers in the country is excessive? As de Soto emphasizes,
there may be no question that the system of law and regulation impairs
economic growth. There may also be no question that, reflecting this
legal system, the proportion of lawyers is relatively high. Does it follow
that the number of lawyers is excessive?
In a case like Peru, the answer must be no, suggesting a serious short-
coming in the inferences of those that are critical of relatively high pro-
portions of lawyers. In a country like Peru, the efforts of lawyers may well
reduce social costs by facilitating compliance with the regulations in effect.
Put more simply, without lawyers, the extended periods of time found nec-
essary by de Soto to obtain required permits might have been even longer.
Without lawyers, economic growth-however low-might even have been
lower.
The basic proposition of the critics is that a correlation between high
proportions of lawyers and low rates of economic growth suggests redistri-
bution, rather than production. Putting aside the broader question of
other determinants of economic growth and the manifold empirical
problems with the studies, there remains a broader conceptual failing to
55. HE.NANDO DE SOTO, THE O-t PATH 201-29 (1989). The broader point of the
book is his illustration of how the capitalistic impulses of the poor have encouraged them to
break the restrictive regulatory regime in various ways, vastly increasing their welfare and the
nation's output.
56. Id. at 133-46.
57. De Soto represents that the Peruvian problems that he discusses are characteristic of
other Latin American countries. Id. at xxiii. The point is not important, however, the Peru-
vian case is merely meant to be suggestive.
58. MAGEE Er Ai-, supra note 7, at 119 (Figure 8.2).
59. Rd; Magee, Optimum, supra note 7, at 673-73 (reproducing Epp's figures).
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this conclusion. Even if we accept that a correlation between a high pro-
portion of lawyers and low rates of economic growth demonstrates the
existence of a redistributive legal regime, it does not follow that the efforts
of lawyers within such a regime are redistributive, rather than productive.
It is necessary to define with much greater precision how the legal regime
operates redistributively before the normative judgment about lawyers can
be defended. The issue is very complicated, but the aggregate judgment
of Magee and other critics of lawyers is surely indefensible.
Although I do not pretend a complete analysis of this problem, we
might distinguish at the outset two separate ways in which a legal system
can operate to redistribute income, rather than to produce it. As we shall
see, in both cases, the normative characterization of lawyers' services is
quite problematic. First, imagine a complicated regulatory regime such as
that in Peru in which the redistributive features of the law are built into
the structure of regulation. Here, the efforts of lawyers who make the law
and enforce the regulations may be regarded as redistributive rather than
productive.60 Nevertheless, as explained above, the efforts of lawyers who
facilitate compliance with the regulations are engaged in productive,
rather than redistributive, activity. To return to the economic definition
of an "excessive" supply of lawyers, because of the extraordinary scale
economies of legislative activity, the private demand for legal services is
likely to principally represent a demand for aid in compliance with regula-
tion, rather than the production of it.61 It follows that, if returns on in-
vestment in legal education are greater than competitive-as in the
United States over the last two decades-then the number of lawyers in
the society is insufficient, and economic growth would be enhanced if
there were more lawyers, rather than fewer.
A second way in which a legal system can operate redistributively
rather than productively, however, is by creating opportunities for litiga-
tion which has no productive effect. For example, some critics of modern
tort law have emphasized it possesses features of a "lottery,"6 2 generates
windfalls, or resembles warfare. Each of these metaphors suggests chiefly
redistributive, rather than productive, effects. Ignoring recreational bene-
fits, gambling represents an investment of effort that provides no addi-
tional value in terms of resources to an economy and thus is entirely
redistributive. Similarly, warfare reduces productive investments for the
purpose of achieving redistributive ends.
60. In Professor Magee's most recent paper, he includes calculations of effects on eco-
nomic growth according to the number of lawyers in national legislatures. Magee, Optimum,
supra note 7, at 675-76. Even this measure is too crude. Those lawyers advocating redistribu-
tive regulation may impair economic growth; those lawyers opposing such regulation, how-
ever, improve it.
61. Obviously, this is an empirical question though the direction of effect is plausible.
62. Humaa, supra note 4, at 109-10. As will be explained more fully in the next Section, I
disagree with this characterization of modern tort law, though I will show how some features
of the law do not enhance national welfare or economic growth, as suggested by this
criticism.
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Nevertheless, even if a legal system possessed features that resembled
the redistributive aspects of gambling or warfare, the normative judgment
with respect to the role of lawyers remains complicated. For example,
even if those efforts of lawyers in pursuing lottery-like lawsuits are redis-
tributive, the efforts of lawyers opposing the suits are normatively produc-
tive because raising the costs of bringing redistributive lawsuits will reduce
their number. Similarly, while warfare in the aggregate is counterproduc-
tive, deterring warfare is productive and enhances welfare. Surely, the
world would be richer and economic growth higher if neither the former
Soviet Union nor the United States had invested to create massive military
reserves. From the standpoint of either one of the countries, however, the
investment was normatively productive because the investment restrained
one country from employing its military force against the other. Again,
aggregate characterizations of lawyers' efforts as redistributive, such as
those of Professor Magee and the other critics, are simplistic.
Returning to an economic analysis, even with respect to clearly redis-
tributive features of a legal system, where returns to lawyers are greater
than competitive, one cannot conclude that more lawyers will hurt, rather
than help, economic growth. Without more precise specification, the
costs of production in any industry are lowest where returns to investment
in production are competitive. Thus, in general, if there were more law-
yers rather than fewer, the extent of redistributive investments would
decline.
Of course, at a much more general level, if a way existed to eliminate
all purely redistributive characteristics of a legal system, national wealth
would increase. This is only to say that, if there were a way to eliminate the
threat of war, the resources invested in military armaments could be di-
verted to more socially useful ends. The point, however, is that the impor-
tant issue for national wealth and economic growth is not the number of
lawyers, but the nature of law reform. Aggregate characterizations of the
effort of lawyers as redistributive are not helpful because they do not gen-
erate useful suggestions for reform. Indeed, the next Part shows that the
gross distinction of this literature between redistributive versus productive
efforts is far too crude. It is possible with much greater detail to describe
the effects of modem tort and environmental law on national wealth and
economic growth and, in turn, on the competitiveness of U.S. producers.
III. LEGAL SYsTEMs, NATIONAL WEALTH AND INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS
The previous section showed that the number of lawyers in a country
derives from the nature of that country's legal system. It follows that more
important than the simple count of lawyers is the evaluation of how the
design and definition of a legal system contribute to or diminish national
wealth and the international competitiveness of U.S. producers. The crit-
ics of lawyers are not ignorant of this point. Although the relationship is
seldom emphasized, the complaint about the alleged oversupply of lawyers
in the United States frequently represents a thinly disguised criticism of
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the expansion of tort and environmental liability since the 1970s. At base,
these studies imply that the expansion of tort and environmental liability
has both increased the demand for lawyers and impaired U.S. economic
growth and international competitiveness.
This Part evaluates how different levels of environmental regulation
and different elements of modem tort law (including products liability law
and damages measures) affect national wealth and, thus, economic growth
and, in turn, influence the relative competitive position of U.S. producers.
There is little novelty to the analysis, but simple economics aids in evaluat-
ing the various conflicting claims about the effects of modern law. As we
shall see, the simple dichotomy between redistribution and production
characteristic of the literature criticizing lawyers does not aid analysis.
"Redistribution" may appropriately describe the ambitions of litigants, but
the term does not advance identification of how to reform our modern
legal regime to increase national wealth and competitiveness.
It is important at the outset to define the relationship between na-
tional wealth, economic growth, and international competitiveness. Na-
tional wealth is defined as the value of the composite resources available to
the society, including both physical and human capital resources. Na-
tional wealth increases-the economy grows-as new resources are discov-
ered or as available resources are employed more productively. The
international competitiveness of a country's producers is related to in-
creases in national wealth, but is not identical. A nation's wealth can be
increased by international trade where foreign markets place higher val-
ues on the nation's resources than the nation's citizens themselves. Thus,
the national wealth of the United States increases where U.S. producers
sell products or services in foreign markets at prices higher than their
costs of production. This does not mean, however, that the United States
would benefit from maximizing foreign sales or enhancing international
competitiveness at any cost. Obviously, foreign trade could be vastly in-
creased if American-made products or American-owned resources were
sold at below market prices or below true cost. Such sales, however, would
reduce national wealth, not increase it. International trade benefits na-
tional wealth only to the extent that foreign markets place equal or higher
values on resources owned or produced in the United States than do U.S.
citizens themselves. The continuous reallocation of resources toward
higher-valued uses constitutes economic growth.
Much of the discussion of international competitiveness has focussed
on the increasing U.S. trade deficits of recent years. As a general matter,
attention to trade balances is not helpful for the analysis of the effects of
legal controls on national wealth. 63 For example, a country may incur a
massive trade deficit yet still increase its national wealth. The trade deficit
only records the relationship between the prices of resources purchased
abroad and the prices of those sold abroad. To the extent that U.S. citi-
63. For a valuable demolition of myths about the trade balance, competitiveness and the
law, see Litan, supra note 13.
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zens purchase products or services from foreign producers at prices less
than the same products or services would cost at home, national wealth
increases because the current level of wealth in the United States is captur-
ing a larger set of resources.
In the most basic sense, the legal regime-whether environmental
regulation or tort law-affects national wealth and international competi-
tiveness as it allocates resources toward or away from more valuable uses.
For this analysis, it is useful to ignore the source of the legal control-that
is, whether the control derives from a governmental agency or a court-
imposed liability judgment-in favor of distinguishing between laws and
regulations which chiefly affect consumers of a product who are able to
freely buy or refuse to buy it and laws and regulations which affect a
broader population exposed to byproducts of the production process.
64
Examples of controls which affect the production process, but without di-
rect effect on product consumers, are emission constraints, water pollu-
tion discharge limitations, occupational safety and health regulation, and
the like. In contrast, examples of controls or liability triggered by charac-
teristics of a particular product thus affecting consumer choices are prod-
uct liability judgments or the direct regulation of product safety
characteristics. 65 As we shall see, although the evaluation of effects on
national wealth are not importantly different as between these forms of
regulation, there are important differences with respect to implications
for international competitiveness.
A. Controls on the Production Process
Analysis of the effects of controls on the production process is
straightforward, but provides a helpful introduction to the more compli-
cated issues regarding the regulation of product characteristics. I will re-
fer to such controls generically as forms of environmental regulation,
which most are, though they may be directed at problems such as occupa-
tional health and safety. As reported earlier, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen esti-
mate that environmental regulations diminished U.S. Gross National
Product from 1973-85 by .191 percentage points per year.6 6 These regula-
tions affected resource allocation by compelling substitution toward less
polluting inputs, by inducing investment in pollution abatement technol-
64. Richard B. Stewart has named this the distinction between "product" and "process"
regulation. Stewart, supra note 3, at 2042. See also Litan, supra note 13 (employing a similar
distinction); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From the Federal
Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 1329, 1333-37, 1340-45 (1992) (concerning the distinction
in the context of pollution).
65. This definition may differ from Stewart's. See sources cited supra note 64. For exam-
ple, Stewart defines hazardous waste discharge controls as a form of process regulation. Stew-
art, supra note 3, at 2042. According to the distinction I will follow, if the controls relate to
byproducts of the production process, they will be regarded as a form of production process
regulation; on the other hand, if they relate to characteristics of the product itself requiring
different levels of post-manufacture control, i.e., the disposal of batteries, fluorocarbons, or
chemicals, they will be regarded as a form of product characteristic regulation, which con-
sumers may wish to purchase or not.
66. Jorgenson & Wilcoxen, supra note 5, at 315.
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ogy, and by requiring changes in the production process to reduce emis-
sions. The U.S. industries most severely affected were coal mining, motor
vehicles, petroleum refining, primary metals, and pulp and paper.
67
While the magnitude of the diminution in Gross National Product is
clearly substantial, the authors concede that their estimate does not take
into account any offsetting benefits from the regulations. Under what
conditions will environmental regulations or other controls on the pro-
duction process increase or diminish national wealth and U.S.
competitiveness?
At the simplest level, environmental controls increase national wealth
to the extent that the net value of resources under the controlled alloca-
tion is greater than their value prior to the controls. Obviously, pollution
or other damage to the environment imposes costs on a society. For ex-
ample, recent reports have estimated serious damage to life expectancy
from airborne pollutants.68 Somewhat less directly, citizens of every soci-
ety value cleaner air and water; the weekends and vacations spent in the
mountains and countryside or the increasing preferences for a smoke-free
environment are obvious illustrations. As with any resource, however,
these preferences must-be exercised subject to cost constraints. Few can
afford to commute from the mountains; our cities cannot afford to re-
move all particulates from the air or to make urban rivers as pure as spring
water.
For purposes of national wealth, the issue is not simply how to elimi-
nate or even reduce such costs, but whether resources can be reallocated
so that the net of environmental values less related production costs is
greater after the reallocation than before. With respect to national wealth,
environmental purity is an input into production no different than other
more obvious forms of material and labor. If the quality of the environ-
ment is too low, the wealth of the society will be too low. Conversely, if
there are excessive investments in environmental purity, national wealth
declines. The objective is to achieve the optimal level of environmental
quality: all investments in environmental quality for which the benefit
from the investment is greater than the cost.
6 9
Environmental controls affect international competitiveness, obvi-
ously, because higher levels of environmental control increase production
costs, increase prices and, thus, reduce sales. In terms of national wealth,
however, if these controls make the level of domestic environmental qual-
ity optimal, then national wealth is maximized. If the level of environmen-
tal control is too low, costs and prices will be lower and sales higher-the
nation's producers may appear more competitive-but national wealth
will decline. Maintaining an excessively low level of environmental quality
67. Id. at 315-16.
68. See, e.g., PhilipJ. Hilts, Studies Say Soot Kills Up To 60,000 in U.S. Each Year, N.Y. TiMES,
July 19, 1993, at Al.
69. Obviously, statistics such as changes in Gross Domestic Product do not adequately
capture effects on aesthetic values. Cost-benefit analysis is probably the most helpful tool for
such analysis, but many benefits of environmental control cannot adequately be estimated in
monetary terms alone.
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is the equivalent of selling a national resource at a price below its true
costs of production. Conversely, if environmental controls are excessively
high-that is, if the costs of the controls exceed the benefits-national
wealth will decline as sales decline. Environmental controls that are exces-
sively high represent the society's purchase of the resource of environmen-
tal quality at a price greater than its worth.
There is extensive rhetoric in the modem debate over international
competitiveness about the unfair trade advantages of countries that im-
pose lower levels of environmental controls on their domestic producers
than those prevalent in the United States. Some commentators, for exam-
ple, have endorsed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
but only on the condition that Mexico increase the level of internal Mexi-
can environmental regulation."0 The aggregation of interests involved in
the success of NAFTA is a complicated matter, but on its face, such a posi-
tion, if implemented, may well reduce rather than increase the national
wealth of the United States. Because of greater environmental regulation,
the costs of producing certain products-those whose production gener-
ates pollution in some form-may well be higher in the United States than
in Mexico. As a consequence, Mexican producers are able to sell such
products at prices less than U.S. producers. These higher costs of-U.S.
production, however, represent the higher value that U.S. citizens place
on environmental quality than Mexican citizens and are appropriately in-
cluded in the price of products manufactured in the United States.
Should the United States impose environmental values on Mexican
citizens that the Mexicans themselves do not find worth their cost? 7 1 It is
straightforward that imposing such values will reduce the wealth of Mexico
in the same way that excessive levels of environmental regulation in the
United States would reduce U.S. national wealth. Regardless of principle,
will the United States benefit? The answer depends upon the markets in
which United States and Mexican producers of affected products com-
pete. As a general matter, to the extent that the costs of Mexican products
increase because of such environmental controls, the sales of competing
U.S. products will increase. With respect to sales in Mexico and in other
non-U.S. markets, the increase in sales of U.S. producers will represent a
clear gain to U.S. national wealth, albeit at the expense of Mexican na-
tional wealth.
To the extent that United States and Mexican producers compete for
sales to U.S. citizens, however, the imposition of U.S. environmental con-
trols in Mexico will diminish, rather than increase, U.S. national wealth,
and at no net gain to Mexico's citizens. As described above, a country
benefits by obtaining equivalent resources at the lowest possible price. To
the extent that Mexican products are sold at artificially higher prices be-
cause of environmental regulations that the Mexicans themselves do not
70. For a brief discussion, see Lloyd Bentsen, NAFJA: The Post-Protectionist Era?, N.Y.
TPMEs, July 21, 1993, at Cll (advertisement).
71. I put aside any question of the democratic adequacy of Mexican political
institutions.
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value, U.S. consumers lose because the prices that they must pay are
higher. Put differently, the imposition in Mexico of U.S. environmental
regulations compels U.S. consumers of Mexican products to pay for a level
of environmental quality in Mexico greater than the value that Mexicans
place on that resource themselves. Here, U.S. producers are made more
competitive against the Mexicans, but at the expense of U.S. consumers.
As a consequence, both United States and Mexican national wealth de-
creases, though there are redistributional gains to U.S. producers.
Note that this analysis must distinguish between environmental pollu-
tion that affects only Mexicans and pollution that affects U.S. citizens as
well. For example, to the extent that Mexican-generated pollutants affect
U.S. citizens-say, with respect to production near the border 7 2 -it is en-
tirely appropriate to compel Mexican producers to comply with U.S., not
Mexican, standards of environmental quality. Again, where U.S. citizens
suffer the consequences, their values with respect to the appropriate level
of environmental quality ought to control because it is their environment
that is being employed as an input to Mexican production. In contrast, to
the extent that the pollutants affect only Mexican citizens-for example,
with respect to production near Mexico City or farther south-the envi-
ronmental values of Mexico's citizens should control. It would diminish
the wealth of both the United States and Mexico if higher U.S. standards
were somehow imposed in this context.
Has the expansion of U.S. environmental regulation harmed U.S.
competitiveness? The answer must be yes7" since U.S. environmental reg-
ulations are stricter than those of most other countries. 74 Moreover, the
growth in environmental regulation is one likely source of increase in the
number and proportion of lawyers over the past decades because of the
increasing necessity of ensuring compliance. Here, however, it is clear
that the critics miss the point with their gross indictment of the number of
lawyers and their crude differentiation between productive and redistribu-
tive efforts. Obviously, if the level of environmental regulation is either
too low or optimal, the lawyers employed for purposes of compliance in-
crease national wealth. To the extent that the level of environmental reg-
ulation is too high, there is admittedly a redistributive effect: consumers
who place higher than market values on environmental quality obtain the
resource by paying only an average price. Nevertheless, is the number of
lawyers excessive? Are those lawyers whose efforts reduce the costs of com-
pliance engaged in non-productive, redistributive activity? Given the regu-
lation, surely not. Given the regulation, the efforts of lawyers to reduce
compliance costs increases national wealth.
72. For a discussion of border pollution problems, see Note, Protecting the Environment
and U.S. Competitiveness in the Era of Free Trade: A Proposal, 71 Thx. L. Rzv. 1355, 1373-74
(1993).
73. SeeJorgenson & Wilcoxen, supra note 5, at 315-16 (estimating the magnitude of the
effect).
74. SeeJoseph P. Kalt, The Impact of Domestic Environmental Regulatory Policies on U.S. Inter-
national Competitiveness, in INTERNATIONAL CoMPErVENEss 221, 249 (A. Michael Spence &
Heather A. Hazard, eds., 1988).
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Similarly, the focus on competitiveness misses the point. Again, envi-
ronmental controls may harm competitiveness, yet still increase national
wealth as long as the benefits of those controls exceed their costs. Where
environmental controls are set at the optimal level, the reduction in U.S.
competitiveness and the continued employment of lawyers will increase
national wealth rather than reduce it. On the other hand, if U.S. consum-
ers, because of environmental controls, are in effect paying higher prices
for environmental purity than its value to them, national wealth dimin-
ishes. Correcting that problem may secondarily improve competitiveness
and reduce the demand for lawyers, but the source of the problem is not
the number of lawyers, but the incorrect translation of consumer prefer-
ences for environmental quality into the appropriate level of regulation. 75
B. Controls on Consumer Products and Seroices
The analytical framework for determining the implications for the
competitiveness of U.S. product and service manufacturers of liability and
regulation is similar to that for environmental regulation, though several
considerations are more complicated. The control of product characteris-
tics-through products liability judgments and specific product safety reg-
ulation-of course, has been the most sharply criticized feature of modem
law. No one can doubt that an extraordinary expansion of products liabil-
ity has occurred since the 1970s in all jurisdictions of the country.7 6 In
response, products have been designed so that they are less susceptible to
injurious accidents. 77 In addition, that component of production costs
represented by liability payouts and insurance premiums has increased
dramatically for virtually all U.S. products and services.78
These developments have impelled vituperative criticism with respect
to effects on U.S. competitiveness. Although the conceptual basis of much
of the criticism is not well worked out, the claims have been broadcast
widely enough that they merit careful review. For example, it has been
alleged that U.S. products liability law imposes costs on U.S. businesses
"that are three to eight times higher than comparable costs for foreign
competitors."79 These higher costs derive from several sources. First, it is
claimed that, because United States and foreign producers sell relatively
larger proportions of their products in their own domestic markets, "it
translates into higher overhead for U.S. firms simply because of the higher
cost of doing business in the United States."80 Second, U.S. manufactur-
75. For cost-benefit estimates of the effects of environmental regulation, see G.B. Chris-
tainsen & T.H. Tietenberg, Distributional and Macroeconomic Aspects of Environmental Policy, in 1
HANDBOOK OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY ECONOMiCS 345 (Allen V. Kneese &James L.
Sweeney eds., 1985).
76. See, Priest, Invention, supra note 2, at 518.
77. George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate in LsntmLr. PERSPEC-
TIVES AND PoLY 184 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988).
78. See Priest, Risk Contro4 supra note 2, at 207.
79. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 180. Other authors support the claim of higher
costs, but attribute them to the interaction of U.S. product liability and workers' compensa-
tion costs. See, e.g., Stayin, supra note 6, at 193.
80. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 181. See also Stayin, supra note 6, at 199.
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ers incur higher costs than foreign competitors "because of their earlier
domination of many industries."8 ' The imposition by courts of "long-tail"
liability on products manufactured many years earlier, "exposes U.S. busi-
nesses to the additional overhead costs of insuring against liability from
these older products."8 2 Third, these legal differences are exacerbated
because of the overly litigious attitudes of U.S. consumers in contrast to
"the fatalistic attitude [toward loss] of Europeans" or the anti-litigation atti-
tudes of Japanese.8 3 Finally, it is alleged that there are systemic jurisdic-
tional disadvantages to U.S. manufacturers: "A U.S. business is always
subject to U.S. product liability laws, even when doing business in a for-
eign country with foreign citizens."8 4 In contrast, "[floreign manufactur-
ers . . . are not equally subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and
therefore, may not be subject to U.S. product liability laws-even when
their products are sold in the United States."8 5 As a consequence of these
various causes, U.S. manufacturing competitiveness is alleged to be seri-
ously impaired.8 6
The next two subsections evaluate these claims. Subsection 1 ad-
dresses how the expansion of products liability in the United States since
the 1970s has affected product design and development including the
costs of maintaining product liability insurance. It also discusses the impli-
cations of these developments for national wealth. Subsection 2, discusses
how these developments affect the relative competitiveness of U.S. manu-
facturers and the evaluation of the role of lawyers.
1. How the expansion of products liability affects product safety,
product loss insurance and' national wealth
The broad expansion of products liability since the late 1960s and
1970s has been justified as attaining two goals: to improve the level of
product safety and to provide greater compensation to consumers for
product-related losses. Liabilityjudgments were the means to attain both
goals: safety, by establishing financial incentives to encourage greater
manufacturer investments; and compensation, by encouraging manufac-
turers to provide consumers with a form of product loss insurance with the
proportionate premium built into the product price.
8 7
81. Cortese & BIaner, supra note 6, at 181.
82. Id. See also Stayin, supra note 6, at 199.
83. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 184.
84. Id. at 180.
85. Id. See also Stayin, supra note 6, at 201-02.
86. See Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 180-81; Stayin, supra note 6, at 193; Hagglund
& Igbanugo, supra note 6, at 358-61.
87. For a now classic statement of enterprise liability rationale, see Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-42 (Cal. 1944) (en banc) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en banc). These develop-
ments are described in Priest, Invention, supra note 2.
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a. Product safety
Few would doubt that, as liability standards have been expanded since
the 1970s, manufacturers have been led to make greater investments in
order to reduce the extent of product-related injuries.8 8 As with the im-
pact of environmental regulations on national wealth, however, analysis
does not end with the observation of greater manufacturer investments in
safety. Rather, it is necessary to evaluate the relationship between the ben-
efits of these investments and their costs. From an economic view, manu-
facturer investments in product design are inputs toward safety, but not
exclusive inputs. Manufacturer investments are both complements and
substitutes of consumer investments. Consumers may make allocative in-
vestments to reduce the probability of a product-related loss in various
ways, including choosing a product suitable for the consumer's needs and
using the product in a way that optimizes safety, both with respect to the
method and frequency of use.8 9 At the margin, consumer investments in
safety will be determined in response to manufacturer investments: the
greater the level of manufacturer safety-related investments, the less care-
ful consumers must be, and the reverse.
From the standpoint of national wealth, the level of optimal product
safety-like the level of optimal environmental quality-is the point at
which the costs of further investments in safety are exactly equal to ex-
pected benefits. At any point less-where benefits are greater than
costs-the wealth of the nation could be increased by further safety-re-
lated investments. Conversely, at any point beyond, the costs invested in
safety garner a lower return, reducing national wealth.
It is obvious that tort liability will encourage a manufacturer (or any
other economic actor) to make safety-related investments in order to avoid
subsequent liability for loss. Nevertheless, it is well established in the law
and economics literature that there is a limit to the extent to which manu-
facturers will invest to increase the level of safety.90 Since it is presumed
that manufacturers seek to maximize profits, a manufacturer can be pre-
dicted to continue investments toward greater product safety only to the
point at which further safety-related investments are more expensive than
paying damage judgments (whether directly or through insurance) for
losses that still occur. Obviously, it is not feasible economically (or even
possible) to prevent all product-related losses. As a consequence, it is una-
voidable that a manufacturer (or a society) must, at some point, deter-
mine where to end further safety-related investments.
If damages measures are perfectly compensatory, then manufacturers
will be induced to invest in safety exactly to the point at which the costs of
further investment are equal to benefits, the optimal point in terms of
88. For a crude comparison of product design before and after the expansion of liability
standards, see Priest, supra note 77.
89. For a more complete explanation of consumer investments in product safety, see
George L. Priest, A Theory of the ConsumerProduct Waranty, 90 YALE UI. 1297, 1310-13 (1981).
90. For an early statement of this point, see RscH A. PoSER, EcoNoMirc ANALYSIS OF
LAw 90 (1st ed. 1972).
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national wealth. This optimal point will be reached, in general, without
regard to the definition of the liability standard. If there were no manu-
facturer liability, then market forces would encourage optimal manufac-
turer investments. On the other hand, if there were absolute
manufacturer liability, it would remain cheaper for manufacturers to end
safety-related investments at the optimizing point, paying damages for re-
maining losses.91
I have emphasized the assumption of perfectly compensatory damage
measures. The assumption is important because in a liability system dam-
ages constitute the price mechanism for informing manufacturers of the
value of further investments in safety. Obviously, if damages measures
were lower than compensatory, the price signal to manufacturers would
suggest that the costs of injuries were lower than they actually were. Mar-
ket forces may still lead manufacturers to optimal investments in safety,
but there is a risk, as with any undervaluation of a resource, that the sig-
nals provided by the liability system would lead to underinvestments in
safety, reducing national wealth.
Conversely, where damages measures are greater than compensatory,
the liability system is placing a greater price on the resource than its value.
Here, national wealth will clearly decline. Where damages measures are
greater than perfectly compensatory, manufacturers will be induced to
make greater investments in safety than are socially optimal.
There are two prominent ways in which damages measures may fail in
this regard. First, under U.S. law, damages for personal injury are deter-
mined by the sum of lost income, medical expenses and pain and suffer-
ing. Damages can be greater than compensatory if any of these damages
elements is exaggerated, either by expansive predictions of future wage or
medical expense losses or by excessive calculations of pain and suffering.
Second, damages judgments are greater than compensatory where ex-
emplary damages are levied, such as punitive damages. There are circum-
stances in which punitive damages can serve a positive, wealth enhancing,
role. Where the detection of either the occurrence of loss or the appro-
priate attribution of its source is incomplete, a punitive levy can restore
total damages to the aggregate compensatory level. For example, if some
set of product-related injuries were detected only once every three times
they occurred, a punitive levy of treble damages would adjust the aggre-
gate damages total to the appropriate compensatory level.92 Obviously,
this is not likely to be a common occasion; especially following the expan-
sion of manufacturer liability, consumers are probably more rather than
less likely to attribute harm to a manufacturer than to other possible
sources. Punitive levies may be justified on these grounds, however, where
manufacturers have concealed research indicating product-related harms
or fraudulently altered test results to secure regulatory approval.93
91. See id
92. See id, at 77-78.
93. For a broader discussion of punitive damages in products liability contexts, see
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE UJ. 1521 (1987)
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The only other role for punitive damages in the context of product
manufacture is substantially more problematic in terms of national wealth.
Many have defended punitive damages levies on manufacturers essentially
as a method of in terrorem deterrence, arguing that, in contexts of egre-
gious departures from normal safety standards, manufacturers ought to be
charged more than compensatory damages for a loss in order to discour-
age similar behavior in the future. Here the punitive levy is employed to
reorient a manufacturer's priorities or judgment.
94
This justification is problematic because it is typically articulated with
seeming obliviousness to the deterrent role of compensatory damages. Ac-
cording to economic analysis, the levy of compensatory damages serves a
deterrent function toward encouraging safety, indeed, a deterrent func-
tion precisely measured to attain the socially optimal level of deterrence.
Because manufacturers are profit-maximizers, compensatory damages will
lead them to invest exactly the socially optimal amount in safety so that
consumer and societal welfare is maximized. A further levy of punitive
damages will surely increase the level of deterrence. The additional deter-
rence, however, will in general reduce national wealth by encouraging ex-
cessive manufacturer investments in safety.
This in terrorem deterrence justification for punitive damages derives
from behavioral assumptions that at base are contradictory or, at the least,
build upon psychological response assumptions that are very fragile. To
find that a manufacturer deserves liability for punitive damages implies
that the manufacturer-however otherwise acting to maximize profits-
somehow failed to respond to the strong financial incentives created by
compensatory damages to make investments in safety to the socially opti-
mal point. On the other hand, to believe that the punitive damages levy
will enhance welfare implies that the manufacturer will switch and become
responsive to a different (admittedly greater) financial incentive.
With respect to the broader ambition of employing punitive damages
as a general social deterrent, the assumptions become even more fragile.
Are there many manufacturers who are likely to be ignorant of the finan-
cial incentives created by compensatory damages, sensitive to the financial
incentives created by punitive damages, but who in response will invest in
safety to the socially optimal point determined by the compensatory,
rather than the punitive, incentive? Perhaps, but, to date, there are no
data supporting the effectiveness of punitive damages in encouraging opti-
mal safety in product manufacture. The more likely effect is to reduce
national wealth by encouraging excessive manufacturer investments.
[hereinafter Priest, Insurance Crisis]. For a more comprehensive discussion, see Dorsey D.
Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1982).
94. For a more complete discussion, see Ellis, supra note 93. Others defend punitive
damages on moral and retributive rather than economic grounds. Punitive damages levied
for retributive purposes represent a cost inflicted by the society on itself. As with warfare,
retribution diminishes a nation's wealth.
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b. Product insurance
As described above, except for the levy of greater than compensatory
damages, there is a maximum amount beyond which a manufacturer will
not make further investments in product safety. Increasing levels of manu-
facturer liability beyond this maximum will shift liability costs to manufac-
turers leading them, in essence, to provide insurance for product-related
losses. Again, the founders of our modem tort law regime understood this
would occur and believed that the provision of compensation insurance
for product losses would benefit the society. The expansion of liability in
order to increase levels of consumer compensation remains one of the
great humanitarian gestures of the post-War era,9 5 but there is wide agree-
ment today that it has harmed, iather than helped, consumers in the ag-
gregate.96 These points have been developed more extensively elsewhere,
but, briefly, insurance delivered through the tort system imposes excessive
levels of administrative costs, provides a form of insurance coverage that
consumers do not value (in particular, coverage of pain and suffering
losses), and systematically discriminates against the relatively low income
of the population of product consumers (because they must pay the same
product insurance premium as the high income, but receive lost income
and pain and suffering coverage at a much lower level). 9 7 Ignoring the
redistributional harm to the poor, I have separately estimated that insur-
ance provided through the tort system is between 64% and 134% more
costly than comparable first-party insurance coverage. 98 These greater in-
surance costs themselves reduce national wealth. In addition, there are
strong reasons to believe that many products have been driven from the
market because of the adverse insurance effects of the expanded U.S.
products liability.
2. How the expansion of products liability affects U.S.
competitiveness
The evaluation of the effects on competitiveness of the expansion of
products liability is different from the expansion of environmental regula-
tion. The effects of environmental regulation are chiefly domestic. As de-
scribed earlier, environmental regulation represents the purchase of some
level of environmental quality by U.S. residents. Product safety and insur-
ance are similar with respect to U.S. consumers. But, for foreign consum-
ers, the effects are different, because foreign consumers may or may not
wish to purchase the same level of product safety and insurance purchased
by Americans. It is this difference that has motivated the great concern
about the effects of the expansion of products liability on U.S. trade
competitiveness.
95. See Priest, Invention, supra note 2, at 463.
96. See Priest, Insurance Cnsis, supra note 92, at 1534-39.
97. See generaly id.
98. Id. at 1556.
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The previous subsection described three effects of the expansion of
products liability: 1) compensatory damages encourage manufacturer in-
vestments toward the optimal level of product safety for U.S. consumers;
2) damages beyond compensatory, including punitive damages, en-
courage investments in safety greater than the optimal; and 3) the expan-
sion of liability induces the provision of insurance for product-related
losses at a cost substantially greater than its benefits. How do these effects
influence U.S. trade competitiveness? First, there is no reason to believe
that levels of product safety generated by compensatory damages, however
optimal for U.S. consumers, correspond to levels optimal in different in-
ternational markets. As with environmental quality, U.S. consumers are
likely to demand greater levels of safety than most foreigners. U.S. manu-
facturers, of course, could design and sell products in foreign markets with
appropriately different safety characteristics, and some probably do. Seg-
regating products according to levels of safety, however, diminishes advan-
tages from economies of scale in production, increasing costs and
reducing foreign sales of U.S. manufacturers.
There are no grounds, however, to criticize this source of the reduc-
tion in U.S. trade. It enhances the wealth of the United States to attain
the optimal level of product safety for U.S. consumers. Put differently,
U.S. consumers would be worse off if products were designed to corre-
spond to any other safety level. The adverse effect on U.S. trade from the
inability to take advantage of manufacturing scale economies is attributa-
ble to the dominance of U.S. consumers among the world-wide consumer
population, not to U.S. products liability law.
In contrast, the second effect of the expansion of liability-greater
than optimal safety because of the imposition of greater than compensa-
tory damages, including punitive damages-both harms U.S. consumers
directly and exacerbates the effects of differential international demand
for safety. U.S. consumers are harmed because exemplary damages en-
courages manufacturers to make safety-related investments whose costs ex-
ceed their benefits. U.S. trade is harmed because these excessive
manufacturer investments will likely generate even lower levels of value to
foreign consumers. The levy of exemplary damages in the products con-
text, thus, imposes a double harm on U.S. national wealth.
The third effect of the expansion of liability-the provision of insur-
ance for product-related losses-may well reduce national wealth for sales
within the United States, but may have no adverse effect on U.S. trade
depending upon the legal regime in force in the context of losses suffered
by foreign consumers. If foreign consumers are constrained to recover
according to the law of the country in which the product was sold, and
that country has not-as most have not-expanded products liability to
shift insurance burdens to manufacturers, then U.S. manufacturers need
not attach an insurance premium to the price of products sold in foreign
markets. The same product may be sold in the United States at a price
that includes insurance, but in a foreign market at a lower price without
the same compensation insurance package. As long as these jurisdictional
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constraints are preserved, then the expansion of liability to provide con-
sumers insurance will have no adverse effect on U.S. trade though, again,
it reduces U.S. wealth by providing insurance to U.S. consumers at a cost
greater than its value to them.
This analysis suggests that the various popular criticisms of the effects
of modem liability on trade competitiveness are grossly imprecise. For
example, it was claimed that U.S. manufacturers face higher costs of pro-
duction than foreign manufacturers because of U.S. standards of liabil-
ity.99 This claim may be accurate in part, but the source of higher U.S.
manufacturing costs must be clearly denominated before criticism is ap-
propriate. U.S. manufacturers may face higher production costs in gen-
eral because U.S. consumers demand higher levels of product safety and
quality than foreign consumers. This difference provides no grounds for
the criticism of U.S. law, as long as that law is equally applied to foreign
manufacturers with respect to their sales within U.S. markets. 10 0 Whatever
the market, consumers should receive the level of product safety and qual-
ity optimal for them.
In contrast, to the extent that manufacturing costs in the United
States are higher than abroad because of the imposition of greater than
compensatory damages recoveries, including punitive damages recoveries,
then U.S. manufacturing costs are artificially higher for reasons that, in
the aggregate, provide no demonstrable benefit to consumers. 10 1 The
wealth of U.S. consumers would increase and U.S. trade competitiveness
would increase at no loss to consumers if punitive damages levies were
curtailed.
Finally, to the extent that total product costs are higher for U.S. man-
ufacturers because of the provision of insurance compelled by expanded
standards of products liability, sales will decline. There will be no general
effect on competitiveness, however, as long as foreign manufacturers are
subject to identical standards for sales within the United States and as long
as foreign consumers cannot generally recover in U.S. courts for product-
related losses. This is not to deny that, within the United States, U.S. con-
sumers as well as U.S. and foreign manufacturers lose from the compul-
sion of expanded standards of manufacturer liability to provide tort law
product insurance. Because that insurance imposes costs greater than
benefits, U.S. national wealth would increase by constraining liability.
Nevertheless, this insurance generates no clear loss to U.S.
competitiveness.
For the same reason, the allegedly greater litigiousness of United
States than of foreign consumers will not generally affect U.S. competitive-
ness. As long as foreign manufacturers are equally subject to U.S. litigious-
ness with respect to their sales in U.S. markets, and as long as U.S.
manufacturers are free of such litigiousness for their sales in foreign mar-
99. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 179-80.
100. For some problems in this regard, see infra text accompanying notes 112-20.
101. Again, exceptions are cases in which the punitive levy restores total damages to an
aggregate compensatory level. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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kets, there will be no differential effect on trade competitiveness.
Whether differential litigiousness exists, of course, is hotly contested.
10 2
Obviously, where there are greater opportunities for recovery through the
legal system, citizens are more likely to exercise them and, thus, to appear
litigious. As with criticisms of the number of lawyers, however, the source
of the problem is not some collection of individual attitudes or predisposi-
tions, but rather the character of the legal system. The best way to estab-
lish an appropriate level of national litigiousness is to establish a legal
system that encourages optimal-but not greater than optimal-invest-
ments in environmental quality and product safety.
One further common complaint about modem U.S. law-the com-
plaint about "long-tail" liability- is generally without merit, at least with
respect to competitiveness. Long-tail liability for products manufactured
years before will not generally affect current product prices in competitive
markets. Prospective liability for products manufactured years before re-
sembles a sunk cost-it is no more than an expense against assets-and
cannot be taken into account in determining the price to be charged for
new products. The price of new products may include a premium for ex-
pected long-tail liability attaching to those products themselves. But that
premium must be added to the price of products sold in the United States
by both domestic and foreign manufacturers.' 0 3 Admittedly, the assets of
manufacturers of durable products may decline and even decline drasti-
cally as long-tail liability expands. That liability, however, cannot generally
affect current product prices, thus, it cannot affect competitiveness. In a
competitive market, a manufacturer must set a product price at least equal
to all expected costs related to that product. Competition prevents setting
the price higher to recoup other losses or attain monopoly returns.
This conclusion, however, should not be read as an endorsement of
long-tail liability, but only that long-tail liability-as long as it is applied
equally to durable products whether manufactured in the United States or
elsewhere-will not generally affect competitiveness. From the standpoint
of national wealth, long-tail liability is probably harmful. The principal
problem of long-tail liability is that it holds manufacturers liable according
to current safety standards for design and manufacturing decisions made
many years before. Except where manufacturers might have responded to
current safety innovations by cost-effectively improving earlier products,
long-tail liability converts the manufacturer into an insurer with respect to
previous sales. As with other forms of insurance, long-tail liability insur-
ance is excessively costly because it is delivered through the tort system,'
0 4
thus, national wealth declines.
Finally, as reported earlier, some critics of the modem expansion of
liability complain that rules of jurisdiction and choice of law are heavily
slanted against U.S. manufacturers. Many claim that foreign consumers
can always recover against U.S. manufacturers in U.S. courts under U.S.
102. See Galanter, supra note 10.
103. But see infra text accompanying notes 112-20.
104. For a discussion of tort law insurance, see supra text accompanying note 96.
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standards of liability and damages, but that U.S. consumers can never re-
cover against foreign manufacturers selling in U.S. markets. As a conse-
quence, U.S. trade is said to be badly damaged.
10 5
These claims are exaggerated, but there remain serious grounds for
concern on this point. There are many examples of judicial rulings in
product cases on issues involving jurisdiction and choice of law that inflict
harm on U.S. trade without any clearly offsetting advantages. Since U.S.
rules ofjurisdiction and choice of law do not overtly address trade effects,
these problems may accelerate in the future.
In terms of principle, the analysis is straightforward and resembles the
analysis of the regulation of environmental quality. Consumers of differ-
ent nationalities are likely to prefer or be able to pay for different levels of
product safety. It will enhance the wealth of any nation for its citizens to
receive exactly the level of safety optimal for them. To impose a higher
level of safety than optimal will reduce their aggregate wealth because it
compels them to purchase product characteristics whose costs are greater
than the benefits to them.
As a general proposition, this suggests that lawsuits involving product-
related losses should be controlled by standards of liability and measures
of damages in effect in the jurisdiction in which the consumer purchased
the product. The law of the national market will provide the best evidence
of the level of product safety optimal for the consumers of that nation. To
apply any different, higher standard of liability will compel consumers to
purchase a level of product quality greater than they value.
It is not surprising that many foreign consumers of U.S. products seek
to file suit in U.S. courts for product-related losses, given the expansion of
liability in the United States, especially relative to standards applicable in
other countries. Foreign consumers can expect stricter standards of man-
ufacturer liability and more expansive measures of damages in U.S. courts
than in their own courts. As a general matter, rules ofjurisdiction in the
United States allow suit, variously, in the venue in which the product was
manufactured or in which the manufacturer is incorporated or doing busi-
ness, though limited by procedural doctrines, such as forum non conveniens.
The approach of U.S. courts has been inconsistent with respect to
entertaining suits by foreign consumers against U.S. manufacturers. The
Texas Supreme Court, for example, held for many years that Texas law did
not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens, thus allowing suits
under U.S. law by foreign consumers against U.S. corporations.' 0 6 To al-
low such suits, however, damages U.S. trade without aggregate benefit to
consumers in foreign nations. Allowing suits by foreign consumers under
U.S. law compels U.S. manufacturers to conform products sold in foreign
markets to U.S. standards of product safety and to accompany the sale of
these products with U.S. levels of compensation insurance. Both the level
105. See sources cited supra note 6.
106. Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 674-77 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1024 (1991).
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of safety and the extent of insurance coverage, however, are typically
greater than those demanded by foreign consumers. If foreign consumers
demanded U.S. levels of product safety and insurance, their domestic law
would more closely resemble U.S. law. The point is painfully obvious with
respect to European countries, all of which provide extensive government
supported health and medical compensation systems, rather than relying
on manufacturers to finance medical care for product-related losses. Put
in economic terms, therefore, to impose U.S. law on sales in foreign mar-
kets imposes an additional price that foreign consumers must pay for
safety and insurance that is greater than its value to them.
Similar issues are often raised in cases involving choice of law ques-
tions. For example, in Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a Colorado federal
district court selected application of the strict liability standard of Iowa
over the negligence standard of Alberta, Canada in a suit brought by a
Canadian farmer against a U.S. manufacturer. 10 7 The court sought to
identify the jurisdiction with "the most significant relationship" to the in-
jury. The product was designed and manufactured in Iowa, but sold in
Canada where the injury occurred. The court applied Iowa law on the
grounds that Iowa products liability law provided greater remedies to con-
sumers than did the law of Canada. According to the court,
The United States has a legitimate interest in assuring that do-
mestic law is applied when a foreign plaintiff claiming to have
been injured by an American corporation chooses a court in this
country in seeking redress.... Canada provides no strict prod-
ucts liability remedy and creates the bar of assumption of risk to
preclude recovering even for negligently inflicted injuries....
Moreover, the existence of unlimited punitive and exemplary
damages in Iowa, illustrates that state's policy to deter, punish
and make an example of, certain dangerous corporate
conduct.' 08
This decision, too, though beneficial to the plaintiffs in the case,
harms Canadian consumers in general and harms U.S. trade. If consum-
ers in Canada desired or thought that they might benefit from American
standards of manufacturer liability or unlimited punitive damages, their
legislatures or their courts could adopt those principles. 10 9 For a U.S.
court to provide for Canadians a set of legal standards that Canadians
themselves do not appear to desire has the effect simultaneously of raising
costs in Canada and reducing U.S. trade competitiveness. Canadian man-
ufacturers will gain because they do not have to include American liability
107. Kozoway v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 641 (D. Colo. 1989).
108. Id. at 644.
109. In addition to limitations on substantive liability and punitive damages, the Supreme
Court of Canada has imposed a limitation on pain and suffering recoveries starkly below that
of the U.S. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 229 (1978) (finding $100,000.00
(Canadian) as the upper limit to be awarded for non-pecuniary damages); Thornton v. School
Dist. No. 57 (Prince George), 2 S.C.R. 267 (1978) (limiting damages for pain and suffering, loss
of amenities and shortened expectation of life to $100,000.00 (Canadian)); Arnold v. Teno, 2
S.C.R. 287 (1978) (ceiling of $100,000.00 (Canadian) for pain and suffering, inflation-in-
dexed from 1978).
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costs in the prices of their products; American manufacturers lose com-
mensurately; Canadian consumers lose because they face fewer affordable
choices. The State of Iowa may well possess a policy to deter "dangerous
corporate conduct," but, except perhaps for criminal activity, that state's
policy must be designed-however mistakenly with respect to strict liability
and unlimited punitive damages-for the benefit of Iowa and U.S. con-
sumers who pay for it in the price of the products sold domestically.
Other courts have refused to entertain suits by foreign consumers
under U.S. law, although traditional grounds for decisions regarding juris-
diction and venue are not generally sensitive to the trade and welfare is-
sues discussed here. For example, the California Supreme Court recently
denied jurisdiction in a suit brought by foreign purchasers of artificial
heart valves against a California manufacturer that designed, manufac-
tured, tested, and packaged the product in California. 110 According to
the court, the jurisdictional issue was to be determined by evaluating the
private interests of the litigants and the public interest of the state in en-
tertaining the litigation. The manufacturer had conceded service in the
foreign country, leading the court to view the private interests of the liti-
gants in terms of enforcing the judgment and gaining access to witnesses
and proof as roughly equivalent with respect to jurisdiction. The court,
however, found that the state's public interest in terms of reducing court
congestion and "concern for the community", tilted in favor of suit in the
foreign jurisdiction where the product was sold, rather than in California.
The court emphasized the burdens on California courts in terms of con-
gestion from the trial of complex product liability actions and distin-
guished the state's interests in recovery by its own citizens as opposed to
foreign citizens.
The outcome, of course, is consistent with the argument here con-
cerning maximization of the national wealth both of citizens of the foreign
country and of the United States. To compel U.S. manufacturers to sell
products abroad that comply with U.S., rather than foreign, standards of
safety and insurance reduces both foreign and U.S. national wealth. Obvi-
ously, however, these grounds were not explicitly adopted by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court 1 1 nor, to date, have they been adopted by any other
court. Moreover, however salutary the outcome, the deleterious effects on
all parties (except, of course, the individual plaintiff) of allowing suits by
foreign consumers in U.S. courts do not change with the level of a state's
civil court congestion.
Both in this country and abroad, the legal principles for resolving ju-
risdiction, venue, and choice of law issues were developed at a time during
which the substantive law of nations-especially civil law-was more
closely identical across the various commercial nations. Where substantive
law does not importantly differ across nations, considerations of access
and process may well deserve commanding weight. In contrast, where the
110. Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1991).
111. Such grounds were urged by the Petitioner-Defendants. See Petitioner's Answer to
Petition for Review at 16-20, Stangivic v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1991).
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substantive law of one country differs substantially from that of others, the
impact on the comparative welfare of nations must be carefully consid-
ered. Today, the civil law of the United States-especially products liabil-
ity law-is dramatically different both doctrinally and in effect from the
law of any other nation. Even nations that have adopted the strict liability
standard for product defects, such as the EEC nations, have no experience
with products liability judgments that remotely approximates that of the
United States. 112 As a consequence, it is imperative for U.S. courts to care-
fully evaluate the effects on the wealth of both the United States and af-
fected foreign markets of entertaining suits by foreign consumers.
Although this development has not been widely noted, in recent years
the courts of foreign countries have increasingly observed the substantial
differences between U.S. products liability law and their own domestic law
and have invoked these differences as grounds for protecting domestic
manufacturers in suits brought by or from judgments sought to be en-
forced by U.S. consumers. Again in principle, foreign producers selling
products in the United States should be subjected to U.S. standards of
liability. As reported earlier, some critics of modem law have claimed that
"[floreign manufacturers... are not equally subject to the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts, and therefore, may not be subject to U.S. product liability laws
.... -113 This claim is an exaggeration, although many problems persist.
As a general matter, foreign manufacturers selling in the United States are
fully subject to U.S. law in suits brought by U.S. consumers." 4 The princi-
pal problem, however, relates to whether a successful damages judgment
can be effectively collected. If foreign manufacturers possess sufficient as-
sets in the United States, consumers may be fully protected. Where the
assets of foreign manufacturers lie abroad, however, there may be severe
collection limitations.
The United States is not a signatory of any treaty or convention with
respect to the enforcement of foreignjudgments. 115 General principles of
comity may recommend enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction of a judg-
ment rendered in the United States. Principles of comity, however, are
always weighed against the public policy of the homejurisdiction. Increas-
ingly, foreign courts are holding that recognition and enforcement of U.S.
judgments must be constrained because of the conflict between the stan-
dards of law and damages measures in the United States and the law and
damages of the home nation. For example, very recently, the German
Federal Court of Justice (Germany's highest court for civil and commer-
cial matters) denied recognition of substantial portions of a U.S. civil dam-
112. For a description of the law and how it departs from U.S. strict liability, see Giulio
Ponzanelli, The European Community Directive on Products Liability, in ToRT LAw AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST. COMPETrrION, INNOVATION, AND CoNsturam WELaRE 238 (Peter H. Schuck ed.,
1991).
113. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 6, at 180.
114. See, ag., In re Perrier Bottled Water Litigation, 754 F. Supp. 264 (D. Conn. 1990);
Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985).
115. Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments Abroad: A Landmark
Decision by the German Federal Court of Jusice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 641, 642 (1992).
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ages judgment on such grounds.1 16 An American plaintiff had sued a
German defendant for sexual assault and recovered a civil judgment of
$750,260, comprising $150,260 for medical expenses, $200,000 for pain
and suffering and $400,000 for punitive damages.'1 7 The German court
upheld the medical expense and pain and suffering portions, but denied
enforcement entirely of the punitive damages component on the grounds
that it was incompatible with German public policy.118 Since there are
much stronger reasons supporting punitive damages in a sexual assault
claim than in a products liability claim," 9 the decision of the German
court would appear to signal its refusal to enforce American punitive dam-
ages judgments in all instances.
120
The German court's refusal to enforce an American punitive damages
judgment has important implications for U.S. trade competitiveness and
national wealth. The decision seriously damages the competitiveness of
U.S. manufacturers. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the decision may in-
crease U.S. national wealth. First, in principle, to the extent that foreign
manufacturers are protected from U.S. punitive damages judgments,'
21
then U.S. manufacturers face severe competitiveness problems in U.S.
markets. U.S. manufacturers must design their products to comply with
U.S. products liability standards reflecting U.S. judgments. This means
that, to the extent that greater than compensatory damages-like punitive
damages-are awarded, U.S. manufacturers must invest in safety at levels
greater than optimal for consumers. In addition, given expanded stan-
dards of liability, U.S. manufacturers must insure consumers and pass the
proportionate insurance premium along in the product price.
To the extent that foreign manufacturers can discount the collec-
tibility of U.S. products liabilityjudgments, however, their prices can be set
commensurately lower. If they do not face equal prospects of punitive
damages levies, then they need not invest in excessive levels of safety, as
must U.S. manufacturers. In addition, to the extent that other forms of
116. Judgment ofJune 4, 1992, BGH Gr. Sen. Z., cited in id, at 643 n.13.
117. Doe v. Schmitz, No. 168-588 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 24, 1985), cited in Zekoll, supra
note 113, at 644 n.10.
118. Zekoll, supra note 114, at 644. An intermediate German appellate court had allowed
enforcement of only $70,000 of the pain and suffering component and $55,065 of the puni-
tive damages component because it viewed the punitive damages as a form of compensation
for attorney's fees. Id. For further discussion of this decision, see PatrickJ. Nettesheim &
Henning Stahl, Bundeigerichtshof Rejects Enforcement of United States Punitive Damages Award, 28
TEx. INT. L.J. 415 (1993). For a comprehensive discussion of developments of this nature in
Europe, see Alberto Saravalle, I Punitive Damages nell Corti Europee e nei Tribunali Arbitrali, 29
Rrvs-rA D Dnu-rro INTERNAZiONALE PrvATo E PROCEssuALE (forthcoming 1993).
119. In the context of sexual assault, compensatory damages alone would be an inade-
quate remedy since the ambition of the law is not, as in products liability, to create incentives
for the potential tortfeasor to attain the socially optimal level of safety, but rather to establish
punitive incentives to stop the activity altogether. See RicwHan A. PosNEm, ECONOMIC ANALsis
OF LAW 208-10 (4th ed. 1992). In Doe v. Schmitz the German defendant had been sentenced
to a criminal penalty, but escaped to Germany to avoid detention. See Zekoll, supra note 114,
at 644.
120. See Zekoll, supra note 114, at 658-59; Nettesheim & Stahl, supra note 117, at 425.
121. Because they do not possess sufficient assets in the U.S. to allow collection or their
domestic courts refuse to enforce U.S. judgments.
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damages are uncollectible 122 or costly to collect, the level of insurance
that foreign manufacturers must provide is less, and the price, commensu-
rately less. Obviously, the ability to sell products at lower prices provides a
substantial competitive advantage to foreign manufacturers in U.S.
markets.
Thus, although the German court's refusal to enforce the American
judgment substantially harms the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers,
it is likely to increase the wealth of the United States by benefitting U.S.
consumers in the aggregate. l23 As explained earlier, punitive damages
judgments in products cases and the product insurance compelled by ex-
panded manufacturer liability, harm U.S. consumers because their costs
greatly exceed their benefits. To the extent that U.S. consumers are able
to purchase products with optimal rather than excessive investments in
safety and without product insurance, U.S. consumers are better off, and
the wealth of the nation increases, albeit here at the expense of U.S.
manufacturers.
Put differently, the refusal of the German court to enforce American
punitive damages judgments represents a form of tort reform for America
that benefits U.S. consumers in the aggregate. Subject to decisions such as
that of the German court, American consumers are able to obtain prod-
ucts better designed for their needs at more affordable prices. Regretta-
bly, of course, the benefit to U.S. consumers results from the decline in
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturers. The better option, obviously, is
American tort reform, which would benefit both U.S. consumers and
manufacturers.
Once again, it can be seen that condemnation of the number of law-
yers or of their redistributive efforts is not helpful. The damage imposed
upon national wealth and competitiveness stems not from lawyers, but
from the definition of legal standards and the determination of damages,
including punitive damages, that systematically raise product prices with-
out commensurate gain to consumers. The number of lawyers and the
level of legal services demanded in the United States is surely affected by
the opportunities for litigation, but for every lawyer seeking redistribution,
there is a lawyer opposing it. The reform of the law to more closely corre-
spond to standards that would increase national wealth might eliminate
both of these lawyers. Law reform within the United States is surely the
optimal approach.
122. The intermediate German appellate court had denied enforcement of 65 percent of
the American pain and suffering award, though the award was reinstated by the Federal
Court ofJustice. See Zekoll, supra note 114, at 657-59; Nettesheim & Stahl, supra note 117, at
416-25.
123. Again, I am referring here only to the effect of the decision on products liability, not
as, in the case itself, on the deterrence of sexual abuse, undoubtably harmed by the decision.
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IV. How TO REFORM THE LAW TO INCREASE NATIONAL WEALTH,
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. TRADE COMPETrrVENESS
The implications of the previous discussion with respect to the direc-
tion of modem tort reform are straightforward:
1. First, national wealth and economic growth can best be
achieved by defining standards for environmental quality and
product safety that are optimal for consumers.
a. Standards of environmental quality should be established
as precisely as possible at the point at which the costs of
higher environmental quality are equal to the benefits, but
not beyond that point.
b. Optimal standards of product safety can be attained by de-
fining damages in product cases as carefully as possible at
the compensatory level, constraining excessive damages
judgments, and limiting punitive damages to contexts in
which the punitive levy will restore aggregate damages to
the compensatory level, such as cases involving fraud or
concealment.
2. With respect to product defects, the standard of liability
should be defined to remove or reduce all insurance features.
I have addressed this question in greater detail elsewhere, but
it implies establishing a standard according to which a manu-
facturer is liable only for those product-related accidents
which it could practicably and cost-effectively have prevented
by identifiable manufacturer investments. 124 In all other con-
texts, and especially in contexts in which it is argued that man-
ufacturers should insure consumers, liability should be
denied, removing the costly and ineffective insurance pre-
mium from the product price.
3. Products liability standards should be imposed according to
the law of the market in which the product was purchased.
Foreign manufacturers selling in U.S. markets should be held
liable to U.S. standards. U.S. manufacturers selling abroad
should be held liable to foreign standards in foreign courts.
The refusal of foreign courts to enforce U.S. judgments
should be informative as to the effects of modem U.S. tort law
on the welfare of consumers. Nevertheless, if the principles
with respect to liability standards, set forth in paragraphs 1
and 2 above are implemented, there will be no persuasive
grounds for foreign courts to deny enforcement of U.S. judg-
ments, and the otherwise deleterious effects on U.S. trade
competitiveness of disparate judicial enforcement will
disappear.
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It was one of those rare collegial conversations from which one gains
an insight rather than merely engages in Dean-bashing (nitpicking?, whin-
ing?). You are free to characterize casual faculty conversation as your ex-
perience dictates. He said:
You know-it was, after all, an informal conversation-the mis-
take most people make in thinking about criminal law is that they
see it as a grant of power to the State. Just the opposite is true;
criminal law is a limitation of sovereign power. Before there was
criminal law, the King could kill you for any reason or for no
reason other than he wanted you gonel! After criminal law came
into existence, the King could only kill you if he had an accepta-
ble reason, i.e., you had committed a crime.'
That observation certainly made me look at criminal law in a new way.
Sometime later, in a telephone conversation with my brother about
an article of his dealing with "unfair discharge"2 , it dawned on me that
employers too-although much more recentlyl-had also had their power
to "terminate"3 severely restricted. Putting these two thoughts together-
no mean feat for an aging contracts teacherl-I began to see much of
American law in a new way.
* Burton Brody, Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1. The colleague with whom I had this discussion recalls it and will verify it if someone
accuses me of imagining it for the purposes of this paper.
2. Arthur Brody, Wrongful Termination As Labor Law, 17 Sw. U. L. REv. 434 (1988). My
brother remembers his article and although he sees the employment relationship in terms of
power (see 435-437), he does not necessarily agree that "lawyering" is the solution; although
all the solutions he discusses involve legal action. Therefore he asks that I point out that he is
not responsible for the views herein expressed because, as one might well guess, he is not his
brother's keeper.
Who then, one might well ask, is responsible for the care and feeding of so brutish a
mythologic beast as a Contracts teacher?
Certainly not my wife. She is too beautiful and refined a woman-I describe her thus
because it is accurate and because, as she often reminds me, I have to sleep sometime!-for
such demeaning labor.
The only other possible candidate for such discreditable work is my Dean. Any inspec-
tion quickly discloses that he has decently discharged his disgraceful duties; I am obviously
well fed, but my cage could use a cleaningll
3. At this point I will not ask you to pardon the pun. However, I reserve the right to do
so should the Muse continue to strike me in this fashion. For the moment, you must take
comfort in the fact that it is rare for law review writing to be completed in one sitting. So
your chances are good she will strike me differently in future sessions.
DENVER UNIVE_,S!TY LAW REVIEW
PREMISE
Limiting the arbitrary exercise of power characterizes the develop-
ment of American law in the twentieth century. Limiting power and, more
importantly to the conduct and quality of private affairs, limiting the abil-
ity of the powerful to wield power arbitrarily, may be the distinguishing
feature our law. In a nation that has limitation of government power im-
bedded in its founding document, limitations of and on the exercise of
private power became inevitable.
If the epigram, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely," is an accurate description of the effect of power on those who
wield it, one might equally describe the reaction of Americans subjected to
it as, "Power annoys and despotic power revolts ultimately." The distrust
of autocratic rule that gave rise to the American experiment in democracy
echoes in a national antipathy toward authority. This antiauthoritarianism
takes form in laws that limit the acquisition, accumulation, and most fre-
quently, the exercise of power.
Legal curbs on power have been created in a number of different
ways. One method was to legislatively create limits on the acquisition and
exercise of power, giving courts additional cases and issues to adjudicate.
A second method was to enact a new set of rights that countervailed an
existing concentration of power and also create a special bureaucracy to
administer the conflicts between the new rights and the challenged power.
Another uniquely American means of legally restricting the exercise of
power was to judicially create new criteria for the exercise of existing
power and thus create new issues that had to be litigated.
Regardless of the manner of its creation, the essence of a limitation
on power, or its exercise, is that it creates issues that must be adjudicated
by a bureaucracy and, in some instances, requires a new bureaucracy to
administer and adjudicate the limits. The individuals in this society
trained to deal with bureaucracy are lawyers. And further, the individuals
in this society capable of administering a bureaucracy (rule-making, inves-
tigating and adjudicating) are lawyers. Thus the nexus between lawyering
and eliminating abusive power and its exercise is apparent.
LAWS THAT LIMIT POWER
The classic example of laws that limit the acquisition and abuse of
power are the antitrust laws.4 Concerned that too much economic and
market power was being concentrated in the hands of too few,5 Congress
4. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1988).
5. See Robert H. Bork, The Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L &
EcoN. 7, 7-48 (1966); WrujAm LErwN, LAw AND EcoONmic Poucy rN AaFmucA 88-99 (1965);
HANs B. THORELu, THE FEDERAL ANrUsr Poucy (1955). For congressional debate sur-
rounding the Sherman Act see S. Res. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889) reprinted in 1 The legisla-
tive History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related Statutes § 89 (Earl W. Kintner ed.
1978); see also 21 CONG. REc. 2460, 2457, 3146, 3152 (1890).
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enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.6 There has been much debate
whether the primary goal of the antitrust laws was to protect competition
(i.e., limit the powerful) or promote efficiency.7 Regardless of the debate,
seemingly unresolved and unresolvable, it is fair to conclude that at least a
part of the motivation behind the antitrust laws was a distrust of power.
Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Corporation of America
said:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which for-
bid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others,
based on the belief that great industrial consolidations are inher-
ently undesirable, regardless of their economic results. In the de-
bates in Congress Senator Sherman . . . himself showed that
among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an
end to great aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of
the individual before them.
8
The distrust of power and its abuse are clearer in.the antitrust laws
that followed the Sherman Act. Section 3 of the Clayton Act9 prohibits
"tie in" sales (i.e., a seller tying one product to another, or expressly
prohibiting purchasing a competitor's product, or requiring the pur-
chaser to purchase only from a certain supplier). Prohibiting tying sales
explicitly inhibits a seller with substantial market power from using that
power to affect another market.' 0 Section 7, the antimerger section of the
Clayton Act," expresses obvious concern about excessive power by mak-
ing illegal those mergers that substantially lessen competition. And Sec-
tions 2 (a) and (f) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act,12 clearly aim at abusive use of market power by making it unlawful for
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
7. E. TkomAs SuLuvAN & JEFFaY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 2-6 (1988); ROBERT H. BORy, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A Poucy AT
WAR wrri ITSELF 51 (1978). Professor Bork's views, although concerned with other issues,
support the position that Congress sought to limit the accumulation and exercise of power
when it enacted the antitrust laws:
(1) The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of con-
sumer welfare; therefore,
(2) "Competition," for the purposes of antitrust analysis, must be understood as a
term of art signifying any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be in-
creased by judicial decree.
Id. at 51. Bork refines his definition of competition:
"Competition" may be read as a shorthand expression, a term of art, designating
any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an
alternative state of affairs through judicial decree. Conversely, "monopoly" and "
restraint of trade" would be terms of art for situations in which consumer welfare
could be so improved, and to "monopolize" or engage in "unfair competition"
would be to use practices inimical to consumer welfare.
Id. at 61 (emphasis added). Thus, Bork seems to say that the purpose of the antitrust laws is
to protect consumers from "monopoly" and "unfair competition," i.e., excessive accumula-
tions of power and the abuse of it.
8. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d. Cir. 1945) (em-
phasis added).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
10. See LAWRENCE A. SULIUVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE AW OF ANTITRUST 434-40 (1977).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
12. Id. §§ 13a, 13f.
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sellers to discriminate in price between buyers, and for buyers to induce or
receive a discriminatory price.
Additionally, in 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act was en-
acted.' 3 It outlawed unfair inethods of competition in commerce 14 and
created the Commission' 5 to help the Justice Department enforce the an-
titrust laws. Together these offices, and their efforts in pursuing congres-
sional mandates to control the acquisition and exercise of economic and
market power, have created the need for many lawyers. In 1980, the Anti-
trust Division of Justice alone recorded more than 4,644 attorney days
spent in court.16 When one contemplates the amount of lawyering that
lies behind a day in court, it becomes obvious that the distrust of power
reflected in the antitrust laws created and sustained the need for much
lawyering in government and out.
The laws granting employees the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively as to wages, hours and working conditions are an example of law
that limits the exercise of power rather than prevents its acquisition. The
legislative concern with the disproportionate power of employers, and
their use of it, can be seen in the preamble to the Norris-LaGuardia Act
which stated that employees should be "free from the interference, re-
straint, or coercion of employers .... 17
Congress attacked management's predominance by seeking to equal-
ize power between workers and management. It did so by enacting the
National Labor Relations Act (The Wagner Act) that granted workers the
right to organize and bargain collectively. 18 It sought to further limit
management's excessive power by restricting its exercise; it required man-
agement to bargain in good faith with labor 19 and to refrain from certain
abuses of power called "unfair labor practices." 20 The Supreme Court, in
upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, also recognized that
employers had too often exercised their power autocratically when it
observed:
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of
labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice
21
The Wagner Act also created the National Labor Relations Board to
administer and enforce labor's new rights and the limitations imposed on
13. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
51 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
15. Id. § 41.
16. 1980 A'rr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 112.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). For confirmation that Senator Wagner saw the act in
terms of power, and beyond, see Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin And Current
Signiwance, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REa. 199, 215-24 (1960). Mr. Keyserling served as the Senator's
Legislative Assistant at the time the Act was in Congress. Id. at 199.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
20. Id. § 158(a).
21. N.L.R.B. v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937) (emphasis added).
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the exercise of management's power.2 2 The Board became an active par-
ticipant in American industrial and legal life. In 1936 it filed 1,068 cases,
including 865 unfair labor practice cases; it closed 738, including 636 un-
fair labor cases.23 By 1967, the annual case totals were 30,425 opened
29,494 closed with the unfair labor practice case totals being 17,040
opened and 16,360 closed.24 The 1985 totals were 41,175 opened, 43,328
closed; 32,685 unfair labor practice cases opened and 33,946 closed.25
The opening, investigating, litigating, deciding, appealing and implement-
ing so many cases per year for fifty years no doubt required the skills and
services of many lawyers at the Board and a corresponding number in pri-
vate practice.
American law's response to abusive use of power is also seen within
labor law. After World War II, when it was perceived that unions were
misusing the power they had developed under the protection of the Wag-
ner Act, Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley) that outlawed union activity that obstructed commerce, i.e., juris-
dictional strikes and secondary boycotts. 26 Taft-Hartley also gave employ-
ees the right to refrain from union activities and prohibited union
discipline of employees exercising such a right.2 7 The act further limited
union power by requiring' mediation in certain situations,2 8 by providing
for suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements, 29 by placing restric-
tions on payments to employee representatives and on union health and
welfare funds,3 0 and by restricting union political contributions.3 ' Contin-
ued and further abuse of power by union officials led to the Labor-Man-
agement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act).
3 2
Landrum-Griffin limited the power of unions and union officials by,
among other things, creating a members' "bill of rights," 33 requiring peri-
odic financial reports from unions and union officers,34 regulating union
elections,35 and regulating the use and loan of union funds.
3 6
Thus the creation, protection, and regulation of union activity can be
seen as the legal system first seeking to temper the power of employers by
fostering the right of employees to act collectively, and then seeking to
temper untoward union power. And later, when for various reasons,
strong unions could not or would not prevent abusive employer practices,
22. 29 U.S.C. § 153.
23. 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 29, 33 (1936).
24. 32 NLRB ANN. Rm'. 1 (1967).
25. 50 NLRB ANN. REP. 1 (1985).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988 & Supp. HI 1992).
27. Id. §§ 157-158(b) (1).
28. Id. § 158(d)(3), 158(d)(4)(C).
29. I& § 159(c) (1) (A) (i).
30. Id. § 186(a).
31. Id&
32. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
34. Id. § 432.
35. Id. § 481.
36. Id. § 503.
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additional legislative action became necessary. So statutory limits on
abuse of the power to hire were established by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196437 to prevent discrimination against individuals based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.3 8 Title VII also created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission,39 creating more lawyer positions
in government, and no doubt, increasing at least the workload in the pri-
vate Bar. Additionally, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act4° and
the Americans With Disabilities Act 4' create additional issues requiring
the attention of lawyers.
However, the disparity in power continued to exist for the nonunion
worker 42 and the majority of the work force did not belong to unions. 43
The evolution of the "termination at will" rule into a body of "unfair dis-
charge" law, viewed from an American antiauthoritarian perspective, illus-
trates the law acting to eliminate autocratic workplace behavior directed at
nonunion workers." Unfair discharge law demonstrates, once again, that
American law consistently seeks to limit the arbitrary exercise of power. As
one observer put it: "The development of rights of action for wrongfully
discharged at will employees reflects the general trend toward increasing the
accountability of those who possess power over the lives of others."4 5 One can also
view current cases dealing with sexual harassment as the legal system's
attempt to deal with a particularly vile abuse of management's workplace
power.
46
Another private relationship that has drawn the attention of the law
because of abusive use of power by the more powerful party is the land-
lord-tenant relationship. Statutes granting lessee's greater rights and lim-
iting lessor's power were enacted,47 and warranties of habitability granting
tenants the right to withhold rent in certain circumstances were created.
48
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L No. 88-352,78 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1988 & Supp. II 1992)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
39. Id. § 2000e-4.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. 1I 1992).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-114 (Supp. III 1992).
42. For what I would describe as well written, realistic appraisal, see Brody, supra note 2,
at 435-37.
43. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissak Time for a Statute, 62
VA. L. REv. 481, 483 (1976).
44. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1404, 1408 (1967); Clyde W. Summers,
The Rights of Individual Workers, 52 FoRDmu L. REVrEw 1082, 1100-03 (1984).
45. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 449, 495-96 (1985) (emphasis added).
46. See e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F.
Supp. 1438 (S.D. W. Va. 1985); see also Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (applying state law).
47. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 90.100-90.940 (1991); see also C.. Cxvim CODE §§ 1940-1954.1
(West 1985 & Supp. 1993); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-12-101 to 38-12-302 (1982 & Supp. 1992);
ILL. ANN. STAT. 765 ILCS 705/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 220-238
(McKinney 1989).
48. See, e.g.,Javins v. First Nat. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (court recognized landlord's obligation to keep leased premises in habit-
able condition); see also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.2, 5.4 (1977) (where
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Courts of various states limited the ability of landlords to use their supe-
rior power to extract from renters exculpatory clauses that freed the land-
lord from liability for negligence.4 9 And federal5 ° and state5 1 fair housing
laws seek to prevent lessors from abusing their power through objectiona-
ble discrimination. All these attempts to limit the exercise of lessor power
increased the need for legal services.
An abuse of a public power, the policing power, drew the attention of
the United States Supreme Court and appears to have stimulated the need
for a good deal of lawyering. Miranda v. Arizona,5 2 the famous case that
requires police interrogators to advise suspects of their rights prior to cus-
todial interrogation, is based on a longstanding concern that over-zealous
police practice can transform inquiry into inquisition. The advice, cou-
pled with the right to have an attorney present during such interrogations,
is a check on the exercise of the physical and psychological power police
officers wield over those in custody.
Some indication of the lawyering created by Miranda can be gathered
by looking at a recent study by Inbau and Manak.5 3 They surveyed Mi-
randa issue decisions by the Supreme Court, the federal circuit courts of
appeal and the intermediate appellate courts of California decided from
1966 (the year of the decision) through 1986. The study reveals that Mi-
randa caused considerable litigation and thus, demanded more lawyering
and lawyers. The Supreme Court considered forty-four such cases, 5 4 the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals considered Miranda issues in nine
hundred eighty cases (covering 2,155 pages and approximately 1,200,000
wordsl) 55 and the California appellate courts, three hundred sixty three.
56
Alone, these cases represent a lot of lawyering, but when one ponders that
this is only a sample and the other forty nine states would, in all likeli-
hood, also have had a good deal of activity, and then add to that the work
required at the federal and state trial levels to cause the appellate deci-
sions, one begins to see that Miranda created the need for a swarm of
legally trained people.
Other situations in which the law has addressed a particular misuse of
power are almost too numerous to mention. However, I shall mention a
few for the purposes of illustration, confident that the reader can think of
others.
withholding rent is available remedy for tenant when landlord fails to maintain premises for
suitable use).
49. SewTenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.C. 1969); McCutcheon v.
United Homes Corp. 486 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1971).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1988 & Supp. 111 1992).
51. See CAl.. GowvmiNrr CODE § 12940 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 24-34-502 (1988 & Supp. 1993); FLA., STAT. A.NN. §§ 760.20-760.37 (West 1986); ILI
ANN. STAT. 775 ILCS 5/1-101 (Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. CiviL LAw §§ 18-a to 19-b (McKinney
1992).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. Fred E. Inbau &James P. Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost?, 24 CAI. W.
L. R-v. 185, 186 (1988).
54. I. at 188.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id.
19931
DENVER UAN!_RS!TY LAW REVIEW
In my own field, the expansion of the doctrine of unconscionability57
and the duty of good faith in the performance and enforcement of con-
tracts58 seem to aim at preventing abusive use of superior economic or
bargaining power. The doctrine of contracts of adhesion5 9 seems similarly
motivated. Economic duress cases also seek to prevent abuse of bargain-
ing power.60 Even the old pre-existing duty rule cases dealt with mis-
dealing by contracting parties who, under the circumstances, held the
upper hand.6 1 Similarly, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code62 and the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act63 would appear to be directed at
abuse of market and economic power by lenders and sellers.
There are two other legal limitations on the exercise of power that
deserve mention but are beyond my ability to discuss in any depth. I set
them forth because they may be indicative of other limitations and will
cause the reader to think of more. The "informed consent" principle in
the rendering of medical services tempers the arbitrary exercise of the
superior power that flows from superior knowledge. And lastly, I simply
ask whether one of the motivations behind the liberalizing of pleading
rules and the rules of evidence was the desire to lessen the litigation power
of those who could afford more expensive counsel?
CONCLUSION
For those who believe that limiting power is an essential characteristic
of American law, it is worth noting that the very first dissent 64 ever filed by
Justice Holmes was in a case where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held unconstitutional a statute limiting the power of employers to
fine employees. 65 It is further worth noting that Holmes served nine years
on the Court before he felt constrained to dissent.66 Of greatest signifi-
57. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRaCTs § 206 (1981).
58. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 205 (1981); see also
Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945) (court requires
good faith when giving notice of contract cancellation).
59. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
60. Laemmar v.J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970); Mitchell v. C.C.
Sanitation Co., 430 S. W.2d 933 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
61. 1A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171 (1963); Burton F. Brody, Per-
formance of a Pre-Existing Duty As Consideration: The Actual Criteuia for the Effiacy of an Agreement
Altering Contractual Obligation, 52 DEN. U. L. REv. -433, 450-56 (1975).
62. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, reprinted in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 1200
(1993). "Another basic issue in the regulation of consumer credit is adequate protection of
consumers from creditor practices and agreements that are abusive or have the potential for
abuse." Id. at 1210.
63. UNIFORM CONSUMER SALES PRAcacFs Act, r7einted in SELECrED COMMERCIAL STAT-
UTEs 1348 (1993). The following quote is from Section 1 of the Act: "Purposes, Rules of
Construction... (2) [T]o protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and un-
conscionable sales practices . . . ." Id.
64. SHELDON M. NovicK, THE HONOR.ABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
Hot ms 197 (1990).
65. Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (1891).
66. Holmes was appointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Court on December 15, 1882.
NovicK, supra note 63, at 169. Holmes' reluctance to dissent is expressed in the first para-
graph of his opinion, where he says: "I have the misfortune to differ from my brethren. I
have submitted my views to them at length, and, considering the importance of the question,
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cance to those who see the nexus between lawyering and limiting power is
that Holmes felt constrained to uphold the statute because he saw it as an
attempt to limit an abuse of power. He wrote:
I suppose that this act was passed because the operatives, or some
of them, thought they were often cheated out of a part of their
wages under a false pretence that the work done by them was
imperfect, and persuaded the Legislature that their view was
true. If their view was true, I cannot doubt that the Legislature
had the right to deprive the employers of an honest tool which they were
using for a dishonest purpose .... 67
In dissenting from the majority in Pery, Holmes saw limiting abuse of pri-
vate power to be so fundamental as to prevail over constitutional protec-
tion of property rights and constitutional prohibition against impairment
of the right to contract.
The law, as it has been seen by its most able and respected practition-
ers, serves American society by limiting power and its abuse. I am pleased
that students here at the University of Denver College of Law are learning
this view of the law. Mr. Steve Hall, selected by his classmates as one of the
student speakers at our May 1992 Commencement, spoke to this:
They say there are too many lawyers .... I offer this thought in
rebuttal: ... If the charter of this profession is to aspire to a
standard of dignity, competence, devotion to duty, and to the
value of the individual human being .... And in this day of an
ever more complicated social contract... ever more abstract def-
inition of property rights ... exploding technological develop-
ments.., imploding ideologies and governments... hazardous
waste, ozone holes, starvation, AIDS, Rodney King, Anita Hill
.... [T]hen how could there possibly be too many lawyers.68
It would appear that the legal profession, from its most revered mem-
bers to its newest, understands and accepts its obligation to create and
maintain a just distribution and use of power within this society. It may
well be that lawyers, as a profession, have day-to-day operational responsi-
bility for the American antipathy toward authority. Our charge is to make
antiauthoritarianism work within an ordered society. Anyone who believes
there are too many lawyers represents those among us who hold power
and would rather not be accountable for its exercise. And any lawyer who
fails to recognize the professional responsibility we bear toward preventing
the arbitrary exercise of power, makes the case that we are "overlawyered"
by at least one.
feel bound to make public a brief statement, notwithstanding the respect and deference I
feel for the judgment of those from whom I differ." Pery, 28 N.E. at 1127.
67. Pery, 28 N.E. at 1127 (emphasis added).
68. Mr. Steve Hall, Address at the University of Denver College of Law Commencement
(May 9, 1992) (emphasis supplied) (transcript on file with the DEN. U. L. Ra,.).
1993]

TowARD DECONSTRUCTING THE DECONSTRUCTION
OF LAW AND LAWYERS
PENELOPE EILEEN BRYAN*
Lawyers have yet to experience a period of great public approbation.'
Nevertheless, the current offensive against lawyers, litigants, and litigation
seems particularly virulent and widespread.2 Lack of access to the legal
system frustrates many citizens,3 and professed pundits, liberal and con-
servative, point to overcrowded dockets as evidence of the system's failure
to provide legal services to both the powerful and the disadvantaged. 4 A
profusion 5 of overly zealous lawyers, 6 discovery abuse,7 expansion of legal
* Penelope Eileen Bryan, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of
Law.
1. See, e.g., Honestus (Benjamin Austin), Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law,
13 Am.J. LEGAL HisT. 244,249 (1969); Lawrence Savell, Why Are They Picking on Us?, 78 A.B.A.
J., Nov. 1992, at 72, 72; Mark G. Yudof, Lawyers Aren't Really So Bad - And Times They Are A-
Changing, TEx. LAw.,Jan. 20, 1992, at 12.
2. See generally Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer Reflections in a Dark
Glass, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 379 (1987).
3. E.g., Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers ImpairEconomic Growth?, 17 LAw & Soc. INQurmy 585,
621 (1992) (observing that lack of access is occurring at a time when people, more than ever,
need technical legal advice to help them maneuver through complex administrative and
corporate mazes, heightening citizen frustration).
4. See, e.g.,Joel B. Grossman & Austin Sarat, Access to Justice and the Limits of Law, 3 LAW
& PoL'v Q. 125, 127 (1981); William Rich, The Role ofLauvyers: BeyondAdvocay, 1980 B.Y.U. L
REv. 767, 780; Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examin-
ing the Critical Assumptions, 37 RTrroGEs L. REv. 319, 319-25 (1985).
5. SeeJames Bishop,Jr., Quayle vs. The Lawyers. The Hunt Is onfor a Plump New Scapegoat
to Blame for the Nation's Woes, ARiz. RaEPuuc, Dec. 8, 1991, at C5 (reporting that critics of the
legal system claim that the United States has 20 times more lawyers than Japan per 100,000
population); Saundra Torry, Quayle and Curtin Generate More Heat Than Light in ABA Debate
WAsH. Posr, Aug. 19, 1991, at F5 (quoting Vice President Quayle as stating that America has
70% of the world's lawyers). See infra note 31 for commentators and studies that refute these
claims.
6. Peter Carlson writes: "Standing by, ready and eager to help Americans bludgeon
each other with lawsuits, are nearly 800,000 lawyers...." Peter Carlson, LegalDamages, WASH.
PosT, March 15, 1992, at Wll. Moreover, Robert Sayler quotes William F. Buckley as saying.
"What we have too much of is litigation-but diminish litigation, and you diminish the things
that keep lawyers busy .... The Result is the current litigious mess." Robert N. Sayler, Don't
Blame the Lawyers, WASH. Posr, Sept. 21, 1991, at A21. Mr. Buckley wrote this statement only a
few weeks before he and seven other Yale alumni filed suit in a Connecticut state court seek-
ing to bar women from membership in Yale University's Skull & Bones Society-a secret, all-
male club. Id.
7. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Laryers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 Am. B. Foumn. Ras.J. 787, 811, 833-35 (1980) (reporting that in a
1980 survey of Chicago attorneys, 96% said that they had settled a case knowing significant
information the opposition had not discovered and that evasive or incomplete responses
impeded discovery in 60% of their cases); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some
Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 189,192 (1992)
(designating discovery abuse as a major problem in our courts); Maurice Rosenberg & War-
ren R King, Curbing Discovey Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
579, 579-80; Robert E. Sarazen, Note, An Ethical Approach to Discovery Abuse, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHics 459, 459-60 (1990) (observing that discovery is not achieving its purpose of assuring
"mutual knowledge of all relevant facts" due to various forms of abuse).
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doctrine, s and a litigation-loving populace 9 allegedly cause the overload. 10
The adoption of informal dispute resolution procedures like mediation
and arbitration is urged as a way to alleviate court congestion."
8. SeeJohn H. Barton, Behind theLegalEplosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1975) (discussing
two explanations given for the expansion of law- the increasing complexity of society and the
perceived helplessness of the individual); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis, OurNationalDieas 71
Nw. U. L. REv. 767, 767 (1977) (hyperlexis described as a "pathological condition caused by
an overactive law-making gland"); George L Priest, The New Legal Structure of Risk Contro 119
DAEDALus 207 (1990) [hereinafter Priest, Risk Contro!] (changes in legal doctrine partially
responsible for increase in products liability cases).
9. Chief Justice Warren Burger opined: "One reasbn our courts have become
overburdened is that Americans are increasingly turning to the courts for relief from a range
of personal distresses and anxieties.... The courts have been expected to fill the void cre-
ated by the decline of church, family, and neighborhood unity." Warren Burger, Isn't There a
Better Way?, 68 A.BA.J. 274, 275 (1982). See also Maurice Rosenberg, Let's Eveiybody Litigate?,
50 TEx. L. REv. 1349, 1350 (1982) (Americans overemphasize litigation, seeing the courts as
the solution to problems once thought of as personal misfortune). Peter Carlson disapprov-
ingly notes that nearly 18 million new civil suits were filed in American courts in 1989-one
for every 10 American adults. Carlson, supra note 6, at W1l. But see Sarat, supra note 4, at
320-21 (the idea of an overly litigious society is largely a problem of perspective).
Studies belie the myth of litigious Americans. See infra note 31. In spite of the legal
profession's growth and the organizational complexity of the United States, many Americans
continue to avoid using lawyers. Epp, supra note 3, at 621.
10. Cf Sarat, supra note 4, at 320 (acknowledging these explanations but critiquing their
foundation). Generally, confusion abounds over where to place the blame for the alleged
litigation explosion. See Saundra Torry & Mark Stencel, Bush, Quayle Put Lawyers in Election-
YearDocke WASH. Posr, Aug. 28, 1992, atA16 (reporting President Bush's statement that the
problem was not lawyers, but a legal system which had "spun out of control" and his very
different statement four months later that the problem was "ambulance-chasing lawyers.").
11. During colonial times, the public sought alternative ways of resolving disputes out of
fear that self-interested lawyers would protect only their own interests. Austin, supra note 1,
at 267-72 (proposing that parties should offer their pleas personally rather than utilizing
lawyers who engage in "lawcraft").
Today informal alternatives to litigation receive broad support. See, e.g., STEPHEN B.
GoLDnRGo Er AL., DisPuTE REsoLrrON 7 (1985); Stephen R. Feldman, A Statutoy Proposal to
Remnove Divorcefrom the Courtroom, 29 ME. L. REv. 25, 33 (1977) (encouraging divorce media-
tion in order to alleviate court congestion); Nancy Ann Holman & Jane Noland, Agreement
and Arbitration: Relief to Over-Litigation in Domestic Relations Disputes in Washington, 12 Wi-
LurmEr L. REv. 527, 544 (1976); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 Axuz. L.
Rev. 467, 467 (1991) (arguing that mediation empowers the parties, savesjudicial resources,
reduces court overloads, and is more likely to satisfy the parties than is the court process); see
also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott, The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L
& POL'Y Rev. 42, 42-47, 52-60 (1988) (discussing how access to justice concerns have en-
couraged the movement to private justice). See generally LEMAL BtxAKDowN: 40 WAYS TO Fix
OUR LEGAL SVSTEM 83-84 (Stephen Elias et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter LEMAL Be eAxOwN]
(neighborhood disputes should always be mediated to avoid entanglement in the court sys-
tem and its costs). In Colorado the Judicial Department's long-range strategic planning pro-
ject ("Vision 2020: Colorado Courts of the Future") has uncritically endorsed Frank Sander's
vision of a multi-doored courthouse that offers disputants the choice of various dispute reso-
lution alternatives. The project report, however, does reflect some sensitivity to the special
problems alternative dispute resolution (ADR) presents in family cases. Craig Boersema, Vi-
sion 2020: Building a Strategic Plan for Colorado Courts, 22 COLO. LAw. 11, 16 (1993).
As George Priest notes, however, neither the size of the court system, the composition of
the caseload, the number of judges, the number of cases per judge, the court's settlement
policies, nor the provision of mandatory alternatives demonstrably affect the speed of case
disposition. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
527, 528-29 (1989). Moreover, many commentators have questioned the virtues and have
suggested the negative consequences of ADR. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of
InformalJustice, in 1 THE POLITIcS OF INvo A.Jus-nc: THE A. imc, ExPERIENcE 267 (Rich-
ard L. Abel, ed., 1982); Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
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The formal system's frequent failure to dispense substantive justice
also promotes public indignation.12 Academic criticism reinforces public
disdain. Scholars deconstruct the notion of legal rights, suggesting that
rights rarely protect the disadvantaged,' 3 increase alienation,14 fail to ad-
dress truly important needs like food and shelter,15 and discourage the
political mobilization of the powerless needed for reform.16 Others con-
Tn.. L Rxv. 1 (1987); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of
Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441 (1992); Sara Cobb &Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Decon-
structing Neutrality in Mediation, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUImY 35 (1991); Richard Delgado et al.,
Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Pr udice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis.
L. Rav. 1359 (1985); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody'Decisionmaking, 101 HIIv. L. R~v. 727, 729, 774 (1988); Trina Grillo,
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE LJ. 1545 (1991); RobertJ. Levy,
Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17 F m. L.Q. 525, 525 (1984).
12. Charles Dickens provides a classic example of citizen frustration:
The systeml I am told on all hands, it's the system. I mustn't look to individuals. It's
the system .... I mustn't go to Mr. Tulkinghorn, the solicitor in Lincoln's Inn
Fields, and say to him when he makes me furious by being so cool and satisfied-as
they all do, for I know they gain by it while I lose, don't I?-I mustn't say to him, "I
will have something out of some one for my ruin, by fair means or foull" He is not
responsible. It's the system. But, if I do no violence to any of them .... I will
accuse the individual workers of that system against me, face to face, before the
great eternal barl
CHARLES DicERNs, BLEAK HOUSE 228 (Signet 1974) (emphasis removed).
Public outrage in response to the Rodney King verdict affords a more current example.
See, e.g., Bill Maxwell, Blacks Must Give Voice to Values, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, May 27, 1992, at
A9; Cycles of Political Expediency, HARFORD CoUANT, May 17, 1992, at B2. For statistics on the
public's reaction to the verdict, see Richard Morin, Polls Uncover Much Common Ground on LA.
Verdic WASH. POST, May 11, 1992, at A15.
13. See, e.g., STUART ScHEINGoLD, THE PoLITICS OF RIG S 6-9 (1974); Michael Diamond,
Law, the Problems of Poverty, and the 'Myth of Rights,'1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 785 (discussing the
failure to provide housing for low-income citizens despite favorable legislation); Marc Ga-
lanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc',
REv. 95, 103-04 (1974) [hereinafter Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead] (noting that
those who are unfamiliar with the legal system and have limited access to legal services are
disadvantaged by legal institutions and rules).
Members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement see little value in rights due to their
indeterminate nature. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of
the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tax. L. REv. 1563, 1584-85 (1984) (rights possess an "infinite number
of surface meanings" that protect their "fantastic nature" and obstruct the desire to give them
a realized meaning); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L.
Rv. 209, 359-60 (1979) (a conflict between rights forces a choice between categorizations
that a skillful arguer can manipulate); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tax. L. Rav.
1363, 1364 (1984) (rights matter only when recognized in a specific social setting).
14. See Gabel, supra note 13, at 1567-76 (asserting that alienation occurs when people
who desire authentic contact with each other assume the character of "rights-bearing
citizens").
15. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll OverBeethoven, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 33 (1984)
(arguing that people do not need rights, but rather forms of social life created through the
building of movements).
16. See, e.g., Richard D. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo
ST. L.J. 223, 240-52 (1981); Louis B. Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest C_,S-
Land, 36 STAN. L. Rav. 413, 424-26 (1984).
Professor Derrick Bell has hinted at the political immobilization that occurs when rights
generate a false sense of security
One of the most insidious aspects of our civil rights policies is the false sense of
racial neutrality that they provide. This mirage is so attractively pervasive, even
some of the best young black minds are fooled into believing that they made it
strictly on merit, and that affirmative action and other preferential policies deny
them the credit and respect that they deserve.
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firm what the public experiences and scholars surmise-the formal sys-
tem's failure in many contexts17 to deliver the substantive justice it
promises.18
Courts themselves often invite public scorn by treating certain dispu-
tants with disrespect.19 Lawyers, concerned with the economics of prac-
tice, sometimes do not provide the care and concern their clients seek.
20
The problem is that the new civil rights laws permit discrimination even as they
outlaw it, and they make policies and actions that are non-discriminatory seem like
mandated compliance, when, in fact, they are voluntary responses to self-interest
and profit.
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Who'K Afraid of Derrick Bell? A Conversation on Harvard, Storytelling and
the Meaning of Color, 78 A.B.A. J. 56, 57 (1992); see also Linda Greenhouse, Ginsburg a Rare
Judicial Find: Though a Liberat Nominee Favors Restraint by the Courts, DENy. POST, July 25, 1993,
at 6A (explaining that Ginsburg thought that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Roe v. Wade encouraged members of the abortion-rights movement to relax).
17. For example, Mark Tushnet argues that by stripping the states of power to control
women's abortion decisions in Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court also created a foundation
which allowed it later to find no state obligation to provide funding for abortions. Mark V.
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
HARv. L. RExv. 781, 813-14 (1983). What the Court gave to the privileged with one hand it
took from the disadvantaged with the other.
18. The pluralism of our society inevitably compromises our legal system's ability to pro-
duce results that a broad spectrum of our citizens will perceive as just. See generally ROBERTO
M. UNGER, LAw IN MODERN SOCIETY: TowARD A CRTcIsM OF SocLAL THEORY 198-200 (1976).
See also Harry T. Reis, The Multidimensionality of Justice, in THE SENSE OF INJUsTIcE: SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERsPEcrvEs 38-57 (Robert Folger ed., 1984) (suggesting that individual
characteristics such as gender, belief in the Protestant Ethic, and belief in the legitimacy of
various distributional schemes influence perceptions of substantive justice).
19. E.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNE.LL L. REv. 1298, 1313 (1992) (reporting that the
judge in an "attitude arrest" case paid little attention to defendant's testimony, turning his
chair away from the witness stand so he could not see the defendant); Linda K. Girdner,
Adjudication and Mediation: A Comparison of Custody Decision-Making Processes Involving Third
Parties, 8J. DIVORCE,. Spring/Summer 1985, at 33, 37-38 (quoting an exasperated family law
judge as telling the parties, "I never understand why parents want to spend all their money
on lawyers' fees for something between themselves... You two are probably going to fight on and
on.... It's utterly ridiculous.") (alteration in original).
As one report indicates:
One Texas judge justified giving a light sentence to a convicted killer because the
victim had been gay. Many commentators criticized the judge's candor, but not his
prejudice.
Judges often treat minority and women witnesses, court employees and lawyers with-
out respect. For example, one California judge ordered an attorney-the only wo-
man among a group of seven-to type up a settlement agreement. "Come on
sweetheart," urged the judge. "I know you can type." African-American and His-
panic lawyers are often harassed by court officers who assume they are criminal
defendants. Judges often call them by their first names and refer to their minority
clients as "boy" or "girl."
Such prejudice also destroys faith in the fairness of the court system. A 1989 New
York investigation into racial bias found that many minorities mistrust the state's
court system, which is overwhelmingly dominated by whites....
But despite the mounting evidence, most courts refuse even to acknowledge
the problem. This hypocrisy and indifference, on top of the actual unfairness,
make a travesty of the legal system's claims to provide equal justice under the law.
LEGAL BRAiwowN, supra note 11, at 43-44; see also KAREN CzAPANsvY & TmcIA D. O'NEIL.L,
THE WOMEN's BAR Ass'N OF MARYLAND, COURTWATCH REPORT 24-28 (1993).
20. From his hundreds of interviews with clients, Alan Levine concluded that clients
value lawyers who, among other things, listen and treat them with respect. Alan P. Levine,
Lookingfor Mr. Goodlayer. What Clients Want A.B.A.J., Sept. 1992, at 60, 60-62. He also noted
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Further, the public grows increasingly uneasy with the law's steady en-
croachment into areas once thought private21 and with the perceived gap
between substantive law and individual mores.
22
Faulty system operation and public resentment are not the only
problems allegedly flowing from a surplus of lawyers and Americans'
penchant for litigation. President Bush blamed ambulance-chasing law-
yers for the reluctance of doctors to practice in rural areas and for the
unwillingness of parents to coach Little League. 23 Increased malpractice
premiums allegedly price medical care beyond the reach of most citizens
and drive doctors from their profession.2 4 The Bush Administration
claimed that the litigation explosion bleeds our economy of $80 billion in
that it is the rare lawyer who takes sufficient time to listen and understand client problems
and concerns. Id. at 62; see also Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling Reappraisal
and Refinemen4 32 ARIz. L. REV. 501, 506 (1990) (stating that in traditional legal counseling,
the lawyer is concerned with the client's reaction to his advice but tends not to value client
input and that the lawyer and client are likely to talk at, rather than with, each other); Su-
zanne B. O'Neill & Catherine G. Sparkman, What Your Client Expects From You: A Guide for New
Lawyers, 36 PRAc. LAw., March 1990, at 39, 40 (noting that a frequently heard client com-
plaint is that the lawyer failed to understand what the client needed in the first place, because
the lawyer simply assumed she knew what the client wanted and failed to listen to the client's
actual goal or problem).
In dissolution of marriage cases, the problem seems particularly acute. In their long-
term study of divorce lawyers and their clients, Felstiner and Sarat found that lawyers contin-
ually encouraged clients to separate emotional from legal issues, while clients could not ac-
cept definitions of their cases that excluded emotional issues. William L.F. Felstiner & Austin
Sarat, Enactments of Power:. Negotiating Reality and Respansility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77
CoRmuL L Rav. 1447, 1455 (1992); see alsoJohn Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do
in Divorce Cases?, 20 LAw & Soc'v Rav. 135, 152 (1986) (a survey of Dutch divorce clients
revealed that clients often wanted to unburden themselves of emotional and social concerns,
but that lawyers typically reacted to client overtures by offering a cup of coffee or by changing
the subject).
21. Yudof observes that "[o]ur society's frustration with the legal system may result from
the increasing involvement of lawyers with everyday decisions that used to be made by physi-
cians, manufacturers, employers, teachers and police officers." Yudof, supra note 1, at 14; see
also Hazard & Scott, supra note 11, at 52-60 (discussing how the growing public sentiment
that the state should not interfere in voluntary arrangements has influenced the movement
to private justice).
22. Rich, supra note 4, at 783; Lynne D. Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An
Examination of the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 811,
811. To some extent, this gap exists because of the growing complexity and the pluralistic
nature of our society. See Diamond, supra note 13, at 792-93; Richard D. Schwartz, Law,
Society, and Moral Order: Introduction to the Symposium, 1980 B.Y.U. L Rav. 721, 727-33; see also
UNGER, supra note 18, at 66-86 (arguing that the confluence of group pluralism and a belief
in higher law, reinforced by a transcendent religion, produced the rule of law ideal in mod-
em European societies).
23. Torry & Stencel, supra note 10, at A16.
24. Amy Goldstein & Rene Sanchez, D.C. Council at Last Faces Malpractice Morass, WAsH.
POSr, Feb. 5, 1992, at Cl. However, the reporters also explain that doctors and hospital
officials remain unable to trace rising medical costs to malpractice liability or to offer firm
figures on how many doctors have altered or left their practices in response to increasing
insurance costs. Id. Others note that changes in technology, waste within the medical sys-
tem, inappropriate treatment, administrative expenses, high doctor incomes, health insur-
ance plans allowing insured individuals to participate in a treatment plan with little out-of-
pocket expense, and ignorance and greed probably have more to do with the high cost of
medical care than malpractice liability. Spencer Rich, Demand for High-Tech Medicine Hampers
Efforts to Curtail Health Costs, WAsH. POSr, July 12, 1992, at Al. The first two factors alone
explain 50 to 83% of the increase in medical costs. Id
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direct, and $300 billion in indirect, costs each year.25 And, Professor
George Priest informs us that in the products liability area substantive doc-
trine has expanded and liability policy has shifted to risk control.26 These
developments, he argues, cause American manufacturers to incur more
liability27 and process costs than manufacturers in other countries, hinder-
ing our ability to compete in international markets.28 Moreover, anticipa-
tion of potential liability provides a disincentive for the creative
development of innovative products2 9-another competitive disadvan-
tage.3 0 In difficult economic times, many Americans find these assertions
25. Carlson, supra note 6, at W15 (quoting then Vice President Quayle).
Professor Galanter, however, identifies two flaws in these figures: (1) costs and transfers
are conflated and (2) benefits are not used to offset costs. Marc Galanter, Too Many Lawyers?
Too Much Law?, 71 DENv. L. REv. 77, 88 (1993).
26. Priest, Risk Control supra note 8, at 207. Priest explains that two assumptions under-
lie this shift. First, if practical prevention of the injury were possible, liability should extend
to the party in the better position to prevent the injury. Id. at 216. Second, if practical
prevention of the injury were not possible, liability should extend to the party in the better
position to spread the risks of injury. Id. at 216-17. For Priest's explanation of how this shift
occurred, see George L Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Inten, 10 CaDozo L REv.
2301, 2302 (1989).
27. Some commentators insist that part of the increased liability stems from jury bias
against business. Yet, a recent study ofjurors reveals that jurors admit skepticism of plaintiff
tort claims against businesses; admit a greater focus on plaintiff actions and motivations than
on businesses' responsibilities; and admit concern over the litigation crisis and the need to
limit awards. Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments of Business Liability in
Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAw & Soc'v Rev. 85 (1992).
28. Professor Priest receives support from ex-Vice President Quayle who stated that
America is in the "midst of a 'litigation explosion'.... The result is a civil court system
characterized by 'overloaded court dockets' and 'excessive delay,' a system that.., puts
American business at 'a self-inflicted competitive disadvantage.'" Carlson, supra note 6, at
W15 (paraphrasing Vice President Quayle); see also, e.g., Bishop, supra note 5, at C5.
A recent study by Charles Epp refutes the common assumption that large lawyer popula-
tions impair economic growth, claiming it lacks theoretical and empirical support. Epp,
supra note 3, at 585; see also Frank B. Cross, The Fust Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists:
An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political System, 70
Tax. L. Rev. 645 (1992) [hereinafter Cross, Effect of Lawyers] (finding no statistically significant
evidence that lawyers impair economic growth). Moreover, risk managers and chief execu-
tive officers differ among themselves as to whether litigation affects competitiveness. Ga-
lanter, supra note 25, at 81.
Priest also explains that when a firm cannot pass along the increased cost of its liability
insurance premium to consumers because buyers will refuse to purchase at the higher price,
the firm removes the product from the market. He notes a recent survey showing 25% of the
nation's 500 largest corporations had removed products from the market for this reason.
George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 Osno ST. L.J. 497,500 (1987). Perhaps, however,
removing products from the market when cbnsumers are unwilling to pay the full cost of
producing them, including the cost of injury, is a social good rather than an economic evil.
29. Priest, Risk Contro supra note 8, at 223 (noting that since 1987, 25% of U.S. manu-
facturers have discontinued new product research for liability reasons).
30. Priest's position implies an unacknowledged value preference for maximum eco-
nomic prosperity over increased consumer safety. Priest, however, also suggested during his
oral comments that increased tort liability hurts disadvantaged people because it causes firms
to remove cheaper products that the poor people want from the market or to raise the price
of these products beyond the poor's ability to purchase. He also explained that forcing man-
ufacturers to insure for an average expected liability payout for a particular product resulted
in the poor, in essence, subsidizing the insurance costs of high-income earners and the
wealthy because their tort damages normally were considerably greater than those of the
poor. For fuller development of this argument, see id. at 225-26.
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threatening, increasing their disapproval of lawyers, litigants, and litiga-
tion in general.
These criticisms decrease the legitimacy of the legal system, tarnish
the reputation of the legal profession, and discourage the public from
bringing legal claims. If these accusations were valid, or if they told the
entire story, our justice system would need sweeping reform and citizens
would be wise to seek alternatives to legal representation. Yet, Professor
Galanter and others have demonstrated that distorted and erroneous sta-
tistics provide the only support for most of these criticisms.31 Moreover,
discussions about the legal system and how to restructure the delivery of
legal services appear one-sided, largely ignoring the system's positive at-
tributes and what might be worth retaining or supporting. What promotes
this shortsightedness and distortion? In seeking an answer, I first want to
expand the discourse on the formal legal system by acknowledging its posi-
tive attributes, by transforming the pejorative language used to describe
lawyers and litigants, and by discussing unacknowledged problems and po-
tential solutions.
To begin, I agree with critics that talented and dedicated (rather than
overly zealous) lawyers successfully have pushed for the expansion of sub-
stantive doctrine in many areas. The development of strict liability for de-
fective products makes successful claims against manufacturers easier.
The redefinition of marital property in family law gives divorcing wives
rights to more of the marital assets. 3 2 Similarly, prior to the last two Re-
publican administrations, the expansion of civil rights doctrine offered mi-
norities and women greater redress for injuries.as In each of these areas,
reform led by dedicated lawyers has helped the traditionally dis-
31. For instance, commentators claim that American lawyers comprise 70% of the
world's total of lawyers. Carlson, supra note 6, at W1l. Yet, American lawyers (including
judges, prosecutors, government lawyers, and in-house corporate counsel) only comprise be-
tween 25 and 30% of the world's lawyers. Galanter, supra note 25, at 108. Galanter also
indicates that countries with the highest lawyer populations do not suffer impaired economic
growth. Id. at 81. For additional statistical misrepresentations, I refer the reader to Ga-
lanter's article. Id See also Cross, Effect of Lawyers, supra note 28, at 645; Epp, supra note 3, at
585. Galanter and others also dispute the perception that the American public is overly
litigious. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986); Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 4 (1983) [hereinafter
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes]; Earl Johnson, Jr. & Ann Barthelms Drew, This
Nation Has Money for Evaything Except Its Courts, 17JuvmcEsJ. 8 (1978); Laura Nader, A Litigious
People?, 22 LAw & Soc'y REv. 1017 (1988).
32. E.g., Bryan, supra note 11, at 441, 442 & n.2.
33. But see GERALD N. RosFNBFRG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTs BRING ABoUT SocIAL
CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that courts by themselves largely are ineffective at bringing about
meaningful social change). See Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Tia4 17 Lw &
SoC. INQunty 715 (1993) for a review and critique of Rosenberg's analysis. See also Kimberle
William Crenshaw, Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HI-tv. L REv. 1331 (1988) (arguing that those who have not known the
reality of oppression nor experienced its overpowering constraints cannot understand or
evaluate accurately the civil rights movement).
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empowered. These changes have occurred despite overcrowded
dockets.
3 4
Moreover, while Professor Galanter is correct in that some character-
istics of the legal system impede legal rights from trickling down to the
people they were designed to protect,3 5 that the value of rights is not lim-
ited to the results achieved within the formal system. For example, the
social validation implicit in the acquisition of legal rights can instill in re-
cipients a sense of entitlement and dignity and can ultimately affect their
expectations and the confidence with which they act.3 6 Moreover, to the
extent law shapes social attitudes, citizens treat individuals with legal rights
(especially if they have the power to assert them) with more respect than
those who lack the symbolic value the possession of the rights communi-
cates.3 7 The confluence of internal and external validation makes it more
likely that a person will take offense at injury and seek redress.
3 8
34. Overcrowded dockets hurt the economically disadvantaged who cannot survive long
waits for relief. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supra note 13, at 119-22
(arguing that overload increases the cost and risk of adjudicating, tending to favor the al-
ready influential); see also Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Centuy ofJudicial Re-
form: Time as the Greatest Innovator, 57 FoRDHAN L. Ray. 253, 254-55 (1988) (noting that the
"twin demons" of cost and delay continue to afflict the judicial system, erecting a barrier to
court access).
35. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supra note 13, at 95.
36. In August Wilson's play, Two Trains Running a black man named Memphis Lee owns
a small restaurant. The City of Pittsburgh wants to exercise its eminent domain power to
condemn and purchase the restaurant. Memphis engages in negotiations with the city that
come to a favorable conclusion. With a reinforced sense of worth and stature, he talks next
of returning to Alabama to establish his ownership of land illegally taken long ago from his
father. Memphis might be unsuccessful, but his first experience with the law motivates him
to proceed with the second claim. AUGUST WILSON, Two TRsS RUNNING (1992).
37. For a discussion of how the adoption and transformation of standard legal texts by
the disadvantaged can alter mainstream consciousness see Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 323, 323-35 (1987). See
also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987); PatriciaJ. Williams, AlchemicalNotes: Reconstruct-
ing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L L REV. 401 (1987).
38. As noted by Professor Matsuda in discussing Japanese-Americans' struggle against
racism:
If trust in the Constitution sustainsJapanese-Americans in their uphill battle against
racist oppression, then the Constitution for them has become a radical document.
Their consciousness-legal consciousness, if you will-of the ultimate legitimacy of
their fight against racism allows them to hold unpopular and ultimately transforma-
tive opinions with confidence, and to risk retribution from powerful opponents.
Matsuda, supra note 37, at 340.41.
Other critical race theorists explain that the impact of rights on those who traditionally
have gone without is different than for those whose power guarantees their advantaged social
positions. See Delgado, supra note 37, at 305-06; Williams, supra note 37, at 404-05; see also
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXcLusio , AND AMERicAN LAW
310 (1990) ("Rights pronounced by courts become possessions of the dispossessed.... Legal
language, like a song, can be hummed by someone who did not write it and changed by
those for whom it was not intended.").
Professors Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat note that class, education, work situations, and so-
cial networks contribute to whether, and how quickly, an individual will recognize an experi-
ence as an injury, blame someone other than herself for inflicting the injury, and make a
claim for redress of the harm. William L.F. Felstiner, et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 631, 632-37, 640 (1980-81); see
also Linda R. Singer, Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects on Justice for the Poor,
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Additionally, when people expect the formal legal system to recognize
certain rights, the system's failure to do so can produce outrage and mean-
ingful social change may follow.8 9 The insurrection in Los Angeles follow-
ing the Rodney King verdict suggests this possibility.40 Finally, sometimes
the disadvantaged effectively can use the formal legal system to secure
their rights.4 1 Missing from the discourse that explores the legal system's
value, then, is any recognition of its ability to expand rights for the disad-
vantaged in a society that allegedly reveres equality and justice for all.
In the civil rights arena, minority protection has eroded under the
last two Republican administrations and a reactionary Supreme Court.
42
13 CLEATn NHOUSE REv. 569, 573 (1979) (noting studies which reveal that minority and low
socioeconomic status negatively influence the propensity to complain about injury).
39. ScsaNaoLD, supra note 13, at 131 (arguing that the sense of entitlement associated
with rights can help initiate and nurture political mobilization).
Many citizens, for instance, called for reform after the Rodney King verdict. See, e.g.,
Melanie E. Lomax, Race, Politics and the System: Cary out Much-needed Reforms Now, ATLANTAJ.
& CONST., May 6, 1992, at A15.
40. But see Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENY. U. L. REy.
283 (1993) (discussing how dominant discourse employs the pejorative narratives of "irra-
tionality" and "deviation from the rule of law" to delegitimate social protest-ultimately rein-
terpreting insurrection as riot).
41. See Matsuda, supra note 37, at 332-39 for a discussion of how minorities have used
legal doctrine in their fight against racism. While remaining skeptical about law's ability to
effect change, Professor Diamond acknowledges, "[tihe legitimization by the law of new
norms, the recognition of personal 'rights,' provides a basis around which people can organ-
ize so that the legal abstractions may be achieved, at least in part" Diamond, supra note 13,
at 794-95. See also ROSENBERG, supra note 33 (setting forth conditions which the author con-
siders necessary, hut rare, before courts can effect significant social change). Professor Ga-
lanter notes that rule-changes that redistribute symbolic rewards may make use of the courts
more attractive to have-nots. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead, supra note 13, at 137.
He also observes, however, that symbolic do not always lead to tangible rewards and that
symbolic rewards may decrease the drive to secure tangible benefits. Id.
Sally Merry's research supports the above legal theorists. She found that courts fre-
quently deny working-class individuals enforcement of their legal entitlements, defining their
problems as moral or therapeutic rather than legal. SALLY ENGLE MElon', Gs-rrNG JUs'ncE
AND Grrnto EvEN 180 (1990). She also observes, however, that working-class court users
frequently resist:
Yet, there are forms of resistance. Even within this relationship of domination,
plaintiffs struggle to control their problems, to shape the legal system to their needs
rather than to be shaped by it. Despite the efforts of lower-court personnel to con-
vert these legal claims to moral discourse and to send them out the door, plaintiffs
struggle to keep the legal issues in the forefront, to assert their claims for protection
of their rights. Plaintiffs come back, renewing their demands, learning to use legal
categories with more sophistication, mastering legal discourse, asserting their
problems in their full complexity and emotional power, demanding recognition in
their own terms. This is a continuing struggle, a pull between plaintiffs who wish to
harness the power of the law for their own ends and those who would use it to
control the weaker and subordinate members of society.
JdL
42. In a recent blow to civil rights litigants, the United States Supreme Court placed the
burden of persuasion on the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action to show that the em-
ployer gave false -reasons for firing the plaintiff and to show that the actual reason for the
firing was racially motivated. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748-49
(1993). In his dissentJustice Souter wrote: "[A] victim.., lacking direct evidence will now be
saddled with the tremendous disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of
proving the employer's reasons to be false, but the amorphous requirement of disproving all
possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find lurking in the record." Id. at
2762 (Souter, J., dissenting). Public protest was immediate. Overburdened The Supreme Court
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Knowing the political and legal opposition they face, concerned advocates
and courageous clients nevertheless voice their complaints and bring their
formal claims in the legal system.43 Although their activity may not meet
with success for the individual claimant, it keeps the public apprised of
significant social grievances. Moreover, highly visible verdicts from the
formal legal system, like the verdict in the Rodney King case, expose the
hegemony of racism in this country and promote agonizing moral dia-
logue and intellectual debate. 44 Missing, then, from disparaging discus-
sions of the legal system is acknowledgment of yet another positive
attribute: the facilitation of moral discourse on important social issues.
45
Without dedicated civil rights advocates, we, as citizens, might be more
easily persuaded that our moral problem is solved and that we no longer
need be concerned about racism in our society.
4 6
In addition to ignoring positive attributes of the formal system, the
critical discourse disregards several serious problems and potential solu-
tions. For instance, as a faculty supervisor in the University of Denver's
poverty clinic, I am convinced our system needs more lawyers. 47 Or, if we
Has Made It Too Difficult to Prove Bias. The Congres Must Ac, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 1, 1993, at
54.
43. For instance, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct 2077, 2081 (1991),
an African American sued his employer for injuries he sustained on the job. During voir dire
the employer used two of its three peremptory challenges to remove African Americans from
the perspective jury. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
refusal to require the employer to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strikes. Later,
however, a divided en banc panel affirmed the district court. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and remanded to the district court to determine whether a
"prima facie case of racial discrimination has been established.., requiring Leesville to offer
race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges." Id. at 2088-89. Edmonson fought
his way through four major judicial proceedings to establish the precedent that civil litigants
are entitled to the same racially neutral juror select:on process as criminal defendants. Ed-
monson's individual claim against his employer, however, still remained unsolved. Thus,
dedication and perseverance seem required of both the lawyer and the client who are con-
cerned with civil rights.
44. See, e.g., Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 40; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Notes From
California: Rodney King and the Race Question, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 199 (1993); Deborah W.
Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DEN,. U. L. REv. 237 (1993).
45. The high ethical precepts sometimes articulated in law also help maintain the ten-
sion between the ideal and the actual, which is a precondition of a community's moral
growth. UNGER, supra note 18, at 216.
The relation of law to morality has received the attention of many scholars. See, e.g.,
RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); LON L FULLER, THE MORALrrv OF LAW
(rev. ed. 1969); JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1972); PHILP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAw
101-09 (1984); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fulelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 630 (1958); H.L.A Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HA~v. L. Rev.
593 (1958); Schwartz, supra note 22.
46. The increase in hate crimes across our country suggests our continued racism and
our need for constructive moral dialogue. See Dan Lovely, We Came Herefor Freedom... We
Live in Hell, USA WEEKEND: DENv. Posr, Jan. 10, 1993, at 4, 5 (citing statistics reported by
Richard Vega: during 1992 seven percent of adults were hate crime victims and racially moti-
vated crimes increased by 22% in Los Angeles between 1990 and 1991).
47. Laura Nader also notes substantial evidence that, in proportion to population and
need, litigation in the United States is not great. Laura Nader, The Recurrent Dialectic Between
Legality and Its Alternatives: The Limitations of Binay Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 621, 635-36
(1984) (reviewing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JuSTIcE wrrnotrr LAW (1983)). Statistics show, for
instance, that households use a third party to handle a complaint in only 1.2% of cases where
consumers have problems with purchases. Id. at 635 n.77.
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do have a surplus of lawyers, they seem to work for all the wrong (or per-
haps all the same) people.48 Expansion of legal aid services, government
funding for law school staffed poverty clinics, or national insurance for
legal representation might alleviate this problem. The deficit in or misal-
location of legal services and potential solutions, however, receive scant, if
any, consideration.
Overcrowded dockets certainly present problems, particularly in ur-
ban areas49 and especially for the economically disadvantaged who cannot
survive a long wait for relief. The creation of more courts, or specialized
courts with highly trained support staff, might mitigate this difficulty.50
Yet these potential solutions remain outside the discourse.
An increase in poverty lawyers and in courts might, however, create a
corresponding increase in substantive legal doctrine sensitive to the inter-
ests of the disadvantaged and the injured, compromising the interests of
the privileged. So, too, might litigation that expands the rights of the dis-
advantaged and exposes and encourages moral debate on significant so-
cial problems. A consistent, yet all too familiar, theme emerges. The
current assessment of the formal legal system's viability selectively omits
positive attributes and potential adjustments that threaten the powerful.
Consider the following question. If you were worried about (1) the
troublesome redistribution of wealth from the powerful to the disadvan-
taged that can occur when lawyers advocate in the formal system; (2) the
expansion of substantive law offering greater sensitivity to the rights of and
injuries suffered by the underprivileged; (3) the growing sense of entitle-
ment and dignity of the traditionally disempowered; (4) the continuation
of moral discourse on social issues you did not want acknowledged; and
Similarly a significant body of research shows that the vast majority of negligently injured
people who legally are entitled to compensation receive none at all. Epp, supra note 3, at
591. For instance:
[R]esearch on medical malpractice consistently finds that very small percentages (in
the range of 5-15%) of negligently injured patients, even those suffering from sig-
nificant permanent injuries, attempt to gain compensation. According to other
studies, there are similarly low claiming rates for various other types of injuries. In a
compelling survey of such evidence, Saks notes: "One of the most remarkable fea-
tures of the tort system is how few plaintiffs there are."
Id. at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
48. See BARBARA A. CURREN & CLARA N. CARSON, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LA,%ER STATISTICAL
REPORT 20 (1988) (indicating that of the 723,189 lawyers in the United States in 1988, only
7,369 or 1% of them were employed as legal aid attorneys or public defenders, while 519,941
or 71.9% were in private practice and 66,627 or 9.2% worked for private industry).
Interestingly, the 250,000 to 300,000 lawyers in the Soviet Union in 1990 offered private
citizens little relief because representation normally went to state enterprises, foreign busi-
nesses, and organized crime. David Lempert, Russians Still Can't Get MuchJustice N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 1992, at A28.
49. Dockets are more crowded in urban areas. See Catherine T. Clarke, Missed Manners
in Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L REV. 945,948 n.7 (1991) (noting that urban dockets are more
crowded); see also Marc Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75
Mim. L. REV. 335, 345 n.70 (1990) (noting that in urban jurisdictions, the criminal justice
systems are often overburdened).
50. Others in the past have suggested these solutions, e.g., James Willard Hurst, The
Functions of Courts in the United States, 1950-1980, 15 Lw & Soc'y REv. 401,413 (1980-81), but
recent discussion contains little or no mention of these possibilities. See also Hazard & Scott,
supra note 11, at 47-52 (discussing potential difficulties with specialized tribunals).
1993]
DENVER UN!VERSTY LAW REVIEW
(5) the occasional suggestion that more lawyers and more courts are
needed to address disputants' grievances-what would you do? How
would you reign in troublesome grievants and their even more trouble-
some lawyers? A number of things might occur to you.
To control grievants, especially the disadvantaged, you might launch
a negative publicity campaign that distorts statistics and constrains reality.
To convince poor, minority and/or injured persons that legal remedies
should be avoided, you might decry the litigiousness of the American pub-
lic, making them appropriately ashamed if they dared to litigate their dis-
putes. Japanese citizens who seek conciliation rather than litigation could
be offered as desirable models.51 In essence, you might strive to create an
ideology of conciliation rather than confrontation-of compromise rather
than rights.
Against overly zealous and misdirected lawyers a similar campaign
could be mounted. Those fulfilling the traditional role of advocate would
suffer professional ostracism and stigmatization as greedy and insensitive
undesirables. Your new script for lawyers might proclaim that only "bad"
lawyers pursue client interests and fight for what they believe is right and
fair.52 "Good" lawyers compromise or "cool out" complaining clients. Ag-
gressive use of Rule 11 sanctions might provide an additional disincentive
for creative and expansionist lawyering.
53
To further protect the interests of the powerful and retard evolution
of substantive doctrines, your publicity campaign might focus on specific
legal areas where the interests of elites seem most threatened. For in-
stance, you might carefully craft arguments and compile statistics designed
to instill fear in the public that the expansion of legal rights in the prod-
ucts liability area threatens the economy and, ultimately, the jobs of those
working for besieged manufacturers. In the family law area where the eco-
nomic interests of powerful divorcing husbands are under siege, you
might label mothers who litigate as greedy and insensitive to the psycho-
logical and emotional harm litigation causes their children. Discouraging
litigation in these and other targeted areas would retard the expansion of
substantive law favoring the less powerful.
51. As Professor Galanter notes, Japan often is offered as a counterpoint to litigious
America. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes, supra note 31, at 11. He also comments,
however, that the much cited Japanese preference for conciliation might result as much from
structural barriers to litigation as from disputant preference. Id. at 58-59.
52. William Rich writes: "Many a couple reconciled to separation has been driven to
hostility by the maximum demands asserted by their spouse's lawyer." Rich, supra note 4, at
782.
53. For a thoughtful appraisal of how Rule 11 sanctions negatively affect civil rights liti-
gation, see Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFr. L REa. 485 (1989); see also
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988) (suggesting Rule 11
sanctions disproportionately and negatively affect plaintiffs-especially plaintiffi in civil
rights, employment discrimination, and other types of "disfavored" litigation); Georgene M.
Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FoanRDH L Ray. 475 (1991) (discuss-
ing the chilling effect of Rule 11 sanctions on various types of plaintiffs and the rule's pro-
pensity to increase, rather than decrease, litigation); Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to
the Value ofAccessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R-C.L L. Ray. 341 (1990) (discussing the
effect of Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights litigation).
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To address the threatening solution of more courts and lawyers, and
to further retard legal reform, you might also propose informal alterna-
tives for resolving disputes. These procedures could be offered for cases
that are believed to cause court congestion, thereby reducing the pressure
and temptation to establish more courts. For example, petitions for disso-
lution of marriage constitute a large percentage of filed cases.
54
Mediators could help divorcing couples resolve their differences, signifi-
cantly reducing judicial caseloads. Lawyers then would become unneces-
sary and unwelcome participants in divorce dispute resolution, alleviating
any perceived need for more lawyers. Ordering large numbers of disputes
into informal procedures where legal rights lack relevance and rights con-
scious lawyers are unwelcome, would produce the additional benefit of
retarding doctrinal expansion in sensitive areas like divorce and products
liability. No litigation. No new precedent. No expansion of doctrine. At
least not through litigation.
55
I stop here-struck by the similarity between our fanciful plot and the
current campaign against lawyers, litigants, and the formal legal system.
While I cannot and do not wish to deny the formal legal system's
problems, I wonder whether the current critical discourse on the system's
shortcomings has insidious as well as altruistic underpinnings. Could this
discourse be shaped by elites who want to encourage lawyers and dispu-
tants to behave in ways that compromise further the interests of those who
have yet to achieve equality? Perhaps our legal system does have signifi-
cant, yet unacknowledged, difficulties. As Professor Ely notes:
Malfunction occurs when the process is underserving of trust,
when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out .... 56
54. SeeRudolphJ. Gerber, Recommendation on Domestic Relations Reform, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 9,
10 (1990) (stating that matrimonial actions comprise over half of the cases filed in trial
courts); see also David M. Trubek, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rv. 72, 87
(1983) (reporting on research showing post-divorce disputes as 59% of all litigation).
55. The covert nature of mediation also restricts public knowledge of substantive results.
Thus the public outrage in response to grossly unfair results that sometimes fuels reform
largely is lacking in divorce mediation.
56. JoHN H. ELY, DFmocAcy AND DisRUsr 103 (1980).
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A GENTLE AND EASY DEATH: FROM ANCIENT GREECE
TO BEYOND CRUZAN TOWARD A REASONED LEGAL
RESPONSE TO THE SOCIETAL DILEMMA OF
EUTHANASIA
THANE JOSEF MESSINGER*
To be, or not to be, that is the question:
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles
And by opposing end them. To die, to sleep.
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to; 'tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish'd. To die,
to sleep.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of euthanasia has presented societies throughout history
with a deeply troubling dilemma of defining the meaning of death-and
the value of life. 2 Advocates on both sides are pointed in their criticisms,
* Associate, Oshima, Chun, Fong & Chung, Honolulu, Hawaii; J.D., University of
Texas, 1991; M.B.A., Southwest Texas State University, 1985; BA, California University of
Pennsylvania, 1984.
I would like to express my appreciation to Drs. Milton MessingerJoseph Kulhavy, David
Ronin, Yvonne Cripps, and the Honorable Lynn Hughes for their review of, and insightful
comments to, various drafts of this article.
I would also like to thank my wife, Bao-lan.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAmLET PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1.
Hamlet's soliloquy speaks timelessly well to both sides of the euthanasia debate; "the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune" captures the essence of what is normally considered by
proponents necessary for euthanasia to be legitimate, while the "thousand natural shocks"
are destined for all, and are thus not sufficient to warrant taking arms against one's own sea
of troubles. Id. The operative words are "outrageous" on the one hand and "natural" on the
other.
2. See, e.g., DON V. BAnE, TH CHALLENGE OF EUTHANASA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRA-
PHY ON EUTHASI AND RELATED SUBJECTS (1990); DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE
RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING EUHANASIA 1-130 (1986) (the authors are co-founders of The
Hemlock Society, which advocates euthanasia); 0. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO Din: MORAL
AND LEGAL AsPEars OF EUTHANASIA 53-214 (rev. ed. 1977); BETH SPRING & ED LARSON, EUTHA-
NASIA SPIRITUAL, MEDICAL & LEGAL ISSUES IN TERMINAL HEALTH CARE 105-34 (1988) (histori-
cal Christian perspective); SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA: HISTORICAL AND COTEMPORARYTHEMES
9-216 (Barouch A. Brody ed., 1989) [hereinafter SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA]; DAVID C. THOM-
ASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHAsA TowARD AN ETHICAL SOCIAL POLCY 85-86 (1990);
ROBERT N. WENNBERG, TERMINAL CHOICES: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE, AND THE RIGHT TO DIE 1-107
(1989);JEERv B. WILSON, DEATH BY DECISION: THE MEDICAL, MoRAL, AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
EUrHANASIA 17-45 (1975).
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with little common ground for compromise.3 The law often skirts the is-
sues involved, primarily because society is unable deal with the explosive
problems associated with euthanasia. Euthanasia, however, should not be
viewed through the narrow lens of our own society or time. It is important
to understand the historical and philosophical developments surrounding
euthanasia if we are to strive to devise an acceptable legal structure to
resolve these difficult problems.
Those opposed reject euthanasia on the ground that it places injeop-
ardy a fundamental inviolability of human life.4 From Biblical proscrip-
tions to "natural" law, human life is considered sacrosanct, and efforts to
destroy even a fraction of our time on earth are a direct violation of God's
will.- Suffering is itself seen as a positive influence. 6 The objection has
two levels: first, rejecting the possibility that life can have negative value,
7
and second, rejecting the power of man to choose for himself to end his
own life.8 Further, opponents point to a parade of horribles, which they
3. Compare Nat Hentoff, The Indivisible light For Life STUmS IN L., MED. & Soc'y 1-9
(1987) (pamphlet describing a "pro-life" position, published by Americans United for Life,
which opposes euthanasia) (copy on file with DENY. U. L. REv.) and PAUL MARX, Excns'rS
FROM: THE MERCv KILLERS 1-7 (date unknown) (pamphlet distributed by Human Life Inter-
national, which opposes euthanasia) (copy on file with Draw. U. L. Ray.) and CALIFORNIA
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, VOLUNTARY ACTIV EuT AN~s THE "HuMANE AND DIGNIFIED DEATH
Act 2 (1988) (report concluding that the risks of active voluntary euthanasia outweigh the
benefits) with GLANv.LE WnLAAms, THE SANCrrrT OF LIFE AND THE CmMNAL LAw 311-50
(1957) (an early modem advocation of euthanasia by a leading legal scholar) and THE NA-
TIONAL HEMLOCK SOCIETV, SUPPORTING THE OnIoN OF ACrrVE VOLUNTARY ETHNASIA FOR
THE TERMINALLY ILL 1 (1990) (pamphlet describing the Hemlock Society's General Principles
and Objectives) (copy on file with DENv. U. L. REv.) and AMERICAN CvIL LmERTIs UNION,
Poucir #271 (1976) (supporting the legitimacy of Living Wills, while recognizing society's
right to prevent suicide (Policy #213)) (reprinted in informational sheets distributed by the
ACLU) (copy on file with DENv. U. L. REv.).
4. Cf Basil Mitchell, The Value of Human Life in MEDICINE, MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE
VALUE OF LIF 34-46 (1990). Western civilization has been indelibly marked by Christian
influences, which have imbued an assumption that, to be civilized, a society must value
human life absolutely. See id. at 38-39; see also infra note 78 and part II.B. See generallyJoseph
Boyle, Sanctity of Life and Suicide: Tensions and Developments Within Common Morality, in SUICIDE
AND EUTANASIA, supra note 2, at 221-47 (explaining that the sanctity, sacredness, or dignity
of human life provides sufficient reason why one should not kill an innocent person).
5. See infra notes 112, 361-62, 365-67 and accompanying text. It is possible to object on
non-religious grounds to euthanasia as immoral. See infra notes 367, 370 and accompanying
text. Non-religious moral arguments often concentrate on the effects of condoned euthana-
sia, particularly concerning the element of "voluntariness" and its difficult definition. See
infra parts IV.A.4-6; see also infra note 48 (noting an argument that "voluntary" euthanasia is
oxymoronic, and necessarily involves varying degrees of coercion). These arguments are
powerful because they do not rely for support on the self-referential nature of theological
arguments, but instead look to the moral foundations of society. Objections on moral
grounds, as distinguished from purely theological ones, are probably best enunciated
through the slippery slope objection, infra part IV.A.2, and the effect on the euthanasia-
candidate and his family, infra part IV.A.6.
6. See infra notes 217, 368, and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 101 and accompanying text; cf. infra notes 428-432 and accompanying
text (arguing that life may indeed have a negative "value"). But cf. Mitchell, supra note 4, at
43-44 (noting that the authors of the Linacre Centre's report Euthanasia and Clinical Practice
carefully avoided framing the issue in terms of the overall quality of the patient's life to avoid
the moral morass there).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 107-08, 112.
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fear will inexorably follow any loosening of proscriptions against killing.9
One example often cited is the Nazi German debacle, during which mil-
lions died-hundreds of thousands under the auspices of "euthanasia"
programs. 10 Opponents further argue that any legitimization of euthana-
sia will erode medical" and societal' 2 values and will deprive the individ-
ual of the will to live.'
3
Against these contentions, proponents of euthanasia cite examples of
human suffering that have become increasingly frequent as medical tech-
nologies improve.' 4 Medicine can now save many who, arguably, should
not be saved; some, in essence, outlive their own deaths.' 5 The noble goal
of medicine has proved a double-edged sword: in the race to preserve life,
suffering is sometimes prolonged instead.16 Those in favor of euthanasia
must necessarily reject-or ignore-the theological arguments regarding
the sanctity of life. Sanctity itself is, by definition, absolute.' 7 This is an
uncomfortable position for many, but an unavoidable one when faced
with the very real problems of miserable deaths.
As with other issues that are inextricably linked to disparate moral,
medical, philosophical, theological, and legal considerations, euthanasia
provides little room for agreement.' 8 Each side in the debate enters the
arena with incompatible presuppositions; either one accepts theological
precepts-and all that that implies-or one does not.'9 Progress in the
9. Generally, proponents are also concerned about the possibilities for abuse, but stress
instead the need for legal safeguards. Se; e.g., RussEu., supra note 2, at 272-80; Paul A. Drey
&James J. Giszczak, May I Author My Final Chapter? Assisted Suicide and Guidelines to Prevent
Abuse, 18J. LEGIs. 331, 338-45 (1992) (noting several policy considerations that need to be
addressed before legislation is passed). Further, abuses may be exacerbated by the secrecy
caused by a lack of legal options. RussEl., supra note 2, at 226-27; cf. Robert A. Pletcher,
Assisted Suicide for the Terminally ll: The Inadequacy of Legal Models to Rationally Analyze Voluntary
Active Euthanasia, 13 CiuM. JusT. J. 303, 304-15 (1992). Also objected to is the use of the
slippery slope argument as an offensive shield; it can be raised against virtually any action.
Wnjums, supra note 3, at 315; see also infra text accompanying note 141.
10. See infra notes 176-89, 371, and accompanying text.
11. See infra part IV.A4.
12. See infra part IVA5.
13. See infra part IV.A.6.
14. See Htmn mv & WicKE-rr, supra note 2, at 131-44.
15. See WENNB.RG, supra note 2, at 77-78.
16. Robert N. Wennberg recounted a horror story based on a letter published in the
British Medical Journal of February 17, 1968, in which a 68-year-old physician is diagnosed as
having advanced stomach cancer, which spread quickly to the liver. He suffered constant
pain despite increasing dosages of drugs. He developed a lung arterial clot, which was re-
moved. After this, he specifically requested that no other actions be taken to prolong his life.
Two weeks later he had a heart attack and was resuscitated. He had four heart stoppages that
night, and was resuscitated each time. He lingered for another three weeks, while vomiting
and suffering convulsions. Preparations were made for artificial respiration, but his heart
beat them to it. Id. at 112.
17. See Boyle, supra note 4, at 221-47 (discussing the theological arguments behind sac-
rosanct life).
18. The fact that five U.S. Supreme Court opinions were written in the recent watershed
case concerning Nancy Crnzan indicates the divisive nature of the debate. See infra notes 438-
40 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 361-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of non-religious ob-
jections to euthanasia see Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Kill-
ing" Legislation, 42 MwN. L. REv. 969 (1958).
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form of reasoned, balanced public debate and policies are unlikely. In
this version of the zero sum game, one side will be the loser. Unfortu-
nately, in this debate the loser won't be able to easily live-or die-with
the loss.
Part II of this article focuses on the various meanings of "euthanasia"
and related issues.20 Part III traces the patterns of euthanasia practices
and societal mores from ancient Greece and Rome 2 to early Christian
attitudes, 22 and finally to contemporary history.23 Part IV examines argu-
ments on either side of the euthanasia controversy.2 4 Parts V and VI ex-
amine the legal issues25  and moral, medical, and economic
considerations2 6 surrounding the various facets of the euthanasia debate.
Part VII briefly illustrates contemporary euthanasia policy in the Nether-
lands.2 7 Finally, Part VIII recommends a redefinition of the right of pri-
vacy to include a property interest in one's own physical person, arguing
that government mustjustify intervention in cases where euthanasia is con-
sidered.28 Further, the criminal law should consider the humanitarian
motives of the person who kills, the circumstances of the death, and the
circumstances of the person who dies. These distinguish permissible eu-
thanasia, under very limited circumstances, from homicide.
2 9
II. DEFINING EuIrHANASIA AND RELATED TERMs
The term "euthanasia" often connotes disguised murder, barbarism,
uncaring elimination of "problem" people, or worse, planned genocide.
30
Many who advocate euthanasia define it as "death with dignity," "mercy
killing," or "the right to die,"3 ' while opposing groups, such as the Inter-
national Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, see active3 2 euthanasia as "death on
20. See infra part II.
21. See infra part ll.A
22. See infra part II.B.
23. See infra part III.C.
24. See infra part IV.
25. See infra part V.
26. See infra part VI.
27. See infra part VII.
28. See infta part VIII.
29. See infra part VIII.
30. See infra notes 177, 189 and accompanying text.
31. See CHRimAAN BARNARD, GOOD Lir GoOD DETxi: A DocroR's CASE FOR EurTHANA-
SIA AND SUICIDE 63 (1980); Arthur Dyck, Beneficent Euthanasia and Benemortasia: Alternative
Views of Mercy, in BENEmCENT Eur N5ia 117, 118 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975);James Rachels,
Passive and Active Euthanasia Are Equally Acceptable, in EuT As OPPOsING VIEWPoINTS 42,
43 (Neal Bernards ed., 1989). See Generally ROBERT L. RISLEY, DeATH wrm DCNrIr. A NEw
LAw PEPJ&rNG PSYsicLAN Am-rNDvmr, (1989); Peggy L. Collins, Note, The Foundations of the
Right to Die, 90 W. VA. L. Rev. 235 (1987). "Agathanasia" refers to a "better death." Kenneth
L. Vaux, Debbies Dying. Mercy Killing and the Good Death, in EurHA AsIA: THE MoRAL ISSUES 30
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989). Arthur Dyck believes the word
"benemortasia," from the Latin bene (good) and mor (death), better describes how we ought
to behave toward those who are dying or whose death would appear to be a merciful event
See Dyck, supra, at 124.
32. See infra text accompanying note 45.
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demand," the moral equivalent of murder.8 , Importantly, euthanasia is
not suicide; rather, it can be a limited subset of a general category of sui-
cide.8 4 Defining euthanasia precisely has become particularly problematic
because it can encompass disparate actions, or omissions, as well as gen-
eral philosophies of life and death. The emotions involved in this debate
invariably affect, and are affected by, broader feelings, fears, and societal
taboos.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines euthanasia simply as "[a] gentle
and easy death."8 5 Black's Law Dictionary defines euthanasia as "the act or
practice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable
and distressing disease as an act of mercy."8 6 Of these definitions, Oxford's
is the most eloquent,3 7 while Black's is more precise in addressing the cur-
rent uses and connotations of the word, and in focusing the legal and
ethical issues on the circumstances where euthanasia may or may not be
appropriate.38 For these reasons, Black's definition is intended through-
out this Article.
3 9
Euthanasia can be further subdivided according to the nature of the
action ending life.40 Passive 41 euthanasia ordinarily entails a refusal to
33. See HUMAN LIE CENTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-EuTHANASIA TASK FORCE: AN IN-
TRODUCTION, (undated) (discussion of the organization's reasons for being); see also FR. PAuL
MARx, AND Now EUTHANAsIA 14 (1985) (distributed by Human Life International, an organi-
zation that opposes euthanasia).
34. Suicide is "the act or an instance of taking one's own life voluntarily and intention-
ally." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1156 (1981). The motive for taking one's own
life, central to the issue of euthanasia, is missing in the definition of suicide. See infra text
accompanying notes 501-03 (discussing motive in the definition of homicide). Itis also possi-
ble for euthanasia to not be suicide, as in involuntary euthanasia. See infra notes 49-52 and
accompanying text.
35. VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 444 (2d ed. 1989). The definition includes "the
means of bringing about a gentle and easy death," as well as the more recent use, "the action
of inducing a gentle and easy death." Id.
36. BLACKS'S LAw DICTIONARY 554 (6th ed. 1990); see also Arm iucAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDcICN 424 (1989) (rejecting passive euthanasia as a subset of
euthanasia).
37. It has the advantage also of being (relatively) apolitical. Etymologically derived from
the Greek eu (good) and thanatos (death), it does not bear the burden of current sociological
debate. See OxFoRD ENGLISH DicrnoNARY, supra note 35. But cf. C. Everett Koop, The Chal-
lenge of Definition, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2 (1989) (U.S. Surgeon General C. Everett Koop
arguing that "euthanasia" is misleading when interpreted as a "good death," because such an
interpretation rejects theJudeo-Christian axiom of absolute sanctity of life, and that the med-
ical arena is no place to reverse societal values).
38. See also Philippa Foot, Euthanasia, in DEATH AND DECISION 85, 86 (Ernan McMullin
ed., 1978) (underscoring the importance of understanding the meaning beyond that given
by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which is essentially the same as that of the Oxford
English Dictionary); THOMASMA & GRtAER, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing the role of "value"
in the euthanasia debate).
39. Poetic license is requested for the title; BLACK's definition is hardly the stuff of an
inspiring banner.
40. Many, particularly those opposed to euthanasia, refuse to recognize the following
distinctions; they are seen as purposefully confusing distractions from the central issues. See,
e.g., MARX, supra note 33, at 14.
41. Also referred to as "negative" or "indirect" euthanasia, or "dysthanasia." See Hum-
Pint & WIcKETr, supra note 2, at 289; RUssELL, supra note 2, at 19-20; WILSON, supra note 2, at
81 (citing Joseph Fletcher, who later replaced "dysthanasia" with "antidysthanasia").
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1
make extraordinary efforts to keep a person alive.42 Many do not consider
this euthanasia. Rather, it is seen as merely leaving to nature the ordinary
course of events that follow if extraordinary means are not used to main-
tain life.4 3 Active 44 euthanasia, conversely, involves some deliberate action
to cause death.4 5 Distinguishing between passive and active euthanasia is
often crucial because many who strongly oppose active measures support
passive ones.46 Others, however, see a false dichotomy between the ethics
of passive and active euthanasia.
47
Euthanasia can be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary eutha-
nasia is the least complicated ethically, as the dying person can make a
rational request, and be examined to ensure the validity of the request.
48
42. But cf Rachels, supra note 31, at 43 (defining passive euthanasia as refraining from
doing anything to keep the patient alive) (emphasis added). To avoid semantic difficulties,
medical ethicists now often refer to "forgoing life-sustaining treatment" rather than the more
controversial "passive euthanasia." See THOMAS SCULLY & CELIA SCULLY, PLAYING GOD: THE
N w WORLD OF MEDICAL CHOICES 112 (1987). See generally By No ExTR owRNDr, ME.ANs:
THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE-susTATNINc FOOD AND WATER (Joanne Lynn ed., 1986) (discuss-
ing the implications of a decision to forgo food and water).
43. See, e.g., MARx, supra note 33, at 14; see alsoJ. Gay-Williams, The Wrongfulness ofEutha-
nasia, in EU ANAsI THE MORAL ISSUES 97, 98 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum
eds., 1989) (stating that a failure to continue treatment after it is recognized that the patient
will not recover is not euthanasia).
44. Also referred to as "positive" euthanasia. See RussE.L, supra note 2, at 19.
45. See, e.g., BARNAR.D, supra note 31, at 27; Rachels, supra note 31, at 43.
46. This is particularly true in a religious context. For an excellent synthesis of various
religious beliefs, see Htmsv & Wicxrmr, supra note 2, at 295 (containing a chart from
GR.LD LARuF, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION (1985)). Nearly all religions cited accept passive
euthanasia (albeit not necessarily with that label), while opposing active euthanasia. See id.
Notably, this is not universally true; some religions consider active euthanasia to be a personal
choice. See id.
47. See BARNARD, supra note 31, at 69, 80; Rachels, supra note 31, at 44; see also DennisJ.
Doherty, Physician-Assisted Suicide: What Constitutes Assistance?, 65 Wis. LAw. 20, 20 (1992). Dr.
Joseph Fletcher outlined a progression in degrees of euthanasia:
1. An absolute refusal to elicit any human initiative in the death or the dying. Life
must always be considered as the ultimate human value.
2. A qualified refusal, in that the doctor can refrain from employing extraordinary
means of preserving life but would nonetheless do whatever possible by ordinary
means to keep life going.
3. Declining to start treatment in a patient who has an incurable disease and is
suffering from a curable inter-current illness (for example, the terminally ill
cancer patient with pneumonia). The doctor refuses to initiate treatment for
the lung infection that can be cured and in this way may actually hasten death.
4. Stoppage of treatment, with consent, where it is the patient's wish not to be
treated any further.
5. Stoppage of treatment, without consent, when the attending physician feels that
further treatment can only prolong suffering.
6. Leaving the patient with an overdose of narcotic or sedatives, thus assisting the
dying person to take his own life.
7. Prior permission is given by the patient to the doctor to administer an injection,
under certain circumstances, from which the patient will not recover.
8. Without consent, and on his own authority, the doctor ends the patient's life
with an overdose of drugs.
Paper given by Dr.Joseph Fletcher to the 1974 Euthanasia Conference in New York, reprinted
in BA NARD, supra note 31, at 63-64. Barnard sees social attitudes regarding the various forms
of euthanasia as hypocritical and illogical; man has long sanctioned and encourages massive
deaths via war. Id. at 67; see alsoJustice Scalia's discussion in Cruzan, infra note 440.
48. But cf. Richard Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, 19 HAsTNcs CENTER REP.
22, 24 (1989) (arguing that "voluntary" euthanasia is oxymoronic and necessarily involves
varying degrees of coercion). This constitutes one of the strongest arguments of those op-
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Involuntary49 euthanasia has not been, but should be, further categorized
into beneficent and malevolent involuntary euthanasia.50 The distinction
is a function of the motives behind, and the methods used, in the actions
taken. On the one end is a decision made by the family and the courts
with the best of intentions, and with full legal safeguards.5 1 On the other
is the purposeful disregard of human concerns, either in violation of legal
processes, or with co-option of the legal system itself.
52
As medical technologies extend life, the question of what constitutes
death is itself becoming increasingly difficult to define.53 This is particu-
larly relevant to the issues of beneficent involuntary euthanasia where pa-
tients can be kept alive when arguably they should die.
5 4
III. HIsToRIcAL CONTEXT
A. Early Attitudes Toward Euthanasia
5
By necessity, ancient views of death often differed dramatically from
posed to euthanasia on moral, but not necessarily religious, grounds in that the voluntariness
of the euthanasia decision can never be truly ascertained, and decisions made because of
subtle or not-so-subtle external pressures may poison the possibility for genuinely beneficent
euthanasia. See generally VOLUNTARY EuTHANAsIAz EXPERTS DEBAT THE a rrorO Dm (A.B.
Downing & Barbara Smoker eds., 1986). One of the requirements for active euthanasia in
the Netherlands is "voluntariness," defined as a persistent, conscious, and free request by the
patient. See M.A.M. Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316, 3316
(1989); infra part VII.
49. "Involuntary" is a somewhat unfortunate term, as it can have two connotations as the
antonym of "voluntary": it can mean either a decision made in the absence of free will, or a
decision made against one's free will. The difference is critical, and here, the meaning is that
of a decision made in the absence of free will. Euthanasia performed involuntarily in the
Nazi German sense is neither intended nor the subject of current legal debate.
50. See infra notes 181, 191, 372.
51. If and when such safeguards apply remains a problematic issue in this debate. See
infra part V.A
52. See infra notes 176-89, 371 and accompanying text; cf Donald R.A. Uges & Ben
Greijdanus, Euthanasia: A Challenge for the Forensic Toxicologis 35J. FORENSIC Scs. 1424, 1425-
30 (1990).
53. See ANN E. Wmss, Bimo'cs: DaxtAs IN MODERN MEDicrNE 79 (1985); BARNARD,
supra note 31, at 31. See generally B.D. CoLE, HARD CHOIcES: MIXED BLEssINGs OF MODERN
MEDiCAL TECHNOLOGIES 243-64 (1986); H. Tristram EngelhardtJr., Definitions ofDeath: Where
to Draw the Lines and Why, in DEATH AND DECISION 15 (Eman McMullin ed., 1978); Collins,
supra note 31, at 236. BLAcK's LAW DICrONARY defines death simply as "the cessation of life,"
which is hardly helpful in medical situations. BLACK's LAW DarIoNARY 400 (6th ed. 1990).
Even the second part, "permanent cessations of all vital functions and signs," is too vague for
questions of when death occurs; medical sophistication in monitoring stages of death has
grown far beyond the general diagnoses that have previously sufficed. Id. According to
BAc's, characteristics of brain death (the "Harvard" definition) include: "(1) unreceptivity
and unresponsiveness to externally applied stimuli and internal needs; (2) no spontaneous
movements or breathing; (3) no reflex activity; and (4) a flat electroencephalograph read-
ing after 24 hour period of observation." Id. at 188. A precise definition might not be possi-
ble, or even desirable. Death is a gradual process at the cellular level, with different tissues
varying in their abilities to withstand deprivation of oxygen. See BARNARD, supra note 31, at
34. Brain cells are among the least able to withstand anoxia. Id.
54. See, eg., infra notes 296-307, 309-38 and accompanying text.
55. Historical illustrations are neither considered nor intended as justifications for
modern practices or proposals. Rather, they are useful empirically as a reference for
contemporary ideologies and as examples to be either criticized or espoused.
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those of modem societies. 56 Whether as a result of injury, disease, or old
age, death was treated as a natural part of life. Aiding death was often
done out of respect, not contempt, for the impaired individual. 57 In an-
cient Greece, euthanasia appears to have been an accepted and prevalent
practice. Indeed, many Hellenic philosophers advocated euthanasia.58 As
the Hellenics prospered, the Platonic principle of kalokagathid, the ideal of
a perfect balance of physical and mental well-being, gradually replaced the
Homeric values of glory and victory.59 Also involved was the underlying
belief, prevalent as well in Roman thought, that man is the master of his
own body, with the right to decide his own fate.60 These values competed
with the traditional disapproval of suicide that was based primarily on the
individual's loyalty to the state, and the Greek taboo against killing one's
kin.61 Despite the Greek taboo, suicide was sometimes not only possible,
but officially endorsed.
According to some historians, a custom existed on the island of
Ceos62 whereby very old citizens who had outlived their usefulness to soci-
ety would gather annually, as if for a banquet, and drink together a lethal
potion. 63 In one of Greece's oldest colonies,64 as well as in Athens and
Ceos, it was the custom for public magistrates to maintain a depository of
poison65 available for anyone who could justify his desire for death before
56. We must be careful to avoid interpreting the actions and beliefs of ancient cultures
according to present-day circumstances and ethical values. To comprehend fairly the poli-
cies then in existence, one must view the practices in relation to the then-current religious,
social, and technological conditions.
57. See, e.g., THoMAsMA & GRAB -R, supra note 2, at 85-86.
58. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 55. See generallyJohn Cooper, Greek Philosaphers on Eutha-
nasia and Suicd in SUCmE AND EtrrHANAsiA, supra note 2, at 9-32. John Cooper points out,
however, that our English understanding of the words "euthanasia" and "suicide" are mis-
leading in interpreting the opinions of Hellenic philosophers; suicide was more narrowly
construed, and euthanasia in its contemporary meaning was never discussed. Id. at 9-11. The
relevant issue was the person's ability to live a full, active life in furtherance of socially useful
activities that he was previously suited for, not his medical conditions or suffering; their medi-
cal knowledge was insufficient to decide these matters with certainty. Id. at 11; cf. infra text
accompanying notes 69-75. Indeed, to Plato, the question was an objective one; the patient's
wishes were not controlling, or even elicited. See Cooper, supra, at 12-14. The result of a
person who wishes to prolong his life is uncertain. Id. at 13; cf. infra note 182 and accompa-
nying text. Interestingly, the aged are not included in Socrates' discussions; their efforts for
the community are no longer expected. Cooper, supra, at 13. In Plato's Republic, they are
due honor and respect, and do not fall under his restrictions against prolonging life. Id.
59. Hum'HRY & WIcTr, supra note 2, at 3; WILSON, supra note 2, at 20.
60. RussELm, supra note 2, at 53 (referring to historian Morris H. Safron of Rutgers Medi-
cal School).
61. See ALFRED ALVAREZ, THE SAVACE GOD: A STuDY OF SUICIDE 56 (Bantam Books 1973)
(1971). Taboos against the taking of one's own life also existed. Illegitimate suicide was an
offense against the state, with penalties imposed. V THE ETHics OF ARISTOTLE xi (J.A.Y.
Thomson trans., 1980); see also Cooper, supra note 58, at 19-23. Usually, the corpse's right
hand was cut off, he was buried separately, his descendants were disenfranchised, and his
family was dishonored. See HUMPHRY & WIcKETr, supra note 2, at 3.
62. The birthplace of Hippocrates. RussEuL, supra note 2, at 53.
63. Id.
64. What is now Marseilles.
65. Extracted from the infamous hemlock, which provides a painful and uncertain
death. See Introductoy Letterfiom the National Hemlock Society 2 (rec'd Aug. 10, 1990) (copy on
file with DENY. U. L. REv.).
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the Senate. 66 Libanius 6 7 is quoted as stating the rules for requesting
permission:
Whoever no longer wishes to live shall state his reasons to the
Senate, and after having received permission shall abandon life.
If your existence is hateful to you, die; if you are overwhelmed by
fate, drink the hemlock. If you are bowed with grief, abandon
life. Let the unhappy man recount his misfortune, let the magis-
trate supply him with the remedy, and his wretchedness will
come to an end.68
According to Plato, Socrates saw painful disease and suffering as good
reasons not to cling to life. 69 In the Republic,70 Socrates praised Asclepius,
the god of healing and medicine, for his more humane and practical poli-
cies. Bodies that disease had penetrated "through and through" Asclepius
would not have attempted to cure: "[H]e did not want to lengthen out
good-for-nothing lives.... Those who are diseased in their bodies, [physi-
cians] will leave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an
end to themselves."
7 1
A far more extreme view of appropriate social policy was sometimes
advocated. Asclepius is said to have scorned weak fathers for begetting
weaker sons.72 Similarly, Socrates recommended infanticide: "[T]he off-
spring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed,
will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be."
73
Socrates even condemned the physician Herodicus, the teacher of Hip-
pocrates, for "the invention of lingering death."74 Aristotle also endorsed
infanticide to ensure the state of the worthiest citizens.75 On Ceos, evi-
dence indicates an ancient custom76 requiring people over sixty to com-
mit suicide-a "utilitarian practice."
77
Perhaps the best evidence of euthanasia in Greece is the condemna-
tion of the practice by others, such as the Pythagoreans,
78 Aristotelians,7 9
66. See HUMPHY & WIczMT-, supra note 2, at 4.
67. Greek Sophist and rhetorician, who serves as a major source of historical informa-
tion for the period. SeeVIR THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BArrNNIcA 327 (15th ed. 1986).
68. EMIE DuRm-ma, SuicmE: A Sru-Y IN SOCIOLOGY 330 (John A. Spaulding & George
Simpson trans., 1951).
69. Humsmwv & WicKarr, supra note 2, at 4.
70. PLATO, THE PORTABLE PLATO 398 (Scott.Buchanan ed. & Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Viking Press 1966). Many physicians may have followed this policy, but for less noble rea-
sons. Doctors of the time were itinerant and had the status of craftsmen. Their livelihoods
demanded accurate diagnoses and effective cures-if at all. HutnHRv & WICKETr, supra note
2, at 4; Wn.soN, supra note 2, at 19.
71. PLATO, supra note 70, at 398, 401.
72. Id. at 398.
73. Id. at 471.
74. PLATO, supra note 70, at 396. Socrates stated that Herodicus, "being a trainer, and
himself of sickly constitution, by a combination of training and doctoring found out a way of
torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world." Id.
75. See HUmPHRY & WicKtrr, supra note 2, at 3.
76. Possibly a legal requirement. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 20.
77. Id.
78. The Pythagoreans rigorously opposed suicide based on their religious belief that
each man is assigned to his post in life by the gods, and cannot desert it regardless of the
circumstances. Id. at 21; Cooper, supra note 58, at 32. The Pythagorean philosophy influ-
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and Epicureans.8 0 Perhaps most importantly, the Greeks elevated the sub-
ject to one susceptible to rational discourse.8 '
To the Romans, living nobly meant dying nobly. The appropriateness
of suicide depended on the dominant will and a rational choice.8 2 Conse-
quently, aristocrats were often allowed suicide as an alternative to execu-
tion or enslavement.8 3 Killing oneself was also acceptable as an escape
from disgrace at the hands of an enemy.
8 4
In Rome, suicide was punishable only if irrational. Killing oneself
without cause was contemptible because "whoever does not spare himself
would much less spare another."8 5 Terminal illness, however, was consid-
ered good cause. The idea of dying well was a summum bonum, or extreme
good.8 6 Indeed, Marcus Aurelius defended the right of the individual to
free himself from even the danger of "intellectual decrepitude."
8 7
The Stoics favored suicide when life was no longer in accordance with
nature, because of pain, grave illness, or physical abnormalities.8s Seneca
wrote:
It makes a great deal of difference whether a man is lengthening
his life or his death. But if the body is useless for service, why
should one not free the struggling soul? Perhaps one ought to
do this a little before the debt is due, lest, when it falls due, he
may be unable to perform the act.8 9
Although less debated, in other areas of the world similar practices
occurred. In some Eskimo tribes, an old or sick member would request of
his family to die. If the family was a good one, it would comply by aban-
enced later beliefs, and indeed, is reflected in the basic medical ethics of the Hippocratic
Oath. WILsoN, supra note 2, at 21.
79. Aristotle opposed suicide as contrary to the right rule of life, as an injustice against
the state, and cowardly if done to escape suffering. WILSON, supra note 2, at 21; Cooper,
supra note 58, at 19-23.
80. While the Epicureans believed that the soul ceased to exist at death, they did not
value life absolutely. Epicurus urged men "to weigh carefully whether they would prefer
death to come to them, or would themselves go to death." WILSON, supra note 2, at 21-22.
Cicero attributes to Epicurus the thought that we may "serenely quit life's theatre, when the
play has ceased to please us." Cooper, supra note 58, at 29. Still, Epicurus was insistent on
the unreasonableness of suicide. Id.
81. HUMPHRY & WIcKETr, supra note 2, at 5. John Cooper admires the Hellenic debates
and believes that these philosophers have already said everything of value regarding the kill-
ing of one's self. Cooper, supra note 58, at 32.
82. ALVAREZ, supra note 61, at 62.
83. HuMPHR & Wiciarr, supra note 2, at 5.
84. Id. For interesting accounts of a classic example of 960 men, women, and children
who consciously chose death rather than disgrace and certain execution or enslavement, see
generally GEORGE C. BRAu.vR, JR., JUDAEA WEEPING: THE JEWISH STRuocLE AGAINST Rohm
FROM POMPEY TO MASADA, 63 B.C. TO A.D. 73 (1970); MOSHE PEARLmsAN, THE ZEALOTS OF
MASADA: STORY OF A DIG (1967); AiYRlE H. TAMAmN, REVOLT INJuDEA: THE ROAD TO MASADA
(1968).
85. HUMPHRY & WicTrr, supra note 2, at 5.
86. Id.
87. RussELL, supra note 2, at 54.
88. Cooper, supra note 58, at 24-25.
89. WILSON, supra note 2, at 22.
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doning the Eskimo to nature or by killing him.9 ° When an elderly Aymara
Indian's9 1 time came, relatives and friends were summoned for a death
vigil. If death was slow, the elder could ask for assistance, whereupon his
family would withhold food and drink until he slipped into unconscious-
ness and died.9 2 Aboriginal Australians may have practiced their own
form of euthanasia.93 The Khoikhoin9 4 of southern Africa would prepare
a lavish feast before ceremonial abandonment in the wilderness. 95 Less
sympathetically, -the Ethiopian elderly were tied to wild bulls, the Amboyna
ate their failing relatives out of a sense of charity, and the Congolese
jumped on the tired and old until life was gone. 96 Formosans97 would
complete the process somewhat more humanely with strong drink-most
likely a potent rice alcohol.
98
B. Early Christian Influences
Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear
no evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me.99
In the second and third centuries, the growing influence of Christian-
ity weakened Stoicism.100 For Christians, the value of life, which for the
Greeks and Romans was determined by the quality of life, was reinter-
preted to mean that life per se was valuable regardless of the circum-
stances. 10 1 Church law followed the denunciation of suicide' 0 2 by
denying anyone who had taken his own life a Christian burial, a considera-
ble punishment for the time.10 3 Civil legislation was similarly influ-
90. HumPr-Rta & WicxE-r, supra note 2, at 2. Abandonment is not as cruel as it may at
first seem. Hypothermia (exposure to extreme cold) normally causes an anesthetized state as
the body slowly shuts down its non-critical (exterior) systems in favor of heating the body
core, resulting in spreading numbness. Pain results usually only during reheating. Cf. ENLc-
acoPEDtA OF MwDrcrNE, supranote 36, at 562-63; THE MERcK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THER-
An 2361-63 (15th ed. 1987). Religious beliefs are also relevant here, as many Eskimos believe
that anyone who has courageously faced death spends eternity in the highest heaven. Hum-
PHRY & WicKETT, supra, at 2.
91. Of Bolivia. HumpHRY & WcKErr, supra note 2, at 2.
92. Id. Interestingly, medical examinations of these deaths indicates that death was
caused not by starvation or thirst, but rather, by the simple will to die. Id.
93. See Derrick J. Pounder, A Probable Case of Euthanasia Amongst Prehistoric Aborigines at
Roonka, South Australia, 23 FORENSIC Sca. INT'L- 99, 101-08 (1983).
94. Pejoratively known as the Hottentots. VII OxFoRD ENGLISH DICnONARY, supra note
35, at 430.
95. See HumPHrY & WxcE-rr, supra note 2, at 2.
96. Id.
97. In what is now Taiwan, remnants of the aboriginal culture remain in the mountain-
ous central and eastern regions. See ROBERT SToREY, TArwAN 10 (1987).
98. See HumPHRY & WicKcEr, supra note 2, at 2.
99. Psalms 23:4 (KingJames).
100. HumPHRY & Wic:--rr, supra note 2, at 5.
101. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 23. See general!y Darrel W. Amundsen, Suicide and Early
Christian Values, in SuXCD E AND EUTANAsLA, supra note 2, at 77.
102. Suicide was considered diabolically inspired. WILSON, supra note 2, at 23; see also
SPRNmG & LARSON, supra note 2, at 105;Joseph Sullivan, The Immorality ofEuthanasia, in BENEF -
cEs-r EuTHAN~siA 12, 19 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975). Scripture, however, is silent on suicide. See
Amundsen, supra note 101, at 77.
103. -WtsoN, supra note 2, at 23.
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enced.10 4 The deceased's property was confiscated, and the body was
ignominiously buried on the highway, impaled by a stake. 10 5 There were
no exceptions; every suicide was branded a frlo de se, regardless of the ex-
tent or duration of suffering.1 0 6 Christian leaders' interpretations of
Christianity demanded that suicide was an abomination. 10 7 Killing oneself
essentially took from God that which belongs to God; to decide one's own
death thus violated God's will.' 0 8 Still, suicides were not uncommon. 10 9
In the fifth century, however, Saint Augustine 1 0 proclaimed that "sui-
cide is a detestable and damnable wickedness.""' He proposed several
reasons to support his condemnation. First, taking one's own life was a
violation of God's Sixth Commandment: "Thou shall not kill." 112 Second,
suicide was a usurpation of the function of church and state. 113 Third,
suicide deprived man of the opportunity'of repentance. 1 4 Finally, life
and its sufferings are divinely ordained by God and must be borne accord-
ingly. 1 5 It should be noted that Saint Augustine was referring to suicide,
104. Id.
105. HUMPHRY & WITrrr, supra note 2, at 6.
106. Id. But cf. Amundsen, supra note 101, at 78 (noting that early Christian condemna-
tions of suicide were rare, and equivocal).
107. See HUMPH & WIctr, supra note 2, at 6.
108. Id.
109. The general practice of suicide was perhaps fueled by Christian martyrdom. Id.; see
also Amundsen, supra note ibi, at 79-80; WILSON, supra note 2, at 25 (noting indications of
ceremonial euthanasia in Scotland, Wales, Ireland, and England).
110. Leader of the early Christian Church and author of City of God. RussELL, supra note
2, at 54.
111. SAnrr AuGusTIm, THE Crry OF GOD 30 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950). Augustine saw
two classes of exceptions: suicide would not be murder if it were justified either by a general
law or by a special commission granted to some individual. Id. at 27; RussELL, supra note 2, at
54. In addition, deaths resulting from wars fought in obedience to divine commands, or in
conformity with God's laws, were by no means violations of the Commandment that "Thou
shall not kill." AUGUSTINE, supra, at 27 (making no mention of the method of communica-
tion from God necessary to divinely command a war). Under the second exception, Abra-
ham's actions were to be applauded, because he was ready to slay his son in obedience to
God, rather than to his own passion. Id. Similarly, Jephthah's killing of his daughter was
merely in compliance with a command from God to kill the first to meet him as he returned
from battle. Id.
112. Saint Augustine took pains to point out his interpretation of the Commandment
"Thou shalt not kill" did not prohibit the killing of plant and animal life, but did prohibit the
killing of other men and one's self. AUGUSTME, supra note 111, at 26.
113. HUMPHEY & WicIxr, supra note 2, at 6. This could logically imply that both the
church and state have the power to enforce suicide and homicide. It does, however, seem to
suggest that the church and state have the sole, or ultimate, authority over a person's life and
death.
114. SeeAuGuSTNE, supra note 111, at 30 ("Is it not better to commit a wickedness which
penitence may heal, than a crime which leaves no place for healing contrition?").
115. See id. at 29-30. An argument used by Augustine in support of this proposition is
arrived at by negative implication:
For suicide we cannot cite the example of patriarchs, prophets, or apostles; though
our Lord Jesus Christ, when He admonished them to flee from city to city if they
were persecuted, might very well have taken that occasion to advise them to lay
violent hands upon themselves, and so escape their persecutors. But seeing He did
not do this, nor proposed this mode of departing this life, though He were address-
ing His own friends for whom He had promised to prepare everlasting mansions, it
is obvious that such examples as are produced from the "nations that forget God,"
give no warrant of imitation to the worshippers of the one true God.
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which encompasses a broader range of actions than euthanasia. 116 Saint
Augustine may also have had practical considerations in mind: high birth
and survival rates of Christians were crucial to the growth of Christian-
ity. 117 Both church and criminal laws followed, intensifying the official
disapproval of euthanasia.
Theological opposition to suicide culminated in the thirteenth cen-
tury with Saint Thomas Aquinas. 118 In the Summa Theologica, he synthe-
sized the medieval philosophical and theological arguments against
suicide. Suicide was sinful, not merely because it violated the Sixth Com-
mandment, but because it left no time for repentance." 9 Further, suicide
was against the law of nature and contrary to charity. 120 Each man be-
longs to his community;, it was thus unlawful to deprive society of his pres-
ence and activity. Finally, it was a sin against God, as life was a gift and
subject only to God's powers.' 2 ' While the Reformation altered the near-
total authority of the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages, the
Reformers continued in their opposition to suicide, citing theological ar-
guments.122 Similarly, euthanasia was not an arguable moral issue. Some
accounts, however, indicate a different treatment of the insane and de-
formed. According to three slightly variant accounts, a twelve-year-old
congenitally abnormal boy was considered merely a monster or lump of
flesh-a massa carnis without a soul-and should thus be drowned. 123
In the Chrisian world, the noted sixteenth century British scholar and
statesman Sir Thomas More 124 differed dramatically in his views. In Uto-
pia, his vision of an ideal society, voluntary euthanasia was officially
sanctioned:'
25
The sick they see to with great affection, and let nothing at all
pass concerning either physic or good diet whereby they may be
restored again to their health. Them that be sick of incurable
diseases they comfort with sitting by them, with talking with
them, and to be short, with all manner of helps that may be. But
if the disease be. not only incurable, but also full of continual
Id. at 28. For example, it is not for women to follow the example of earlier martyrs who
avoided rape by suicide, or even to question the design of God in allowing such rapes by
enemy heathens. See id. at 31, 33. Saint Augustine alluded to "some lurking infirmity" in the
women which might have caused God to bring such outrages upon them. Id. at 33-34.
116. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
117. See RussEa., supra note 2, at 54.
118. HtrMprYw & Wicrrr, supra note 2, at 7; Russu.L, supra note 2, at 55.
119. See Hurmwv & WicKErr, supra note 2, at 7.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 24. Two unusual forms of euthanasia were evidently
practiced in the Jewish community during the period. Removal of a pillow from beneath a
dying person was believed to hasten the process of dying. Alternatively, the synagogue keys
were placed under the pillow of the dying as a means of easing death. Both practices were
officially discouraged, either by law or condemnation. Id. at 25. The former practice was not
peculiar to the Jewish community, and continued into the seventeenth century. Id.
123. Id. at 24. It was further believed that the devil resided in such persons in place of
their soul. See id. at 25.
124. The Roman Catholic Church canonized Sir Thomas More in 1935, four centuries
after his death. Russu.L, supra note 2, at 55.
125. See Humw & Wicrr, supa note 2, at 7.
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pain and anguish; then the priests and the magistrates exhort the
man, seeing he is not able to do any duty of life, and by outliving
his own death is noisome and irksome to others and grievous to
himself, that he will determine with himself no longer to cherish
that pestilent and painful disease. And seeing his life is to him
but a torment, that he will not be unwilling to die, but rather take
a good hope to him, and either dispatch himself out of that pain-
ful life, as out of a prison, or a rack of torment, or else suffer
himself willingly to be rid of it by others. And in so doing they
tell him he shall do wisely, seeing by his death he shall lose no
commodity, but end his pain.... But they cause none such to
die against his will, nor they use no less diligence and attendance
about him, believing this to be an honourable death.
126
Sir Thomas More thus outlined a forerunner of contemporary proposals
for the practice of euthanasia with legal safeguards. 12 7 His views met with
strong opposition, but in succeeding centuries, others, including Francis
Bacon,128 John Donne,129 and David Hume, 30 joined his criticism of the
doctrine that taking one's own life was necessarily wicked.' 3 '
Medical knowledge grew throughout the Renaissance to such an ex-
tent that professionals began to recognize the paradox their knowledge
brought them; abilities to maintain life sometimes brought suffering,
which threatened to diminish the value of life.' 3 2 In 1790, due primarily
to the influence of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Diderot, France enacted a
statute legalizing suicide.' 33 The common law of England, however, con-
tinued to regard suicide' 3 4 as a crime, with the penalties of forfeiture and
ignominious burial.'
3 5
126. ST. THOMAS MoRE, UTOPIA (Edward Surtz ed., 1964), reprinted in RussELL, supra note
2, at 55-56. Lawyers, interestingly enough, would play no part in the debate; truth would
most easily come from the mouths of each citizen, "uncoached in deception" by lawyers, who
would be banned from the mythical Utopia. See MoRE, supra, at 114.
127. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 56.
128. Who insisted that doctors should help dying patients "make a fair and easy passage
from life." HUMPHRY & WICKE31r, supra note 2, at 8.
129. Dean of St. Paul's, who, in Biathanatos, argued in favor of voluntary euthanasia. See
id.; RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 56.
130. In his 1777 Essay on Suicide, Hume argued that a man who retires from life does no
harm to society, he only ceases to do good. DAVID HtmE, DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL
RELIGION AND THE PosTuMoUs ESSAYS OF THE IMMORTALITY OF =H SOUL AND OF SUICIDE 103-
04 (Richard H. Popkin ed., 1980). Further, ifa person cannot promote the interests of soci-
ety but rather is a burden, his resignation from life is not only innocent but laudable. Id. See
generally Tom L Beauchamp, Suicide in the Age of Reason, in Stncm AND EuTHA~ssA, supra
note 2, at 183 (discussing of the views of Donne, Hume, and Kant).
131. See SUICIDE AND EtrmsANsrA, supra note 2, at 183. See generally Gary B. Ferngren, The
Ethics of Suicide in the Renaissance and Reformation, in SUICDE AND EuTrnNAiA, supra note 2, at
155 (discussing the evolution of opinion regarding suicide after Augustine).
132. See WiLsoN, supra note 2, at 26.
133. RussELu, supra note 2, at 56. From 1700 to 1789, only eighteen successful actions
were taken against suicides in France. HUmfa & Wc, rr, supra note 2, at 9.
134. Defined as one who "deliberately puts an end to his own existence, or commits any
unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death." 4 WnjjtAM BiACysrONE,
CoMMENrAIus ON a LAw OF ENGLANm 189 (The University of Chicago Press 1979). There
was no exception for suffering- suicide was prohibited even when accomplished "to avoid
those ills which [persons] had not the fortitude to endure." Id.
135. See id. at 189-90.
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C. Contemporary Historical Background
1. The 1800s
The term "euthanasia" first appeared, in the contemporary sense of
induced death, during the latter part of the nineteenth century.' 3 6 Essays
by S.D. Williams, and later by the Honorable Lionel A. Tollemache, re-
futed critical arguments and laid the groundwork for the formation of
pro-euthanasia groups in England and elsewhere.13 7 Williams insisted
that it was the duty of the physician in cases of hopeless and painful illness
"to destroy consciousness at once and put the sufferer to a quick and pain-
less death."' 38 He warned, however, that every effort should be made to
prevent any possible abuse of this duty.13 9 Tollemache incorporated his
and Williams' arguments into his book Stones of Stumbling, in which he at-
tributed much of the fear of death to the preachings of Christians regard-
ing hell and suffering as a punishment for sins.1 40 He criticized the
slippery slope argument by commenting that "if we rejected all reforms
which might lead to contingent and remote evils, no reform whatever
would be passed and we should be in a state of... stagnation."14 1 He
further believed adequate safeguards were possible to prevent an abuse of
power.142 In the late 1800s, a society was formed in England to secure
such a change in the laws, but was declared illegal and disbanded. 143 Ad-
ditionally, Dr. William Munk'4 proposed, with little result, that the medi-
cal profession incorporate the study of euthanasia in medical training.
45
2. The Early 1900s
In 1901, Dr. Charles Goddard 146 suggested that, beginning with the
medical profession, a new attitude was needed regarding this "somewhat
gruesome subject." 14 7 The first bill to legalize voluntary euthanasia for
adults of sound mind who are fatally hurt, terminally ill, or suffering ex-
treme pain was introduced in the Ohio legislature in 1906, but died in
committee.
148
136. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 57.
137. See id.
138. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 27.
139. Id.
140. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 57.
141. Id. at 58.
142. Id.
143. WILSON, supra note 2, at 27.
144. Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons, who used the term "euthanasia" in its origi-
nal meaning of a gentle or easy death. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 58.
145. See id.
146. In an article entitled: Suggestions in Favor of Terminatinatng Absolutely Hopeless Cases of
Injuiy and Disease. Id.
147. Id. at 60.
148. Id. The bill was described in a January 24, 1906 New York Times article as being
requested by a Miss Anna Hall following her mother's miserable death. That a woman would
draw up such a "cruel" bill dismayed the editor of the Independen who, along with editors
from the New York Times, condemned the bill. The January 25 New York Times editorial saw
the Ohio proposal as "something considerably worse than ignorant folly-something that
verges close upon, if not into, the criminal." RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 60-61.
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In 1912, a woman suffering constant pain from an incurable disease
petitioned the New York state legislature for permission for her physician
to put her to death painlessly.149 Her petition caused a sensation, eliciting
a mostly hostile public reaction, and was unsuccessful. 150
In 1917, Dr. HarryJ. Haiselden of Chicago allowed a baby girl born
with microcephaly to die when he could have saved her life. 151 Forty
other physicians had examined the girl and agreed with Dr. Haiselden's
decision.1 52 Supported by fifteen doctors at trial, he was acquitted.
153
In 1920, in People v. Roberts,'54 a Michigan man was convicted of willful
murder in the preparation of a poisonous mixture for his wife, who was
suffering from multiple sclerosis and had previously attempted suicide.155
He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor and solitary confine-
ment.15 6 His conviction was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Michigan.'
57
In 1925, however, a Colorado physician who had killed his incurable
invalid daughter whom he had nursed for thirty-two years was released
after a jury was unable to reach a decision; the case was dismissed.
15 8
3. The 1930s
The 1930s were an important decade for the debate on euthanasia.
Books by two of Britain's most distinguished clergymen' 5 9 challenged
traditional beliefs and religious dogma. In 1931, Dr. C. Killick Millard, a
health officer for the city of Leicester, England, intensified the debate in
an address to the Society of Medical Officers of Health in London, and by
a companion article in support of legalization of euthanasia.16° In his ad-
dress, Dr. Millard described euthanasia as a basic human right, and pro-
posed a Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation Bill with the following
provisions:
1. An application for a euthanasia permit may be filed by a dy-
ing person stating that he has been informed by two medical
practitioners that he is suffering from a fatal and incurable
disease and that the process of death is likely to be pro-
tracted and painful.
2. The application must be attested by a magistrate and accom-
panied by two medical certificates.
3. The application and certificates must be examined and the
patient and relative interviewed by a "euthanasia referee."
149. Id. at 63.
150. Id.
151. RUSSEL, supra note 2, at 63.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 178 N.W. 690 (Mich. 1920).
155. WILSoN, supra note 2, at 29.
156. Roberts, 178 N.W. at 692.
157. Id. at 694.
158. WILsoN, supra note 2, at 29.
159. Dr. Willima Inge and Canon Peter Green. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 64.
160. Id. at 65; see also HumPHRY & Wicirr, supra note 2, at 13.
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4. A court will then review the application, certificates, the testi-
mony of the referee and any other representatives of the pa-
tient. It will then issue a permit to receive euthanasia to the
applicant and a permit to administer euthanasia to a medical
practitioner (or euthanisor).
5. The permit would be valid for a specified period within
which the patient would determine if and when he wished to
use it.
1 6 1
From this point on, euthanasia became a subject of much debate.' 62
In 1935, the British Voluntary Euthanasia Legislation Society was founded
to promote a change in the law. Its supporters and critics were both repre-
sented by medical, educational, religious, and social leaders of Britain.
The opponents succeeded in defeating the bill in the House of Lords by a
vote of thirty-five to fourteen.
163
In 1937, a similar bill was introduced in the Nebraska legislature. 164
It differed, however, in two respects. First, in addition to a person suffer-
ing from an incurable and fatal disease, it would have included those who
were helpless and suffering from the infirmities of old age. Second, the
next of kin would have been able to make an application on behalf of a
mentally incompetent adult, and a parent or guardian could similarly ap-
ply on behalf of a minor whose condition was incurable or fatal.1 65 The
161. C. Killick Millard, The Case for Euthanasia, 120 FORT. Rv. 708 (1930), re'rinted in
WusoN, supra note 2, at 31-32.
162. Dr. Harry Roberts, a highly regarded British physician and advocate of euthanasia,
was critical of Dr. Millard's bill for two reasons. First, its safeguards were too cumbersome,
and second, its scope was too limited. Regarding the former, Dr. Roberts wrote that "when
our sympathy outweighs our fear of the law, let us act on it." He further felt it was important
to permit euthanasia for hopelessly incapacitated or defective ihdividuals, who may not be
capable of making a request. RussELL, supra note 2, at 76. Dr. George W.Jacoby, in his 1936
book P, sicta.N, PASTOR, AND PAT=NT, criticized the influence of superstition and religion on
medicine and the resulting effect on public policy. Id.
The suicide in 1935 of Charlotte Gilman, great-granddiughter of Lyman Beecher,
sparked a public controversy. Named one of the greatest women in the world by Carrie Catt,
she left both a note in which she called "justifiable suicide" the simplest of human rights, and
an article for publication in which she wrote:
Our mental attics are full of old ideas and emotions, which we preserve sentimen-
tally but never examine. The advance of the world's thought is promoted by those
whose vigorous minds seize upon inert doctrines and passive convictions and shake
them into life or into tatters. This theory that suicide is a sin is being so shaken
today.
Id. at 77. Ms. Gilman's suicide had a parallel in the suicide three years earlier of George
Eastman, the manufacturer of cameras and patron of music and education. Id.
In response to her suicide, the editor of the Forum published a debate entitled The Right
to Die- Dr. Abraham Wolbarst, a distinguished New York physician, advocated euthanasia,
including cases of insanity which remained uncured for a period of time, such as ten years.
He further urged consideration of the suffering of relatives and friends, particularly where
hopelessness continues indefinitely. Dr. James Walsh argued the opposite position. He
wrote: "Suffering is one of the great mysteries of life and we do not know the meaning of
it.... Man who has suffered is more human." Id. at 78. He added that patients "recognize
that they deserve some punishment for.., slips from grace in past moments of weakness, and
become persuaded that their pain may represent punishment." Id. at 78; see also infra note
368 and accompanying text.
163. WILSON, supra note 2, at 32.
164. Russ=aL, supra note 2, at 71.
165. WILSON, supra note 2, at 32.
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bill was referred to a committee and indefinitely postponed.
16 6
In 1938, the Euthanasia Society of America was formed in New
York.16 7 The Reverend Dr. Charles F. Potter,168 its founder and first presi-
dent, commented that euthanasia was a problem that, sooner or later, con-
fronts every practicing physician.16 9 Potter, responding to the religious
argument that euthanasia violated the Sixth Commandment, stated:
It seems that if the killing is done wholesale and in anger and
bitter hate, the Ten Commandments can be set aside; but when
you come to an individual case, and the killing is done in mercy,
to release a sufferer from intolerable agony, then the Ten Com-
mandments are suddenly in force again.
170
Potter emphasized the safeguards that would prevent possible abuse by
unscrupulous and impatient heirs who might wish to hasten their benefac-
tor's demise. 171 Potter further advocated euthanasia for defective new-
born babies and the chronically insane, but on advice from other
members, limited the scope of proposed legislation to voluntary euthana-
sia only.
172
In 1939, a bill to legalize euthanasia, similar to the British bill,' 73 was
proposed by the treasurer of the Euthanasia Society for the State of New
York. It was, however, never introduced into the legislature, and the Sec-
ond World War temporarily suspended efforts on its behalf.' 74
4. Nazi Germany and the 1940s-1950s
The practice of euthanasia took a radically tragic turn in Nazi Ger-
many. The concept of lebensunwerten Leben17 5 provided the underlying ra-
tionale for the Nazi practice of "euthanasia."176 In stark contrast to most
166. RussELL, supra note 2, at 72. Apparently, no action on this bill has been taken since.
167. Id. Its original name was: "The National Society for the Legalization of Euthanasia."
Id.
168. Potter had left the Baptist Church to become a Unitarian minister and later a New
Humanist and was regarded by some as an apostle of liberal religion. Id.
169. Id. at 73.
170. Id.; cf. supra note 111 (St. Augustine's exceptions to suicide as murder).
171. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 73.
172. Id. at 74. Others in the Society were more radical in their views. Dr. Foster Ken-
nedy, the second president, recommended "the release from living of those who should
never have lived at all." Foster Kennedy, Euthanasia: To Be or Not to Be, CoLUEPas, May 20,
1939, at 15. Regarding "nature's mistakes," Kennedy argued that "it would be for the general
good that euthanasia be legalized for creatures born defective, whose present condition is
miserable and whose future ... hopeless." Id. at 16. Dr. Kennedy would, however, later
modify his position, to limit the scope of acceptable euthanasia, because of the danger of
errors. WILsoN, supra note 2, at 33. Dr. Alexis Carrel, another advocate, was even more
radical. "Sentimental prejudice," he had declared several years earlier, "should not obstruct
the quiet and painless disposition of incurables, criminals, and hopeless lunatics." The Right
to Kil TIME, Nov. 18, 1935, at 54; cf. infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 161.
174. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 74.
175. "Lives not worthy of life." HUmPHRY & Wrcxcrr, supra note 2, at 22. The term,
coined by Karl Binding and elaborated by Binding and Hoche, referred to a patient's objec-
tive uselessness to the community. WILSON, supra note 2, at 34. Also used during the war was
the phrase, unnutze Esser, or "useless eater." HUMPHRY & Wicxrrr, supra note 2, at 22.
176. WILSON, supra note 2, at 34.
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previous efforts to promote edthanasia based on a humanitarian compas-
sion for individual suffering, the argument behind lebensunwerten Leben fo-
cused on the right of society to rid itself of those who were
burdensome. 177 Although opposed by some religious leaders, the concept
had popular support in Germany. 17 8 Germany, like most cultures, has a
long history of obsession with racial purity.179 This, coupled with Ger-
many's humiliating defeat in World War I and the emphasis on a philoso-
phy that subordinated the individual to the community, led to "eugenic
euthanasia."' 80 Interestingly, efforts for legal reform to sanction euthana-
sia for the benefit of the patient were rejected because they were based on
individual rights, rather than for societal benefit.' 8 ' Indeed, throughout
177. SeeHelen Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law 103 U. PA. L Rzv.
350, 356 n.21 (1954). In an attempt to explain the depraved atrocities committed by some of
the most educated of the world's medical practitioners in exterminations and medical experi-
mentation, George Ables of the Nazi Health Office reportedly commented: "We're not think-
ing of individuals but of the race. The race is bigger than the individual." RUSSELL, supra
note 2, at 92. Medical experimentation was rationalized by the defense at the Nuremberg
trials as justified "worthy medical questions." Id.
178. WILSON, supra note 2, at 34. According to a 1920 poll, seventy-three percent of the
parents and guardians of mentally deficient children favored euthanizing the children. Id.
179. And thus, by illogical conclusion, racial superiority. The German concept of the
Volk or pure "Aryan" Germans who were destined to rule the world, had existed for centu-
ries. Humt-RY & Wcxr-r, supra note 2, at 21; see also CLARIssA HENRY & MARc HiF.LE, OF
Pu BLOOD 22 (Eric Mossbacher trans., 1976).
180. See HutrfPHw & WIccr, supra note 2, at 21; WILSON, supra note 2, at 34. The use of
both "eugenic" and "euthanasia" in this context is troublesome. "Eugenics," coined in 1883
by the English scientist Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, refers to the science that
deals with the improvement of hereditary qualities of a species or breed. WE3srER'S NEw
COLLEGIATE DIcrioNARY 390 (1981). What is highly objectionable are the operant qualities
defined by the Nazis, and their methods.
No reasonable conclusion regarding a positive correlation between a person's non-"Ar-
yan" background and decreased intelligence or physical capabilities can be drawn from em-
pirical (or any other) evidence. This assumes, parenthetically, that intelligence and physical
characteristics are the crucial variables for the "improvement" of the human species. Fur-
ther, eugenics has never required or intended extermination; selective breeding, or even
selective non-breeding, is normally meant. For an excellent discussion of the relevant issues
surrounding eugenics, see generally DANELJ. KEvLEs, IN THE NAmE OF EuGENics: GENMrcs
AND THE UsEs OF HuthaL HF F rr (1985).
"Euthanasia" is similarly strained in meaning because the contemporary reference is
from the perspective of the suffering individual; for the Nazis it was more a euphemism for a
program of murder than anything remotely similar to the context normally argued either for
or against. HUMPHRY & WICxKrr, supra note 2, at 28 (argument by Professor Lucy Davidowicz
that studying the Nazi experience does not enlighten us regarding the contemporary
problems surrounding euthanasia). Similarly, philosopherJoseph Fletcher considers it mer-
ciless, not mercy, killing. Id. Philosopher Marvin Kohl agrees, adding-
The motivation behind and the nature and consequences of acts of beneficent eu-
thanasia are radically different. In the Nazi example, the motivation, aside perhaps
from sadism, was solely that of maximizing "benefit" for the state. In cases ofbenefi-
cent euthanasia the motivation is essentially and predominantly that of maximizing
benefit for the recipient, of helping most where and when the individual needs it
most The Nazi form was involuntary- the form advocated here is voluntary.
Marvin Kohl, Voluntary Ben fient Euthanasia, in BENEFICENT EutHANAstA 130, 137 (Marvin
Kohl ed., 1975).
181. Silving, supra note 178, at 356 n.23. Further, there is no indication that later Nazi
atrocities included putting to death those suffering intolerably from a fatal illness; the entire
thrust of the government program was involuntary extermination of those the government
considered undesirable. HUMPHRY & WicKxrr, supra note 2, at 23.
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the war, no law legalizing euthanasia 82 existed.' 8 3
Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf in 1924: "All who are not of good race in
this world are chaff. And all occurrences in world history are only the
expression of the races' instinct of self-preservation, in the good or bad
sense."18 4 In 1939, Hitler signed a directive initiating a Nazi euthanasia
program, with the result of secret institutions that carried out Hitler's di-
rective with usual German efficiency.185 In contrast to a national program
of sterilization, 18 6 the "euthanasia" program operated secretly.18 7 By the
end of the war, the Germans had "euthanized" at least 275,000 people, in
182. In the sense of death given to relieve suffering.
183. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 116.
184. ADoLF HrrTLR, MaIN KAmPF 296 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1943).
185. WSON, supra note 2, at 35. Initial gassings occurred at Brandenburg an der Havel, the
first of many such sites. Covert organizations in Berlin arranged transportation of the vic-
tims, dealt with financial and legal affairs, and sent false letters to next of kin. The letters
often read:
We regret to inform you that your _ who was recently transferred to our
institution by ministerial order, unexpectedly died on _ of _ All our
medical efforts were unfortunately without avail.
In view of the nature of his serious, incurable ailment, his death, which saved
him from a lifelong institutional sojourn, is to be regarded as a release.
Because of the danger of contagion existing here, we were forced to have the
deceased cremated at once.
HUMPHRY & WICKLr, supra note 2, at 22. Alternately, the letter might conclude: "For pur-
poses of avoiding the outbreak or the communication of an infectious disease, the local po-
lice authorities, as per § 22 of the ordinance concerning the combating of communicable
diseases, have ordered the immediate cremation of the corpse and the disinfection of any
remaining effects." Id. at 23. An urn containing the supposed ashes of the deceased was
forwarded to the family. Expenses were often paid by unwilling relatives, who were warned
against demanding further explanations or spreading "false rumors." Id.; WilsoN, supra note
2, at 35. Administrative errors did occur, but little was allowed to come from them. Hum-
PHy & WicKEr, supra, at 23. The program was slowed, however, probably in response to
growing awareness of the government's actions and concern that the elderly would be next.
Public morale deteriorated to the extent that in late 1940, Heinrich Himmler, head of the
SS, wrote to a Reich official:
I hear that there is great unrest in the Wurttemberg mountains on account of the
Grafeneck Institution. The people know the grey SS bus and they think they know
what happens in the crematory with its ever-smoking chimney. What does happen
there is a secret, and yet it is a secret no longer. The public temper is ugly and in
my opinion there is nothing to do but to stop using this particular institution. Possi-
bly one might initiate a skillful and reasonable program of enlightenment by run-
ning films on hereditary and mental disease in this particular region. May I ask you
to let me know how this difficult problem was solved.
Id. at 24.
186. Shortly after assuming office in 1933, the Nazis enacted a compulsory sterilization
program for all persons with hereditary illnesses. HUMPHRY & WIcKaETr, supra note 2, at 21.
187. Id. at 22. Hider insisted on distancing himself officially from the project. In late
October 1939, he signed a secret decree, backdated to September 1, 1938, which read:
"Reich leader Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility for expanding the
authority of physicians, to be designated by name, to the end that patients considered incur-
able in the best available human judgment, after critical evaluation of their state of health,
may be granted a merciful death." Id. (quoting ALExANDER MrrscHERLICH, DocTORs OF IN.
FAMy. THE STORY OF THE NAZi MEDICAL CRIMES 92 (1949)). "Granted" was hardly the appro-
priate word; the exterminations were involuntary. See Htmi-mtv & WicxL=T, supra note 2, at
22. Some dispute exists over whether Hitler's secret order was backdated. SeeYale Kamisar,
Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mergy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MiNN. L REV. 969, 1034
n.219 (1958).
Reports of Nazi practices did make their way to the rest of the world, however. In 1941,
William Shirer's Berlin Diary was published, which contained accounts of the Gestapo's mur-
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addition to the millions of other "undesirables."' 8 8
The German medical profession, seeking readmission to the World
Medical Association, admitted its guilt and pledged to "exact from our
members a standard of conduct that recognizes the sanctity, moral liberty,
and personal dignity of every human being." 89 After heated discussion at
the same meeting of the General Assembly, approval was given to a resolu-
tion to "condemn the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances."1 90
Interestingly, the German debacle appeared to have little effect on
American public opinion regarding voluntary euthanasia. 191 In 1945, the
Euthanasia Society of America started a new campaign in New York to
legalize -voluntary euthanasia.192 In 1946, a committee of 1776 physicians
and 54 Protestant ministers publicly supported, the movement.1 93 The
clergymen announced that, in their view, voluntary euthanasia was not
contrary to the principles of Christianity.' 9 4 In 1949, additional Protestant
and Jewish spokesmen supported the bill, but it was never introduced into
the New York legislature.' 95
derous practices. Other accounts surfaced intermittently throughout the war. HuMPHRY &
Wzicrr, supra note 2, at 37.
188. Dr. Leo Alexander, an investigator for the War Grimes Tribunal, attributed much of
Germany's moral decline to the attitudes of the physicians. In what is often incorporated as a
major argument for anti-euthanasia and "pro-life" forces, Dr. Alexander described a "wedge,"
or slippery slope effect of the German programs:
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shifting in emphasis, in the basic atti-
tude of the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the
euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be lived. This
attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically
sick. Gradually the sphere of those to be included in this category was enlarged to
encompass the socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially un-
wanted and finally all non-Germans. But it is important to realize that the infinitely
small wedged-in lever from which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was
the attitude toward the nonrehabilitable sick.
HUMPHRY & WICar, supra note 2, at 27. But cf infra note 374 (explaining why the wedge or
slippery slope argument may be ruled out).
189. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 93-94. The German request for readmission was thus palat-
able to the General Assembly, which admitted German doctors by a vote of 33 to 3, with
Israel, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia strongly protesting. Id. at 94.
190. Id. The United States was among those supporting the resolution. This is likely a
result of the influence of a U.S. representative and former American Medical Association
president, Dr. Morris Fishbein, who held strong anti-euthanasia beliefs. Id.
Assuming the use of the term "euthanasia" is illegitimate when describing the actions of
the Nazi Germans, the confusion of the term after the war to prevent "real" euthanasia is
logically improper. See supra note 183. The effect is the bar of rational considerations of
euthanasia policy because of Nazi co-optation of the term and strong, if incorrect, association
with the atrocities of Nazi Germany. Perhaps for this reason alone a new term is preferable.
191. WILSON, supra note 2, at 35. But see SPRINO & LARSON, supra note 2, at 89.
192. WILSON, supra note 2, at 36. The proposed bill, presented to the New York legisla-
ture in 1947, was similar to previous voluntary euthanasia model bills. Id.; see supra text ac-
companying note 162.
193. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 95.
194. Id. This brought forth strong religious opposition. Monsignor R.E. McCormick, the
presiding judge of the ecclesiastical tribunal in New York's Catholic Archdiocese, denounced
both the statement by the ministers, and the ministers themselves. He further announced
that the proposed bill was "Anti-God, un-American, and a menace." Id.
195. See WiLsoN, supra note 2, at 37. Further efforts were suspended until 1952, when a
final attempt was made. Htu.mw & WicKrr, supra note 2, at 38. In a dramatic attempt to
capture attention, representatives from the Euthanasia Society in New York presented to the
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Cases of euthanasia continued, but rarely publicly. In one well-publi-
cized 1943 case, John Noxon, a forty-six-year-old Harvard-educated attor-
ney crippled for twenty years by polio, was charged with first-degree
murder in the death of his six-month-old mongoloid child.19 6 The evi-
dence was substantial but not conclusive.' 9 7 After five hours of delibera-
tions, the jury found Noxon guilty; death via electric chair was
mandatory.' 9 8 Eight days before his scheduled execution, the Massachu-
setts governor cited "extenuating circumstances" and commuted his sen-
tence to life. 19 9 The governor carefully explained that mercy killing, so-
called, could not be considered extenuating circumstances and was not a
factor in his decision; he never specified the basis for his decision.
2 0 0
In another case, New Hampshire physician Hermann Sander was
charged with first-degree murder after ordering the injection of forty cu-
bic centimeters of air into an incurably ill patient.20 ' The patient's hus-
band pled with the doctor to end her suffering; she was within a week of
death and could neither eat nor sleep.20 2 Dr. Sander was acquitted due to
problems with proof of causation, thereby avoiding the broader question
of mercy-killing.20 3 The case polarized the local community.20 4 While
supporters gathered money to defray his legal expenses, the Reverend Na-
poleon Gilbert declared that "suffering on earth is useful in the sight of
God,"20 5 and the Reverend Dr. Franklin Frye condemned all mercy kill-
ing, although he hoped that Dr. Sander could be restored to practice with-
out condoning euthanasia.
20 6
In 1958, an Illinois defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter for suf-
focating his wife, a rheumatoid arthritis sufferer, who begged to be
killed.2 0 7 Following testimony concerning her pain and his devotion to
president of the Senate a nine-foot petition signed by two thousand voters. Id. at 47. The bill
was not introduced into the legislature. Id.
196. HUMPHRY & WICKETr, supra note 2, at 40.
197. Id. The child was found on a metal tray in wet diapers with a radio wire around his
arm. He died by electrocution, suffering acute heart failure caused by electric current pass-
ing through the chest from forearm to forearm. Id. Noxon maintained his innocence
throughout the trial and appeals. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 40-41.
201. Id. at 42-43. This is a rather painful way to go. Scuba divers (good ones, anyway) are
obsessed with avoiding overly rapid decompression as they ascend. If the diver ascends too
rapidly, the result can be fatal. The medical results, in increasing order of severity, include
decompression sickness (the "bends") and air embolisms. The latter arefatal, while the
bends are the excruciatingly painful result of nitrogen gas bubbles formed within the blood
vessels and body cells. See OwEN LEE, THE SKiN DIVER'S BaLE 162 (3d ed. 1986).
202. HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 2, at 43.
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 44.
206. Id. Evangelist Billy Graham told a Boston audience of six thousand that Dr. Sander
should be punished as "an example.... Anyone who voluntarily, knowingly or premedita-
tively takes the life of another, even one minute prior to death, is a killer. I don't say that Dr.
Sander deserves death, but if we let this pass, who is to say who is to die and who is to live."
RussELU, supra note 2, at 108.
207. WILSON, supra note 2, at 39-40.
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her, he was allowed to change his plea to not guilty and was acquitted. 208
Similarly tragic cases arose over the years but with inconsistent legal re-
sults; much depended on the circumstances and the characters surround-
ing the "crime."20 9 The difficult moral and legal questions regarding
euthanasia were never addressed in these cases.
2 10
In 1950, the Euthanasia Society in England submitted a petition to
the United Nations that called for universal human enjoyment of "free-
dom from fear." The petition was signed by 356 prominent Britons and
more than two thousand Americans, 211 but was not submitted to Eleanor
Roosevelt, the chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, for two
years.2 12 She sympathized but was concerned about possible conflicts with
the Genocide Convention and felt it inappropriate to submit the proposal
at that time.
213
In 1956, Pope Pius XII declared:214 "Medical jurisprudence is
subordinate to medical ethics which expresses the moral order willed by
God. Medical jurisprudence cannot, therefore, in any circumstances per-
mit doctor or patient to carry out euthanasia directly, nor may a doctor
ever perform it either upon himself or upon anyone else."215 In 1957, at a
convention of Catholic physicians, the Pope softened his stance when he
responded to three questions presented for edification of euthanasia-re-
208. Id. at 40. Otto Werner, the defendant, was resuscitated after taking an overdose of
drugs following the euthanizing of his wife. HUMPHtY & Wlctrhr, supra note 2, at 61. Her
physician had described the severity of her illness in a letter to the Court. Id. The trial
court's comments are worth noting:
Well, folks, how would the family and neighbors feel if I permitted the defend-
ant to withdraw his plea of guilty and I found him not guilty?
Here is a man sixty-nine years old, in the twilight of his life, and he has been so
devoted and attentive to his wife....
I would rather send him home to his daughter and son without the stigma of a
finding of guilty, and I am not reluctant to do it if the family feels they wouldn't
have any objection.
I won't ask the state's attorney for his consent to [the change of plea). I know
him well enough to know he would be inclined to do the same thing ....
Mr. Werner, this is a time in one's life where good reputation and decency over
a span of years pay off. I can't find it in my heart to find you guilty. I am going to
permit you to go home with your daughter and live out the rest of your life in as
much peace as you can find it in your heart to have.
Id. at 62 (alterations in original).
209. See, e.g., HUMPHRY & WIcarr, supra note 2, at 60-62; RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 135-36;
WILsoN, supra note 2, at 38-40. The fact that uncertainty is the rule of law in this area is itself
cause for concern. Individuals who disclose their actions or consult with medical or legal
professionals are at risk of prosecution, providing a strong incentive for clandestine euthana-
sia. This results in even less societal control over the safeguards which even devout propo-
nents generally agree are necessary to protect those who either do not wish to, or should not,
end their lives.
210. See WILSON, supra note 2, at 40.
211. RussELL, supra note 2, at 110.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The Pope's declaration was given in an allocution to the Seventh International Con-
gress of Catholic Doctors in the Hague. RussELL, supra note 2, at 128.
215. Id.
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lated issues.2 16 While addressing a later international audience of physi-
cians, the Pope gave instructions to Catholic doctors on the use of
extraordinary means for prolonging life. Although he admired the in-
stances of resurrecting a seemingly dead person, he made it clear that
when life was ebbing irrevocably, physicians might abandon further efforts
to prolong life.2 1 7 Indeed, relatives may ask doctors to desist "in order to
permit the patient already virtually dead, to pass on in peace."
2 18
216. See LiE E mcs CENTRE, EuTHAwsta Racmr DECLARATIONS OF POPES AND BISHOPS
(1983). The questions were:
1. Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesia and to accept physical
pain in a spirit of faith?
2. Is it in accord with the spirit of the Gospel to bring about by means of narcotics
the loss of consciousness and the use of a man's higher faculties?
3. Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to make use of
narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? Can narcotics be used
even if the lessening of pain will probably be accomplished by a shortening of
life?
RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 128-29.
Before answering specifically, the Pope spoke to the spiritual value of suffering and the
justification for seeking relief from it if one so desired, because: "[I]n the long run, pain
prevents the achievement of higher goals and interests." Id. at 129. In answer to the first
question, the Pope responded: "The patient desiring to avoid or relieve pain can in good
conscience use those means discovered by science which, in themselves, are not immoral."
Id.
Regarding the suppression of consciousness, the Pope had no moral objection to the use
of narcotics, providing "they do not prevent the patient from fulfilling his duties." Id. The
Pope warned, in response to question three, that:
every form of direct euthanasia, that is to say, the administration of a narcotic, in
order to procure or to hasten death, is unlawful because it is a claim to dispose
directly of life. It is one of the fundamental principles of natural and Christian
morality that man is not the master and possessor, but has only the usufruct of his
body and of his existence. One lays claim to a right of direct disposition, whenever
one wills the shortening of a life, whether as an end or as a means. In the hypothe-
sis you envisage, it is merely a question of saving the patient from insupportable
sufferings, as for example, in the case of inoperable cancers or of incurable diseases.
If between the narcosis and the abridgment of life there exists no direct chain
of causality due to the will of the interested parties, or from the nature of the cir-
cumstances, (this would be the case if the suppression of pain was obtainable only
by a shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the administration of narcotics,
itself lead to two distinct effects, one the relief of pain and the other the shortening
of life, it is lawful; one is still bound to ascertain that between these two effects there
exists a reasonable proportion and that the advantages of the one compensate the
disadvantages of the other. It is also important, in the first place, to determine
whether, in the actual state of science, the same result might be obtained by employ-
ing other means, and then in the administration of the narcotic not to exceed the
limits of what is practically necessary.
LrE Emics CENTrr, supra, at 8-9.
217. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 131; cf infra note 245 (advancing medical technology as
a possible threat to human dignity due to prolonging life for too long). See also Kevin
O'Rourke, Catholic Teaching in Regard to Two Prominent "Right to Life Issues". A Historical Theolog-
ical Study, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L REv. 425 (1992).
218. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 131 (emphasis added). Curiously, this is in opposition to
the Hippocratic Oath requiring of doctors "to strive at all costs to keep a patient alive as long
as possible." Id.; infra part IV.A.4.
The use of the word "virtually" belies the crux of the issue. In effect, the Pope is begging
the question by leaving open the possibility of some Twilight Zone of human existence. "Vir-
tually" is susceptible of shades of meaning-particularly in the context of modern medicine
and death. Even if by "virtually" the Pope meant merely "just a matter of a very short time,"
he is sanctioning behavior which contradicts the ethos of sacrosanct life. Cf. infra note 216
(comments about the sanctity of life).
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The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, written in 1957 by Glanville
Williams, 21 9 sparked debate among both supporters and opponents of eu-
thanasia. Williams, in response to what he saw as the counterproductive
effect of legal safeguards in euthanasia legislation,220 recommended that
future euthanasia legislation provide only that physicians would not be
criminally liable for helping a patient to die-providing the physician
"acted in good faith, with the consent of the patient, and to save [the pa-
tient from] severe pain in an illness both incurable and fatal."22 1 Williams'
recommendation did not recognize a patient's right to choose euthanasia,
leaving the issue to the discretion of the physician. 222 Consequently,
many euthanasia supporters while appreciating Williams' efforts, were




Efforts to enact legislation in England continued with the attempted
passage of a new Voluntary Euthanasia Bill.22 4 Controversy in this area was
already high due to a controversial Neasden Hospital policy on the
resucitation of patients brought to public attention in 1967.225 The policy
had been posted in the hospital for over a year before being reported to
authorities by a patient. The policy provided: "The following patients are
not to be resuscitated: very elderly, over sixty-five; malignant disease.
Chronic chest disease. Chronic renal disease. Top of yellow treatment
card to be marked NTBR [not to be resuscitated]." 226 The Bill, passed
219. A Fellow ofJesus College, Rouse Bali Professor of Laws at Cambridge University, and
member of the Standing Committee on Criminal Law Revision. HuMPiM & Wicx , supra
note 2, at 57. He also wrote the treatise Cwenq. LAw: THE GENERAL PART (1953).
220. HtThPHRY & WiCKmrr, supra note 2, at 58-59. He noted that, rather than drawing
support, they provided additional areas for attack by anti-euthanasia groups: "Did the oppo-
sition like these elaborate safeguards? On the contrary, they made them a matter of com-
plaint. The safeguards would, it was said, bring too much formality into the sickroom, and
destroy the relationship between doctor and patient." Id.
221. Id. Similar to the Pope's pronouncements, Williams' proposals focused on decisions
and actions instigated by the physician. Id.
222. RussELL, supra note 2, at 127. He likely continued to believe that legislation recog-
nizing a right to choose euthanasia, with legal safeguards, was the best alternative; in 1969, he
assisted in the drafting of a new British Voluntary Euthanasia bill. Id. at 127-28.
223. See Humpmar & Wicimir, supra note 2, at 59.
224. Humrmunv & Wicirr, supra note 2, at 89. The 1969 version of the Bill contained
fewer safeguards than the 1936 version. -See supra text accompanying note 162.
225. Id. at 88.
226. Id. Do-not-resuscitate orders, previously non-existent, are now commonplace. Syd-
ney H. Wanzer et a., The Physician's Responsibiliy Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, in
EuTANhswr THE MoRAL Issuas 163, 163-64 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds.,
1989); see also Lieutenant Colonel William A. Woodruff, Letting Life Run its Course: Do-Not-
Resucitate Orders and Withdrawal ofLfe-Sustaining Treatment, ARssv Law., April 1989, at 6, 6-18
(discussing the history, substance, and potential problems with both do-not-resuscitate orders
and withdrawal of life-sustaining policies in the United States Army).
For an interesting discussion of this issue in the tentatively developing area of law that is
the reciprocal of the "wrongful death" tort, see William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, Wrongful
Living. Resuscitation as Tortious Inteference with a Patient's Right to Give Informed Refusal 19 N.
Ky. L. REV., 253, 255-76 (1992).
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without debate on its first reading in the House of Lords,2 27 subsequently
met opposition on several fronts. St.John-Steva 228 launched the "Human
Rights Society" to fight the bill, while the British Medical Association con-
tinued its opposition to euthanasia. 22 9 A rabbi and a bishop similarly ex-
pressed their opposition. 23 0 The Bill was rejected by a vote of sixty-one to
forty on its second reading.
23 '
In 1967, the Euthanasia Society in New York established the Euthana-
sia Education Fund23 2 with the goal of distributing information concern-
ing the dying. Some isolated attempts at promoting legislation were made
by others not affiliated with the New York group.23 3 In Florida, Dr. Walter
Sackett23 4 sought to amend the state constitution to include the concept
of "death with dignity."23 5 The attempt failed.23 6 In 1969, the Health and
Welfare Committee of the Idaho House of Representatives introduced a
Voluntary Euthanasia Bill to legalize voluntary euthanasia "when the pa-
tient is suffering from an irremediable condition."23 7 Although safe-
guards to prevent abuse were included, this Bill also failed.238 Bills similar
to the Florida measure were introduced in several states, including Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 23 9 Nevertheless, no sig-




The subject of death, which underwent a process of repression in the
cultural psyche throughout the advancement of medical technology,
2 41
227. HUMPHRY & WICK=Tr, supra note 2, at 89.
228. A conservative member of Parliament. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The bishop viewed euthanasia as a violation of the commandment "[t]hou shalt
not kill." Id. The rabbi explained his position as:
We cannot agree to purchasing the relief from pain at the cost of life itself ....
One of the reasons for our position is that we consider human life to have infinite
value and therefore every fraction of human life, even only one hour of it, has pre-
cisely the same infinite value as the whole of life.
Id. See generally IMMANUELJAKoBovrrs,JEwIsH MEDICAL Emuncs 123, 123-25, 276 (1959) (posit-
ing that Jewish law sanctions passive euthanasia while condemning active euthanasia); Ba-
ruch A. Brody, A Historical Introduction tojewish Casuistry on Suicide and Euthanasia, in SUICIDE
AND EuTHANAsIA, supra note 2, at 39-75 (arguing thatJewish law consists of more than a blind
reverence for mere physical existence).
231. HUMPHRY & WicxyrT, supra note 2, at 89.
232. Id. at 87-88. To preserve its tax-exempt status, the fund abstained from further ef-
forts to promote euthanasia legislation. I&
233. Id. at 88.




237. RussELL, supra note 2, at 192.
238. HUMPHRY & WicKE r, supra note 2, at 88.
239. WILSON, supra note 2, at 42.
240. See id. at 43.
241. See HUMPHRY & WIKxrr, supra note 2, at 63-64; RussELL, supra note 2, at 168; Alastair
Maclntyre, The Right to Die Garrulously, in DEATH AND DECiSioN 75, 77-79 (Ernan McMullin
ed., 1978).
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underwent a new period of examination in the 1960s and later.24 2 This
was, simultaneously, a period of rapid advances in medical technology, es-
pecially in the areas of life-saving and life-prolonging techniques.
243 Vari-
ous physicians publicly supported revised legal guidelines for dealing with
critically ill or incurable patients.244 Among them were Dr. Perrin
Long,245 Dr. Arthur Levisohn,2 46 Dr. William Williamson,24 7 Dr. Frank
Ayd, Jr.,248 Dr. Robert Williams,24
9 and Dr. Arthur Schiff.2
50
242. See HumPntv & WtcKmr, supra note 2, at 63-90.
243. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 15-16, 140.
244. See id. at 140-52.
245. Dr. Long, editor of the Medical Times, published an article in 1960 entitled On the
Quality and Quantity of Life which described numerous examples of human suffering. See id.
at 140-41. Dr. Long asked:
Has not the medical profession missed the point in certain of its endeavors? Are we
not piling up one Pyrrhic victory after another, while gradually losing the war? Are
we not causing... untold anguish to the patient and his friends, insupportable
financial burdens for the family and community, the diversion of resources from
those who could use them more effectively, and a great increase in the cost of hospi-
talization for the average patient, just because we are more interested in increasing
the "quantity" of life no matter at what painful cost to the individual or his
community?
Id. at 142 (alteration in original).
246. Professor of medical jurisprudence at the Chicago Medical School. Id. He viewed
the advancement of medical technology as a possible threat to human dignity, forcing some-
times tortured and hideous deaths, which would be a disgrace to our civilization if no legal
remedy were devised. Id. at 142-43. He cited inadequate public awareness as the result of
relatively uncommon tragic occurrences, but warned that all faced the possibility of a painful
and lingering death. Id. at 143. He criticized the forced circumvention of the law by judges
and juries in cases where "mercy killing" is at issue. Id. He further illustrated the fallacies of
religious arguments against euthanasia: "They would have come to some other very startling
different conclusions had their reasoning preceded their conclusions instead of succeeding
them in order to bolster a conclusion already established." Id. Regarding Pope Pius XII's
1957 statements, Levisohn commented that while euthanasia was condemned in name, "the
most essential contention of the euthanasists is conceded." Id. at 144.
He conducted a poll of 250 internists and surgeons. Of the 156 who responded, sixty-
one percent agreed that doctors did practice euthanasia, by either accelerating death or
omitting life-saving measures. Id. Still, seventy-two percent disapproved of proposed legisla-
tion to legalize euthanasia. Id. In a poll of 146 non-doctors, eighty percent of the 116 respon-
dents would welcome euthanasia if they were incurably ill and were suffering unendurable
pain. HUmPHRY & WiC=Tr, supra note 2, at 71. Seventy-six percent favored legalization of
euthanasia for incurable adult sufferers at their own request. Id. In both instances, affirma-
tive responses were received by seventy-four percent of Protestants, seventy percent ofJewish
respondents, one-hundred percent of those with no religious affiliation, and twenty to
twenty-five percent of the Catholics. Id
247. Professor of surgery at the University of Kansas Medical School. RussEri, supra note
2, at 144. He emphasized a team approach involving consultations among the patient, the
family, and the physicians, to reassure all that the medical profession is deeply concerned
about the welfare of the patient. Id. at 145. While supporting the medical responsibility to
prolong life, he believed there were times for the doctor to ask. "Should [I] lengthen a man's
life a few months at the cost of leaving the man's wife and children penniless?" Id.; cf. infra
part V.C.
248. Catholic psychiatrist who opposed any deliberate hastening of death, but said that a
physician must recognize a person's right to live and die peacefully. RUssELL, supra note 2, at
146. Although he objected to calling it such, he advocated passive euthanasia where the
patient is clearly dying. Id. He further deplored the intrusion of gadgets and medical per-
sonnel, which deprived the family and the patient of the chance to share his last moments.
See id. He surprisingly called for what could be seen as advocating surreptitious administration
of active ("positive") euthanasia:
Also there should be no need or demand for positive euthanasia if physicians un-
hesitatingly administer whatever amount of pain relieving drugs a dying patient
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In opposition, Dr. Laurence Foye 25l insisted that it is the duty of doc-
tors to prolong life as long as possible in every case.25 2 Physicians remain
divided over what appropriate role, if any, euthanasia should play in both
their practices and in society.258 Medical associations have not escaped
the controversy. 254 Interestingly, nurses-especially those who care for
needs. The medical profession has the power to erase any demand for legalized
euthanasia. All doctors have to do is apply their skills prudently as they are morally
and legally [sic] empowered to do.
Id. at 147.
249. Professor of medicine at the University of Washington Medical School. Id. He criti-
cized the law's inability to differentiate between murder and the merciful act of euthanasia.
Id. He commented on the vast sufferings which are forced on many and urged that euthana-
sia was preferable to suicide in dealing with intolerable cases. Id. at 148. He further noted
the irony of a society that refused to permit a suffering, dying person for whom life has no
further value to terminate his life, while simultaneously condoning wars, in which millions
are killed. See id. at 147; cf infra part 1V.C (discussing the inability of the criminal law to
distinguish between active euthanasia and murder).
250. A general practitioner in Florida, Dr. Schiff appealed to doctors and society to face
honestly and realistically the problems associated with euthanasia. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at
148.
251. Formerly associated with the National Cancer Institute and with the Veterans Ad-
ministration at the time of his testimony before the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging
in 1972. Id. at 149.
He defended his position on the grounds that mistakes in prognosis can sometimes be
made and the outcome of any given case can never be known with certainty. Id. He noted
instances where patients had been misdiagnosed, leading to unforeseen recoveries or remis-
sions. I& He also rejected the notion that people were being kept alive needlessly. Id.
"Neither I nor anyone else knows how to decide when being alive becomes useless." Id. He
did not differentiate, however, between those who are still young and want to live, and those
who are aged, truly incapacitated, or already damaged irreparably by their illnesses and who
want to die. Id.
252. Id.
253. A poll conducted by the medical journal New Medica Materia in 1962 indicated that
more than thirty percent of American physicians approved of euthanasia in some cases. Rus-
SELL, supra note 2, at 153. Almost forty percent approved in cases of severely defective in-
fants, while forty-one percent favored legislation to permit euthanasia, with legal safeguards.
Id.
A questionnaire by Dr. Robert Williams, sent to members of the Association of Professors
of Medicine and of the Association of American Physicians, found that eighty percent admit-
ted practicing negative euthanasia and eighteen percent favored positive voluntary euthana-
sia, provided legal safeguards existed. I& Dr. Williams defined negative euthanasia as
planned omission of therapies that would probably prolong life and positive euthanasia as
therapy that is hoped will promote death sooner than otherwise. Id.
A National Opinion Poll taken in 1964 and 1965 of 2000 general practitioners in Eng-
land-selected at random from the Medical Register-found that 48.6 percent reported be-
ing asked by a dying patient to give final relief from suffering, while 53.9 percent saw a
conflict between the request and the law. Id. at 155. 35.8 percent would be willing to admin-
ister voluntary euthanasia if it became legally permissible, while 75.5 percent thought some
doctors already performed such treatments. Id. They were equally divided when asked
whether adequate legal safeguards could be devised. Id.
254. The World Medical Association, meeting in Sydney in 1968, adopted a declaration
stating that it was not their role to be the deliberate agents of euthanasia. RuSSELL, supra
note 2, at 156.
The British Medical Association has remained firmly opposed to euthanasia, and in 1969
passed a resolution condemning it. Id. at 156-57. Many British doctors dissented, however,
pointing out that the influential members who had devised the condemnation were elderly,
and thus overly conservative and out of touch with the misery of dying patients. Id. at 157.
Conversely, they might have been more thoughtful regarding death.
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elderly and dying patients-tend to favor euthanasia.255
The field of bioethics developed rapidly after the invention of a kid-
ney dialysis procedure 256 that proved to be a mixed blessing. In 1960, Dr.
Belding Scribner developed a new shunt which permitted repeated blood
In 1970, the General Council of the Canadian Medical Association approved a change in
the code of ethics: "An ethical physician will allow death to occur with dignity and comfort,
when death of the body appears inevitable." Id. It further stated that unusual or heroic
means to prolong life were unnecessary when clinical death of the mind has occurred. Id.
In 1973, the American Hospital Association made public its new "Bill of Rights" for pa-
tients: "The patient has the right to refuse treatment to the extent permitted by law and to
be informed of the medical consequences of his action." Id.
Also in 1973, the governing board of the Medical Society of the state of New York an-
nounced the following adoption by its Committee on Ethics:
The use of euthanasia is not in the province of the physician. The right to die with
dignity, or the cessation of the employment of extraordinary means to prolong the
life of the body when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is inevitable,
is the decision of the patient and/or the immediate family, with the approval of the
family physician.
Id. at 158.
The American Medical Association had not taken an official position on euthanasia,
although the subject has been the source of considerable discussion. See id. at 159. In 1973,
despite suggestions that the AMA develop a euthanasia policy rather than force doctors to
make decisions for themselves, the Association officially condemned mercy killing, although
simultaneously adopting a report advising doctors that they should respect a dying person's
wishes. See HUMPHRY & WIcKrr, supra note 2, at 101.
255. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 165; but ef. Irene P. Loftus, Note, IHave a Conscience, Too:
The Plight of Medical Personnel Confronting the Right to Di 65 NoTRE DAME L. RaV. 699 (1990)
(discussing the medical professional's right to refrain from participating in euthanasia for
ethical reasons); Nurses Question Cruzan Decision, AUSrN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 16, 1990,
at Al3. (noting that the nurses responsible for the care of Nancy Cruzan were attempting to
deal with the anger they felt toward those whose decision prompted the termination of a
feeding tube from Nancy, whom they had come to love). As with most of life's situations, it is
the "person in the trench" who should be heeded when questions with which they are the
most connected arise. Nurses have the greatest contact with patients and should at least be
heard in this debate, if not above the voices of other groups.
Barbara Davis, a geriatric nurse, criticized the role of doctors in the debate, when nurses
are likely to be more closely involved with the patient. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 165. She
further commented that passive euthanasia is unsatisfactory, as it will often increase the pa-
tient's suffering. Id.
Eileen Strauss, a nursing supervisor, protested the distance between doctors and patients
in reality;, doctors often disobey their own orders not to resuscitate if they are on the ward at
the time. Id.
Jennifer MacPherson, a pediatric intensive care nurse, doubts that heroic efforts made
to save severely defective infants are well advised. See iU. at 166. Even parents who ask for
such efforts may not consider the effects decades hence, when they may not be able to care
for the severely disabled adult. See id.
Sharon Curtin related her nursing experiences in her book Nobody Ever Died of Old Age.
She recounts the dread many elderly have, not of dying, but of losing all pretense of indepen-
dence. Id She castigates our society for its deplorable neglect of the elderly and their poten-
tial. See id. She's right, but that's for another article.
At a convention of the Colorado Nurses Association in 1970, an unofficial vote revealed
roughly sixty-one percent favored active euthanasia. Id. at 166-67.
Nurses are further at risk by becoming involved in efforts to covertly end life. See id. at
167. This, however, carries the same moral and legal dilemmas, with none of the possible
safeguards against abuse.
256. Kidney dialysis is needed when the kidneys fail and impurities build up in the blood-
stream. See SPRMNG & LAmsON, supra note 2, at 29.
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dialysis. 25 7 Physicians soon realized that too few machines existed for too
many patients. 25 8 Between 1962 and 1972, hospital selection committees
performed the gruesome task of choosing, in effect, which patients lived
and which died.25 9 Due to the explosive issues involved, Congress ex-
tended Medicare to cover every patient under sixty-five who needed kid-
ney dialysis.
2 60
The dilemma of euthanasia is particularly acute when confronting the
problem of severely deformed infants who are otherwise not in threat of
imminent death. Perhaps one of the greatest medical tragedies in this
regard was the result of the use of thalidomide, a tranquilizer that, if used
during pregnancy, caused serious fetal malformations. 261 The case that
attracted the greatest attention was that of Madame van de Put, of
Belgium.262 On May 22, 1962, her child Corinne was born severely de-
formed as a result of thalidomide use.2 63 The family was shocked and
decided that Corinne should not live. 26 The mother pleaded with both
her gynecologist and midwife to do away with the baby.2 65 Both re-
fused.2 6 6 The nun replied: "It is God who gives life and God who takes life
away."2 67 The family doctor 268 gave to Corinne's grandmother a prescrip-
tion for a dosage of barbiturates sufficient to kill an infant.2 6 9 Madame
257. Previously, direct access to the veins was required, resulting eventually in collapsed
veins. Id. at 30. With no further means to access the blood for cleansing, the patient died.
See id.
258. See id. The expense of treatment was also often an obstacle. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. As of 1980, the costs have risen to $1.2 billion annually. See id. This effec-
tively avoids the issue by government largess. The underlying problems of valuation of life in
situations of limited resources are so repugnant that virtually any option, regardless of cost, is
accepted. As is increasingly apparent given fiscal constraints, this may no longer be continu-
ously feasible.
Interestingly, only where the lives in question are visible is the dilemma so clear. The
more impersonal the life involved, the easier the choice to terminate, or disfavor, that life. A
commander's choice of battle plans by necessity involves a choice of some lives over others.
Even less dramatic situations require similar choices, as with problems commonly faced by
decision makers, high and low politicians in social programs (although the solution is usually
the same-largess, particularly when politicians become involved, as they invariably do when
controversies arise). This proves only that what is espoused generally is often unsustainable
in practice. A euthanasia policy at either extreme is unlikely to be popular when individual
cases of need or abuse arise.
261. See RussELL, supra note 2, at 175.
262. She was 24, and had taken eleven thalidomide pills prescribed by her family doctor,
Dr. Casters, during her pregnancy with her first child. Id. at 176.
263. Corinne had no arms or shoulder structure and flipper-like embryos of hands pro-
truding from the end of each shoulder. Id Her feet were deformed, her face was disfigured,
and her anal canal emptied into her vagina. Her chances of survival, however, seemed good.
Id. Her family doctor later testified, however, that there would have been no possibility of
fitting her with artificial limbs because there was no shoulder bone structure, only cartilage.
Id. at 177. Other experts gave her a one in ten chance of living. Id.
264. Id. at 176. "The grandmother told the doctor 'Don't condemn the child to live.'" Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. It could be argued, however, that it was not God who was responsible for the
tragically deformed thalidomide babies.
268. Testimony at the trial described him as "'the doctor of the poor' and beloved by his
patients." Id. at 177.
269. Considering the baby's future, Dr. Casters later expressed no regrets. Id. at 176.
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van de Put insisted on performing the euthanasia herself, and alone.270
She rocked Corinne gently, and fed her a bottle of milk, honey, and the
barbiturates. 27 1 She was indicted on a charge of murder, and her hus-
band, mother, sister, and family doctor were arraigned as aiders and abet-
tors.272 At the trial, she stated that she could not put the baby in a home,
as suggested by the gynecologist, because: "[I] t wouldn't have given her her
arms."273 She further stated that Corinne's normal mental state only
made things worse: "If she had grown up to realize the state she was in, she
would never have forgiven me in her whole life for letting her live." 274
The prosecutor demanded a verdict of guilty while indicating that he
would support a recommendation from the jury for a royal pardon.275 He
warned that an acquittal would set a "terrible precedent" and possibly lead
to "great abuse."2 76 The defense attorney broke down and sobbed: "For
this terribly deformed child there was no possible place of happiness on





272. Id. at 176-77.
273. Id. at 177.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. He continued: "You must affirm that the principle of respect for life is sacred.
Thousands of thalidomide mothers who kept their children alive in spite of malformations
have their eyes on your verdict." Id. This illegitimately presumes that because other mothers
chose to raise their children under such circumstances, or could not personally choose other-
wise, Ms. van de Put had a legal obligation to raise Corinne-which was precisely the ques-
tion at issue.
277. Id. at 177. His were not the only tears in the courtroom. Newsweek reported: "Even
the lawyers, reporters, and gendarmes felt tears welling up as the story of the final hours of
Corinne was told .... " Id. at 178. A public opinion poll by Radio Luxembourg showed
popular opinion to be ten to one in the defendants' favor. Id.
278. Id. Dr. St.John-Stevas, a Catholic and strong opponent of euthanasia, described the
reaction:
The verdict was greeted with frenzied joy by the thousand people who had crowded
into the court for the last day of the trial. Their rejoicing was taken up by the
crowds outside the court when the news became known ... Undoubtedly popular
sympathy in Belgium and elsewhere was on the side of the mother and her family
doctor. This is hardly surprising. Both had suffered intensely. They had been five
months in custody, and had experienced the harrowing public ordeal of the trail
[sic]. Whether misguided or not, both had acted from what they imagined to be
unselfish motives, and the element of malice present in ordinary murders was totally
lacking. The mother was a pathetic figure; the doctor, a revered one, regarded as a
saint by the poor of.Liege. No one wanted further punishment inflicted on them.
Id. St.John-Stevas continued in his opposition to euthanasia. In his book TheRight to Life, he
wrote that, "if there is a right to life, Corinne van de Put possessed it as much as anyone else."
Id. Even if this is assumed, however, it does not address the questions of parental discretion
where Corinne is in a situation susceptible to euthanasia, but cannot decide for herself. As
incapacity is not a question here, this would be about as far into the grey as any euthanasia
issue could be. Given that more basic questions of euthanasia remain undecided, the right of
a parent to decide for a malformed but mentally normal child will likely remain an open
question, decided by judges or juries-as is perhaps best.
Not until 1973 did the Distillers Corporation, which manufactured and marketed
thalidomide in England under the trade name Distaval, agree, under public pressure, to
compensate the thalidomide victims. Each child would be paid an average of $126,000. See
id. at 179.
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6. The 1970s to Present
In 1972, an elderly Seattle couple were found side-by-side on their
bed with plastic bags wrapped around their heads,279 reportedly despon-
dent over the fact that one needed to move to a nursing home.28 0 The
following year, a San Francisco couple also insisted on controlling their
own fates,28 ' deciding years earlier that if one became terminally ill they
would go together.2 8 2 They first sent a telegram to their son and then
committed suicide.
28 3
In the summer of 1973, Donald "Dax" Cowart was critically injured in
a freak natural gas explosion.2 84 His wish to discontinue excruciating
burn treatments was ignored despite his constant requests; throughout his
ordeal he maintained his demand to die.28 5 He lives in Henderson,
Texas, where he practices law and continues in his belief that his wish
should have been granted.
28 6
A 1973 Gallup poll reported that public approval of active euthanasia
had increased dramatically since an identical poll was taken in 1950.287 In
1975, eighty-seven percent of Californians surveyed favored passive eutha-
nasia.288 Another majority-sixty-three percent-supported active eutha-





283. Id. Their son, after receiving the telegram, flew to San Francisco, where he found
them in their bedroom, dead from cyanide. He related: "I was relieved and I was proud of
them." Id.
For an interesting examination of double suicides, usually committed by aged couples,
see generally ANN WIcxErr, DOUBLE Exrr. WHEN AGING COUPLEs COMMIT SUICME TOGETHER
(1989). Parenthetically, Ms. Wickett is believed to have committed suicide. Advocate for Sui-
cide Group Found Dead, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 10, 1991, at A8. It is unclear whether breast cancer,
which had been surgically removed, or depression caused her action; her former husband,
Derek Humphry, disavowed her action if caused by the latter. Id.
284. His story is detailed in DAx's CASE: EssAYs IN MEDicAL ETHics AND HUMAN MEANING
(L. Kliever ed., 1989). The explosion, which occurred as he was attempting to start his truck,
killed his father and left him blind, permanently disfigured, and severely maimed. Id. at xi, 3-
4.
285. See id. at 5-9, 15. His attorney, who, as counselor and family friend, represented him
and his mother in their personal injuryactions, not only refused to help Dax obtain a court
order for the termination of treatment, but-in good faith-apparently circumvented Dax's
desires. See id. at 99-101.
286. See id. at xi; see also Gary Taylor, Reluctant Surivor Turns to Law, 10 NAT'L L.J. at 6
(Sept. 21, 1987).
287. See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 198. Fifty-three percent of respondents answered "yes"
to the following question, which had also been used in the 1950 poll: "When a person has a
disease that cannot be cured, doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life by
some painless means if the patient and his family request it.L" Id. Safeguards were not men-
tioned in the question.
Men and women held similar views, while Protestants and Catholics were not greatly
dissimilar (fifty-three percent to forty-eight percent, respectively). Id. at 198-99. Educational
level was positively correlated, with support of euthanasia increasing with formal educational
level; six in ten of the college-educated respondents favored active euthanasia. Id. at 199.
The young also were more in favor of active euthanasia, with sixty-seven percent of people
under thirty approving. Id.
288. See HUMPHEY & WicKgarr, supra note 2, at 94. Seventy-seven percent of Catholics
agreed. Id.
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nasia.289 The Euthanasia Society of America2 90 was reactivated in 1974
with the goal of legalizing the Living Will through state legislatures.29 1 By
the end of 1975, bills legalizing the Living Will had been introduced in
fifteen states.292 Only in California did such a measure pass.
293
On the night of April 15, 1975, a pretty, bright twenty-one-year old
was rushed to a NewJersey hospital.2 9 4 Karen Ann Quinlan was in a coma
caused by a combination of drugs and alcohol consumed on an empty
stomach during a birthday party.2 95 She had stopped breathing, and thus
suffered irreparable brain damage, although she was not brain-dead.
296
Three months later her father signed a release to discontinue her use of
the respirator. 297 Her physicians, however, refused to remove the respira-
tor, arguing that to do so would be homicide. 298 The Quinlans, both
Catholics, had been advised by priests about the Catholic Church doctrine
distinguishing between acting to take a life and removing devices that arti-
ficially sustain life in hopeless cases.29 9 Consequently, Joseph Quinlan
filed for appointment as Karen's guardian with the express power to au-
thorize discontinuance of all extraordinary means of sustaining vital
processes.3 00 Noting that she did not meet the Harvard criteria for brain
death,8 0 ' the judge ruled for the hospital.8 0 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed, citing Karen's right to privacy.8 0 3 The respirator was re-
moved but Karen did not die as expected. 0 4 She was transferred to a
nursing home where she remained in a coma until her death in July 1985,
289. Id.
290. After 1975, the name was changed to the Society for the Right to Die. Id. at 100.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 99.
293. HUfPHRY & WicK=rr, supra note 2, at 99. In 1976, Governor Brown signed into law
the Natural Death Act, which recognized the legitimacy of the Living Will. He commented:
"For too long, people have been unwilling to talk about death. This bill gives recognition to
the human right that people have to let their life come to its natural conclusion." Id.
294. Id. at 107.
295. Id.
296. Id. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text. Some movement was recorded on
the electroencephalogram (EEG, which monitors electrical brain activity), she exhibited
some involuntary muscle activity, and responded to pain, light, sound, and smell. HUMPHRY
& Wicxzr, supra note 2, at 107. But cf. infra note 325 (findings of trial courts regarding
Nancy Cruzan's unconsciousness).
297. See HUMPHRY & WICKa, supra note 2, at 107.
298. Id. at 108.
299. Id.
300. Id. Both testified that only weeks before Karen went into a coma, she had told her
sister and mother that she would not want to be kept alive by extraordinary means if she ever
became ill beyond hope. Id.
301. See BLAcK's LAw DiaroNARsY, supra note 53, at 400.
302. See Humpmrw & Wtc=trr, supra note 2, at 108. The judge held: "There is a duty to
continue life-assisting apparatus.... There is no constitutional right that can be asserted by a
parent for his incompetent adult child." Id.
303. The court held:
We think the State's interest... weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows
as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.... It is for that
reason that we determine that Karen's right of privacy may be asserted on her be-
half, in this respect, by her guardian and family ....
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
304. HUMPHRY & Wtcic-rr, supra note 2, at 108.
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ten years later.
30 5
The Quinlan case had a profound effect on both public opinion and
legislative efforts, while also establishing legal precedent8 0 6 As of 1992,
thirty-eight states have recognized Living Wills.
30 7
The Living Will has been devised to enable competent adults to make
their wish known for an end to extraordinary treatment.30 8 The Living
Will has promoted discussion of the various issues surrounding euthana-
305. Id. For a complete discussion of her case, see generally IN THE MATTER OF KARm
QuNLN (2d ed. 1982).
306. Karen's situation led to a series of decisions regarding a patient's right to terminate
life-sustaining measures. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc) (listing 54 state court decisions), cert. granted, 492 U.S. 917 (1989); Lyon, infra note
454, at 1367 n.2.
307. See ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(Supp. 1992); AR- ConE ANN. §§ 20-17-210 to -217 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7194.5 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 &
Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (Supp. 1993); DEI. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2403 (1989); F1A. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101-
.401 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1991 & Supp. 1993); IDAHo CODE
§§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1993); ILu. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/1-35/10 (Smith-Hurd 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A. -.12 (1989 &
Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101-28,109 (1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1-.58.10 (West Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN. HEATH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -614
(1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055
(Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-102 to -206 (1991); Nav. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 449.535-.690 (Michie 1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137H:1-16 (1990 & Supp. 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1990 &
Supp. 1992); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 3101.1-.6; OR. Ray. STAT. §§ 127.605-.650 (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1119 (1993
& Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18: §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to
-2992 (1988 & Supp. 1989); WASH. RSV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.920 (West 1992 & Supp.
1993); W.V. CODE 16-30-1 to -13 (1985 & Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West
1989 & Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -208 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Introductoy Letter
from the National Hemlock Society, supra note 65, at 2.
308. See, e.g., Anthony J. Burgalassi, Living Wills-The Right to Die: A Selective Bibliography
with Statutoy Appendix 45, THE RacoRD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE Crry OF N.Y. 816
(1990). See generally Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Autonomy: On the Limits of Shaping One's
Postcompetence Medical Fat4 8J. CoNTEMp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y. 13 (1992). A sample living will:
TO MY FAMILY, PHYSICIAN, MY CLERGYMAN, MY LAWYER-If the time comes
when I can no longer take part in decisions for my own future, let this statement
stand as the testament of my wishes: If there is no reasonable expectation of my
recovery from physical or mental disability, I, , request that I be allowed
to die and not be kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures. Death is as
much a reality as birth, growth, maturity, and old age-it is the one certainty. I do
not fear death as much as I fear the indignity of deterioration, dependence and
hopeless pain. I ask that drugs be mercifully administered to me for terminal suffer-
ing even if they hasten the moment of death. This request is made after careful
consideration. Although this document is not legally binding, you who care for me
will, I hope, feel morally bound to follow its mandate. I recognize that it places a
heavy burden of responsibility on you, and it is with the intention of sharing that




RUssELL, supra note 2, at 296-97 (distributed by the Euthanasia Educational Council, 1972).
The Council reported that, as of 1973, it had distributed a quarter of a million copies of the
Living Will. Id. at 181.
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sia, but may also provide a false confidence to those who believe it carries
the force of law.5 09 Indeed, doctors hesitate in following Living Wills ab-
sent clear legal guidelines.31 Further, the Living Will is a positive action
that must be taken. Many are not unaware of the Living Will or its
problems, but nonetheless do not complete one, or assume nothing tragic
will ever befall them.31 1 Finally, the Living Will provides no guidance for
the treatment of congenitally defective minors or incapacitated
individuals.
3 12
Also available to authorize others to act on one's behalf are Dura-
ble3 1 3 Powers of Attorney.3 14 Originally intended to simplify commercial
transactions for relatives after the death or disability of the principal, they
are now often recognized by state statute, and are valid for health-care
decisions.3 15 A Durable Power of Attorney may be drafted to the specifica-
tions of the principal, within legal limits, granting either broad or narrow
powers in all or specified areas.3 16 One drawback, however, is the possibil-
ity of a change in heart of the designated attorney-in-fact, or a change in
circumstances, without a corresponding change in the Durable Power of
Attorney.
As a converse to the emphasis on the death-inducing consequences of
Living Wills and Durable Powers of Attorney, a person can request in ad-
vance that maximum treatment be given in case of disabling illness or in-
jury.3 17 The problem of incompetent persons who have not, for whatever
309. See id. at 182. Moreover, in cases where the provisions of the statute are not followed
properly, the existence of a Living Will statute might be construed as positive evidence of
legislative. intent strongly favoring the preservation of life. See infra part IVA. For an interest-
ing examination of the law concerning living wills, see Craig K Van Ess, Note, Living Wills
and Alternatives to Living Wills: A Proposal-The Supreme Trus4 26 VAL.. U. L Rav. 567 (1992).
310. RussEuL, supra note 2, at 182.
311. See id.Judge Teel, who presided over the controversial case involving Nancy Cruzan
and who recently suffered a heart attack, has not executed a Living Will. See Andrew H.
Malcolm, Paying a Personal Price in a Big Right-to-Die Cas N.Y. Tunas, Nov. 4, 1990, at 14; see
also infra notes 319-38, 438-44. Neither has Mr. McCanse, who is Nancy's court-appointed
guardian: "I suppose I should, though, shouldn't I?" Malcolm, supra, at 14.
312. RussE., supra note 2, at 182.
313. They are "durable" because they remain effective even after the principal becomes
disabled or incompetent, if the document so provides. See BLACK's LAw DixnoNAwR 611 (5th
ed. 1979).
314. As ofJune 1990, thirteen states and the District of Columbia have durable power of
attorney statutes expressly authorizing the appointment of proxies for making health care
decisions. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 290 n.2 (1990)
(O'Connor,J., concurring). All fifty states and the District of Columbia have general durable
power of attorney statutes. Id. at n.3. Missouri has had a particularly public debate in this
arena. See, e.g., CatherineJ. Barrie, Legislative History of Missouri Senate Bill 148, Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. Ray. 453, 454-76 (1992); cf. Michael A.
Refolo, The Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990: Health Care's Own Miranda, 8J. CoNrraErm. L.
HE.ALT & PoL'y 455 (1992) (discussing various advance directives concerning a patient's
desire for or against certain types of medical care).
315. See Barrie, supra note 314, at 461.
316. See SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 141.
317. See id, at 141-42. A model form:
LIFE-SUSTAINING PROCEDURES DECLARATION:
I, _ , being at least eighteen (18) years old and of sound mind, will-
fully and voluntarily make known my desire that if at any time I have an incurable
injury, disease, or illness determined to be a terminal condition I request the use of
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reasons, used a Living Will remains, and they become candidates for the
drastic action of life-support withdrawal, with only hearsay as evidence of
their unknowable-indeed, nonexistent-intent.
OnJanuary 11, 1983, Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car as she trav-
elled down Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri.3 18 She was revived by
paramedics after being found lying face down in a ditch with her car over-
turned.3 19 She was taken unconscious to a hospital, where an attending
neurosurgeon diagnosed her as having sustained probable cerebral contu-
sions320 compounded by significant anoxia.321 Nancy's brain had proba-
bly been deprived of oxygen more than twice as long as is necessary for
permanent brain damage to occur.3 22 She remained comatose for ap-
proximately three weeks and then improved somewhat to an unconscious
state in which she could orally ingest some nutrition.3 23 Surgeons im-
planted a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube with the consent of her
then husband.3 24 Nancy's condition did not improve, and she lay in a
Missouri state hospital in a persistent vegetative state.3 25 .The State of Mis-
all medical procedures, treatments, and interventions that would extend my life [or
delay my death, without regard to my physical or mental diagnosis, condition, or
prognosis, and without regard to financial cost]. This includes appropriate nutri-
tion and hydration, the administration of medication, and the performance of all
other medical procedures necessary to extend my life, to provide comfort[,] care, or
to alleviate pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of life-sus-
taining procedures, it is my intention that this declaration be honored by my family
and physician as the final expression of my legal right to request medical or surgical
treatment and accept the consequences of the request.
I understand the full import of this declaration.
Id. at 169. Indiana has enacted a statute recognizing, with minor alterations, this form. Id. at
168.
This ignores, however, the issue of cost. Even where the incapacitated person is wealthy,
the use of capital to maintain life with no reasonable chance of future benefit to the individ-
ual or to society is economically unjustified and ethically questionable as related to the deple-
tion of resources for surviving relatives. Where the incapacitated person is impecunious (not
an unusual hypothetical in this age of rapidly escalating medical costs), the economic issue is
easy-society should not waste its limited resources. The economic condemnation is even
sharper where the cost must be borne by individual physicians or hospitals. The ethical issue
is reversed: can society deny sustaining treatment, albeit at great cost, with some chance of
patient recovery remaining? Even if no chance of recovery exists, the act of denying medical
treatment involves questions of appropriate state policy, with corresponding questions of the
safeguards available to ensure against abuse and broader issues of a slippery slope of state
valuation of individual life. Cf infra part V.C (discussion of economic considerations of
euthanasia).
318. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
319. Id.
320. Internal head injuries. See WEBsTER'S NEw WoRiL DiCaiONARY 229, 304 (1988).




325. A "persistently vegetative state" is a condition in which a person exhibits motor re-
flexes, but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
266. The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted much of the trial court's findings, which de-
scribed Nancy's condition:
(1) [H]er respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained and are within
the normal limits of a thirty-year-old female; (2) she is oblivious to her environment
except for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps to painful stimuli; (3) she suf-
fered anoxia of the brain resulting in a massive enlargement of the ventricles filling
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souri bore the cost of her care.3 26 When the permanence of her condi-
tion became apparent, Nancy's parents requested that her artificial
nutrition and hydration procedures be terminated, which would have
caused her death.3 27 The hospital employees refused in the absence of
court approval,3 28 whereupon her parents sought and received authoriza-
tion from the state trial court. The court found.that Nancy had a funda-
mental right under the state and federal constitutions to refuse or direct
the withdrawal of "death prolonging procedures."3 29 The divided
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, based on either the applicability of
the common-law doctrine of informed consent 3 ° to Nancy's case3 31 or on
the broader questions of a state constitutional -right.3 3 2 It further found
that Nancy's parents did not have the power to order withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment in the absence of a valid Living Will.333 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether or not Nancy
had a right under the Federal Constitution to require the hospital to with-
draw life-sustaining measures.3 3 4 In sharply divided opinions, the Court
affirmed the Supreme Court of Missouri, based on questions of the appro-
priate standard of proof required for Nancy to have evidenced her feelings
regarding life-sustaining treatment,3 3 5 and the interests of the State in pre-
serving life in such cases.
3 3 6
with cerebrospinal fluid in the area where the brain has degenerated and [her] cere-
bral cortical atrophy is irreversible, permanent, progressive, and ongoing; (4) her
highest cognitive brain function is exhibited by her grimacing perhaps in recogni-
tion of ordinarily painful stimuli, indicating the experience of pain and apparent
response to sound; (5) she is a spastic quadriplegic; (6) her four extremities are
contracted with irreversible muscular and tendon damage... (7) she has no cogni-
tive or reflexive ability to swallow food or water to. maintain her daily essential needs
and ... she will never recover her ability to swallow sufficient [sic] to satisfy her
needs.
Id. at 266 n.1. "She is not dead. She is not terminally ill. Medical experts testified that she
could live another thirty years." Id.
Persons in a persistent vegetative state "may react reflexively to sounds, movements, and
normally painful stimuli, but they do not feel any pain or sense anybody or anything. Vegeta-
tive state patients may appear awake but are completely unaware." Id at 301 (Brennan, J.
dissenting). See generally LawrenceJ. Schneiderman, Exile and P1'S, 20 HASTrNGS CENTER REp.,
May-June 1990, at 5 (discussion of ethical issues relating to persons who are in a persistent
vegetative state).
326. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266.
327. Id. at 267-68.
328. Id. at 268.
329. See id. The court further found evidence that Nancy had:
[E]xpressed thoughts at age twenty-five in somewhat serious conversation with a
housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life
unless she could live at least halfivay normally.., given her present condition she
would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration.
Id.
330. Id. This doctrine was used as a basis for the trial court's decision. See id.
331. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268.
332. See id.
333. See id. See also supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
334. See id. For a criticism of the judicial role played in this debate, see generally Ter-
rence A. Kline, Suicide, Liberty, and Our Imperfect Constitution: An Analysis of the Legitimacy of the
Supreme Court's Entanglement in Decisions to Terminate Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 14 CAis-
BELL L. RE,. 69 (1991).
335. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-87. See also infra notes 438-55 and accompanying text.
336. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284-86. See also infra notes 446-49 and accompanying text.
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"Do carrots cry?"
3 3 7
On March 4, 1985, Roswell Gilbert shot his wife of 51 years, who suf-
fered from Alzheimer's disease3 3 8 and osteoporosis.
3 3 9 The retired elec-
trical engineer was convicted and sent to prison with a life term that
carried a minimum twenty-five-year sentence. 3 4 0 On August 2, 1990, Flor-
ida Governor Bob Martinez pardoned Mr. Gilbert, who was then eighty-
one and in failing health,3 4 ' after previously opposing clemency.
3 4 2 After
being freed, a frail Gilbert admitted that he was wrong to commit a "mercy
killing" of his wife: "I tried to help her as much as I could. The best word
to use is desperation. It was a state of desperation, in my mind."
3 43
In 1987, Janet Adkins began to notice slips in her memory; she be-
came frustrated when she lost her concentration while playing the piano,
one of her great loves in life.3 4 4 In 1989, she was diagnosed as having
Alzheimer's disease, and immediately began planning her death.
3 4 5 She
had always led an unusually active life and continued to do so up to the
time she committed suicide.3 4 6 She contacted Dr. Jack Kevorkian,
3 4 7 who
337. Nurses Question Cruzan Decision, Ausrm AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec. 16, 1990, at A13
(comment of a nurse concerning the persistent vegetative state of Nancy Crnzan).
338. See Freed Man Says He Regrets "Mercy Killing" of His Wfe AusrrN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
Aug. 3, 1990. Alzheimer's is a degenerative disease with no known cure or treatment. See
generally RONALD C. HAMY ET ATL, ALZHErMER'S DISEASE: A HANDBOOK FOR CAREGIVERS
(1990); LENoa S. PowE.L & KATIE CouRTcE, ALZsF.umt's DISEASE: A GUIDE FOR FAMIIES
(1983).
339. See Man Who Shot Wife Is Granted Clemency, N.Y. TMrms, Aug. 2, 1990, at A9.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Man Freed After Five Years in Jail for Mercy Killing, AUSTIN AMEmCAN-STASMAN,
Aug. 2, 1990, at A4.
343. See Freed Man Says He Regrets "Mercy Killing" of His Wife supra note 338.
344. See Whose Right to Die?, AusTIN AMERrCAN-STATESMAN, June 10, 1990, at Dl.
345. See id. She had previously been a member of the Hemlock Society. See id.
346. See id. She remained an avid mountain climber had recently climbed Mount Hood
and hiked in the Himalayas. See id.
347. A 62-year-old semi-retired pathologist, Dr. Kevorkian considers himself on the
frontlines of a movement to legalize and legitimatize assisted suicide. See id. at D4. Indeed,
he is now considered by others, for good or evil, to be on the frontline. As of March 1993,
Dr. Kevorkian has helped 15 terminally ill people commit suicide. See, e.g., Tom Morganthau
et al., Dr. Kevokian's Death Wish: The 'Suicide Doctor' Plans to Cany On, Despite a Murder Investi-
gation and a Law Aimed to Stop Him, NEwswEEK, Mar. 8, 1993, at 46-48. He has been charged
with committing three murders, in 1990 and 1991, but each time the cases were thrown out
for the simple reason that Dr. Kevorkian had been careful not to do the deed himself. Id. at
46. Until 1992, Michigan had no law making assisted suicide a crime. Id. In December of
that year and in clear response to Kevorkian's actions and public comments, Michigan en-
acted such a law. Again in response to Kevorkian, Michigan moved the effective date from
March 30 to February 26 of 1993 to combat the quickened pace of assisted suicides; six took
place in February 1993. Id. at 46-47.
Nevertheless, Kevorkian has vowed to continue to aid in the suicide of the terminally ill.
Id. at 46. Indeed, having since lost his license to practice medicine, Dr. Kevorkian defied a
Michigan law that proscribed assisted suicide. Isabel Wilkerson, Suicide Doctor Tests Law, Stays
with Man Who Dies, N.Y. Timss, May 17, 1993, at Al. Kevorkian was arrested after allegedly
assisting in the suicide of Ron Mansur, a 54-year-old man who suffered from both bone and
lung cancers. Id. The extent of Kevorkian's involvement was unclear, and prosecution
against him under the law which makes assisted suicide a felony punishable by four years in
prison and a two-thousand-dollar fine was equally uncertain, according to the prosecutor's
office. Id.
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assisted her by connecting her to a device of his invention, which induced
death in three stages.3 4 8 Their actions produced much public
commentary.
3 49
On July 26, 1990, Maxim Menendez, a twenty-five-year-old pet-store
worker, lapsed into a coma after drinking a cocaine-laced soft drink that
was accidentally missorted by a cocaine smuggler.3 50 He is brain-dead and
is kept alive by machine.
3 51
In a rare public admission, Dr. Timothy E. Quill disclosed that in
1990 he had prescribed barbiturates sufficient for one of his long-time
patients, suffering from acute myelomonocytic leukemia, to commit sui-
cide.3 52 The fact he knew his patient well distinguishes his case from cases
involving Dr. Kevorkian and the anonymous resident who did not.3 5 3 The
prosecutor decided against bringing charges against Dr. Quill because of a
lack of evidence.
3 54
IV. THE CuRRENT DEBATE
A. Arguments Against Euthanasia
Two primary arguments are made in opposition to euthanasia.3 55
The first, rooted in Judeo-Christian heritage, concerns an intrinsic immo-
rality of "premature" death.356 The second relates to the unacceptable
consequences which, it is believed, inevitably follow any loosening of legal
proscriptions or social mores.3 57 Additional arguments contest the scope
of the problem, question the effect on the medical community and soci-
ety, and reject the psychological consequences faced by potential euthana-
sia candidates and their families under any legalized active euthanasia
scheme.
35 8
Kevorkian's actions remain highly controversial. See generally, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Rxfor
Death, TrmE, May 31, 1993, at 35-39 (comprising the lead and cover article for the issue).
348. See Whose Right to Die?, AusTrN AmErcAN-STATEsmN, June 10, 1990, at Dl.
349. A poll conducted by the Times Mirror Center of 1213 adults showed that fifty-nine
percent would want to terminate life-sustaining treatment if they suffered from a painful,
terminal disease. See id. Religion was a strong factor, and a distinction was made between
withholding treatment from adults and from severely disabled children. See id. Interestingly,
one-third could imagine assisting in the suicide of a loved one suffering from a terminal
illness. See id. Eight in ten polled approve of state laws allowing the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment where the terminally ill patientes wishes are known. See id. at D4. Fifty-five
percent support active euthanasia, compared with only forty-one percent in 1975. See id.
Fundamentalist Christians are generally strongly opposed to active euthanasia, but, paradoxi-
cally, a majority of "born-again" Christians and the very religious support mercy killings by
spouses in some instances. See id.
350. See Sydney P. Freedburg, AUsTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 16, 1990, at A23.
351. Id.
352. Lawrence K. Altman, Doctor Says He Agonized, But Gave Drug for Suicide, N.Y. TIMm,
Mar. 7, 1991, at Al.
353. See infra text accompanying note 514.
354. See Doctor Won't Be Charged in Suicide Case, AurN. AMERICAN-STATESMAN, April 13,
1991, at A23.




358. See infra parts IIA.3-5.
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1. Theological Objections
"His Death concerns the gods, not those men, no!"
3 5 9
"Thou shalt not kill."360 From no less an authority than God, the
proscription against any form of killing seems clear.3 61
There are two fundamental theological premises for the conclusion
that all active forms of euthanasia are forbidden: the sanctity of human life,
and the merits of human suffering.3 6 2 The concept of the inviolability of
human life3 63 is derived from divine revelation and natural law. Through
the Bible, God's will is expressed in numerous commands against the tak-
ing of life. 36 According to natural law, God has sovereign dominion over
all life3 65 and thus man has no right to usurp God's domain.366 To dis-
359. SOPHOCLES, AjAX 970, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 6 at
513 (3d ed. 1979).
360. Exodus 20:13. Some biblical scholars believe the proper interpretation is: "Thou
shalt not murder." See RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 217-18.
361. This may pose interesting questions regarding the religious justifications for war, but
that is a topic for another millennium.
362. SeeWIlsoN, supra note 2, at 82. Many religions do not see passive euthanasia, or the
withholding of medical care, as euthanasia at all; indeed, many refuse the nomenclature. See
supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Passive euthanasia can be considered, however,
either the withholding of all medical care, or of only extraordinay medical efforts. The differ-
ence can be crucial to approval or condemnation in practice. See supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text. See generally Joseph V. Sullivan, The Immorality of Euthanasia, in BENEFICENT
EuTIANAsrA 12 (Marvin Kohl ed., 1975); SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 96 (discussing the
euthanasia debate among theologians).
363. One argument not raised by proponents of euthanasia, but a general presupposition
nonetheless, involves the definition of"human." A religious view assumes that all persons are
human, see generally supra note 214, and accompanying text (Pope Pius XII discussing eutha-
nasia); supra part II.B. (life is per sevaluable, regardless of circumstances), but this is arguable
where a person is in a persistent vegetative state. The lack of cognitive capacity can at least be
considered the absence of an essential element of being human, leading to the unanswerable
question of whether the body, without sentience,. is sufficient to be "human."
This should not be confused with the Nazi assumptions of sub-humanity; Gypsies, Jewish
people, and persons with physical disabilities do not, as groups, suffer from persistently vege-
tative states. In Nazi Germany the defining characteristics were wholly unrelated to the qual-
ity, if possible, of being less than fully "human." See generaly supra notes 176-89 and
accompanying text discussing Nazi Germany.
According to a religious perspective, it might not be incompatible to distinguish physical
existence from being "human"; the concept of the soul as a separate entity is common to
religions, and it is there that salvation will occur, if at all. The issue would then be one of
deciding whether a soul inhabits a person in a persistently vegetative state. Presumably it
does, but the question has not been posed so specifically; previously no need for such edifica-
tion existed.
364. See, e.g., Exodus 23:7; Darrel W. Amundsen, Suicide and Early Christian Values: The
Nature of the Problem and the Scope of this Essay, in SUICIDE AND EuTmHANsLA, supra note 2, at 81-
96; BAILw, supra note 2, at 22-23.
365. See BAIL.E, supra note 2, at 20-22. But cf. id. at 113 (suggestion by theologian Daniel
Maguire that humans have underestimated their dominion over life and death with regard to
difficult medical situations). See generally SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 122-25 (explain-
ing God's sovereign power over all creation).
366. See WILsON, supra note 2, at 83. It is further argued that any action to take life goes
against a basic instinct in humans of self-preservation and is thus inherently unnatural See
Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 98-99; William F. May, The Right to Die and the Obligation to Care:
Allowing to Die, Killing for Mercy, and Suicide, in DEATH AND DECISION 111, 111 (Ernan
McMullin ed., 1978). This presupposes that such an instinct, while generally accurate, can-
not in certain instances be overwhelmed by suffering, or overridden by conscious decision.
Even given the instinct of survival, its existence is not itsjustification; its origins are (presuma-
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obey this divine order is to reject God's will and suffer the consequences;
obedience to God takes primacy over considerations of human suffering.
Such considerations can be irrelevant in any event as Christian dogma
places a spiritual significance on suffering. 86 7
2. The Slippery Slope Objection
Even assuming that moral obstacles are not controlling, the possibility
of mistake or malevolent abuse presents the common slippery slope objec-
tion. s68 Even where euthanasia is seen as beneficial in certain circum-
stances, the potential for misdiagnoses and the threat of non-mercy
killings are seen as too great to justify any exceptions to an absolute bar
against euthanasia. 86 9 Further, counterbalancing the needs of a particular
individual are the considerations for society as a whole. The slippery slope
objection is. particularly relevant here because euthanasia involves such a
serious and complicated subject and because we have an example of a
contemporary, similar society, run amok.
Anti-euthanasia forces often point to the Nazi atrocities as an example
of the dangerousness of euthanasia.3 70 This argument is flawed for several
bly) biological and cannot be juxtaposed against the complex ethical questions surrounding
the value and meaning of life filled with suffering. Indeed, in nature, no such creature that
suffered to the extent normally envisaged in the euthanasia debate would long survive.
367. See HumPHRY & Wcxir-r, supra note 2, at 165; WENNBERG, supra note 2, at 82-88;
SAcRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DoCrRINE OF THE FArmi, DECLARATION ON EuTHANAsIA III
(May 5, 1980) (reprinted.in Lim ETfucs CENTRE, supra note 216; full text in L'Ossermatore Ro-
mano, June 30, 1980). Monsignor Middleton, while condemning the proposed New York
euthanasia bill, see supra note 193 and accompanying text, "extolled 'the mystical beauty of
pain.'" Huni'mR & Wicscarr, supra note 2, at 38. See generally SPRING & LARsON, supra note 2,
at 130-31. Suffering is seen as providing an opportunity to draw closer to, and become more
dependent on, Jesus Christ. Id. at 131. Further, some view as repugnant any attempt by
moralists to decide how much suffering is too much. Id.; see also id. at 56 (rejection of the
belief that man should be free to control his own life and death). A pastoral letter from
Dutch Catholic Bishops refuted the "secular philosophy that equates good health with the
'value' of a person's life," stating that personalities can grow despite deteriorating bodies. Id.
Original-sin beliefs notwithstanding, Dr. James Walsh's argument extolling suffering as
virtuous disregards the possibility of innocent suffering, as with infant AIDS sufferers today.
See supra note 163.
368. For an interesting discussion on 'slippery slope arguments, see generally Frederick
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HA.v. L. REv. 361 (1985) (explaining that slippery slope argu-
ments focus on the possibility of future damages).
369. Additionally, opponents fear that a "right to die" would rapidly deteriorate into a
"duty to die," as those who are burdens would feel pressure to succumb to euthanasia. See
SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 49; see also infra note 540 (former Governor of Colorado
stating that the elderly have a "duty to die"). This, coupled with the demographically aging
U.S. population, is seen as a serious genocidal possibility. See SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2,
at 22. Some see efforts by euthanasia proponents as a thinly veiled attempt to, step by step,
"establish the death penalty for those whose lives they consider unworthy to be lived." Rita
Marker, Don't Let Doctors Turn into Killers, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 1989, at 8A (photocopy distrib-
uted by the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force) (emphasis added).
370. See RussEu., supra note 2; at 90. Anti-euthanasia forces, which tend as well to corre-
late positively with those who hold strongly religious beliefs, have little answer to the criticism
that the Holocaust occurred through deafening Church silence in an overwhelmingly Chris-
tian coiintry (a 1940 census indicated that ninety-five percent of Germans were affiliated with
a church). See Husmpma, & Wixc r, supra note 2, at 29. Further, many who were directly
responsible for the heinous acts were church oriented and continued to think of themselves
as such, despite their actions. Id. Franz Stangi, commandant of the Treblinka concentration
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reasons. The motives behind the Nazi programs are at the opposite end of
the moral spectrum from legislation with the goal of meeting the desires
of the suffering individual.37 1 The Nazi emphasis was not on the suffering
individua but rather on the sociey's right to exterminate unwanted indi-
viduals regardless of the individual's feelings on the matter.3 7 2 Killing for
the convenience of the State has never been a goal of mainstream eutha-
nasia proponents.37 3 Further, the Nazi euthanasia program was directed
secretly and in an extra-legal manner.374 If anything, this argument might
support openly discussed and legislated policies in order to lessen the like-
lihood of a possible reoccurrence of the Nazi debacle.
camp, where 700,000 people died, was a devout Roman Catholic. I& Indeed, he found it
difficult to sign a statement that he was a Gottglaubiger (a believer in God without a religious
affiliation); Germans were loyal to their churches and church rituals. Id. Hermann Goering,
at the Nuremberg court, proclaimed: "[I] always considered I belonged to the church." Id.
He further noted that the party represented a "'positive Christianity... [fighting] the spirit of
Jewish materialism.'" Id.
Historian William Allen argues essentially that itwould have been futile for the churches
to oppose the Nazi regime. Id. He further explains that a lack of focus on moral fundamen-
talism and concern for the church's survival, even in the face of blatant violations of religious
dogma, in effect supported the Nazi regime, except where government policies were directly
opposed to church self-interest. Id.
371. One wonders how many Charles Proteus Steinmetzs were slaughtered for the mor-
ally obscene and intellectually idiotic "euthanistic" justifications of the National Socialists.
Then again we do know, give or take a few hundred thousand, how many ordinaryJohn and
Jane Q. Europeans were exterminated. After all, one need not be a genius to validate exist-
ence. The question that follows is not, however, what does one need to validate one's exist-
ence; that presupposes that the State has the right to terminate existence based on
intelligence or physiological (or other, state-defined) factors. See supra notes 176-89 and ac-
companying text. Rather, the question is more appropriately: when does one have the right
to legitimately conclude that his own life no longer desires existence? The difference in
emphasis is critical. No remotely mainstream advocates propose active involuntary euthana-
sia in any form even approaching what occurred in Nazi Germany; to do so would be anti-
thetical to the foundations of our culture and legal system. See also supra notes 186-88
(outlining the Nazi's secret and involuntary euthanistic programs).
The U.S. Supreme Court grappled with an analogous issue concerning the execution of
retarded defendants convicted of capital crimes. See, e.g., Al Kamen, Executing the Insane For-
bidden: High Court Rules Punishment Unconstitutionally Cruel and Unusual, WASH. Posr, June 27,
1986, at A4.
372. Or the feelings of the individual's family, where the individual was incapacitated. An
article by Michael Straight published in the New Republic detailed German practices:
In September, October, and November, 1940, 85,000 blind, incurably ill or aged
Germans were put to death by the Gestapo. They were put to death as casually as
the SPCA chloroforms old and helpless dogs. They were not killed for mercy. They
were killed because they could no longer manufacture guns in return for the food
which they consumed; because the German hospitals were needed for wounded
soldiers; because their death was the ultimate logic of the national socialist doctrine
of racial superiority and the survival of the physically fit.
RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 91.
373. Further, according to Marvin Kohl:
There is simply no evidence that killing per se is contagious, but there is overwhelm-
ing evidence to show that it is not. It is true that people who believe that it is right
to kill Gypsies, Jews, or anyone else, provided their deaths may profit the state, will
probably continue to kill if they have the power to do so. But this is not evidence of
the seductiveness of killing. Rather it is evidence that when men have almost unlim-
ited power their actions will be consistent with their beliefs, and if their beliefs en-
tail needless cruelty, so will their actions.
Kohl, supra note 180, at 137.
374. According to generally accepted Western legal principles. See supra notes 186-89 and
accompanying text.
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3. Objections as to the True Extent of the Problem
Some writers opposed to euthanasia stress that the need for euthana-
sia is often exaggerated with extreme examples of patient suffering.
37 5
This is a specious argument, implying that because euthanasia is truly
needed so rarely it is thus wrong. That a single person must endure ex-
treme and/or hopeless suffering validates the arguments both for and
against euthanasia.
4. The Effect on the Medical Community
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Pan-
acea, and I take to witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to keep accord-
ing to my ability and my judgment the following Oath:
To consider dear to me as my parents him who taught me this art; to
live in common with him and if necessary to share my goods with him; to
look upon his children as my own brothers, to teach them this art if they so
desire without fee or written promise; to impart to my sons and the sons of
the master who taught me and the disciples who have enrolled themselves
and have agreed to the rules of the profession, but to these alone, the
precepts and the instruction. I will prescribe regimen for the good of my
patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to
anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice
which may cause his death. Nor will I give a woman a pessary to procure
abortion. But I will preserve the purity of my life and my art. I will not
cut for stone, even for patients in whom the disease is manifest; I will
leave this operation to be performed by practitioners (specialists in this
art). In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my
patients, keeping myselffar from all intentional ill-doing and all seduc-
tion, and especially from the pleasures of love with women or with men, be
they free or slaves. All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of
my profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men,
which ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never
reveal. If I keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice my
art, respected by all men and in all time; but f I swerve from it or violate
it, may the reverse be my lot.
376
Euthanasia stands against all that modern medicine stands for; "to
kill" is, after all, antonymic of "to cure." Blurring the lines of the function
of medicine would arguably harm an essential element of trust among pa-
375. See, e.g., MAR.x, supra note 33, at 25.
376. The Hippocratic Oath, reprinted in DoRL.AN's ILLUSrRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 767-
68 (27th ed. 1988). Although the Hippocratic Oath has for generations been a revered tradi-
tion at medical school graduation ceremonies, it has undergone changes, sometimes severe.
See BARNARD, supra note 31, at 29. Some schools have made word changes, while others have
abandoned it altogether, or substituted the Declaration of Geneva, which was adopted in
1914 by the World Medical Association. Id. at 28. Few Canadian schools use the Hippocratic
Oath. Id.
In fairness to Hippocrates, he could not have foreseen the progress of two thousand
years of medical advancements. Indeed, he avoided the use of drugs even in his own time; he
preferred instead a homeopathic healing process. See DoRu.LAN's IsusrraTED MEDICAL Dic-
TioNAR, supra, at 767. In addition, Ms. Russell proposed that, if man can promulgate such
an oath, he can also revise it. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 221.
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tients, physicians, nurses, and society.377 In addition to a fundamental
moral unacceptability, many are concerned that if active euthanasia be-
comes a prevalent practice, a stigma would be attached to those doctors
willing to perform euthanasia.37 8 Others point to the demoralizing effect
of a condoned and systematic "abandonment" of scores of patients.
3 79
Another argument against euthanasia involves the progress that medi-
cal technology makes against diseases. Euthanizing patients might deprive
them of potential cures developed after it is too late, but before they
would otherwise have died. °8 0 This might occasionally prove true, but is
also a function of the time before "natural" death when euthanasia would
be allowed.3 8 ' It is doubtful a breakthrough would be made and be avail-
able to the dying patient in a matter of a few months or even years. Re-
strictions on medical experimentation might significantly restrict the
benefits of new discoveries to any who suffered from the affliction too near
to the time of the discovery. Even if a discovery is made and is available,
the issue then requires a proper balancing of the demands of the pa-
tient38 2 with the probabilities of an effective, available cure.388 Also of
concern is the possibility of misdiagnoses which might result in euthaniz-
ing non-terminal patients.3 8 4 These remain valid concerns, but the risks
377. See Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill in EUTrN.Asw THE MoRAL IssuEs,
supra note 31, at 25, 27; see also THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 14649. See generally
HELGA KUHSE, THE SANCTr-OF-LrFE DoCrgrNE IN MEDicmN: A CRITIQUE (1987).
378. RussELL, supra note 2, at 79. Dr. Abraham Wolbarst, a distinguished New York physi-
cian, argued that-analogous to the situation of abortion operations-legalization would re-
move the stigma attached to what has been a criminal act. Id. Many opposed to euthanasia
see the issues of abortion and euthanasia as inextricably related, both involving a question of
the right to life. See, e.g., MARx, supra note 33, at 17; SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 47-48.
379. See Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100-01 (arguing that the practice of euthanasia
would eventually affect the attitudes of all health professionals, diminishing the quality of
medical care for everyone).
380. See WErss, supra note 53, at 87.
381. "Natural" is now a difficult concept, as life can often be extended "artificially" via
extraordinary medical care. Moreover, our life spans are historically much longer now than
previously, due to both better nutrition and living conditions, and improvements in medical
care. Distinctions of when "natural" ends and "artificial" begins become an academic argu-
ment, with little basis in medical realities. See generally MEDICAL INNOVATION AND BAD OUT-
COMES: LEGAL, SoCL.L, AND ETHiCAL REsPONSES (Mark Siegler et al. eds., 1987).
382. At the time euthanasia is considered.
383. Quantifying probabilities may not be as difficult as it first appears. Most medical
progress now occurs as the result of organized, even bureaucratic, experimentation. Knowl-
edge of programs in development, with educated guesses as to rates of progress, would give a
nearly complete picture of new cures "in the pipeline." These considerations should, how-
ever, be a part of the physician's analysis of the patient's condition and recommended treat-
ments as a matter of course.
384. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100.
Best while you have it use your breath,
There is no drinking after death.
JOHN FLETCHER, THE BLooDY BROTHER, rprinted in THE OxFoRD DICrIONARY oF QUOTATIONS
para. 7 at 215 (3d ed. 1979).
Death, for all its presumed beneficence against suffering, is final. Any mistake, whether
honest or otherwise, cannot be reversed. Even honest mistakes can take several forms: im-
proper medical diagnosis by either incompetence or the state of medical knowledge, or the
unpredictability of the progression of an illness. The finality of euthanasia requires at the
very least a high degree of certainty that only those persons who meet the requisite criteria of
x amount of human suffering and Yamount of hopelessness will be given the option of
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can be reduced in accordance with intelligent practice in any case by "get-
ting a second opinion." In a terminal case where euthanasia is under con-
sideration, third or fourth opinions would be well warranted.
Many who oppose euthanasia reject the implication that it is the only
option available to a dying person. They propose instead alternatives such
as hospice care.3 8 5 Others emphasize the Christian responsibility to minis-
ter to the needs of those who might otherwise consider euthanasia.3 8 6
While these are legitimate criticisms and honorable suggestions, 387 they
do not avoid the underlying question of the right of an individual to
choose death, even with the option of alternative health care, in the face
of continuing pain.
Yet another objection relates tor the ability of physicians to alleviate
most pain with drugs, obviating the need for euthanasia.38 8 This again
does not address the underlying question of the patient's right, or lack
thereof, to choose death, and further disregards the question posed by
those favoring euthanasia: "What will be the resulting quality of life?"
3 89
While drugs certainly do much to alleviate pain, at some point, the quan-
tity and type of drugs needed increases to the point that this question
becomes particularly relevant.
5. Effect on Society
Mary Senander, of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force,
presents an interesting argument. She reverses a standard refrain by those
favoring euthanasia of a legislated morality imposed by those in
opposition:
If you want to commit suicide, you can do that. It's not illegal. If
you want to hang yourself with a velvet cord from the rafters of
your garage-I'm not recommending it and I wish you
wouldn't-you can do that. If you want to blow your brains out
euthanasia. Where the risks are so lopsided, it seems reasonable to err on the side of caution
and thus against euthanasia.
Even if we could be certain as to the honor of those who might euthanize improperly,
more fundamental questions remain. Who decides what those circumstances are and
whether the patient meets them? Further, what controls are needed to ensure faithful com-
pliance with a presumption against euthanasia? And what of the instances where the patient
is unable to make known his or her wishes? These questions bode ill for the very real
problems facing any implementation of a euthanasia policy.
385. See, e.g., RobertJ. Miller, Hospice Care as an Alternative to Euthanasia, 20 LAw, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 127 (1992); MARx, supra note 33, at 81. Hospitals, it is noted, are oriented
toward the treatment of those who can be treated, while nursing homes are oriented toward
non-terminal elderly, neither are designed for the needs of the dying. See id.; see also THOM-
AsMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 113-15; DAvID CUNDIF', M.D., EUTHANAsA Is NOT THE AN-
swsR: A HospicE PsssiciAN's VIEw (1992).
386. See generally SPING & LARsoN, supra note 2, at 17-75 (discussing the rationale be-
hind hospice care).
387. See generally ELzABETH CALLiu, A GENTLE DEATm: PERSONAL CAREGIVING TO THE TER-
sumiALLV ILL (1986) (registered nurse's advice on coping with and caring for a terminally ill
loved one).
388. See SPRING & LARSON, supra note 2, at 176-77.
389. A patient, bed-ridden and racked with drug-masked pain, may well ask- "Is this life?"
- a question that, sadly, begs to not be answered.
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with a diamond-studded pistol-I hope you won't, for your sake
and for your famfy's-you can do that. If you want to save up
pills and poison yourself-I'd try to talk you out of it-but you
could do it. But what you're asking for-what proponents of eu-
thanasia are demanding,[sic]-is my approval and acceptance of
your actions. What's more, you expect-and proponents of "aid
in dying" demand-someone else to help.39 0
She continues:
When you ask for social and legal approval of killing, you're ask-
ing ME to participate in YOUR death, to share a communal re-
sponsibility and burden. And guilt. And blame. And I won't do
it! Now you're meddling with MY choices and MY conscience.
Don't expect me to be silent when these issues of public policy
are debated; I have MY rights too.39 1
This presents a unique perspective of two opposing forces, each saying: by
your actions and beliefs, you are forcing me to do or to countenance
something that is reprehensible to me. Who's rights are being infringed
by whom's? It is further notable that this position posits a moral objection
that is not necessarily religious, thus distinguishing theological from
strictly moral objections.
Here, Ms. Senander relies on the premise that assistance of suicide
(not euthanasia per se)3 92 violates a right of all citizens to be free from
immoral infringements (according to the complaining individual's sense
of moral correctness). This is, at once, both a powerful emotional argu-
ment and a difficult one to refute on any but a strictly logical basis. The
fallacy here is that Ms. Senander's use of the term "participate" is suscepti-
ble to different meanings in different contexts. Her "participation" is lim-
ited to her existence in a society that may condone a practice that is
reprehensible to her. Her argument, however, should not be so simply
dismissed. She validly exposes a base objection to the effect on non-par-
ticipants of the difficult decisions that must be faced by those considering
euthanasia. To those who feel strongly about the importance of maintain-
ing a bar on any takings of life, euthanasia is an affront to humanity and a
diminution of society's claim to civilization. This does, however, disregard
the fact that the argument is disassociated from the situation of any partic-
ular individual. This leaves the argument in the untenable position of re-
quiring compliance to the moral dogma of society-an impossible task in
this society and probably an undesirable goal even if feasible. In effect,
this would necessarily lead to a lowest common denominator of moral
jurisprudence.
Should society condone euthanasia, there is recourse available to
those who object to the practice. As a member of society, each person has
the right to participate in the process of legislating both morals and public
policies, via whatever reasonable means is available-in our case via demo-
390. MARY C. SENANDnE, INThRATIONAL ANnI-EurHANAsIA TASK FORCE, DEATH ON DE-
MAND: "DON'T COUNT ME INI" (1988).
391. Id.
392. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:1
A GENTLE AND EASY DEATH
cratic governance. Whether the victor will be able to gather the greatest
political power to force the issue remains an open and troubling question
with such a basic issue at stake; neither side can live easily, if at all, with the
other's demands.3 93
Another objection, closely related to the slippery slope objection,3 94 is
the change in attitudes toward the terminally ill and others who are medi-
cally vulnerable, which is viewed as necessarily leading to an eroded value
of life in general.3 95 After it becomes possible to think of some as deserv-
ing death, it will consequently become less improbable that the general
revulsion against killing will decline.
3 96
6. An Admission of Defeat: Creating an Atmosphere of Despair
I do not want to die-no; I neither want to die nor do I want to
want to die;
I want to live for ever and ever and ever. I want this "I" to live-
this poor "I"
that I am and that Ifeel myself to be here and now, and therefore the
problem of the duration of my sou4 of my own sou4 tortures me.
39 7
The option of euthanasia might be seen by patients as a shortcut, per-
haps leading many to give up too easily.3 98 The very possibility of euthana-
sia might keep some from surviving when they otherwise might.399
Medical recoveries can occur based not on medical care, but rather on a
simple yet powerful desire to live.4 0 To give up the fight40 1 is to close off
the incentive to live, thus resulting for some in a needless death.
40 2
Furthermore, some might choose euthanasia out of concern for their
393. This raises interesting philosophical questions of democracy in that a presumption
of consent to the process is required of any minority;, in losing, the loser must accede to the
legitimacy of the contest. This is less certain in areas where some believe strongly that issues
beyond mere governance are involved. The power of any citizen or group of citizens to veto
a practice based on its discontinuity with their sense of morality is itself both undefined and
worthy of further exploration.
394. See supra part III.A.2.
395. See, e.g., C. Everett Koop & Edward R. Grant, The "Small Beginnings" of Euthanasia:
Examining the Erosion in Legal Prohibitions Against Mercy Killing, reprinted in STtDIs IN L MED.
& Soc'y 19 (1986) (published by Americans United for Life, which opposes euthanasia).
396. See id. at 42-43.
397. MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO, THE TRAGic SENSE oF LrF IN MEN AND IN PEOPLES 45 (J.E.
Crawford Flitch trans. 1926).
398. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100; see also David C. Clark, "'Rational' Suicide and
People with Terminal Conditions or Disabilities, 8 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 147 (1992); Harry M.
Hoberman, The Impact of Sanctioned Assisted Suicide on Adolescents, 4 IsSUES IN L. & MED. 191
(1988).
399. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100.
400. See, e.g., BAmARD, supra note 31, at 79-82 (relating a personal experience while on a
"farm call").
401. See supra note 367 (discussing human instinct to survive).
402. This argument may have merit in cases where the diagnosis is uncertain, but in cases
of terminal or incurable illnesses, the value of "willing the illness away" is unproved and not a
legitimate argument against euthanasia generally, particularly considering the restrictions
that would accompany any acceptable euthanasia policy.
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families or others, rather than from a true desire to die.40 3 This is a strong
argument for anti-euthanasia forces in that it combines elements of (non-
religious) moral and slippery slope objections. The argument is further
strengthened by the inability to guarantee that any decision favoring eu-
thanasia will be based strictly on the needs and desires of the individual
who will die and not on the influence of others who may be affected, but
who will not themselves suffer the consequences. This is particularly
troublesome considering that any influence will likely come not from any
conscious encouragement, but from a sense of obligation on the part of
the euthanasia candidate to cease or prevent being a burden on loved
ones.
These concerns are not easily assuaged by an emphasis on the judicial
safeguards present to prevent undue influence. First, whether any influ-
ence can be due is not certain; the "correctness" of an individual's decision
to die to prevent emotional or financial burdens on loved ones is asjustifi-
able on grounds that it is within a person's autonomy to sacrifice for love
as it is condemnable on grounds of its terrible import. Second, assuming
such influence is condemnable, few cases of serious medical decisionmak-
ing would survive such an influenceless standard-life decisions are not
made in an emotional vacuum. Finally, the courts might indeed be the
best available arena to ensure that any influence is not undue.
"No life that breathes with human breath
Has ever truly long'd for death. -404
B. Arguments for Euthanasia
1. A Need
Darkling I listen; and, for many a time
I have been half in love with easeful Death,
Call'd him soft names in many a mused rhyme,
To take into the air my quiet breath;
Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
To cease upon the midnight with
no pain. .... 405
Compassion. In a word, compassion embodies all that insists on the
practice of euthanasia. 40 6 To effectively understand arguments favoring
403. Gay-Williams, supra note 43, at 100: see alsoJoseph Richman, Sanctioned Assisted Sui-
cide: Impact on Family Relations, 3 IssuEs iN L. & MEo. 53, 54-62 (1987). Even more objectiona-
ble is the possibility of subtle or not-so-subtle pressure to force elderly patients to commit
euthanasia. David G. Bjornstrom, Elderly Will Be Pressured to Die Early, 105 LA. DAILYJ., Oct.
28, 1992, at 6.
404. Lord Alfred Tennyson, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DiarioNARt OF QUOTATIONS para. 20
at 543 (3d ed. 1979).
405. John Keats, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 22 at 291 (3d
ed. 1979).
406. See William A. Squires, A Call for Compassion: Removing Obstacles from the Right to Die,
19 BARuISTER Winter 1993 at 3; see also Paul Kurtz, The Case for Euthanasia: A Humanistic
Perspective 8 IssUEs IN L. & MED. 309, 309-16 (1992). Euthanasia has evolved into so many
forms, particularly due to the ever-expanding capabilities of medical professionals, it would
be simplistic to attempt to advocate all in blanket arguments. Compassion, though, does
describe the motive behind beneficent forms under serious consideration.
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euthanasia, it is necessary to distinguish the various forms; different argu-
ments, on either side, apply differentlydepending on the nature of the
action or non-action to end life, the state of the suffering individual, and
his or her say in the matter.
"Death is perhaps nothing, dying eveiything. ,1
7
The primary argument for euthanasia is not so much for euthanasia-
no one408 enjoys the contemplation of misery-as it is against the arguably
absurd propositions that deny a remedy for that which exists-insufferable
and unending pain. Assuming that needless suffering is to be neither tol-
erated nor glorified, we either act or do nothing, to relieve such pain.
"Naught broken save this body, lost but breath;
Nothing to shake the laughing heart's long peace there
But only agony, and that has ending,"
And the worst friend and enemy
is but Death. "109
Some of the early commentators on euthanasia based their ideas on a
religious theme. In one of the first articles on euthanasia to appear in a
Protestant Church periodical, E.N. Jackson cited the infinite regard of
Jesus for every distressed human soul. 410 He continued by proposing that,
based on the Christian concept of soul, what a physician might do to the
physical body would not injure the soul itself.4 11 He further believed that
adequate safeguards could exist to prevent unwise or unscrupulous ac-
tions. 41 2 In an address in 1954, Dr. Claude E. Forkner 413 proclaimed: "It
is not death that people fear ... it is ceaseless pain, endless suffering,
excessive use of the family financial resources, lifelong incompetence,
hopeless dependency."41 4 Euthanasia, he continued, embodies one of the
strongest Commandments of the Bible: "Do unto others as thou wouldst
have them do unto you." 4 1 5 Eighty-four-year-old Dr. Heinrich Wolfe
4 16
deplored the zeal of many doctors in prolonging life cruelly and futilely,
407. E. du Perron, in 19 HAsTNas CENrER REi'. 31 (Special Supp. Jan.-Feb. 1989).
Another of many horror stories involved a 94-year-old woman who entered a hospital
after experiencing severe internal bleeding. A large, malignant tumor was found in her co-
lon. With reservations about the wisdom of surgery, the tumor was removed. Resuscitation
was expressly rejected, in writing, before the surgery. After the operation, a respirator was
placed in her mouth and would remain there until her death, weeks later. Sedation was
minimal so as to not interfere with diagnoses. Her hands swelled to three times their normal
size and were tied to the bed to prevent her from removing the irritating tubes. The onset of
pneumonia was treated with antibiotics, and was revealed only inadvertently to family mem-
bers two days hence. Her kidney malfunction worsened. Her face was swollen beyond recog-
nition. Her lips were raw from the respirator. Finally, she died. See Fred M. Hechinger, They
Tortured My Mother, N.Y. Tms, Jan. 24, 1991, at A14.
408. Sadists and masochists notwithstanding.
409. Rupert Brooke, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 28 at 94
(3d ed. 1979).
410. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 113.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Professor of Clinical Medicine at Cornell Medical College. Id. at 112.
414. Id. See also HUMPHRY & WICgarT, supra note 2, at 65 (noting that, according to stud-
ies, prolonged dying was most feared).
415. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 112.
416. A consultant at Mount Sinai Hospital. Id.
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eager to demonstrate technical skills at the expense of their dying
patients.
41 7
Dr. Harry E. Fosdick 418 countered the basic religious contention that
only God has the right to determine when life should end by pointing out
that man had been responsible for increasing the average lifespan from
approximately 30 years during early colonial days to well over 70 years
today.41 9 In so doing, man may inadvertently have increased suffering for
those who otherwise would not have survived, leading to the dilemma soci-
ety now faces in dealing with euthanasia.
4 20
"It is silliness to live when to live is torment; and then have we a prescrip-
tion to die when death is our physician. "4 21
The situation where the patient is incapable of requesting euthanasia
raises a more difficult question.422 Where a Living Will, Durable Power of
Attorney, or other extant evidence provides a clue as to the person's prior
wishes, physicians and the courts are not faced with the problems of invol-
untary423 euthanasia. Where a person faces continued existence in a form
quite different from cognitive human existence, however, the capacity of
family or relatives to make the decision to end life is far more ethically and
legally attenuated.
"To live a life half dead, a living death. "424
2. Questions Concerning the Meaning of Life
"Please ... kill me. "425
A difficult question that is rarely raised concerns the reasons for want-
ing to die. After all, even for those who are unhappy or in ill health, life is
"good."426 It is not enough to say merely that death provides a release
from suffering. If this were so, any love-spurned soul would provide a suf-
ficient rationale for death. For death to be appealing, its alternative, life,
must be far worse. People view "life," however, as either sacrosanct, in
which case any infinitesimally minute portion always has positive value, or
as relative, in which case life can become negative at some variable point
in the future, the only question being when. Ordinarily, death makes the
417. Id.
418. Then minister of the Riverside Church in New York. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. WILLAM SHAKaSPEARE, OTHEL.O, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3.
422. See, e.g., THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 43-46.
423. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
424. John Milton, reprinted in THE OxFoRD DICfIONARY OF QUOTATIONS para. 17 at 350
(3d ed. 1979).
425. Plea of a female planet colonist, immobilized in a fibrous cocoon, who begs rescuing
Marines to kill her before an alien, which was implanted via alien embryo carrier through the
colonist's mouth to her abdomen, is about to hatch. AuaENs (Twentieth Century/Fox 1986).
426. See Foot, supra note 38, at 87. Here, "good" probably is best defined in the context
of an expectation of better or improving health. The fundamental issue underlying euthana-
sia is the inevitability of death faced continuously, rather than abstractly as is usual until
serious illness strikes or old age creeps up. See alSOJOHN HARIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE 1-110,
192-213, 238-42 (1985).
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determination for us. In cases of terminal illness, the central issue be-
comes: Which death is preferable? Either way, the person will die. Will the
preferred death be (1) painful, according to verified diagnoses, or (2)
controlled? No one would ordinarily choose controlled death,42 7 but
where pain becomes unbearable, a controlled death is no longer unthink-
able. The equation, therefore, is the relationship between what will hap-
pen in the absence of death versus death.4 28 Where only pain or
incapacitation awaits, the question then enters the standard euthanasia
realm of whether or not the person has a right to choose a controlled
death.
Apocryphal dinner-party guest to female acquaintance: "Would you
have sex with me for one million dollars?" The woman replies, after con-
sideration: "Yes, I think I would." "Well then, would you have sex with
me for one hundred dollars?" To which she exclaims in disgust: "What
do you think I am-a prostitute?" "We have already established that,
madam; we are now merely haggling.,
429
Opponents' assertions of sacrosanct life are seriously challenged by
prima facie valuations of life made continuously in the criminal law. For
instance, persons convicted of murdering police officers face more severe
punishments.4 30 Whether those increased punishments are desirable is
not at issue; that police officers as a group are afforded stricter enforce-
ment of differentiated laws is a value judgement that society has made-
determined not by the act, or even the actor, but rather by the person who
dies. Conversely, the life of someone who attempts to commit a felony but
is killed by the victim as a matter of self-defense is per se less "valuable" in
427. Much less a painful death.
428. A fundamental chasm exists between opposing and favoring forces, which can be
reduced to a mathematical construct. Those opposing generally espouse a view of life as
sacrosanct. As such, logically there can be no such thing as a life with a negative value. The
whole reason for euthanasia is a belief that life sometimes does indeed have a negative value;
suffering with no reasonable possibility for relief is negative.
The question underlying all discussions of euthanasia is: Is life, per se, always good?
Following theological doctrines, and normal experience, the answer is: Yes. But "always" is
such an absolute beast, so easily defeated in logic and on exams. To disprove the hypothesis.
we simply have to find one example where life is not good. Assuming a reasonable interpre-
tation of "good," examples both hypothetical and real abound.
Suppose a person were to be executed-let's say a notorious spy to liven the Article-
and had a choice of being shot directly through the cerebral cortex, with the monotonously
predicable outcome of death, or of first being tortured over a generous time by various lov-
ingly cared for medieval instruments. The first question is whether the torture preceding
and including death is worse than death sans agony. The next question is whether our spy
has the right to decide (which might, of course, depend on the honor of the captors). For an
interesting discussion of this dilemma, see also SUICIDE AND EU'rHMAsiA, supra note 2, at 251-
76 (concluding that a coercive state force should not be available to prevent suicide or
euthanasia).
Nancy Cruzan's pseudo-ghost will attest to the experience that the above debate is any-
thing but fictitious. Accordingly, is her experience sufficient to qualify as "negative?" Or
perhaps: "neutral?" If neutral, the arguments for euthanasia are even muddier.
429. Source blessedly forgotten; a preemptory apology for the implied sexism.
430. See, e-g., Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(1) (West 1974). Firemen are also covered;
the homicide must occur when the officer or fireman is acting in the lawful discharge of an
official duty. Id.
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the eyes of the law; no punishment is meted.43 1 Valuations are made re-
garding human life. It is for civilization to justify those distinctions.
Whose Life Is It Anywayn
32
Some people object to the effect of intensive medical care on the pro-
cess of dying. Although the goal may be admirable, the effect is one of
degradation of the patient to the status of a research specimen. 43 3 The
patient sometimes becomes little more than an experimental mass, sub-
jected to treatment after treatment in the hopeless quest for a continued
heartbeat.
43 4
Death (to a woman in pain, about to die): Do not fear me, my child.
Come, climb into my arms, and I shall take away all your pain.4 35
V. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL IssuEs
A. Euthanasia and the Courts
I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty, or
give me death!
43 6
As if to mimic society's uncertainty regarding euthanasia, a deeply di-
vided 43 7 U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision affecting Nancy Cruzan,438 up-
held the right of the State of Missouri to maintain Nancy's artificial
nutrition and hydration. 439 The Court's opinion focused on technical
431. See, e.g., id. at § 9.32.
432. WHosp LFE Is IT ANYWAY? (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1981).
433. See, e.g., COLEN, supra note 53, at 229-42; Huswymw & Wicsxrr, supra note 2, at 96
(describing the experience of a cancer patient).
434. See, e.g., HUMPHR & WicK-rr, supra note 2, at 96; THOMASMA & GmBER, supra note 2,
at 158-64; supra note 16.
435. Franz Schubert, Der Tod und das Madchen (1821).
436. Patrick Henry, reprinted in Ti OxsoRD DicrIoNARY oF QUOTATIONS 245-46 (3d ed.
1979). The question at hand appears to be: can we demand both?
437. Five opinions were written for a 5-4 majority. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 269 (1990); infra note 440.
438. See supra notes 319-38 and accompanying text.
439. See Cruan, 497 U.S. at 265.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion focused on narrow legal issues. See infra text accompanying
notes 442-45.
Justice O'Connor emphasized personal interests in refusing medical treatment. See id. at
287; infra note 442.
Justice Scalia, rejecting any federal judicial role in the debate, commented on the
Court's divisions:
The various opinions in this case portray quite clearly the difficult, indeed agoniz-
ing, questions that are presented by the constantly increasing power of science to
keep the human body alive for longer than any reasonable person would want to
inhabit it.
Id. at 292 (Scalia, J., concurring). He argues that any decision regarding appropriate public
policy is the sole domain of the legislature of the separate States; to rule otherwise violates
our original principle of federalism. See id at 293. He further rejects Nancy's petition on
three points: (1) the relevance of Nancy's suffering, (2) the passive/active distinction, and
(3) prevention of withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration violates her bodily integ-
rity. See id at 295. He does not seem to accept the legal distinction between suicide and
euthanasia. See id. at 296.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissenting, reject as procedural obstacles the
evidentiary standard of Missouri, which they argue impermissibly burden Nancy's right to
terminate artificial nutrition and hydration. See id. at 302.
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points, concluding that Missouri had a sufficient interest, and a right, to
impose a clear and convincing standard of proof, in the evidence re-
quired, to show that Nancy would have chosen withdrawal of her artificial
food and water.440 Further, the Court ruled that the Missouri Supreme
Court did not err constitutionally in overturning" 1 the trial court, which
had found that the evidence "suggested" Nancy would not have wanted
the continuation of life-preserving measures in her situation.4 42 Finally,
the Court concluded that Missouri was not required to accept the "substi-
tuted judgment" of Nancy's close family. 43
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, objects to the primacy of general State interests
when in conflict with Nancy's personal interests, and criticizes the majority for its decision in
the face of principles guaranteeing Nancy the fulfillment of her interests. See id. at 331. He
does not dispute the importance of a clear and convincing standard of proof, but disagrees
that the facts proved here should be controlling. See id. at 344-45. He further criticizes judi-
cial interpretations that set Nancy's life and liberty interests in opposition, and decides her
fate for her-the ultimate denial of her interests. See id. at 347.
440. See id. at 281. Because of the necessarily invasive nature of artificial nutrition and
hydration, it is considered medical treatment. In 1989, the Supreme Court of Illinois
adopted the "consensus opinion [that] treats artificial nutrition and hydration as a medical
treatment." In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ill. 1989):
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a physician to pass a long
flexible tube through the patient's nose, throat and esophagus and into the stom-
ach. Because of the discomfort such a tube causes, "[mlany patients need to be
restrained forcibly and their hands put into large mittens to prevent them from
removing the tube.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 288-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Alternately, ajejunostomy tube must
be surgically implanted into the stomach or small intestine. Id.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to emphasize the invasive nature of artificial nutrition
and hydration, and to stress the due process protection of an individual's "deeply personal
decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." See
id. at 289. She further emphasized that the Court did not decide whether a State must give
effect to the decisions of a surrogate who has been chosen by the individual undergoing
treatment; it ruled only on an evidentiary standard of one State. See id. at 289. She warned
that, because evidence of the patient's intent is often not conclusive, current evidentiary
standards might often result in actions inconsistent with the patient's wishes. See it. at 289-
90. She recommends State recognition of Durable Powers of Attorney to effectuate the indi-
vidual's intent. See id at 290.
441. By a divided vote. See id. at 263-64.
442. See id. at 285. The independent guardian ad litem appeared to have only reluctantly
appealed the trial court's decision to the Missouri Supreme Court as a matter of duty, he
advised the court in the appeal that he did not disagree with the trial court's decision. See id.
at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, he cited the undisputed finding that: "it was in
Nancy Crnzan's best interests to have the tube feeding discontinued." See id. Further, the
trial court had found no adverse impact on third parties and no economic motivations. See
id. at 333.
443. See id at 334. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of favored legal treatment
of traditional family relationships, but refused to turn into a constitutional requirement that
the states recognize family decisionmaking in cases such as this. See id at 275. The Court
emphasized that the Cruzans were worthy of such a substituted judgment standard, but the
criteria were a function of state, but not federal due process, powers. See id. at 281; see also
Michele Yuen, LettingDaddy Die: Adopting New Standards for Surrogate Decisionmaking 39 UCLA
.L. REv. 581 (1992).
Nancy's parents, emotionally exhausted from their legal battles, continued in their strug-
gle to end her life, such as it was, citing new evidence of her desire to not live under such
circumstances. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Case Testing Right to Die "Aged Us All," N.Y. TMEs,
Nov. 4, 1990, at L24.
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Ensuring that a person in Nancy's position"" benefits from the full
protection of the law poses another dilemma. The State has the right, if
not the obligation, to demand solid evidence of the incapacitated person's
beliefs and intentions, as if they were not incapacitated.4"5 Parol evidence"
6
is normally forbidden in transactions not involving life-or-death questions;
why then should it be allowed where the consequences are all the more
important?44 7 Essentially, no other option exists. In order to fulfill the
State's presupposed duty to preserve life, some standard of evidence must
be maintained, with the State acting automatically as adversary, even
where the guardian ad litem has a good faith belief that the best interest of
the patient is to terminate artificial support. 4" 8
The Court has never' considered whether a State evidentiary standard
higher or lower than "clear and convincing" would be constitutionally ac-
ceptable. The Court has relied on balancing tests to weigh the compelling
State interests in preserving life against the wishes and rights of the indi-
vidual and the family. 4 9 A lower standard might run the risk of unconsti-
tutionality by failing to properly safeguard the interests of the patient, and
a higher standard might sway some of the Justices against a deferent view
444. "Nancy will never interact meaningfully with her environment again. She will re-
main in a persistent vegetative state until her death." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988)).
445. This assumes, moreover, that the State has the authority to recognize the authority
of an individual to terminate life-supporting measures.
446. Which, in the absence of a Living Will or Durable Power of Attorney, is the only
available indication of the incapacitated person's view on life and death. The Court specifi-
cally did not address the question of what result would have followed if a Durable Power of
Attorney had been made. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 n.12.
447. See id. at 284.
448. See id. at 281 n.9; see also Carl Hernandez III, Note, Legitimate Exercise ofParens Patriae
Doctrine: State Power to Determine an Incompetent Individual's "Right to Die" After Cruzan ex rel.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 6 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 167 (1992); Dr. G.
Steven Neeley, Patient Autonomy and State Intervention: Re-examining the State's Purported lnteres
19 N. Ky. L. Rav. 235 (1992).
Of increasing importance in the debate over constitutional protections for euthanasia
decisions is the emergence of state constitutional reliance. See generally Thomas C. Marks, Jr.
& Rebecca C. Morgan, The Right of the Dying to Refuse Life Prolonging Medical Procedures: The
Evolving Importance of State Constitutions, 18 OHfo N.U. L. REv. 467 (1992) (suggesting that the
explicit privacy provisions in state constitutions represent the best guarantees against the
artificial prolongation of life against one's wishes).
449. SeeYoungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). "[W] hether respondent's consti-
tutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests
against the relevant state interests." Id.; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985); In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (the NewJersey Supreme Court noted that the State's interest weakens and the indi-
vidual's right to privacy correspondingly grows as the prognosis dims and the degree of bod-
ily invasion increases). See generally Glenn W. Peterson, Comment, Balancing the Right to Die
with Competing Interests: A Socio-Legal Enigma, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 109 (1985) (highlighting the
difficulty in formulating adequate balancing equations and suggesting an overhaul of the
laws governing the right to refuse medical treatment). But cf. In reWestchester County Medi-
cal Center, 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988) (the Court of Appeals of New York, over objections of
her family, granted an order for artificial feeding of a 77-year-old woman who was incompe-
tent as a result of several strokes). "[N]o person or court should substitute its judgment as to
... the life [of] another." Id. at 613.
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of the State's duties and powers.450 It remains an open question to what
extent Cruzan will act to continue the formation of a common-law consen-
sus regarding passive euthanasia;451 the number and content of the opin-
ions give little comfort to those looking for solid answers.452
Implicit in the Cruzan opinion is the fact that, had Nancy completed a
Living Will, 45- the case would not have arisen because Missouri presuma-
bly would have had clear and convincing evidence of her intentions. Nev-
ertheless, a Living Will remains in most instances merely evidence of a
person's views; it does not have the force of law and may prove ineffective
unless recognized by the State.4
54
The Cruzan decision is remarkable in that it neither accepts nor re-
jects either the sanctity of life or the "right to die." The majority opinion
is narrowly technical, purposefully ignoring broader issues, while the con-
curring and dissenting opinions illustrate the dependence of the "answer"
on one's own perspectives of life-an arguably nonjudicial function.
B. A Constitutional Right to Euthanasia?
The presupposition that government has plenary authority over the
ending of life is pervasive in both judicial decisions and general literature.
This presupposition has been made, however, with little reference to un-
derlying concepts of personal autonomy or extenuating mortal
circumstances.
One possible means of asserting a legal "right" to euthanasia rests on
the principle of personal autonomy via a right of privacy.455 Because the
right to privacy is itself increasingly controversial and belies an uneven,
450. Compare Justice Scalia's concurrence, 497 U.S. at 292 (arguing impliedly that a
State can set any evidentiary standard), with Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 301 (arguing
that any evidentiary standard must be designed to effectuate the intent of the individual, and
any contrary effect is illegitimate; the clear and convincing standard, coupled with Missouri's
exclusionary rules, are thus nearly prima facie illegitimate). See generally David F. Forte, The
Role of the Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof in Right to Die Cases, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MEn. 183
(1992).
451. Active euthanasia was not at issue in Cruzan.
452. See supra note 441; see also Holly C. Gieszl & Peggy A. Velasco, Comment, The Cruzan
Legacy: Legislative and Judicial Responses and Insights for the Future, 24 Aluz. ST. LJ. 719 (1992);
Philip G. Peters, Jr. et al., Physician Willingness to Withhold Tube FeedingAfterCruzan: An Empiri-
cal Study, 57 Mo. L. Rav. 831, 833-48 (1992).
453. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
455. See infra notes 478-82 and accompanying text. A California appellate court regarded
a right to terminate one's life as probably the "ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy[.]"
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1986); see also
Martin B. Berman, Whose Rite Is It Anyway? The Search for a Constitutional Permit to Dis 22 Sw.
U. L Rxv. 105 (1992) (proposing that in those cases which involve a persistently vegetative
patient, courts adopt a presumption that, absent evidence to the contrary, the patient
chooses to have his or her life terminated). But cf Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The Right to
Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58 U.
CIN. L. Rxv. 1367 (1990). Lyon criticizes extensions of constitutional protections beyond
marriage, procreation, and family for reasons similar to the slippery slope objection (part
IIIA.2, supra), and on grounds of appropriate judicial authority. Lyon discusses the legal
foundation for refusal of life-sustaining measures only, and is thus more limited in scope
than this Article; unfortunately, informed consent is not helpful in cases of incapacitated
persons. Further, the bases for a right to privacy are not mutually exclusive; reliance on
1993]
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poorly expressed development, 456 an investigation of alternative grounds
for supporting such a right-particularly as it relates to euthanasia-is
warranted.
The legal principle of a right to privacy developed relatively recently
in common law, having often been appended as a parasite to property,
tort, and contract law.457 This development contrasts sharply with that of
other legal systems, which often have long histories of protected privacy
rights.458 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in their watershed 1890 ar-
ticle, argued that the common law had developed a right of privacy, which
nevertheless went unnoticed because of mislabeling as a "property" or
"contract" right or "breach of trust."4 59 They advocated instead a protec-
tion based on the law of tort.460 Although the two did not consider the
issue of government intrusion into the "inviolate personality" of the indi-
vidual, they helped establish the notion in American jurisprudence of a
cognizable legal interest in privacy.
46 1
Griswold v. Connecticut,462 which laid the foundation for modem con-
stitutional privacy protections, was decided on arguably irrelevant
grounds.4 63 An ill-defined "right to privacy," along with the Fourteenth
informed consent does not preclude the applicability of a constitutional right of privacy, or
vice versa.
456. This implies that a well-defined right to privacy is possible, built on common core
values of bodily integrity. This may be unrealistic or even undesirable given our constitu-
tional framework and uniquely vague concepts of socially appropriate mores. Cf. Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privaty, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989) (arguing that traditional consti-
tutional privacy analysis, which looks to the prima facie effect of the law, misses the point;
instead, we should look to the affirmative powers of the law in question).
457. See SAMUEL H. HoFsTADTER & GEORGE HoRowrrz, THE RIosHr OF PRIVACy 1, 5, 11-24
(1964). Blackstone records no recognition of an enforceable right of privacy. The writings
of renowned political philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Paine, Rousseau,
and Spencer, which preceded the Industrial Revolution, concerned only interference with
life and property, not with the less tangible aspects of invasions of privacy. See id. at 11. But
cf. 1 WimLAM BLtcroSTON, CoMETAm~m 125-26 (discussion of natural liberties as "the
power of acting as one sees fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature"
and "inherent in us by birth," restrained only by "human laws (and no farther) as is necessary
and expedient for the general advantage of the public"-thus defining civil liberties).
The right of privacy is still not recognized in British common law. See PETER CANE, TORT
LAW AND ECONOIC INTERESrs 15, 87 (1991); RAYMOND WACS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: Pm-
VACY AND THE LAw 39-40 (1989).
458. See Hofstadter & Horowitz, supra note 457, at 1. The earliest record of a right to
privacy is contained in the Mishnah, a compilation of ancient Israeli Oral Law collected circa
200 A.D., which constitutes the core of the Talmudi See id. at 9. In Roman law any "willful
disregard of another's personality" was injuria, and Greek law similarly recognized Contume-
lia, or "every infringement of the personality of another." See id. French, Swiss, and German
laws, which have been influential throughout Europe, followed the Roman and Greek exam-
ple in recognizing actionable rights against invasions of privacy. See id. at 10-11.
459. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Pivacy, 4 HARv. L. Rev. 193,
200-12 (1890).
460. See id. at 219-20.
461. Interestingly, but not too surprisingly, Warren and Brandeis addressed only non-gov-
ernmental intrusions. Id.
462. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
463. The Court was deeply split. Three concurring opinions were written, with Justices
Black and Stewart dissenting seperately. Central to Justice Douglas' opinion, disregarding
the questionable treatment of standing, was the importance of the marriage relationship in
the right to use contraceptives. See id. at 480, 486; see also id. at 502-07 (WhiteJ, concurring).
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Amendment, formed the basis for a right of bodily autonomy,4 64 from
which a right of procreation emerged.465 A right of marriage was estab-
lished in Loving v. irginia,46 6 which held unconstitutional a statute that
made interracial marriage a punishable offense.4 6 7 Further expansion of
the right to privacy occurred in Stanley v. Georgia,468 where the Court re-
lied on the First Amendment to strike a Georgia statute that made illegal
This is hardly arguable with a straight face given today's radically different (if perhaps more
honest) treatment of sexual mores; the right to use contraceptives more likely inheres, if at
all, in individual freedom-not in marital units. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). In fairness to justice Douglas, he likely felt constrained to justify his decision with
specific textual references to avoid broader questions of the role of the Court. SeeJoHN E.
NowAK Er Al., CoNStrruroNAL LAw 686-87 (3d ed. 1986). The right to use contraceptives is
analogous to the issues of euthanasia because both depend on who or what has authority
over the physical being of the individual.
Justice White presumed that "the State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit
sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital, [is] concededly a permissible and
legitimate legislative goal." 381 U.S. at 505 (White,J., concurring). This begs the question: is
it permissible for the State to impose, by force of law, its demands into private consensual
adult relationships? To enforce the majority concept of "proper" sexual mores is to violate
one of the purposes of our system of government: the protection of (non-destructive) minor-
ity interests. To further assume that socially undesirable sexual liaisons are inherently de-
structive may be proper, but the justification of the statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives requires a quantum leap in faith. The statute was indeed an "uncommonly
silly law" because it illegitimately presupposed that banning contraceptive use would neces-
sarily decrease the incidence of socially undesirable sexual relationships. Id. at 527 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). This is a patently spurious argument; such illicit contacts would most likely
continue with roughly the same frequency regardless of official sanction. Even if they do
become less frequent, far more damage will be caused by the non-use of contraception. Addi-
tionally, the burden of this statute falls biologically on only fifty percent of the sexual partici-
pants-women-creating a prima facie equal protection violation. The poor effectiveness of
child support laws negate any counterarguments of equality of legal effect.
The Court demonstrated its uneasiness with its decision based on what was essentially a
value judgment of the control over one's sexual actions as an individual. The issue as it
relates to euthanasia is even sharper, where the exercise of control, if at all, is final.
The Court, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, extended the right of privacy to single persons as
related to procreation and contraception on equal protection grounds. See 405 U.S. at 446-
56. The Court suggested that the freedom to decide to have children is so fundamental it is
protected by a right to privacy. See id. at 453. This circular precedent thus based the right to
use contraceptives on a right between married persons, extended to those unmarried via the
fourteenth amendment.
464. See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacj, 12 Hav. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 233, 266 (1977).
465. The Supreme Court first recognized procreative rights in Skinner v. Oklahoma. See
316 U.S. 535, 536-43 (1942). Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the right to
procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man[,]" because "[m ] arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. Are not thought and
the power to control our destinies similarly important> Would we regard mere existence with
the same philosophical respect as we afford the assumptions of free will? These debates have
burdened philosophers throughout history, we must merely acknowledge them as casting
doubt on any dogmatic position.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held the right to privacy to extend to the decision to not have
children, subject to the state's interest in the protections of fetal life. See 410 U.S. 113, 153-
56, 163-65 (1973). This doctrine is currently the focus of intense societal andjurisprudential
debate-113 files are produced by the phrase "Roe v. Wade" on Nexis; 513 for "abortion."
466. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
467. The Court later poorly expressed this right to marriage and the standard ofjudicial
review in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
468. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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the possession of pornography in any individual's home.
4 69
In Bowers v. Hardwick,470 the Court severely curtailed the right to bod-
ily autonomy in deciding that state sodomy laws do not interfere with an
individual's right to privacy.47 1 Given the dependence of previous find-
ings of a right to privacy on a right to marriage and procreation, no prece-
469. See id at 558-68. Georgia argued that forbidding the possession of pornography,
even within the confines of one's home, was necessary for the protection of the moral health
of the community. See id. at 559-60, 565. The Court disagreed, finding little evidence to
indicate that possession of pornography incited illegal action. See id. at 566-67. The correla-
tion between viewing (non-violent) pornography and criminal sexual behavior remains un-
certain, at best, and very possibly is negative, counter to the assumptions of many who are
vocal in that debate. Compare EDWARD DoNNEesra r AL., THE QUESION OF PoNOGR"PH.
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLCY IMPLICATIONS (1987) and PoRNocRAPH" AND SFXUAL AGRRES-
SION (Neil M. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds., 1984) and WnLu H. MAsmTs Er AL., MAS-
TERS AND JOHNSON ON SEX AND HuMAN LOVING 301 (3d ed. 1986) with U.S. DEPARTMEW OF
Jus'ncE, ArroRNE GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (Final ReportJuly 1986). Care
must be taken to distinguish the effects of violent pornography from pornography per se;
many studies confuse these distinctions within pornography. The Court found finally that
the restriction was a form of thought control "wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the
First Amendment." 394 U.S. at 566.
This issue is similar to euthanasia in that it raises the question of public authority over
consensual actions outside of the public domain. This is raised in cases of voluntary euthana-
sia, where the public interest is expressed only tangentially by an assumed desire to live; any
damage to society in the form of decreased productive capacity has already occurred. The
slippery slope objection to euthanasia similarly relates to the moral decline of the commu-
nity. While the right of the state to regulate behavior in public spheres is well established,
the opposite is true of activity within the home. The adage that a person's home is his castle
did not develop lightly- serious implications regarding the state's authority of intervention
are involved. See, e.g, U.S. CONST. amend. III. This alone casts serious doubt as to the propri-
ety of Georgia's assertion of authority.
470. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
471. The Court reasoned that the right to privacy protects only those rights "implicit in
the ordered concept of liberty" or "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition." Id. at
191-92, 194. This contradicts one of the primary purposes of the Constitution itself: to pro-
tect minority interests against potential tyranny of the majority. Because popular majorities
are transient, an essential function of the Constitution must be effective structural frustra-
tions against present majorities that attempt to prevent the formation of future majorities.
We are each members of numerous minorities. If constitutional protections were valid only
to the extent that they were "implicit in the ordered concept of liberty" or "deeply rooted in
this nation's history and traditions," our Constitution would have little meaning indeed. The
Court assumes that acts of sodomy-not limited to acts between persons of the same sex or
unmarried heterosexuals-somehow violate an ordered sense of liberty, with little reasoning
to support such a claim. The Court further relies on history to mandate social mores. Given
the repressed and culturally heterogeneous traditions of our ancestors, this seems both logi-
cally unsubstantiated and a slavish dependence on a history not nearly as clear as the Court
would have us believe.
In a statement to law students on October 18, 1990, formerJustice Powell, whose swing
vote decided the case, admitted that "[wihen I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a
few months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments." Anand Agneshwar,
Ex-Justike Says He May Have Been Wrong: Powell on Sodomy, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3. Powell
considered Bowers v. Hardwick "of little or no importance" because no one had been prose-
cuted for sodomy. Aaron Epstein, Ex-Justice Admits 'Mistake' in Gay Ruling; AusTN-AMERiAN
STATESMAN, Oct. 26, 1990, at A2. The case remains the law of the land, however, and thus
carries precedential effect in both judicial and legislative arenas. It has been cited regularly,
for example, to deny to gay persons the choice of becoming foster parents, custody of their
own children, and service in the military. See id.
Twenty-five states outlaw sodomy. See 38 Playboy 46 (Jan. 1991). Five of these only out-
law homosexual sodomy. See id. Several individuals have been indicted or sentenced for
violations involving oral sex performed by married or unmarried heterosexual couples. See
id.
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dent was available to support a right to private anal sex. 472 This raises the
question whether a right to sexual privacy is or should be based on a right
of procreation, or an inherent authority over one's own person. Human
rights, which are so often self-proclaimed by the United States as yardsticks
forjudging other societies, presuppose governmental respect for individu-
als' authority to make choices relating to their own lives where their behav-
ior is not destructive to others or to society.4 73
The right to privacy, even if somewhat strained in construction,474 is
far too important to destroy.475 The contemporary interpretation that in-
fers broad privacy protections in the penumbrae of specific constitutional
guarantees has been important, but it is increasingly subject to attack, and
deflects legal analysis from the true source of the right of privacy and all
that follows. The right of privacy can be logically supplemented and sub-
stantiated regardless of the Griswoldian constructs by drawing on the most
basic of legal precepts.
What is ignored in discussions of a right to privacy is the possibility
that the Constitution did not create a right of privacy, but instead reflected
an assumption in the New World of then-unknown personal autonomy-
what would now be labeled a right of privacy. A right of privacy is not
enumerated because it is a precondition to the Constitution itsef.47 6 "We the
472. Bowers v. Hardwick should not be read in an exclusively homosexual context; heter-
osexuals, whether married or not, were equally subject to criminal sanction. See 478 U.S. at
187; see also id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see id. at 188 n.2. Even if criminal
prosecutions are less likely-or nonexistent-for heterosexual couples, the objections re-
main valid; laws cannot be justified on the grounds of non-enforcement against particular
groups. Indeed, such non-enforcement, selective or otherwise, brings into question the legit-
imacy of a statute, particularly if it deals with issues of morality.
473. The question is then legitimately posed whether or not sodomy is per se destructive
to society. Judicial balancing is often relied on in difficult value issues, and the degree of
destruction is thus logically relevant in determining the legitimacy of the government's ac-
tions. For example, treason is expressly provided for in the Constitution and is perhaps the
best example of a true threat to the continued operation of the People's government. Were
government to assert itself in. all areas of potential damage, the concept of limited govern-
ment would be empty. Even if repulsive to many, the damage private sodomy poses to the
continued functioning of society is uncertain and cannot reasonably be said to be severe
enough for the positive intrusion required for enforcement against it. It must be conceded
that the true nature of the Georgia statute is a desire to control the sexual behaviors of its
citizens. This drains any remaining legitimacy to the causal argument of sodomy's destruc-
tive societal effect.
474. SeeJoHN E. NowAx Er A., supra note 463, at §§ 11.5-11.7, 14.26-14.30.
475. Indeed, any attempts to emasculate it severely (i.e., so as to affect personally a large
enough contingent of citizens) would likely be averted by whatever other judicial grounds
were available to avoid nearly inevitable popular confrontations. Alternatively, legislative ac-
tion would likely reassert many of these underlying rights of privacy.
476. Ours is not the first generation to debate the constitutional sources of liberty inter-
ests. In 1875 ChiefJustice Waite noted:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, it is, and
always has been, one of the attributes of citizenship under a free government. It
"derives its source," to use the language of Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 211, "from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized
man throughout the world." It is found wherever civilization exists. It was not,
therefore, a right granted to the people by the Constitution. The government of
the United States when established found it in existence, with the obligation on the
part of the States to afford it protection.
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People" cannot legitimately form a more perfect Union unless we first
have dominion over ourselves. 477 Given that We the People created a lim-
ited government to protect our survival against the real evils of external
threats and internal economic protectionism, the value of privacy lights
intrinsic to the individual appears clear.478 This leads, however, to an ad-
ditional question that asks where this self-authorized power originates.
The building block of the Constitution is: People. The smallest indi-
visible unit of People is: Person. It is mathematically intuitive to attach
some significance to the importance of the Person in this constitutional
equation, quite apart from our strong cultural bias of individuality. Still,
asserting a basis for individual authority demands further investigation.
The right to privacy should be based fundamentally in property law.
Indeed, dominion over one's own physical and mental personalty is argua-
bly the purest example of a property interest.4 79 Any defense of property
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875).
477. The then-radical notion of non-monarchial government was probably best at-
tempted in the unique environment of the New World, where ancient interdependencies
and close autocratic supervision were attenuated to the extent that the citizenry felt less and
less beholden to the European powers. Additionally, the sparse populations and relative
isolation even among colonies added to the sense of social and cultural isolation. This, cou-
pled with the generally negative experiences with colonial powers, led to a general distrust of
governmental authority. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. ScHLESiNoE, THE BIRTH OF THE NATION 3-16,
33-54, 113-27 (1968).
478. This analysis is strengthened by the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federal-
ists preceding constitutional ratification, which centered around the need for a bill of rights
in the Constitution. The Federalists, avidly pro-Constitution, argued against a bill of rights.
See ROBERT A. RuTrLN, THE BIrTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 118-19, 132-33 (1955). The Anti-
Federalists, who were against the proposed Constitution, insisted on a bill of rights to protect
the States and people. See id. at 117-25. Alexander Hamilton's reply to the Anti-Federalists,
in a famous Federalist opinion, viewed with alarm the concept of a bill of rights, because such
enumeration of rights would imply that the federal government had residuary power, where
it supposedly had none. See THE FEDERALIsr No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). A bill of rights
would thus be not only superfluous, but would dangerously limit rights to only those in the
bill. With hindsight we can commend or criticize these views, but their existence does illus-
trate unique assumptions of autonomy that render present commentary about the source of
a contemporary right of privacy as proof of the Federalists' fears of implied governmental
powers, and Anti-Federalists' demands for constitutional protections. See generally ANrI-Fa-
ERALISTs VERsus FEDERAsrs: SELEcaED Docuhmars (John D. Lewis ed., 1967).
479. The standard justifications for property interests remain weak; they are often justi-
fied by power and primacy. See, e.g., SHELDON F. KURTz & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AmERICAN
PROPERTv LAw 1-29, 45, 62-63, 84, 101, 116 (1987); Michelle B. Bray, Note, Personalizing Per-
sonalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx. L. Rav. 209, 211 (1990); see also
EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERIcAN CoNSTrTUTIoNAL LAW 21
(1928) (citing von Gierke: "Property had its roots.., in Law which flowed out of the pure
Law of Nature..."). Locke early recognized the connection between personal existence and
ownership, beginning with the premise that "every Man has a Property in his own Person."
JOHN LocKE, Two TEArISEs OF GovWRNMENT § 27, at 305 (Peter Laslett 2d ed., student ed.
1967) (3d ed. 1698); Bray, supra, at 212.
Defining the body as property is not only not foreign to legal property constructs, but
strongly analogous to common property laws. The general rule relating to the enjoyment of
property assumes a right of use, with government limitations only with cause. Further, the
government has a duty, and stake, in ensuring the peaceful use of property. Thus, tort law
has been applied early to property interests. SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEaTON
ON TORTS § 13 (5th ed. 1984). See generaly RussELL ScoTr, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981)
(discussion of developing medical technologies and resultant social and legal problems).
The California Supreme Court recently decided a case involving the use of a patient's
spleen, for commercial purposes, without the patient's consent or knowledge. Despite facts
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rights beyond the human being-what property law now encompasses-in
reality requires a legal structure that merely defines proximate relation-
ships to individuals. 480 Neither common property nor tort law was suffi-
ciently developed to fully incorporate the impact of a right of privacy.
Given nearly a century of legal introspection, however, the contemporary
concept of property rights is sufficiently expanded and flexible to accom-
pany complex new legal challenges. It is more than sufficient to encom-
pass the basic question presented: defining the ownership of personalty
for purposes of defining a privacy interest.
Do we own ourselves? 481 The answer is far from historically certain.
Slavery was constitutionally justified.4 82 So too was the virtual ownership
quite unfavorable to the defendants, the court decided finally that the patient did not have a
cause of action for conversion of the spleen. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). This opinion has been a source for much legal debate. See, e.g.,Jen-
nifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 75 VA. L. Rav. 1363 (1989); Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, Biotechnology and
the Commercial Use of Human Cells: Toward an Organic View ofLife and Technology, 5 SANTA CLARA
Compumit & HIGH TECH. UJ. 211 (1989); Catherine A Tallerico, Comment, The Autonomy of
the Human Body in the Age of Biotechnology, 61 U. COLd. L. Ray. 659 (1990); see also Bray, supra
(discussion of property rights applied to personalty).
The suggestion of body-as-property is neither logically unsound nor immoral. We each
depend strongly on others for identity, and consider others to be strongly connected to us.
Referring to "my child" or "my mother" is not insignificant; the possessive grammatical form
necessarily connotes-possession. Each descriptive term invariably involves a deep sense of
emotional bonding and belonging. This does not imply any sense of fee simple ownership,
but it does illustrate analogous privacy concepts. Privacy extends spherically not only beyond
individuals, but also pairs and groups of individuals who are bonded by family or other rela-
tionships. In this sense, any uninvited intrusion into a sphere is a violation of an interest in
the sphere's integrity. For a discussion of personhood as a basis for defining property, see
generally MargaretJ. Radin, Propery and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. Rv. 957 (1982). The ques-
tion for the law remains to define how far an interest extends beyond physical being.
A natural resistance to the concept of body-as-property is reinforced by the history of
slavery. See infra notes 484, 486-87 and accompanying text. Societies that accept slavery pro-
mulgate codes to regulate it. See Scorr, supra, at 27. The Law has no virgin slate from which
to castigate ownership of human beings, however, historical ownership of humans merely
strengthens the analogy. What was (viewed contemporaneously) morally despicable was the
ownership of others-not the concept of ownership itself; slavery is antithetical to the concept
of self-ownership. It is for society to recognize the illegitimate basis for human ownership
beyond one's own person. This inalienability is crucial to recognition of self-ownership, and
is explored in depth in Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REa. 1849
(1987).
For an excellent discussion of property rights applied to personalty, see generally Bray,
supra.
480. See 1 AmimcANI LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.7 (1952). Business organizations are the legal
equivalent of fictional (human) beings, enabling economic prosperity via the most basic de-
mand of capitalism: private ownership. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (discussion by Chief Justice Marshall of the nature of a
corporation as a being); A.AN iR BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 3C
(1968); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 80 (1983).
481. An individual who is fundamentally religious (if within the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion) will answer this negatively. There, the religious entity is the owner, with the resident
human merely enjoying (or not, as the case may be) usufructory rights. Notwithstanding the
religious perspective, if we do not own ourselves, who does? This rhetorically poses no legiti-
mate alternative, leading to the assumed answer that each individual "owns" himself.
482. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856); DANIELJ. FLANIGAN, THE
CINAL LAw OF SLAvERY Am FREEDOM 1800-1868, at 191-92 (1987).
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of women, whose legal identities merged into that of their husbands4 8 3-
what is ownership if not legal recognition of identity? In addition to their
status as property of others, slaves were denied legal recognition as individ-
uals.48 4 The law proved logically inconsistent, however, in the treatment
of their personalty when they were either the perpetrators or victims of
crime.
485
In sharp contrast with the dearth of common law on a right of pri-
vacy,486 the common law early recognized a presumption of bodily integ-
rity, drawing on John Stuart Mill's oft-cited assertion that a state may not
exercise power over members of a civilized community except to prevent
harm to others.48 7 Interestingly, recent decisions have emphasized com-
mon law principles at the expense of constitutional doctrines, suggesting
that courts are approaching the limits of a privacy-protected right to
die.
48 8
Raising self-ownership to a constitutionally protected right is difficult,
if not impossible, given the continuing debate over proper textual inter-
pretation. Recognizing this more intellectually honest basis for a right to
privacy does, however, change the relative positions of the interested par-
ties in the euthanasia debate. Proceeding from the assumption of per-
483. See 1 AmERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 5.50-5.52 (1952). Interestingly, the term "wo-
man" (much to feminists' dismay, no doubt) is derived from the German "wifmann" (vari-
ously spelled), meaning essentially "property of a man." VII OxFoRD ENGLiSH DICrIoNARv,
supra note 35, at 325, 484; OxFoRD DIaONARI OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 523, 1011 (C.T. On-
ions ed., 1969) (cf. also leman-mistress of man).
484. The Constitution, in providing for a census, considered slaves as three-fifths of a
person. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
485. The status of slaves as people was uncertain at best. While they are obliquely re-
ferred to twice in the Constitution, courts had difficulty reconcilingJustice Taney's decision
(one of eight) in Dred Scott which declared that slaves were not persons under the Constitu-
tion. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). CompareU.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 andart. LIV, § 2, cl. 3
with 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404-26. Slaves, however, could not logically be prosecuted for
criminal violations; could a criminal statute apply to a non-person? Moreover, even if slaves
were persons for purposes of prosecution under criminal statutes, to incarcerate or capitally
punish them would deprive their owners of property in violation of the Constitution.
In United States v. Amy, Chief Justice Taney considered a point reserved at trial that
contested the application of a federal criminal statute to Amy-a slave and thus a non-per-
son. 24 F. Cas. 792 (C.C.D. Va. 1859). The statute forbade "any person" to steal a letter from
the United States mail. See id at 793-809. The motion for a new trial was overruled, with little
legal reasoning. See id. at 809-11. Justice Taney could have cited THE FEDEPALIST No. 54
(James Madison), which argued that slaves were both property and persons in differing
respects.
In the final analysis, slaves were most equal-most human-under the law when they
committed crimes; the logical inconsistencies of the law were better left unchallenged. For
an excellent discussion of this issue, see generally DANIELJ. FLAsNcAN, THE CRiMINAL LAW OF
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 1800-1868 (1987). Where a slave was the victim and the perpetrator
was white, prosecution was unlikely, and serious punishment rare. See id. at 145-50, 414.
Where, however, a black even remotely threatened a white, the punishment tended to be
capital. See id. at 26.
Interestingly, Dred Scott was the only decision other than Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), to hold a federal statute unconstitutional prior to the Civil War. See
NowAK et al., supra note 463, at § 3.1, n.11.
486. See supra note 459 and accompanying text.
487. J.S. MiLt, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BooKS OF THE WEsrST.N WORLD 267, 271 (Robert
Hutchens ed., 1952); Lyon, supra note 455, at 1384 n.111.
488. See LAureNcE H. TRiBE, AmER AN CONsTrrrTIoNAL Aw 1370 (2d ed. 1988).
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sonal autonomy, the question for the government is: Under what
circumstances may an individual's right to determine the nature and time
of his death be overridden by state and societal interests? This does not
provide an easy answer to the euthanasia dilemma-that would be neither
possible nor desirable. Rather, the debate is placed in a different context.
The issue is essentially one of who must bear the burden of approving or
prohibiting euthanasia. The "right" of the individual to a peaceful death
should be balanced with the government's duty to ensure that that individ-
ual's death is indeed peaceful. The burden should not be on the individ-
ual; rather, the government should show cause for invading a property
interest in a person's autonomy and reasonable extensions thereof.
C. Active Euthanasia and Legal Prosciptions Against Taking Life
Passive euthanasia has posed difficult issues forjudicial resolution, re-
sulting slowly in a compromise of legal recognition of some personal au-
thority to decide for oneself to terminate one's own health care in severe
health care situations. This presents two problems. First, the distinction
between active and passive euthanasia is becoming an increasingly aca-
demic exercise. 48 9 Advances in medicine afford increasingly sophisticated
life-saving and -prolonging options previously unavailable. 490 This blurs
the bright line that divides the previously clear legal and ethical distinc-
tions of euthanasia actions. Second, even with clearly passive euthanasia,
such as the withholding of food and water, the reality is that even "non-
action" is torment to those who are necessarily involved. The process of
starvation 491 is hardly compatible with a civilized ethos. It entails, by de-
sign, progressive deterioration in the functioning of the body, increasing
levels of pain,492 and complication of other medical conditions.493 This,
in any other context, we would label torture.
To justify any actions beyond passive euthanasia requires a quantum
leap in both faith and precedent; the criminal law is generally incapable of
distinguishing active euthanasia from murder.49 4 Given this, why is one
even possibly acceptable when the other is an assumed evil? To attempt
escape from this dilemma's horns, we must first know: Why is murder
wrong?
As a matter of human history, murder has been condemned because
it presents a destructive force in civilized society. Further, murder violates
a person's interest in continuing to live. When applied to the situation
where active euthanasia is being considered, the reasons behind the pro-
scription against homicide are absent. Any disruption for society has al-
489. See Fletcher, supra note 47.
490. See, e.g., supra notes 247, 420 and accompanying text.
491. See infra notes 534-35 and accompanying text.
492. Big Mac attacks are the closest most will ever come to the physiological distress of
food deprivation.
493. See infra notes 533-35. One need only look to instances of famine to verify the physi-
ologically violent nature of starvation.
494. See WLSON, supra note 2, at 143; see also Donald G. Casswell, Rejecting Criminal Liabil-
ity for Life-Shortening Palliative Car 6J. Cowras. HEm L. & Pot.N 127, 128-40 (1990).
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ready occurred, via the loss of the productive capabilities of the
individual.495 Indeed, disruption on a smaller scale-for family and
friends-would continue after the individual becomes a candidate for eu-
thanasia, but would diminish after a euthanic death. Violating a person's
interest to live is, by definition, absent as an objection where active volun-
tary euthanasia is concerned.
4 96
Active euthanasia involves some action causing death.4 9 7 Although
this definition could also be used for murder,498 three crucial differences
serve to distinguish the two. Homicide is not defined by the motives of the
person who kills, by the circumstances and motives of the person who dies,
or by the circumstances of his death, but such distinctions are unofficially
relevant in prosecutorial discretion, grand jury indictments, jury verdicts,
and sentencing.49 9 These distinctions have been the only means to differ-
entiate "real" murderers from "good"-or at least sympathetic-ones. Re-
liance on the graces of individual prosecutors, jurors, and judges is
anathema to the rule of law, however, and counter to advocates' interests
in answering the criticism of those opposed to euthanasia, who rightly
point to the threat of unchecked abuses. These three considerations are
thus crucial in reliably distinguishing euthanasia from murder.
First, humanitarian motives are not recognized as legitimate justifica-
tions for homicide.50 0 Positive motives could legitimately be incorpo-
rated, under very limited circumstances,5 0 1 into the legal definition of
homicide, where humanitarian considerations were present, withoutjeop-
495. An opponent of euthanasia could point to the slippery slope argument as a disrup-
tive factor in itself. See supra part IIIA.2.
496. Active involuntary euthanasia presents a more difficult question, as it remains an
open question whether such an interest can be transferred via "substituted judgment" to
relatives. See supra notes 445-50 and accompanying text. It is presumed that the state has a
legitimate interest in advocating on behalf of the incapacitated and assuming in the individ-
ual's stead a desire to live. See supra notes 450-52.
497. See supra note 45.
498. See, e.g., Tzx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.01-19.05, 19.07 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
Indeed, active euthanasia fits the definition of pre-meditated murder perhaps perfectly-
often better than prosecutors could normally hope for. What is normally contested defini-
tionally is the meaning of malice aforethought. See WAYNE R. LAXAVE & AuSTIN W. ScOTr,
CRiMiNAL LAW § 7.1 (2d ed. 1986). In common law and statutory definitions of felonious
homicide, "malice" is equivalent to "intent," serving to distinguish intentional homicide from
manslaughter. Id. This is problematic for proponents of active euthanasia, as a person who
assists another in suicide, for whatever noble purposes, does intend his actions.
499. This poses a related risk. Euthanasia as currently practiced occurs with virtual igno-
rance of the law. Coroners might falsify reports, prosecutors might decline to prosecute,
grand juries might decline to indict, juries might acquit, and judges might compensate in
sentencing. The one consistent thread is uncertainty. This, if not breeding disrespect for the
law, brings into question the legitimacy of legal sanctions on an issue as central to civilized
government-and as legally amorphous-as euthanasia. Even the Cruzan opinions either
avoided the issue or framed it in one-sided contexts.
A recent opinion concerning capital punishment poses an interesting tangential argu-
ment, in that consideration of subjective factors may arguably violate equal protection guar-
antees, and subject minorities to disfavorable results (or majorities to unfairly favorable
leniency). See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 912-15 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
500. See WILsON, supra note 2, at 143.
501. Verification of humanitarian motives would necessarily be a question of fact for the
state and courts.
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ardizing the integrity of the criminal justice system.5 0 2 Second, the cir-
cumstances and motives of the person who dies are, according to criminal
law precepts, irrelevant to the guilt of the person who kills. 50 3 Yet a clear
medical tragedy, coupled with a sincere desire to die, properly substanti-
ated, clearly distinguishes the act of euthanasia from homicide. Third, the
circumstances of the death provide substantial evidence regarding the au-
thenticity of both the motives behind the killing and the reasons for want-
ing to die.
Looking officially to humanitarian motives of the person who kills,
the circumstances of the death, and the circumstances of the person who
dies provides a clear means to distinguish euthanasia from homicide. Crit-
ics of euthanasia will likely point to the importance of an absolute criminal
proscription against assisting suicide to prevent the possibility of true mur-
der under the guise of a requested death. This, however, is a question of
fact. The criminal law could be as specific as the most ardent euthanasia
supporter would accept in demanding evidence of the authentic need for
death to safeguard against such possible abuse. Rather than skirting the
issues, with a result worse for everyone, the criminal law could distinguish
euthanistic from homicidal death, and make allowances accordingly.
VI. PoucY CONSIDERATIONS
It is dangerous to go out into this hellish world but it is still more danger-
ous to hide in the bushes.
504
Complex moral, medical, and social considerations enter into any dis-
cussion of when, if ever, euthanasia should be condoned or regulated.
Moral objections are present on two levels: a rejection of the philosophy
which sees the possibility of life having negative value, and objections to
the effects of purposeful taking of life.50 5 The medical community re-
mains divided, while further advances in medical technology increase the
likelihood of situations arising where euthanasia might be considered.50 6
Social considerations interweave with religious and moral values,-as well as
more dispassionate economic and political consequences.50 7 Still, objec-
tions to euthanasia fall into two major categories: concern for the sanctity
of life and of the consequences of non-sacrosanct life, which some fear
would result in an inexorable slide into barbarism.
A. Moral Implications
For many, the topic of euthanasia touches chords that cannot be re-
tuned by logic.5 08 Judeo-Christian presuppositions reject human self-de-
502. See infra part VI.C.
503. Although the status of the person who dies can-inconsistently with sanctity-of-life
views-affect the level of punishment. See supra notes 431-31 and accompanying text.
504. Yevtushenko, in Kohl, supra note 180 at 140.
505. See infra part VI.A.
506. See infra part VI.B.
507. See infra part VI.C.
508. An opponent of euthanasia comments:
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termination with regard to ending suffering by ending life.50 9 Against
these faiths, no logic can prevail. Yet we, as a society, are faced with con-
flicts and painful choices that cannot, and must not, be resolved by refer-
ence to any one system of beliefs.5 10 This, unfortunately, disrespects a
view of life as sacrosanct.
5 11
There is little room to argue logically against (or for) theological ar-
guments.5 12 One either accepts divine revelation-and all that follows-
on faith, or one does not. Similarly, strictly moral arguments are con-
strained by their necessary reference to contested bases of analysis. Where
the state is involved, however, the question becomes more difficult.
Whether to form public policy based, at least in part, on assumptions of
the inviolability of life necessarily affects the direction of the debate, and




The call came in the middle of the night. As a gynecology resident
rotating through a large, private hospital, I had come to detest telephone
calls, because invariably I would be up for several hours and would not
feel good the next day. However, duty called, so I answered the phone. A
nurse informed me that a patient was having difficulty getting rest, could
I please see her. She was on 3 North. That was the gynecologic-oncology
unit, not my usual duty station. As I trudged along, bumping sleepily
against walls and corners and not believing I was up again, I tried to
imagine what I might find at the end of my walk. Maybe an elderly
woman with an anxiety reaction, or perhaps something particularly
horrible.
I grabbed the chart from the nurses [sic] station on my way to the
patient's room, and the nurse gave me some hurried details: a 20-year-old
It is very illogical of us to make this distinction between active and passive. Well, so
it is. Logically there is little or no difference. But our gut instinct tells us that there
is. And, like it or not, we are not going to be browbeaten into changing our minds
by mere logic; nor even by the remarkable fact that, whereas in the case of human
beings passive euthanasia is widely regarded as a civilized and humane compromise,
in the case of animals the same thing is considered an inexcusable cruelty.
Thurston Brewin, Voluntay Euthanasia, 1986 LA CEr 1085, reprinted in Robert Campbell &
Diane Collinson, Passive and Active Euthanasia Are Not Equally Acceptabke, in EuHIANAstA: OP-
POSING VIEWPoITrs, supra note 31, at 52.
In the final analysis, one's views of the euthanasia debate are inextricably dependent
upon one's perspective of other ethical issues. This is unfortunate in attempts to deal with
the problem, because logic, by itself, is all but powerless to alter prejudices; dispassionate
logic is unwelcome in arenas of morality.
509. See, e.g., SPitIN & LAmsON, supra note 2, at 124.
510. Interestingly, nearly all books on euthanasia, of either persuasion, give an accurate
and reasonable account of opposing beliefs. This unfortunately reinforces the appearance
that a fundamental chasm of values between the opposing forces renders the development of
any mutually acceptable social policy improbable.
511. Few would argue with the proposition that human life is, ordinarily, worthy of such
absolute protections. But, as with most absolutes, reality rears its Hydraic heads, forcing qual-
ifications where they are not wanted.
512. See supra part III.A.1. Western religions are, by definition, self-referential. They are
justified internally, premised on the assumptions of faith.
513. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
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girl named Debbie was dying of ovarian cancer. She was having unre-
lenting vomiting apparently as the result of an alcohol drip administered
for sedation. Hmmm, I thought. Very sad. As I approached the room I
could hear loud, labored breathing. I entered and saw an emaciated,
dark-haired woman who appeared much older than 20. She was receiv-
ing nasal oxygen, had an IV, and was sitting in bed suffering from what
was obviously severe air hunger. The chart noted her weight at 80
pounds. A second woman, also dark-haired but of middle age, stood at
her right, holding her hand. Both looked up as I entered. The room seem
filled with the patient's desperate effort to survive. Her eyes were hollow,
and she had suprasternal and intercostal retractions with her rapid inspi-
rations. She had not eaten or slept in two days. She had not responded to
chemotherapy and was being given supportive care only. It was a gallows
scene, a cruel mockery of her youth and unfulfilled potential. Her only
words to me were, "Let's get this over with."
I retreated with my thoughts to the nurses [sic] station. The patient
was tired and needed rest. I could not give her health, but I could give
her rest. I asked the nurse to draw 20 mg. of morphine sulfate into a
syringe. Enough, I thought, to do the job. I took the syringe into the room
and told the two women I was going to give Debbie something that would
let her rest and to say good-bye. Debbie looked at the syringe, then laid her
head on the pillow with her eyes open, watching what was left of the
world. I injected the morphine intravenously and watched to see if my
calculations on its effects would be correct. Within seconds her breathing
slowed to a normal rate, her eyes closed, and her features softened as she
seemed restful at last. The older woman stroked the hair of the now-sleep-
ing patient. I waited for the inevitable next effect of depressing the respir-
atory drive. With clocklike certainty, within four minutes the breathing
rate slowed even more, then became irregular, then ceased. The dark-




This letter touched off a firestorm of criticism, both within the medi-
cal community and without. Some medical professionals called for a
strengthening of fundamental moral principles of medicine.51 5 Others ar-
gued for a reassessment of medicine's role.5 16 The resident's actions
should, however, be distinguished from the purpose behind them. Few
would commend the unplanned and unsupervised euthanization by a
bone-tired resident outside his normal duty rounds, but the underlying
dilemma remains: should Debbie have had her wish 51 7 of death fulfilled?
Assuming the laws of that state recognized her choice, she could have cho-
514. It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988).
515. See Willard Gaylin et al., Doctors Must Not Kill in EuTHANAsrA: THE MORAL ISSUES,
supra note 31, at 25, 27. In addition to objecting to the resident's methods, they-condemned
any doctor who would kill a patient, and further insisted on disciplinary actions against any
physician who kills. Id. at 28.
516. See e.g., Kenneth L. Vaux, Debbie's Dying: Mery Killing and the Good Death,in EtrHANA-
stA: THE MORAL IssUEs, supra note 31, at 29.
517. Assuming that was clearly what she meant by- "Let's get this over with."
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sen to refuse medical treatment5 18 and would have died eventually via pas-
sive euthanasia. The medical staff would have had no choice but to watch.
The question of whether she would have been better off refusing medical
treatment, 519 rather than dying from an injection of morphine, leads to a
basic problem with the medical community's approach.
The words of one of my teachers flashed through my mind: "If no cure is
available, the doctor is required to alleviate pain and suffering as much
as possible." For the supreme relief of supreme suffering, there is only one
answer.
5 20
I am a doctor. I cannot kill. I must let live.
52 '
2. The Medical Community's Schizophrenia
The primary function of medicine has never been defined.5 22 Is it to
preserve life, or to reduce suffering?5 23 Based primarily on this conflict,
the medical community has had a difficult time dealing with the issue of
euthanasia.52 4 The American Medical Association supports the patient's
518. It could well be argued that the problem with what happened to Debbie was not that
she wanted euthanasia (how can anyone not sympathize), or that she got it. Rather, the
method of her death was, at least, grossly inappropriate. Particularly objectionable was the
resident's complete lack of familiarity with the patient, her family, her situation beyond the
chart, and his failure to consult with any medical professional-least of all Debbie's personal
physician or anyone else who may have provided some safeguards for a person in Debbie's
position.
519. Assuming she had the willpower.
520. BARNARD, supra note 31, at 71 (thoughts before preparing a morphine solution for
Maria, who had terminal cervical cancer, and was in great pain). He didn't inject her, how-
ever, and she later went into temporary remission. He criticizes not his initial decision, as
her later temporary remission was a medical exception, but the lack of any professional direc-
tion for a physician resident. Id. at 73.
521. RUssELL, supra note 2, at 177 (gynecologist for Madame van de Put).
522. It has, rather, been assumed. Previously, medicine was busy learning the methods of
fighting disease and other agents of misery, with few negative side effects. Thus, preserving
life and reducing suffering were synonymous-until the technologies advanced to the point
of, arguably, forcing some to outlive their own deaths. See ScULLY & ScuLLv, supra note 42, at
16; see also THomAsmA & GRABrER, supra note 2, at 118-20, 193-97 (discussing the goal of
medicine and the obligations to relieve pain and suffering).
523. Alternatively: "curing" patients, or "improving" their lives (and deaths). Either way,
the underlying dilemma remains the same.
524. See, e.g., Dennis Brodeur, Assisted Suicide: The Limits of Personal Choice in a Social Soci-
ety, 11 ST. Louis U. Ptm. L. Rsv. 439 (1992) (Right to Life/Right to Die Symposium issue);
Stephanie B. Goldberg, Assisted Suicide Resolution Defeated: Opponents Say Measure Crosses Line
Between Suicide and Passive Euthanasia, 78 A.B.A.J. 107 (April 1992); Sanford H. Kadish, Let-
ting Patients Die: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CA1. L. REv. 857, 860-86 (1992); Aida A. Koury,
Physician-Assisted Suicide for the Terminally Ill: The Ultimate Cure?, 33 Amz. L REv. 677 (1991);
Juliana Reno, A Little Help from My Friends: The Legal Status of Assisted Suicide, 25 CmaiGrroN L
PEv. 1151 (1992); Thomas Rivosecchi, Comment, Medical Self-Determination: A Call for Uni-
formity, 31 DuQ. L REv. 87 (1992); George P. Smith II, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a
Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv.
275 (1989); Lynn D. Wardle, Sanctioned Assisted Suicide: "Separate but Equal" Treatment for the
"New Illegitimates, "3 Issuas iN L. & MED. 245 (1987); Robert F. Weir, The.Morality of Physician-
Assisted Suicide 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 116 (1992); Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and
the Right to Die with Assistance 105 HARv. L REv. 2021 (1992).
The issue is hardly academic: an estimated 10,000 patients are being maintained in
persistent vegetative states in the United States alone. The number is expected to increase
significantly. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 328 (1990) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). A fifth of all adults surviving to age 80 will likely suffer from a progres-
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right to choose the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, while firmly
condemning active euthanasia.5 25 The dilemma is the refusal to face real-
ity-somewhat like the child who cannot fathom the reason for the
euthanizing of its beloved pet.5 26 Debbie's death, when it came, would
have been far worse than by morphine. The fact that it came somewhat
sooner, and by the hand of a doctor,5 27 is a further question of ethics that
has not been well addressed. 528 The dilemma will likely become worse,
especially with respect to the acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome
epidemic.
5 29
For I was hungy and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and
you gave me something to drink.
530
Similarly, physicians are deeply troubled by the implications of with-
holding food and water from patients. The physiological effects of with-
drawal of nutrition and hydration, which are considered medical
treatment,531 provide a harrowing lesson in dying.53 2 Witnessing death
sive, demential disorder prior to death. Id. at 329. The eighty percent of Americans who die
in hospitals are likely to die in sedated or comatose, and certainly manipulated, states. Id.
The issue of legal liability for physicians who assist in euthanasia is another dimension to
the medical community's dilemma. See; e.g., Hilary H. Young, Assisted Suicide and Physician
Liability, 11 Ray. Lrrm. 623, 641-50 (1992).
525. SeeAaRmcAN MEDICAL Ass'N, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL ASAIRs, REPORT 12:
EurAsrA 3 (June 1988).
526. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association
sees the withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment as acceptable, with the in-
tention not to kill the patient but rather to relieve the patient of the burden of treatment or
suffering. Id. at 4. This ignores, however, the reality that withdrawal of life-prolonging meas-
ures, such as oxygen, food, water, will increase, not relieve, suffering-at least until death.
527. Cf supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text (description of Dr. Kevorkian and his
invention to assist suicide).
528. Compare Rachels, supra note 31, at 43 (arguing that there is no difference between
letting die and killing) and Howard Caplan, Doctors Should Support Euthanasia Decisions in Eu-
*rssqA = OPPosnqG VWoIn rrs, supra note 31, at 49 (recounting of a patient's miserable
death, and the court order needed for withdrawal of nutrition and hydration), with Robert
Campbell & Diane Collinson, Passive and Active Euthanasia Are Not Equally Acceptabl id. at 51
(arguing a prima facie difference exists). The best defense of the position against active
euthanasia appears to be Thurston Brewin's comment. See supra note 508 (pointing out that
passive euthanasia is considered "inexcusable cruelty" in the case of animals.
Compounding the problem is the relative secrecy of the instances where passive eutha-
nasia occurs; most are well hidden even within the hospitals that are already isolated from
society.
529. See SPRENG & LARSON, supra note 2, at 31.
530. Matthew 25:35 (Revised American).
531. See supra note 440.
532. Progressive effects of withholding food and water.
a. The mouth dries out and becomes caked or coated with thick material.
b. The lips become parched and cracked or fissured.
c. The tongue becomes swollen and might crack.
d. The eyes sink back into their orbits.
e. The cheeks become hollow.
f. The lining of the nose might crack and bleed.
g. The skin hangs loosely on the body and becomes scaly.
h. The urine becomes highly concentrated, burning the bladder.
i. The lining of the stomach dries out, causing dry heaves and vomiting.
j. Hyperthermia develops.
k. The brain cells begin drying out, causing convulsions.
I. The respiratory tract dries out, causing very thick secretions which can plug
the lungs and cause death.
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via starvation and thirst is against both functions of medicine; health care
professionals are forced to watch as they fail to either preserve life or re-
duce suffering.5 3 Passive euthanasia is thus arguably more against the
traditions of medicine than either active euthanasia or organized palliative
care. Even more problematic for the medical profession is the dilemma
posed by children who are born with, or develop, serious deformities or
mental incapacities.53 4 As legal incompetents, they must rely on the deci-
sions of their parents or guardians, which can sometimes present confused
conflicts as the parents face terrible options in situations where objective
decisionmaking is difficult, at best, and heart-rending always.535 This
presents an additional burden for the physician, and the courts, in balanc-
ing the needs of the child with the intentions of the parents.53 6 After all,
children must rely on others for everything, including wisdom.
C. Economic Considerations
People talk about the right to die as if they have the right to refuse to
die.
537
Persons who are dying often worry about the effect of their illness on
their family's financial situation. 538 The increasing reliance on hospitals
m. Eventually, the major organs fail, resulting in death.
See Rita Marker, Euthanasia Part HI Starvation and Dehydration as Treatment, STEUB r.VlLE REG-
isrm, Nov. 13, 1987, at 12 (description by Judge David H. Kopelman of Massachusetts). Com-
pare Fred Rosner, Food and Water Must Always Be Provided, in EuTHANASLU OPPOSINo
VxEwPoirs, supra note 31, at 77, with Dan W. Brock, Food and Water Must Not Always Be Pro-
vided, id. at 83.
One recent book that has caused considerable controversy discussed alternative methods
of euthanasia, criticized the effects of many such methods, and provided advice for recom-
mended methods. SeeDEREK HumPHRy, FNAL Exrr: THE PRAcrcAx S OF SELP-DELVERENcE
AN AssisTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991).
533. Withholding of food and water provides an interesting contrast to the withholding
or withdrawal of other, less basic medical treatments. Similar to the kidney dialysis story (see
supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text), starvation is something that physicians and
nurses can (easily) do something about. Resources are not a problem (indeed, even if they
were, congressional reaction would probably be the same as with kidney dialysis: since we
don't like the problem of a pie cut unevenly, let's legislate a bigger pie), yet a vegetative or
terminal life cannot be fixed, whatever the commitment.
534. Some children have congenital defects that will result inevitably in their deaths, nor-
mally after much suffering. Others, such as Down's syndrome children, are in no immediate
threat of death, and can live their lives in reasonably normal ways, remaining as children and
capable of emotional relationships and simple tasks. See Foot, supra note 38, at 106. See also
THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 2, at 37-40 (discussing euthanasia when the patient is not
terminal).
535. Cf. supra notes 262-78 and accompanying text (story of Corinne van de Put). Of
course Corinne was not consulted; infants must rely on others for everything, including wis-
dom. The pertinent question is: Does she have a right to a peaceful death? If so, does that
right outweigh reliance on an assumed desire of a right to live?
536. "If we say we are unable to look after children with handicaps we are no more telling
the truth than was the S.S. man who said that the Jews could not be fed." Foot, supra note 38,
at 106-07 (emphasis in original).
537. Richard Lamm, Euthanasia Should Be Based on Economic Factors, in EuTNAs,: Oppos-
ING ViEWPOINrs, supra note 31, at 135.
538. See HARRY VAN BOMMEL, CHoicEs: FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE A TERMINAL ILLNESS, THEIR
FANIEs, AND THEIR CAREGIVERS 118 (1987); see also M. Rose Gasner, Financial Penalties for
Failing to Honor Patient Wshes to Refuse Treatment, 11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L REV. 499, 499-520
(1992).
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and medical professionals has greatly increased the cost of dying in the
United States.539 According to basic societal values, personal financial
considerations must not be controlling, but, realistically, cannot be consid-
ered illegitimate, either.
The macroeconomic impact of euthanasia, or its prohibition, is an
increasingly troublesome issue, particularly since it disrespects the moral
and social implications of its findings.540 Nevertheless, health care costs
continue to escalate, and many who need health care are forced to survive,
or not, without adequate care. The wisdom of allocating larger portions of
our already insufficient health care resources on the maintenance of ter-
minally ill, or persistently vegetative, patients is not clear.54 1 This element
of the euthanasia debate is generally ignored, and will likely continue to
be so, as a decision based on economic considerations would be seen as
perilously close to the illegitimate considerations of the Nazi Germans.5 42
VII. COMPARATIVE LEGAL ScHEMEs
Perhaps the Netherlands provide the best example of officially ac-
539. Cf. VAN BomMEL, supra note 538, at 118.
540. With some macroeconomic qualifiers, ours is substantially a "zero-sum" society (par-
ticularly with respect to the short- and medium-term allocations); where we allocate resources
(money) on one thing, we have roughly that same amount- less for whatever else we want or
need. See, e.g., ABRAHAM L. GrrLow, ECONOMICS 7-12 (1962).
Further, the demographic aging of our society will eventually force these issues more
into focus; by the year 2040, the elderly will likely constitute twenty-one percent of the popu-
lation and consume forty-five percent of all health care resources. Daniel Callahan, Euthana-
sia Should Be Based on Age, in EuTHANAsw OPPOSING VImWPOIHrS, supra note 31, at 120. But ef.
Roy A. Fox, Euthanasia Should Not Be Based on Age, id. at 126 (supporting medical decisions
based solely on individual cases and rejecting economic considerations as contrary to public
policy). A particularly troubling aspect of this debate is discussed in Robert L. Risky, Volun-
taty Active Euthanasia: The Next Frontier. Impact on the Indigent, 8 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 361
(1992).
An estimated eighty percent of the average American's medical costs are spent in the last
year of life. VAN BoMMErs, supra note 538, at 118.
541. Richard Lamm, who served as governor of Colorado from 1974 to 1986, caused an
uproar when he declared that the elderly had a "duty to die," rather than waste precious
medical resources in the last months of life. See Lamm, supra note 537, at 132. He further
lambastes public policy which favors treatment of the terminally ill while ignoring education,
prenatal care, and our infrastructure. See id. at 133, 137. He asserts that we, as a nation, are
not wealthy enough to base our health care on the assumption that we can provide every-
thing medically possible to everyone who needs it. He thus supports rationing, and points
out that medical rationing already exists. See id. at 134. He also disapproves of the favoritism
bestowed on his (older) generation. See id. at 136; see also Margaret P. Battin, Age Rationing
and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is There a Duty to Die?, 97 ETmcs 317, 319-40 (1987);
Subrata N. Chakravarty & Katherine Weisman, Consuming Our Children?, FoRBES Nov. 14,
1988, at 222, 222-32 (cover story title: Cry Baby: The Intergenerational Transfer of Wealth).
But cf. Dana E. Johnson, Euthanasia Should Not Be Based on Economic Factors, in EuT Astw
OPpOSING Vawpomrrs, supra note 31, at 139 (arguing that the medical relationship should
not be disturbed by economic interference); THOmASMA & GiR"a, supra note 2, at 190-91
(noting the potential danger of "technofix" medical solutions).
Not considered relevant by the drafters of the Life-Sustaining Procedures Declaration,
supra note 317, is the tremendous cost associated with continued vegetative care that often
cannot be covered by family resources. Also, should the family not wish impoverishment, the
ability to abandon the patient poses a difficult problem, if not a cruel dilemma, for the
family.
542. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
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knowledged euthanasia.5 43 Although active euthanasia remains illegal in
the Netherlands, as many as several thousand are still performed annu-
ally.5 44 Dutch opinions have changed dramatically over the past two de-
cades, and a solid majority now favor active euthanasia. 545 The action to
543. See, e.g., Pieter V. Admiraal, Justifiable Euthanasia, 3 Issuzs IN L. & MED. 361 (1988);
Margaret Battin, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Risks of Abuse: Can We Learn Anything from the
Netherlands?, 20 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 133 (1992); Catharina I. Dessaur & Chris J.C.
Rutenfrans, The Present Day Practice of Euthanasia, 3 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 399 (1988); Dana E.
Hirsch, Comment, Euthanasia: Is It Murder or Mercy Killing? A Comparison of the Criminal Laws
in the United States, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, 12 LOY. LA. INT'L & COMe. L.. 821, 835-
38(1990); Henk Jochemsen, Life-Prolonging and Life-Terminating Treatment of Severely Handi-
capped Newborn Babies: A Discussion of the Report of the Royal Dutch Society of Medicine on "Life-
Terminating Actions with Incompetent Patients: Part I, Severely Handicapped Newborns", 8 IssuEs IN
L. & MED. 167 (1992);John Keown, The Law and Practice of Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 108
LAw Q. REv. 51 (1992); M.T. Meulders-Klein, The Right Over One's Own Body: Its Scope and
Limits in Comparative Law, 6 B.C. INr'L & COMP. L REv. 29 (1983);J.H. Segers, Elderly Persons
on the Subject of Euthanasia, 3 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 407 (1988); Helen Silving, Euthanasia: A
Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. Ray. 350 (1954); Peter Zisser, Euthanasia and
the Right to Die: Holland and the United States Face the Dilemma, 9 N.Y.L ScH.J. INT'L & COMP. L
361 (1988).
In February of 1993, "[ t ] he Dutch parliament adopted the most liberal euthanasia guide-
lines in Europe after years of keeping the widely accepted practice in legal limbo." WALL ST.
J., Feb. 10, 1993, at Al. The measuve stopped short of legalization, but guarantees physicians
immunity from prosecution provided they follow strict rules. Euthanasia remains punishable
by up to 12 years in prison, however. Id.
Other societies are slowly, if begrudgingly, becoming exposed to this dilemma. InJapan,
where life expectancies are among the highest anywhere, the high rate of suicide has pushed
euthanasia into the headlines. See Catharine Rosair, Long-Living Japanese Debate Right to Die
with Dignity, HONOLULU ST.R-Buu-mN, Nov. 4, 1992, at A-28. The circumstances surround-
ing Emperor Hirohito's death, in which he received more than ten times his blood capacity
in transfusions after being diagnosed with pancreatic cancer, brought euthanasia issues to
the forefront. His weight dwindled to a mere 66 pounds. During his agonizing illness,
neither he nor the Japanese people were told the truth about his condition. Id.
For discussions of legal policy in Canada, see Daryl-Lynn Carlson, Euthanasia: The Contro-
versy of Mercy, 16 CAN. LAw. 26 (Dec.-Jan. 1992-93); Fran Carnerie, Euthanasia and Self-Deter-
minism: Is There a Charter Right in Canada?, 32 McGiuL L.J. 299 (1987). For a discussion of
euthanasia policy in England, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Right to Die, 141 Nv LJ. 1637
(1991).
For an interesting corollary in a non-Western social context, see Isam Ghanem, The Re-
sponse of lslamic Jurisprudence to Ectopic Pregnancies, Frozen Embryo Implantation, and Euthanasia,
27 MED., ScL. & L 187 (1987).
544. See Pieter V. Admiraal, Justifiable Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in EurHANAsrA
THE MORAL IssuEs, supra note 31, at 125; Marlise Simons, Dutch Survey Sheds Light on Euthana-
sia, Suicide AUsTIN AMERiCAN-STATESMtAN, Sept. 22, 1991, at C2. Every doctor who performs
active euthanasia is technically liable to prosecution, but so long as certain clearly circum-
scribed guidelines are followed, prosecutions have not been pursued. See Admiraal, supra.
Under these guidelines, (1) the patient must have been informed of his situation, (2) he
must have requested euthanasia freely and after careful consideration, (3) the doctor must
believe that death is justified and no alternatives are available, (4) an independent physician
must have been consulted, and (5) a report must be filed. After the death, the case must be
reported to the coroner, and the police must investigate and report to the prosecutor, who,
in consultation with the Attorney General, will decide whether to prosecute. Id. at 125-26.
On December 11, 1987, a bill was introduced, after considerable debate, into the Dutch
legislature to legalize active euthanasia. See HJJ. Leenen; Euthanasia in the Netherlands, in
MEDicINE, MEDICAL ETmcS AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 1 (Peter Byrne ed., 1990).
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end life must be voluntary, thus excluding incompetent persons.5 46 Many
opposed to active euthanasia in the United States accuse the medical pro-
fession of atrocities in the Netherlands, 547 although no independent evi-
dence has verified this.
548
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Euthanasia is controversial because it can be viewed from either the
eyes of God or the hearts of humans. Alternatively, opponents object from
a position disassociated with individuals who must face euthanasia directly,
while those individuals must go against the accumulated wisdom of their
society to meet life as it meets them. Fundamental moral values are pitted
against the exigencies of suffering patients who demand-and deserve-
relief. Active euthanasia has been practiced sporadically throughout his-
tory, but is contrary to the sanctity of life, a tenet of Christian belief. The
frequency of persons who suffer with no reasonable possibility of recovery
continues to increase, further intensifying the debate.
In addition to violating the sanctity of life, euthanasia can be seen as
the first step down a road of self-destructive barbarism. Moreover, the
medical community, and patients themselves, are apprehensive about tak-
ing their own life before Death does. On the other side of the debate is
essentially one argument with two dimensions: we must allow euthanasia
because we must not allow needless suffering. Beyond that-even ac-
cepting the arguments of euthanasia opponents-to continue as we do
now is to ignore reality and insist on forcing euthanasia underground,
where no legal safeguards are available. The answer, if one exists, will
deny one side its fundamental beliefs.
Euthanasia can be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary eutha-
nasia is the least problematic ethically, since the person suffering can jus-
tify his decision intelligently. Involuntary euthanasia has not been further
categorized, but should be. It can be either beneficent or malevolent. Be-
neficent involuntary euthanasia is accomplished on behalf, and in the best
interests, of an incapacitated person, and is currently the topic of much
legal action, as Cruzan illustrated.5 49 Provided adequate legal safeguards
Id.; see also VAN BOMMEL, supra note 538, at 124.
546. Unless they have expressly so provided previously. See Leenen, supra note 544, at 3.
547. The International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force is particularly critical:
Eight Dutch hospitals are performing involuntary euthanasia. Families of pa-
tients who will die by euthanasia need not be consulted.
Some Dutch doctors have been advised to kill their elderly patients rather than
admit them to hospitals, and elderly people report they fear being "assisted to die"
because they are burdensome to others.
And the Royal Dutch Medical Association has endorsed euthanasia for children
without parental consent.
Mary Senander, Medical Murder Is Given a Forum, MrmmAoLrs STAi Tam, June 8, 1989, at
27A.
548. We can reasonably assume that atrocities d la Nazi Germany would be well reported.
549. In the process of molding a new common law, many have suffered beyond their
already pitiful situations, yet that remains the price of our system ofjustice. See, e.g., supra
part ILC.
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are in place, the use of Durable Powers of Attorney or Living Wills in an
evidentiary capacity militates against extended litigation, while absence of
evidence of the incapacitated person's intent forms the core of the current
legal debate. Malevolent involuntary euthanasia, as occurred in Nazi Ger-
many, is not euthanasia at all-it is murder. In any event, it is neither
espoused nor seriously considered as appropriate public policy.
Euthanasia can be either active or passive. Active euthanasia involves
some positive action causing death and is thus equated with murder. Pas-
sive euthanasia is increasingly a poorly defined area extending from sim-
ple withholding to active withdrawal of medical treatment, including food
and water, until death occurs. The effort to distinguish these forms cre-
ates a false dichotomy given current medical technology, because active
and passive are no longer distinct categories. Rather, they form a spec-
trum of possibilities that blend into each other. This makes many argu-
ments against active euthanasia less persuasive when presented with the
medical realities of (barely) live patients.
Assuming we, as a society, recognize situations where euthanasia is
acceptable, then our current attitudes toward death and its ways are worse
than dilemmic; they are hypocritical. Passive euthanasia can be not only
worse than active euthanasia, it is often barbaric. The process of starvation
cannot reasonably be said to be preferable to death itself; there is no logi-
cal answer to the question of how starving a comatose person is better than
a lethal narcotic injection. Denying positive relief, while condoning the
systematic, if hidden, near-torture of those near-in time or physiology-
death is the height of ethical hypocrisy. Hippocrates may indeed have
opposed the Greek tradition of suicide, but he could not have imagined
the advances medical technology would provide. Such advances have
proved a double-edged sword, however. All the physicians we can produce
cannot change this reality. In prolonging life, medicine sometimes pro-
longs suffering. There is no escape from the horns of this dilemma-as
with war, it will be with us for a very long time indeed. The medical com-
munity is singularly unable to cope with this dilemma, and needs guidance
from the law, which must in turn honestly appraise the issues involved.
We insist more fervently on humane treatment for animals than for
those who are dying and need all the compassion we can find in ourselves
to give them.550 Sometimes that means, in the real world, doing that
which we don't want to do, but must. What is wrong is not that we must
aid in their deaths, but the tragedy-of whatever making-that they must
die so ignominiously.
We as a species are probably not yet mature enough to deal with the
explosive issues surrounding euthanasia, yet we have little choice. Not
dealing with the issues directly has brought unnecessary misery into the
lives of many. Society too must learn better to deal with death. Death is
certainly not ajoyful occasion, but it needn't be so maudlin. In our efforts
550. Humane is not insignificantly derived from Latin humanus, or human. See VII Ox-
FoRD ENGLISH DiCTIONARY 473-74 (2d ed. 1989).
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to outmaneuver Death, we have stopped accepting it when it calls and
have often been our own worst enemy in denying it its due. Death is not
always the enemy to be feared and fought to the last.
Mechanisms for killing are, to put it mildly, problematic. Opponents
of active euthanasia are rightly concerned about the potential for social
disaster. We can either proscribe all active euthanasia, with the resultant
misery, or confront the problem and provide for adequate, even obsessive,
legal safeguards. The common slippery slope objection is specious. Life is
a slippery slope. So too, now, is Death. We have no choice but to deal
with these issues in a reasoned, balanced way. We must stop fighting
against the slope and instead define acceptable and unacceptable policies.
To attempt to define precisely the distinctions of euthanasia is to dichoto-
mize falsely what are in reality categories that blend into each other. At
some point passive is no longer so passive, and guidelines to ensure the
patient's rights are needed to ensure civilization's continued presence.
This is not to suggest that judicial standards should be loose-quite the
opposite. But the courts must acknowledge the reality of the diverse cir-
cumstances possible in this arena, and, with polished safeguards in their
sheaths, do justice.55 1 Legal safeguards are particularly important when
concerning incapacitated patients, but, as Cruzan has shown, our legal sys-
tem is capable of handling such delicate issues. That is, after all, its
function.
To accept the religious perspective is to wholly accept the assump-
tions underlying the beliefs of some, but not all, which is as directly op-
posed to the Constitution and our special social leniencies as is likely to be
found. The law cannot accept on faith-to assume that which cannot be
proved-a basic assumption of religious belief. With most issues, religious
beliefs do form a common background for public policy, but with eutha-
nasia, the answer is binary. We must accept either all or nothing-there is
no middle ground to the sanctity of human life. Yet reality indicates
otherwise. So long as some are forced to live, and suffer through, that
reality, it is arrogant, at least, for some to insist on the meaning of life to
those already half in hell.
Society cannot avoid the complex controversies surrounding euthana-
sia and must at least attempt to provide for adequate guidelines and legal
safeguards for those who tragically must face such a decision. Passive eu-
thanasia is rarely painless. Active euthanasia is not only painless, but if
properly administered it should be a positive experience. Drugs that pro-
duce pleasurable sensations given before a fatal injection, coupled with a
dignified ceremony, are far preferable to an ignominious starvation as an
end to life. This is not maniacal; the horror of suffering exists-it is for
society to be honorable in aiding those who would otherwise needlessly
suffer by providing a legally safeguarded exit.
551. Notwithstanding Justice Holmes' admonition that ajudge's duty is to apply the law,
and not to "dojustice." IRvwNG DU.LARD, THE SPRTrr oF LIBERTY 306-07 (3d ed. 1960) (quoting
Judge Learned Hand), repinted in EUGENE C. GERHART, QuoTE IT! MEMORABLE LEGAL Quo-
TATIONS 314 (1969).
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A right to privacy-possibly the ultimate refuge for a right to die-is
more legitimately based in a person's property interest in his own being.
This redefinition does not resolve the debate surrounding euthanasia. It
does, however, frame it differently, placing the burden more squarely on
society to show cause for interrupting a person's actions to end his own
life. Such a showing is not onerous where the individual's demands are
unsubstantiated. Reliance on a constitutional right to privacy is worri-
some, however, because it defies what the law craves-ready definition and
concrete rules.55 2 Recognizing this more intellectually honest basis for a
right to privacy changes the relative positions of the interested parties in
the euthanasia debate. Proceeding from the assumption of personal au-
tonomy, the question for the government is under what circumstances an
individual's right to determine the nature and time of his death can be
overridden by state and societal interests. This does not provide an easy
answer to the euthanasia dilemma-that would be neither possible nor
desirable. Rather, the debate is placed in a more appropriate context.
The legal system must bear the burden in balancing the "right" of the
individual to a peaceful death with the government's duty to ensure that
that individual's death is indeed peaceful. The burden should not rest on
the individual; government must show cause for invading a property inter-
est in a person's reasoned desire for death.
The criminal law must come to terms with the issues surrounding eu-
thanasia. Three means of distinguishing active euthanasia from murder
are available: the humanitarian motives of the person who kills, the cir-
cumstances and motives of the person who dies, and the circumstances
surrounding the death. In so distinguishing, two badly needed functions
are served. First, safeguards against abuse are available to all parties in-
volved. Second, criminal sanctions against actions not in keeping with the
benefit of the suffering individual are legitimized. The criminal justice
system, however, is not solely to blame; the criminal law is merely a reflec-
tion of societal values.
Society as well must face the issue and develop consistent rules.
Where the person is legally competent and suffers from a terminal illness
with no reasonable expectation of recovery or remission, euthanasia must
be voluntary-evidenced by persistent, conscious, and free requests.
Where the person is a minor, the parent's wishes must be balanced by the
medical profession and the courts against any possible abuse. Where the
adult person is incapacitated and has not completed a societally en-
couraged document stating his wishes, the family members should be
given limited discretion, again under court supervision, to authorize active
euthanasia. Any reports of abuse must be investigated thoroughly, and, if
substantiated, punishment to the full extent the law allows must be meted.
552. This illustrates the difficulty in defining too closely an issue-privacy-so basic we
assume its general authenticity. Attempts to make discrete that which is inherently vague
inevitably result in poor articulation of created fictions, which then run the risk of eventual
exposure as the superstructure of stare decisis overwhelms the fluid foundation. It is far
better to recognize a public policy as existing broadly while resisting efforts to define it pre-
cisely, insisting instead on flexible, equitable decisions with structural safeguards.
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With authorized means available, no excuse would exist for unsupervised
or inappropriate euthanasia. Regardless of the course the courts or soci-
ety takes, euthanasia will remain a controversial issue. We must recognize
this and accept the need for balancing the contradictory interests, and get
on with our deaths.
The debate should not center around a "right to life"; does anyone
question that? Rather, it involves a right to non-life; a right, legitimately
circumscribed, to abstain from that which is needlessly painful. As Ham-
let's soliloquy attests, the debate is intensely personal. Yet we cannot deny
to those who are suffering beyond our comprehension the alternative of a
gentle and easy death.
I've never heard of anyone dying from laughing. Wouldn't that be
nice?
5 53
553. DAD (Universal 1990) (spoken by Jake Tremont (actor Jack Lemmon) to his wife,




PRESIDENT CLINTON'S COVENANT AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS
CARL TOBIAS*
President Bill Clinton has eloquently invoked the concept of a new
covenant with the American people. Claiming that the populace elected
him with a mandate for change, the President has appointed individuals to
high-level positions, particularly in the Cabinet, who have made the new
government look like America. In no branch of the federal government
are these ideas more apposite than the Third Branch.
The Republican administrations of President Ronald Reagan and
President George Bush compiled dismal records of federal judicial selec-
tion over the last dozen years. President Reagan appointed a minuscule
seven African-American lawyers out of the 368 federaljudges (1.9 percent)
whom he named in his two terms.1 President Bush appointed only eleven
African-American attorneys out of the 194 judges (5.7 percent) whom he
placed on the bench.2 The number of African-Americans on the courts
actually decreased during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. 3 The
records of the Republican presidents contrast markedly with the record of
Democratic President Jimmy Carter. The Carter Administration ap-
pointed thirty-seven African-American lawyers out of 258 judicial appoint-
ments (14.3 percent) . Indeed, President Carter named more African-
Americans in his four-year tenure than did Republican Presidents Nixon,
Ford, Reagan and Bush, who selected only twenty-seven African-Americans
over their two decades in office. 5
These statistics are even more striking in light of one salient fact.
President Reagan and President Bush had substantially larger, and consid-
erably more experienced, pools of African-American attorneys from whom
to appointjudges than did President Carter.6 Since the time of the Carter
Administration, many more African-Americans have graduated from law
school and engaged in rigorous legal practices which have prepared them
to be excellent federal judges. For example, numerous African-American
attorneys have actively participated in high-impact voting rights litigation
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer for processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous,
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
1. See Sheldon Goldman, Reagan'sJudicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up,
72J imcA'uE 318, 321, 325 (1989).
2. See The Federal Courts at a Crossroads, ANNuAL REPoRT 1992 (Alliance forJustice/Judi-
cial Selection Project, Wash., D.C.) 1992, at 4.
3. Id.
4. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 322, 325. Accord The Federal Courts at a Crossroads, supra
note 2, at 4.
5. See The Federal Courts at a Crossroads, supra note 2, at 4.
6. See id. at 3.
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as counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,7 have earned partnerships
in large law firms,8 and have been writing much cutting-edge scholarship
in law schools.9 The National Bar Association estimates that there are now
nearly 30,000 African-American practitioners in the United States.10
Equally troubling is the dearth of other minorities who sit on the fed-
eral bench. There is only one Native American federal judge in the entire
nation." President Bush appointed a lone Asian-American to the courts,
and that individual is a Pacific Islander named to ajudgeship in Guam.
12
The Bush Administration correspondingly placed fewer Latinos on the
federal courts than either President Reagan or President Carter.' 3 More-
over, the number of Latinos and Asian-Americans on the bench increased
only slightly during the dozen years in which the Republicans controlled
the White House. 14 It is also important to remember that the total
number of African-American, Latino and Asian-American lawyers in-
creased from 23,000 in 1980 to 51,000 in 1989.15
There are several significant reasons why the Republican administra-
tions should have appointed more minorities to the federal judiciary and
why President Clinton must promptly increase the number of minority
federal judges. One of the most important reasons is the substantial,
highly-qualified pool, of minority attorneys which now exists. Moreover, it
is critical to have the diverse perspectives, especially from personal life ex-
periences, that many minorities bring to judicial service. For example, nu-
merous minorityjudges heighten the sensitivity of the federal courts to the
increasingly complex issues of public policy, such as allocation of scarce
resources and affirmative action, which federal judges must resolve.
16
Most minority judges can more easily appreciate certain difficulties, such
as finding jobs and balancing employment and familial responsibilities,
7. See, e.g., Margaret Cronin Fisk, Profiles In Power: The 100 Most Influential La-yers In
America, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1991, at S2, S4.
8. See Claudia MacLachlan & Rita HenleyJensen, Progress Glacial for Women, Minorities,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1992, at 1, 31-32 (statistical survey demonstrating increase in African-
American partners in law firms during period 1981-91).
9. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Minority Law Professors' Lives: The Bell-Delgado Survey, 24
HIARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 349 (1989); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Emerging Voices In the Academic State: A
Bibliographic Survey of Select Writings By Minority Members of the AALS Section on Minority Groups,
1978-1988, 33 How. L.J. 339 (1990).
10. Telephone Interview with Maurice Foster, Director of Special Projects, National Bar
Association (Nov. 4, 1993).
11. SeeAnnual Report oftheJudicial Equal Employment Opportunity Program Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts for the Twelve Month Period Ending September 30,
1992; Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal Courts, 66
N.Y.U. LAw REv. 1682, 1704 n.83 (1991).
12. See The Federal Courts at a Crossroads, supra note 2, at 3.
13. Id. at 3-4. President Bush named nine Latinos, but President Reagan appointed thir-
teen Latinos and President Carter named sixteen Latinos. Id. at 4.
14. See id. at 4-5.
15. Id. at 3.
16. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for theJudiciary? 62 JuDI-
cA-ruR 488, 494 (1979); Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising it Higher?: Affirmative




which many minorities face. 17 Some evidence concomitantly suggests that
numerous members of the American public have greater confidence in a
federaljudiciary that more closely reflects the racial composition of Ameri-
can society.
18
President Clinton has a valuable opportunity to make the courts re-
semble America, because there presently are approximately 125 vacant
judgeships and he probably will make 300 appointments in the next four
years. Numerous measures would enable the Clinton Administration to
increase the numbers and percentages of minorities on the bench. Presi-
dent Clinton and those officials responsible for judicial selection should
clearly state that the appointment of more minority attorneys is an impor-
tant priority of the new administration. The individuals who recruit
judges should diligently search for, find, and promote the candidacies of
well-qualified minority lawyers.
President Clinton must strongly encourage senators to forward the
names of very competent minority attorneys, while administration officials
should work closely with the senators in proposing potential nominees.
Judicial recruiters must also confer with other traditional sources, such as
state and local bar associations. The administration officials should make
special efforts to contact less traditional sources, such as minority political
organizations and women's groups. These entities are more likely to know
many minority lawyers who would be excellent federal judges but who
have engaged in less traditional legal practices.
President Clinton should institute the suggestions above. If his ad-
ministration undertakes a concerted effort to recruit minority attorneys, it
can appoint excellent judges, make the courts look like the United States,
and keep the President's covenant With the American people.
17. See, e.g., Marion Zenn Goldberg, Carter-Appointed Judges: Perspectives on Gender, 26
TRLAl, Apr. 1990, at 108; Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive la Difference?, 73
JuDIcATURE 204, 204 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter'sJudicial Nominees, 62 JunicATuRE 246,
253 (1978). Cf Clinton v. Bush, The Candidates on Legal lssues, 78 A.BA.J., Oct. 1992, at 57-58
(analogous suggestion of Candidate Clinton).
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CLEAN Up YouR FEDERAL MESS IN MY STATE:
COLORADO HAS A STATE RCRA-VoiCE AT THE
RocKy MouNTAIN ARSENAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The horror of the environmental cleanup nightmares scattered
throughout the federal facilities of the United States is overwhelming.
The U.S. Department of Defense ("DOD"), has over ninety-four
Superfund sites and over 17,000 contaminated sites nationwide. Sixty-
three percent of these federal facilities are classified as Class I RCRA viola-
tions,' contrasted with only thirty-eight percent of private facilities with
similar violations. 2 As of 1988, only 30 of nearly 1100 federal facilities
listed on the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket3 had been cleaned
up.4 The worst DOD pollution is found on nearly twenty munitions pro-
duction and testing sites.5 If the federal government is the facility owner
or operator, why should the government not be required to comply with
the same regulations as any non-government owner or operator?6
This Comment investigates the RCRA-CERCLA tension through the
continuing struggle between Colorado and the U.S. Department of the
Army ("Army"), over the cleanup of Basin F at the Rocky Mountain Arse-
nal; ("RMA"). The recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
United States v. Colorado7 yields precedent for the Tenth Circuit and a vic-
tory for Colorado and the twenty-one states who filed an amicus brief in
support of Colorado.
8
1. A Class I RCRA violation is defined as:
a violation that results in a release or serious threat of release of hazardous waste to
the environment, or involves the failure to assure that ground water will be pro-
tected, that proper closure and post-closure activities will be undertaken, or that
hazardous wastes will be destined for and delivered to permitted or interim status
facilities.
S. REP. No. 553, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990). See RCRA § 3053, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988)
(granting courts authority to equitably eliminate risks posed by toxic wastes).
.2. S. REP. No. 553, supra note 1, at 4. See also 138 CONG. REc. S14,755 (daily ed. Sept.
22, 1992) (comments of Sen. Baucus).
3. The Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket lists all federal facilities
"that handle or store hazardous wastes or that contain actual contamination problems."
CONG. BuDcE OFnCF, FEDERAL LtAIrLrrrEs UNDER HAzARuous WASTE LAws, S. Doc. No. 95,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1990), [hereinafter FEDERAL. LABiLrEs], cited in J.B. Wolverton,
Note, Sovereign Immunity and National Priorities: EnforcingFederal Facilities' Compliance With Envi-
ronmental Statutes, 15 H.Av. ENvrt. L REv. 565, 565 n.1 (1991).
4. FEDERAL .aarLrrizs supra note 3, at 19.
5. Id. at 28.
6. Joseph M. Willging, Why EPA's Current Policies on Potential CERCLA-RCRA Authority
Conflicts May be Wrong, 1 FED. FAcrnEs ENVTL. J. 69, 83 (1990).
7. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
8. See Amicus Brief of the States of Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming, United States
v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 91-1360) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
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The environmental statutes and regulations at issue plus the numer-
ous lower court actions preceding the instant decision present a complex
case. This Comment navigates through the dominant issues the court ad-
dressed and presents the thorny peculiarities inherent to the federal facil-
ity environmental compliance arena. Part II introduces the
environmental statutes and details the history of the struggle between Col-
orado and the United States over Basin F. Part III outlines the regulatory
methods available at the federal and state level to a state (delegated with
RCRA authority) wishing to participate in a federal facility remediation.
Part IV provides the court's disposition of the issues in the instant case
while Part V analyzes the court's reasoning concluding with a look to the
future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Environmental Statutes
Congress recognized the magnitude of the hazardous waste problem
and drafted legislation to act in addition to, and in conjunction with, ex-
isting laws.9 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, ("CERCLA"),1° is a federal environmental statute
which focuses on the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites. CERCLA
contains a specific section for federal facilities.
11
Under existing environmental legislation, Congress expected the
states to assume the burden of implementing the national air, water and
hazardous waste programs.' 2 Congress also provided a waiver of sovereign
immunity in each of the major federal environmental statutes with respect
to the activity of federal facilities.' 3 The Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act ("RCRA"), 14 regulating active hazardous waste activities, is
based on the delegation of authority to the states. Congress acknowledged
the duty of the states to protect their own territories and that the states are
in the best position to oversee environmental compliance. 15 Because
RCRA provides for the delegation of primary regulatory authority to the
states, it is utilized most to enforce cleanups of polluted federal facilities.
1 6
9. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-20.
10. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Star. 2767, amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act, (SARA), Pub. L No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
11. CERCLA § 9620 (requiring that each department, agency and instrumentality of the
United States comply with CERCLA).
12. See Clean Air Act (CAA), § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Clean
Water Act (CWA), § 101 (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA), § 1003(a)(1), (7), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1), (7), (1988).
13. See CAA § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1988); CWA § 113,33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988); RCRA
§ 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988); CERCLA § 120, 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1988).
14. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Pub. L No. 94-580, 90 Star. 2795,
amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L. No. 98-
616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988)).
15. Wolverton, supra note 3, at 598.
16. Id. at 581.
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RCRA authorization requires states to adopt standards equivalent to fed-
eral requirements. 17 As of February 1988, forty-four states, the District of
Columbia and Guam were administering all or part of the RCRA program
pursuant to EPA-delegated RCRA authority.'8
B. The Rocky Mountain Arsenal
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal ("RMA"), "possibly the most contami-
nated site on Earth",' 9 covers more than twenty-seven square miles in Ad-
ams County, northeast of Denver. The land holds a collection of chemical
warfare agents, incendiary munitions and other hazardous substances
dumped by the military and private industry since 1942.20 In 1956 the
Army constructed Basin F in response to complaints from farmers that
their crops and livestock were being damaged from Arsenal-contaminated
well water.21 Basin F is a ninety-three acre asphalt lined impoundment
once containing "deadly aquamarine sludge,"22 built'to store and dispose
of contaminated liquid wastes. generated by the chemical manufacturing
and processing activities of the Army and Shell.23 Basin F began receiving
contaminated liquid waste in October, 1956.24 After reports of human
illness, unexplained sickness among livestock and extensive crop damage,
the well waters from farms near the RMA were examined in 1959.25 Nu-
merous chlorides, acids and arsenic had travelled the three miles from the
arsenal holding ponds to the nearest farm. 26 Reports from the 1960's in-
17. RCRA § 3006(b),(c), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b),(c), (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 271
(1992)) (authorizing states to carry out their own hazardous waste programs in lieu of the
Federal RCRA program).
18. John C. Chambers & Peter L Gray, EPA and State Roles in RCRA and CERCLA, 4 NAT.
REsouRCEs & THE ENV'T., Summer 1989, at 7, 7-8.
19. Tamara Jones, Record $1-Bilion Cleanup OK'dfor Colorado Arsenal LA. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1988, at 1. A risk assessment undertaken by Colorado indicated that if humans were exposed
to the RMA toxic contaminants, cancer deaths could increase by one person out of every 100.
Id.
20.
The RMA property was purchased by the U.S. government in 1942 for use in
World War II to manufacture and assemble chemical warfare materials, such as mus-
tard and lewisite, and incendiary munitions. Beginning in the 1950's, the RMA pro-
duced the nerve agent GB (isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate) until late 1969.
A significant amount of chemical warfare materials destruction occurred during the
1950's and 1960's. Since 1970, RMA has mostly dealt with the destruction of chemi-
cal warfare materials. The last military operations ended in the early 1980's. In
November 1988, the RMA was reduced to inactive military status reflecting the fact
that the only remaining mission at the arsenal is contamination cleanup.
U.S. Environmental Protection Admin., History of the Complex Disposal Trenches, Record
of Decision, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, EPA-ID CD5210020769, May 3, 1990.
21. Vicky L. Peters, Laura E. Perrault & Susan Mackay Smith, Can States Enforce RCRA at
Superfund Sites? TheRockyMountainArsenalDecision, 23 Eivrx. L. REP. (ENvT. L. INsT.) 10419
(1993) [hereinafter RMA Decision].
22. SETH SHUL.MAN, THE THREAT AT HoME: CorRoNmNG THE Toxic LEGACy OF THE
U.S. MnmrrARv xiii (1992).
23. See Carolyn L Buchholz, Can a Jurisdictional Showdown Under Superfund Be Avoided?,
19 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENvrL L. INST.) 10327, 10328 (1989).
24. Id.
25. RAcHEL CARSON, SuLENT SPRING 43 (1962).
26. Id. Scientists could not suggest a method to contain or control the contamination.
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dicate that Basin F's liner was damaged and leaking. 27 The Army halted
deep well injection of liquid waste after this method caused earthquakes in
the metropolitan Denver area.28 Toxic chemicals have leached out of
dumpsites on the facility, contaminating groundwater and killing crops.
29
Basin F is so dangerous that the Army has fenced the area and fires gas
guns to scare wildlife away.3 0 Now the RMA contains 10.5 million gallons
of supersaturated liquid waiting to be treated.3 ' Since 1988 the toxins re-
main stored in three tanks and a covered surface pond, slowly precipitat-
ing excess salts and depositing solid-phase waste.3 2 Massive quantities of
contaminated soil identified by dieldrin, (a Shell manufactured pesticide),
have been found in the area near Basin F from deposits of windblown
spills and evaporated disposal basins.33 Until June 1991, the quantity and
chemical or physical composition of the Basin F liquid remained a mys-
tery.3 4 The murk is so deadly that two technicians assigned to collect sam-
ples were forced to wear double space suits and breathe air from scuba
tanks while meticulously working from a floating steel platform.33
1. The Beginnings of Environmental Compliance
In November 1980, the Army as RMA operator, submitted Part A of its
RCRA permit3 6 to the EPA listing Basin F as a hazardous waste surface
impoundment.3 7 The Army continued to operate the RMA as a hazardous
waste treatment, storage and disposal facility during the permit applica-
27. RMA Decision, supra note 21 at 10419.
28. Id.
29. Rockies Menace: Toxic Waste at an Arsenal, TnME, Dec. 27, 1982, at 70, cited in David W.
Goewey, Note, Assuring Federal Facility Compliance With The RCRA and OtherEnvironmental Stat-
utes: An Administrative Proposal, 28 WM. & MARv L. Ray. 513, 517 (1987).
30. Jones, supra note 19 at 1. Canadian birds flying south over the arsenal may be
tempted to land at Basin F, but the liquid brew would penetrate the birds' feathers and there
would be no escape. Id. According to Connelly Mears, (EPA co-ordinator for Basin F during
1987), "a duck that lands on Basin F does not fly away." Stephen Labaton, Business and the
Law; Big Courtroom for Toxic Web, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 16, 1987, at D2. Army and Shell Oil officials
confirmed that the Basin F cleanup efforts created harsh odors and that the air quality mea-
surements forced evacuation of workers during November 1987. T.R. Reid, Coloradans Ask:
Is Toxis-Waste Cleanup Dangerous to Our Health?, WASH. Posr, Dec. 24, 1988, at A5.
31. JoAnn Tischler & Ed Berry, Field Studies of Aqueous Wastes at the Rocky Mountain Arse-
nal, 3 FED. FAcIu-rIEs ENVT. J. 209 (1992).
32. Id.
33. RMA Decision, supra note 21, at 10419-20. The extent of the actual contamination
and danger is still a mystery even though the federal government has spent more than $100
million over nine years to investigate the remediation of Basin F. Id.
34. Tischler & Berry, supra note 31, at 209.
35. Id. at 214.
36. To obtain a RCRA permit, the Part A application requires general information re-
garding the facility, the operator, the hazardous waste and the process for transport, storage,
and disposal. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.13 (1992). A Part B RCRA permit application requires
more specific information including a specific closure plan. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.14 (1992).
37. As a hazardous waste surface impoundment Basin F is subject to specific RCRA regu-
lations. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.220-.230 (1992) (providing interim status standards for surface
impoundments). HSWA requires that the facility cannot receive, store or treat hazardous
waste after November 8, 1988 unless the facility is in compliance with the specific minimum
technological requirements of RCRA § 3004(o) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (1) (A) (1988).
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tion time under a RCRA "interim status."38 In May 1983, the Army submit-
ted Part B of the RCRA permit application to the EPA with a required
closure plan for Basin F followed by a revised closure plan for Basin F in
June 1983.39
2. EPA Actions
In May 1984, the EPA notified the Army of a deficiency regarding Part
B of the RCRA permit application and requested a revised Part B applica-
tion within sixty days subject to termination of the Army's interim status.4°
The Army never complied. In October 1984, the Army commenced a
CERCLA remedial investigation/feasibility study ("RI/FS").
4 1
3. Colorado Is Delegated RCRA Authorization
On November 2, 1984, the EPA authorized Colorado to administer its
own Hazardous Waste Management Program pursuant to the Colorado
Hazardous Waste Management Act ("CHWMA7)
4 2 "in lieu of RCRA."4 3
Consequently, in November 1984 the Army submitted the Part B permit
application originally submitted to the EPA in June 1983, to the Colorado
Department of Health ("CDH"), seeking a Part B RCRA/CHWMA per-
mit. 4 CDH found the application inadequate, particularly the Basin F
closure scheme.4 5 In May 1986 CDH issued its own draft partial closure
plan for Basin F to the Army followed in October 1986 by a final RCRA/
CHWMA modified closure plan for Basin F.
4 6
4. Colorado Against the Army
After the Army challenged CDH jurisdictional authority and indi-
cated no intention of implementing the CDH Basin F closure plan, Colo-
rado filed suit in November 1986, seeking injunctive relief to stop the
Army's violations of CHWMA and to enforce CDH's closure plan for Basin
F.4 7 The Army removed the action to Federal district court and moved to
dismiss the Colorado CHWMA enforcement action claiming that "CER-
CLA's enforcement and response provisions pre-empt and preclude a state
38. RCRA § 3005(e) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(1) (1988) (granting interim status to a fa-
cility owner or operator until the final administrative disposition of the RCRA application).
39. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
40. Id.
41. Id. A RI/FS is the first step in a CERCIA remedial action in order to "assess site
conditions and evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a remedy." 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.430(a) (2) (1992).
42. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-15-301 to -316 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
43. RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988) (providing states with the authority to
implement and enforce RCRA through state hazardous waste programs). See United States v.
Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993); Final Authorization of State Hazardous
Waste Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 41,036 (1984).
44. CDH is delegated with administration and enforcement authority of CHWMA pursu-
ant to CoLo. REv. STAT. § 25-15-301 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
45. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
46. Id. at 1571-72.
47. Id. at 1572.
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RCRA enforcement action with respect to cleanup of hazardous waste at
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal."
48
Other court actions concerning RMA and Shell Oil were ongoing.
49
InJune 1987, the EPA, the Army, Shell Chemical Company and Colorado
agreed on a Basin F interim response action whereby the Army was re-
quired to remove hazardous wastes to temporary holding areas pending a
final cleanup agreement.5 0 In August 1987, the Army requested Colorado
to identify potential applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements
("ARAR's") 5 1 for the Basin F interim response action, and in October
1987, the Army solicited comment on its plan. 52 Colorado did not comply
with either Army request.
5 3
On February 24, 1989, the district court issued the decision in Colo-
rado v. Army54 holding that the Colorado enforcement of CHWMA is "not
precluded by CERCLA in circumstances here presented."55 The court re-
lied on CERCLA § 120(a) (4)56 noting that state laws concerning removal
and remedial actions shall apply to federal facilities "when such facilities
are not included on the National Priorities List."
5 7
5. The Army Fights Back
On March 13, 1989, the EPA expanded the RMA listing on the Na-
tional Priority List ("NPL") to include Basin F.58 Directly following, the
Army moved for relief from, or reconsideration of the district court's Feb-
ruary 24, 1989, decision since Basin F was listed on the NPL.5 9
6. Colorado Presses On
On September 1, 1989, Colorado issued a Final Amended Compli-
ance Order ("FACO") ,60 which directed cleanup methods for each unit
48. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1565 (D. Colo.
1989).
49. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
50. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993).
51. Id. See CERCLA § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988). Remedial actions selected
must comply with ARAR's, the compliance standards set forth in other federal and state
environmental laws which are "legally applicable" to the hazardous substance or are "relevant
and appropriate" under the circumstances. Id.
52. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(f)(1)(E) (1988).
53. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993).
54. 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1570 (D. Colo. 1989).
55. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (4) (1988) (applying state laws to facilities not included on the
National Priorities List).
57. Army, 707 F. Supp. at 1569-70. See FEDERA.L luamrrms, supra note 3, at 17. The
National Priorities List ("NPL"), mandated under CERCIA § 105(a)(8), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a) (8) (1988) identifies sites the EPA believes pose "the greatest risk to human health
and the environment." Id. See also EPA Listing Policies for Federal Facilities, 54 Fed. Reg.
10,520, 10,521 (1989) (placing federal facility sites on the NPL sets priorities and focuses
cleanup on federal sites that present the most serious problems).
58. See 54 Fed. Reg. 10,512 (1989).
59. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1573 (10th Cir. 1993).
60. Id. at 1573.
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containing Basin F hazardous waste, plus stated that the Army was not to
implement any closure plan or work plan without Colorado approval. 6 ' In
response to the FACO, the United States filed a declaratory action 62 seek-
ing an order declaring the FACO "null and void" and enjoining Colorado
and CDH from taking any enforcement action.63
7. United States v. Colorado in District Court
Colorado counterclaimed, and on cross motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court ruled that any attempt by Colorado to enforce its
CHWMA would require the court to review the ongoing CERCLA reme-
dial action at RMA prior to its completion. CERCLA § 9613(h) prohibits
this review. 64
8. United States v. Colorado in the Tenth Circuit
On April 6, 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the United States and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the or-
der prohibiting Colorado and CDH from taking any enforcement action
on the FACO. 65
III. STATE PARTICIPATION AT FEDERAL FACILITIES
A. The Federal Scheme
1. CERCLA
CERCLA provides a number of sections which create a role for the
states at cleanup sites.66 Congress realized the slowness of CERCLA activi-
ties at federal facilities and encouraged the states to utilize state authority
to hasten cleanup.67 Both the Senate and House noted that SARA
strengthened the EPA's authority and preserved state authority.68
Through a series of executive orders the President has delegated his CER-
61. Id.
62. United States v. Colorado, No. 89-C-1646, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13138 (D. Colo.
Aug. 14, 1991).
63. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1573-74 (10th Cir. 1993).
64. United States v. Colorado, No. 89-C-1646, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13138, at *14 (D.
Colo. Aug. 14, 1991). See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988). No Federal court
shall have jurisdiction to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under
§ 9604 (CERCLA response authority). Id.
65. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1584 (10th Cir. 1993).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1988) (giving a state the authority to act independent of
CERCLA state can impose additional liability for release of hazardous substances); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9652(d) (1988) (mandating liability to all persons for releases of hazardous substances); 42
U.S.C. § 9620(i) (1988) (requiring federal government entities to comply with RCRA); 42
U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988) (requiring remedial actions, to meet state ARAR's); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(e) (2) (1988) (allowing states to enforce standards for remedial action); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(f) (1988) (giving state substantial involvement in remedial actions); 42 U.S.C. § 9659
(1988) (providing that states can initiate civil actions against any person for violations).
67. 132 CoNG. REc. 28,437 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Chafee).
68. Id. In adopting SARA in 1986, Congress chose to leave 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a),
9614(d), and 9652(d) as originally promulgated. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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The EPA contends that at most federal facilities it is appropriate to act
comprehensively under CERCLA pursuant to an Interagency Agreement
("LAG"),71 signed by the federal facility, the EPA, and the state (if possi-
ble).72 Any disagreements in the implementation of the JAG are resolved
by the signatory parties under the dispute resolution terms of the IAG.7
3
Following this course the EPA has final authority over selection of any re-
medial action. 74 But even the EPA's remedial selections are subject to
dispute resolution75 and these disputes may ultimately be referred to the
Office of Management and Budget or to the Attorney General.76 If the
EPA should decide that it is not appropriate to authorize a RCRA state
action to continue under CERCLA § 122(e) (6), 77 participation by state
officials in the ARAR's process is specifically provided in CERCLA
§ 120(f).78 Conversely, the EPA may contract with a state and thereby au-
thorize a state to use some or all of the authorities conferred upon the
EPA in CERCLA including site investigation and removal or remedial
action.7
9
a. The Federal Family
The U.S. Department ofJustice ("DOJ"), endorses the unitary execu-
tive theory asserting that Article II of the U.S. Constitution creates a uni-
tary executive branch headed by the President who is solely responsible
for all executive branch activities.80 In this position the Chief Executive
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), (b) (1988) (authorizing the President to act in response to
environmental threats or substantial danger to the public health or welfare).
70. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981), as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,418, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,891 (1983), revoked by and current delegation of authority atExec. Order
No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987).
71. An Interagency agreement (IAG), under CERCLA § 120(e)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(e) (2) (1988) provides for an agreement between the head of the agency concerned
and the Administrator for the expeditious completion of the remedial action at the federal
facility.
72. See 54 Fed. Reg. 10,523 (1989).
73. See id.
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e) (4) (A) (1988) (specifying that if unable to reach agreement
on selection of a remedial action, the lAG shall include the selection of the Administrator).
75. See Exec. Order No. 12088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12146, 44
Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979).
76. See Exec. Order No. 12580, § 10(a), 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987); Exec. Order No.
12146, § 1-4, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,657 (1979).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e) (6) (1988) (no remedial action to be undertaken unless author-
ized by the EPA).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(f) (1988). State officials participate in remedy selection including,
but not limited to, data review and development of action plans. See 54 Fed. Reg. 10,523
(1989).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (1988) (authorizing the EPA to enter contracts with a state to
carry out specific CERCLA activities).
80. See United States House of Representatives Floor Debate on H.R. 1056, the Federal
Facilities Compliance Act of 1989, 135 CONG. REc. H3893, H3906 (daily ed. July 19, 1989)
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"must have an unfettered opportunity to take action in the event of a disa-
greement or disputes within the Executive Branch."8 '
Allowing the judiciary to adjudicate disputes between two executive
agencies (members of the same federal family), would violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine as well as the Constitutional Article III require-
ment for justiciable controversies.8 2 Consequently, at the federal level,
EPA enforcement actions for environmental law violations become ex-
tended negotiations because the DOJ refuses to allow the EPA to issue
compliance orders or seek civil penalties against federal facilities. 88 Dis-
putes between administrative agencies can only be arbitrated by the Presi-
dent.8 4 The Senate and House both discovered that the lack of
aggressiveness in enforcement by the EPA and DQJ actually encouraged
the slow response by federal facilities to CERCLA.8 5 Governors and state
attorneys general have petitioned Congress and the President to hasten
federal facilities cleanup endeavors and deliver more power to the EPA
and the states to enforce the environmental laws at federal sites.8 6 The
EPA is "hamstrung" by the DOJ unitary executive theory.87 The nation's
chief environmental watchdog must sit obediently while environmental
statutes and regulations are ignored at federal facilities.88 The EPA was
reported to have relied on "jawboning at elevated bureaucratic levels" to
enforce RCRA at federal facilities.89
(letter from former Attorney General Griffin Bell to Rep. Richard Ray) [hereinafter Debate],
cited in Sovereign Immunity, supra note 15, at 570.
81. Statements of F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, before the Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 28 (Apr.
28, 1987), cited inJames R. Moore, Enforcement Against Federal Facilities: The Unitary Executive
Theory, 1 FED. FAcrriEs ENvrL. J. 143, 144 n.2 (1990). The dispute between the EPA and
DOJ over whether the EPA can enforce environmental laws at federal facilities is not a new
argument: Justice Department Nixes EPA Plan to Issue Administrative Orders at Federal Facilities,
DhY REP. FOR ExEcuT-s (BNA), May 1, 1987, at Al.
82. See Moore, supra note 81, at 144.
83. Mike Rothmel. Note and Comment, When Will The Federal Government Waive The Sov-
ereign Immunity Defense and Dispose of Its Violations Properly?, 65 Cm.-ITr L. REv. 581, 581-82
(1990). Executive Order 12,580 provides that the EPA can issue administrative orders to
another federal agency only with the concurrence of the DOJ. Moore, supra note 81, at 147.
Executive Order 12,580, § 4(e) specifies that the CERCLA authority to seek "information,
entry, inspection, samples or response action from the Executive Department and agencies
may be exercised only with the concurrence of the Attorney General." Id.
84. See Suits Against Federal Agencies Possible, EPA Deputy Administrator Nominee Tells Senate,
20 ENV'T. R.E. (BNA) 142 (1989).
85. See 132 CoNG. REc. 28,413 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Stafford); 132 CONG. REc. 29,735
(1986) (remarks of Rep. Synar).
86. Environment, Governors, Attorneys General Urge More Enforcement Power for States, EPA,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), February 12, 1990, at A15.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See House Staff Report Hits DOD, DOE for Violations of Environmental Statute, 19 ENV'T.
REP. (BNA) 199 (1988).
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B. The State Scheme
1. ARAR's
The state level of environmental law enforcement at federal facilities
allows state participation in the ARAR's process90 or the use of state RCRA
authority.9 1 CERCLA § 121 (d)9 2 mandates that the selected remedy must
achieve a level of protection at least equivalent to any ARAR standard
under the federal environmental laws or any more stringent state environ-
mental law, including state RCRA programs. 93 If the EPA should decide
to waive an ARAR, the state may obtain review once the remedy is se-
lected.94 Further, if an ARAR is waived, a state may provide additional
funds to ensure the waived standards are enforced.9 5 The EPA has stated
that only substantive requirements may be ARAR's and the' EPA utilizes a
very narrow interpretation of "substantive" so that actual state substantive
requirements may still be waived. 96 The EPA has final discretion.
97
2. EPA-Delegated State RCRA Authority
RCRA § 3006(b) 98 authorizes a state to operate a RCRA hazardous
waste management program "in lieu of" the federal program and states
must modify their programs to meet new EPA regulations. 99 RCRA
§ 6001100 specifically subjects federal facilities to all state requirements
while CERCLA § 120 (i)101 is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity for fed-
eral facilities from RCRA requirements. 10 2 The House explained that
§ 120 (i) ensures the continued authority of the states in selecting remedial
actions and establishing cleanup schedules at federal facilities pursuant to
RCRA. 10 3 Actions taken under state programs have* the same force and
effect as actions ordered by the EPA.10
4
90. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (1988) (requiring that the degree of cleanup must be at least
equivalent to any Federal ARAR standard or any more stringent state standard).
93. Id.
94. CERCLA § 121 (f) (3) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f) (3) (B) (1988) (detailing the method
by which a state may bring a review action).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 51,394, 51,436, 51,443 (1988).
97. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988) (authorizing the establishment of state hazardous waste
programs in lieu of RCRA).
99. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 48,608 (1989).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) (applying federal, state and local laws to federal facilities).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i) (1988) (waiving sovereign immunity for federal facilities from
RCRA enforcement).
102. United States v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 778 F. Supp. 1328, 1331-32
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that CERCLA establishes a clear waiver of federal sovereign immu-
nity from all state hazardous waste laws, procedural and substantive).
103. 132 CONG. Rac. 29,764 (1986) (remarks of Rep. Wyden).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d) (1988).
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IV. INsrANT CASE
A. Prevailing Issues
1. A Challenge To The Remediation
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit unanimous
decision in U.S. v. Colorado,1° 5 in an opinion written by Judge Baldock,
analyzed the prevailing issue of whether a state can enforce its EPA-dele-
gated state RCRA authority to regulate a NPL federal hazardous waste fa-
cility where a CERCLA cleanup is underway. The court decided that an
attempt to enforce state hazardous waste laws is not a "challenge" to the
CERCLA remedial action and thus there is no jurisdictional bar for the
court to review this action or for Colorado to enforce its compliance or-
ders,10 6 contrary to the district court grant of summary judgment.
10 7
2. Basin F on the NPL
The court found that placement on the NPL has no bearing on a
federal facility's obligation to comply with EPA-delegated state hazardous
waste laws under RCRA authority or a state's ability to enforce such
laws.' 0 8 The court asserted that if Congress had intended the placement
of a federal facility on the NPL to exclude states from enforcing their EPA-
delegated RCRA responsibilities, then Congress would have expressly so
indicated.10 9
3. ARAR's As Exclusive State Participation
The court expressed that nothing in CERCLA supports the argument
that Congress intended the ARAR's provision to be the singular method of
state contribution in a hazardous waste cleanup. 1 0 Further, the court
noted that ARAR's only allow a state to ensure compliance with state law at
the completion of a remedial action, yet separate CERCLA provisions ex-
pressly contemplate the application of other state hazardous waste laws,
regardless of whether a CERCLA response is underway."' The court also
reasoned that since RCRA applies during the closure period of a regulated
facility, the ARAR's process cannot be the exclusive means of state partici-
pation in the cleanup of a site subject to both RCRA and CERCLA.
12
4. CERCLA Already Underway
Finally, the court did not afford any deference to the EPA's assertion
that a state is precluded from exercising its EPA-delegated RCRA authority
105. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
106, Id. at 1579.
107. United States v. Colorado, No. 89-,1646, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13138 (D. Colo.
Aug. 14, 1991).
108. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1580 (10th Cir. 1993).
109. Id.
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at a federal facility where a CERCLA response has been initiated.118 The
CERCLA § 122(e) (6) relied on by the EPA in its argument is buried within
a subsection titled "Notice Provisions" in a separate part of the statute ad-
dressing settlements with potentially responsible parties and is contrary to
the plain and sensible meaning of other applicable CERCLA sections.
114
The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
United States and remanded the case back to the district court with in-




The Tenth Circuit supplied a masterful examination of some intricate
details within two very complicated statutes. By rules of statutory construc-
tion, prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are compared and
construed, if possible, to give effect to every provision in both. 116 "When
two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent
a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each
as effective." 117 When considering federal pre-emption of a state regula-
tory law three possibilities exist. First, there must be a clear intent from
Congress to pre-empt the state regulatory programs where the nature of
the regulated matter permits no other conclusion or the Congress has un-
mistakably so ordered. 118 Next, pre-emption may be implicit if the
scheme of the federal law is so pervasive as to make a reasonable inference
that Congress left no room for the states to supplement the law. 1 9 And
pre-emption is apparent when compliance with both federal and state reg-
ulations is impossible or when a state law is an obvious block to the accom-
plishment and objective of Congress.' 2 0 The Tenth Circuit was correct to
rule that CERCLA does not pre-empt Colorado's RCRA authority in the
cleanup of the RMA. As inJones,'2 ' the relationship between the state and
federal laws must be considered as interpreted and applied, not merely as
113. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1583-84 (10th Cir. 1993).
114. Id. CERCLA § 122 (e) (6), 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (e) (6) (1988) (requiring presidential
authorization to undertake remedial action at a site where an RI/FS is underway) is contrary
to CERCLA §§ 114(a), 122, 152(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(a), 9622, 9652(d) (1988) (providing
that states may impose additional requirements with respect to the release of hazardous sub-
stances, that CERCLA does not modify any liability of any person for the release of hazardous
substances and that settlements may be agreed upon).
115. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1584.
116. 2B NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTEAND STATUTORY CONSIRUCTION § 51.02, at 122 (5th
ed. 1992).
117. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
112 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1992) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
118. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). See also Califor-
nia v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (holding that the historic police powers of
the states were not to be superseded by federal acts, subject to the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress).
119. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1991).
120. Id. at 2482.
121. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977).
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written. Section 114(a) of CERCLA, allowing states to impose additional
requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances,
originated in Senate Bill 1480122 and emphasizes the intent of CERCLA to
supplement and not to replace other statutes applicable to CERCLA sites.
The Senate committee report on the 1986 SARA amendments to CERCLA
reaffirmed that CERCLA was not intended to preempt state laws. 123 The
SARA conference report "section ,120" clarifies that CERCLA and RCRA
require federal facilities to comply with all federal, state and local laws
(excepting permits).124
The Tenth Circuit did not stop at rejecting the government's argu-
ment that CERCLA § 113(h) denies jurisdiction to a federal court to re-
view any challenges to a remediation. 12 5 The court suggested that
Colorado could still enforce a RCRA compliance order through a state
court.
1 2 6
The Appeals Court shrewdly rejected the federal government's inter-
pretation of CERCLA and thereby averted the creation of a gaping CER-
CLA loophole. Endorsement of the federal government's argument
would have also exempted private facilities and potentially responsible
parties from many environmental laws which delegate enforcement au-
thority to the states. The court thus avoided delivering a Superfund ex-
emption to thousands of this country's worst toxic waste sites.
127
B. Available Negotiation Format
Colorado has a duty to protect the health and safety of its citizens and
to ensure a safe environment within its borders; the Tenth Circuit has en-
dorsed Colorado's role as an equal partner in the cleanup scheme.'
2 8
Surely, when the EPA and the Army finally recognize Colorado's legal sta-
tus, negotiation regarding the controlling authority will occur. 129 Con-
flicts can be mediated through an IAGI3 0 with assignment of roles and
responsibilities and shared authority between the EPA and Colorado.
Other federal facilities on the NPL (Rocky Flats, Colorado and Hanford,
Washington) are subject to remediation through the interagency process
with recognition of CERCLA and RCRA authorities.
122. S. RP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 95 (1980). See also 126 CONG. REc. 30984
(1980) (remarks of Sen. Stafford).
123. S. REP'. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985). Looking to the SARA legislative his-
tory of § 120(i) of CERCLA, it is obvious that Congress intended for the states to retain
corrective action authority at federal facility CERCLA sites. Willging, supra note 6, at 80.
124. H.R. CoN#. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 242 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.CA.N. 3276, 3335.
125. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1579 (10th Cir. 1993).
126. Id.
127. See RMA Dedsion supra note 21, at 10423.
128. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
129. See Listing Policy for Federal Facilities, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,523 (1989) (avoiding
potential duplication and inconsistency are implementation issues, to be resolved in light of
the facts of the case and after consultation between the EPA and the concerned state).
130. See lAG, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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C. ARAR's in Effect
The Tenth Circuit correctly recognized that the ARAR's process par-
ticipation offered to Colorado for Basin F is frustrating to Colorado's in-
terests and rights. At private sites the EPA is a state ally, but the EPA
abandons the state when a federal facility is involved. The legislative his-
tory of SARA confirms the congressional intent to preserve the state haz-
ardous waste laws at federal facilities as separate and distinct from the
ARAR's provision.' 31 It becomes obvious that Congress could not have
intended ARAR's as the only means of state involvement in CERCLA
cleanups since the ARAR's were enacted with the SARA amendments in
1986, six years after CERCLA. As a practical matter, the RMA Basin F
cleanup would not meet the ARAR's until the remedial action is finished.
Decades will pass before Colorado can be satisfied as to the quality of the
remediation. Certainly this is no substitute for the Congressional intent of
state involvement.
D. The Crippled EPA
The Tenth Circuit and the district court expressed concern regarding
the unitary executive theory 3 2 which allows the Army and the EPA, "the
federal family," to be represented by the same DQJ attorneys.' 3 3 The dis-
trict court in Colorado v. Army' 3 4 also recognized the conflict of interest
when the EPA's job is to achieve a quick and thorough cleanup and the
Army's financial interest is to spend as little as possible. The court could
not imagine how one attorney could vigorously and wholeheartedly ad-
vance both positions.' 3 5 EPA's inability to enforce the necessary hazard-
ous waste requirements against the Army heightens the importance of the
enforcement role Colorado must serve at RMA.' 3 6 The Tenth Circuit de-
cided properly to allow Colorado its EPA-delegated RCRA authority.
Otherwise Colorado has no protection from the Army controlling the Ba-
sin F cleanup through the circumscribed ARAR's process and the ineffec-
tive DOJ "family" attorneys. The federal government's historic poor
compliance with environmental laws coupled with the lame EPA powers at
federal sites leaves individual states as the sole authorities to ensure speedy
and safe cleanups of contaminated federal facilities.'
3 7
Critics of the Tenth Circuit decision believe the court has opened the
door to more "cooks in the kitchen." Some express fear that this decision
will foster unavoidable delays and unnecessary litigation in the federal fa-
cilities cleanup scheme.' 3 8 Yet Colorado, like other states with massive
131. See 132 CONG. Rxc. 28,449 (1986) (remarks of Sen. Chafee); 132 CONG. REc. 29,735
(1986) (remarks of Rep. Synar); 132 CONG. REc. 29,764 (1986) (remarks of Rep. Wyden).
132. See Debate, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
133. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1573 (10th Cir. 1993).
134. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1989).
135. Id. at 1570.
136. See Amicus Brief supra note 8, at 12.
137. RMA Decision, supra note 21, at 10422-23.
138. John F. Seymour, Tenth Circuit Rules that States May Enforce RCRA Requirements During
Federal Facility Cleanups, 4 FED. FACILrEs EN rL. J. 245, 254 (1993). Mr. Seymour lists the
[Vol. 71:1
CLEAN UP YOUR FEDERAL MESS
toxic contamination within state borders, does not look for one-upman-
ship or further litigious delay. In her letter of April 13, 1993 to Janet
Reno, the United States Attorney General, Gale Norton, Attorney General
for Colorado, expressed the belief that the federal government and the
states should develop a cooperative relationship emphasizing cleanup in-
stead of litigation.139 Ms. Norton encouraged Ms. Reno to take a "fresh
look at the Justice Department's position on the role of the states in regu-
lating federal facility cleanups." 140
E. On The Horizon
The future of federal facility compliance with state hazardous waste
laws in CERCLA cleanup activities has become more certain. On October
6, 1992, Congress amended RCRA with the enactment of the Federal Facil-
ities Compliance Act 14 1 including a provision that federal agencies are not
immune from state civil penalties imposed under RCRA. The FFCA re-
quires EPA to inspect and initiate enforcement actions for federal agency
violations of environmental laws with the same treatment as that extended
to a private party.' 42 The legislative history confirms that the federal gov-
ernment is required to comply with all environmental laws, including
RCRA 43 Senator Baucus' comments express the Act's intent:
This bill will ensure the Federal Government is required to
comply with RCRA like everyone else. Quite frankly, I had
thought this was always Congressional intent. The courts, how-
ever, have ruled that while that may have been our desire, the
statute was not clear. With this legislation, there will be no
question. 44
Because the FFCA has made RCRA state enforceable, states may
choose to withdraw from previous federal facility compliance agreements
and enforce state RCRA requirements directly.145 After the FFCA, federal
agencies, states and local communities must relinquish the past struggles
for superior position and work together to achieve environmental
quality.1
46
following concerns in light of the Tenth Circuit decision: 1) both states and private parties
will be able to obtain pre-enforcement review of CERCLA cleanups; 2) states will now be less
motivated to enter into interagency agreements (IAG); 3) it is unclear whether RCRA per-
mits, not previously required, may now be needed for on-site CERCJLA actions; 4) litigation
may flourish since a RCRA citizen suit does not meet the general prohibition in CERCLA of
"pre-enforcement review," 5) CERCLA remediations will be more expensive since the state
RORA standards will reduce agency discretion and tailored site-specific remediation selec-
tion. Id. at 249-52.
139. See Editor's Postscript to Seymour, supra note 138, at 255.
140. Id. at 256.
141. Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992)
[hereinafterFFCA].
142. Steve Gerstel, Senate Votes to Crack Down on Federal Pouters, UPI, Oct. 25, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
143. 138 CONG. REc. S14,758 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Chafee).
144. 138 CONG. REc. S14,756 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1992) (remarks of Sen. Baucus).
145. DOD OK in Norwalk, says GAO, 3 DEFENSE CLEAiup ISSN: 0083-9735, Oct. 30, 1992.
146. Laurent R. Hourcle & WilliamJ. McGowan, FederalFacility Compliance Act of 1992: Its
Provisions and Consequences, 3 FED. FACI.ITIES Elvr. J. 359, 376 (1992).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The entity which created the toxic hazard cannot be allowed to have
the exclusive voice in how the mess is to be remedied. The states must be
an equal partner in the cleanup process. As the deputy Colorado attorney
general for natural resources aptly expressed, "at no other site do you have
the person who polluted saying how much should be cleaned up."
147
Armed with the precedent of United States v. Colorado148 and the enforce-
ment power in the Federal Facility Compliance Act,149 states possess mus-
cle to regulate federal facilities under state RCRA authority and impose
penalties for regulatory violations. The EPA must be permitted to wield its
masterful enforcement authority over its sister executive branch agencies
as it does over the private sector. Private citizens and individual states, not
compromised by the unitary executive theory, must not be the only guardi-
ans over the federal facility compliance program. The federal govern-
ment, states and the EPA must develop a collaborative strategy to cleanup
the toxins and unknown future consequences of our irresponsible hazard-
ous waste legacy.
Alana Bissonnette
147. See Appeals Court Grants Colorado Authority to Regulate Day-To-Day Waste Management 23
ENVT'. REP. (BNA) 3161, 3162 (1993) (comments of Patricia S. Bangert).
148. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
149. See FFCA, supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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ANTI-STALKING LEGISLATION: DoEs IT PROTECT THE VICTIM
WmouT VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED?
I. INTRODUCTION*
Despite the threats he has made against our lives, despite his re-
peated violations of restraining orders, despite the professional
assessment of him as dangerous, both the District Attorney and
our own attorney have said nothing can be done until he has
"done something." What is the "something" they must wait for
him to do? Kidnap [my daughter]? Rape her? Kill her? Would
you be willing to sit back and wait for this to happen to your
daughter or your son?'
More and more stories like Mrs. Poland's are being heard by state
legislators in an effort to prompt them to pass anti-stalking laws.2 Tradi-
tionally associated with celebrities and politicians,3 stalking received na-
tional attention in 1989 with the shooting death of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer by a man who followed her for two years.4 In response to Ms.
Schaeffer's murder, along with the slayings of four other women in Or-
ange County within eighteen months, California passed the first piece of
"anti-stalking" legislation in 1990.5 In the past three years, forty eight
states followed California's lead and passed similar legislation.6
* The author would like to thank Professors J. Robert Brown, Penelope Bryan, and
Alan Chen for their editorial comments and suggestions throughout the drafting of this
Note.
1. Anti-Stalking Legislation, 1992: Hearings on S. 2922 Before the Senate Judiciay Comm.,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Mrs. Sandra Poland, vic-
tim's mother).
2. See, e.g., id.; infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
3. Celebrities actually comprise only 17 percent of stalking victims. Id. at 4 (testimony
of Maine Senator William S. Cohen).
4. Obsessed Fan Gets Life in Actress'Death, L. A. TnMEs, Dec. 22, 1991, at B5. Robert Bardo
followed Schaeffer for two years, sent her letters on numerous occasions, hired a detective to
get her address and enlisted the aid of his brother to buy him a gun. Id. He eventually shot
Schaeffer to death after he rang her doorbell and she answered. Id. He was sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole. Id.
5. Sonya Live: Stalker Laws (CNN television broadcast, June 8, 1992) (statement of then
California State Senator Edward Royce). Royce has since been elected to the United States
House of Representatives and is currently involved in guiding federal anti-stalking legislation
through Congress. Karen J. Cohen, Royce Introduces Federal Stalking Bill States News Serv.,
Feb. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS File.
6. AlA. CODE §§ 13A-6-90 to -94 (Suipp. 1993); 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40 (to be codified
at ALAsA STAT. §§ 11.41.260-.270); Amz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Ark.
Acts 379; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); COLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp.
1993); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 532-181c to -181d (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE. ANN.
§§ 16-5-90 to -91 (Michie Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992), IDAHO
CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, paras. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd
1993); 1993 Ind. Legis. Ser. 242 (West) (to be codified at IND. CODE § 35-45-10); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 708.11 (West 1993); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130-150
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); -.& REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); 1993
Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); 1993 Md. Laws 205 (to be codified at MD. CODE § 27-121B);
Mass. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN.
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The rapid response by so many states confirms that a problem existed
with the application of traditional criminal laws to stalking situations. Cer-
tain behavior by stalkers, while understandably threatening to the victim,
did not rise to a level of culpability sufficient to allow for legal action.
7
Critics of anti-stalking laws, however, fear any legal intervention will
criminalize other constitutionally-protected activity.8 In September 1992,
the Senate Judiciary Committee was prompted by Senator William Cohen
to recognize the need for federal guidance in drafting constitutionally
sound legislation to provide relief for stalking victims.9 As a result, the
National Institute ofJustice conducted its own research into the issues and
§§ 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993); MmN. STAT. ANN. § 609.747 (West Supp. 1993) (harass-
ment); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; 1993 Mo. Legis. Serv. 194 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
220 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.03 to .04 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Nev. Stat. 233; 1993 N.H.
Laws 173; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-3A-3 (Michie
Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.13-15, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GE. STAT.
§ 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992); 1993 N.D. Laws 120; 1992 Ohio Laws 234; OnuA. STAT. ANN. ti. 21,
§ 1173 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 28 (Purdon); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-59-1 to -3
(Supp. 1992); 1992 S.C. Acts 417; S.D. CODUrD LAws ANN. § 22-19A (Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANt. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-106.5 to -108 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Vt. Laws 95; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. Rzv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992) (harassment);
WYo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993).
7. Kenneth R. Thomas, Anti-Stalhing Statutes: Background and ConstitutionalAnalysis, CRS
REP. FOR CONG., Sept. 26, 1992, at 1. See infira part I discussing inadequacies of both civil and
criminal laws prior to stalking legislation enactment.
8. See, e.g., Sonya Live: Staler Laws, supra note 4 (statement of Loren Siegel, ACLU).
Ms. Siegel, concerned about potential abuse of the new laws, makes specific reference to
types of activities which may violate the stalking laws but may not be unconstitutional. Id.
Those activities include an investigative reporter seeking out the public figure who is the
subject of the report and a father, denied visitation rights to his children, who sits in a parked
car outside their school to make sure they are safe. Id.
9. S. 2922, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992), states:
(A) FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS. - The Congress finds and declares that -
(1) The Criminal Act of stalking other persons is a problem of deep concern;
(2) previously available legal recourse against stalking, such as restraining
orders, have proven largely ineffective; (3) anti-stalking legislation has been
enacted or proposed by several of the states; (4) the constitutionality of sev-
eral of the states' anti-stalking statutes may be in question; and (5) the Con-
gress has an interest in assisting the states in enacting anti-stalking legislation
that is constitutional and enforceable.
(B) EVALUATION - The Attorney General, acting through the Director of
The National Institute of Justice, shall - (1) evaluate anti-stalking legislation
and proposed anti-stalking legislation in the states; (2) develop model anti-
stalking legislation that is constitutional and enforceable; (3) prepare and
disseminate to state authorities the findings made as a result of the evalua-
tion; and (4) not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act,
report to the Congress the findings and the need or appropriateness of fur-
ther action by the Federal Government.
(C) EXPENSES - Expenses incurred in conducting the evaluation and de-
veloping model legislation under subsection (B) shall be paid out of funds
that are available to the National Institute of Justice for fiscal year 1992.
Id.
Senator Cohen introduced the bill on July 1, 1992. Id. On September 29, 1992, the
SenateJudiciary Committee held hearings on the bill with testimony or statements offered by
the following- Senator William S. Cohen (Maine), Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (Califor-
nia), Ms. Jane McAllister (victim), Mrs. Sandra Poland (victim's mother), Honorable Perry
Bullard (chairman, House Judiciary Committee, Michigan State Legislature), and Mr.
Charles B. Dewitt (Director National Institute of Justice). Hearings, supra note 1, at iii.
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was scheduled to present model legislation to Congress by September 30,
1993.10 During the spring of 1993, two other major pieces of federal legis-
lation were introduced - one to define stalking as a federal offense I" and
one to reduce the incidence of stalking.12
This Note analyzes the various anti-stalking measures in effect with
specific attention to the constitutional issues presented. Part II discusses
the traditional criminal and civil measures available to stalking victims,
and the deficiencies of these measures. Part III surveys the types of anti-
stalking statutes passed and the areas they address. Part IV explores con-
stitutional questions raised by the statutes surveyed. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that a delicate balance must be struck between the rights of the
victim and of the accused in order for anti-stalking legislation to be effec-
tive and constitutional.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Inadequacies of Traditional Criminal and Civil Domestic Violence
Remedies
Estimates indicate 4600 reported stalking incidents in the United
States in 1991.13 Stalkers threaten, follow, or harass approximately
10. Matt Neufield, Area Officials Praise U.S. Support for Anti-Stalking Laws, WASH. TiAmS,
Dec. 25, 1992, at B3. TheJustice Department announced in 1992 that it would help fund the
project. Id. The project is being run by the private nonprofit National CriminalJustice Asso-
ciation, the Federal National Institute ofJustice, the American Civil Liberties Union and at
least ten other groups. Id. See Lynne Marek, Caucus Pushes for More Female Appointees, Cm.
Tin., Apr. 25, 1993, at 11. The federal project will study existing domestic violence and and-
stalking laws, mental health commitment statutes, telephone harassment laws and anti-tres-
passing ordinances as well as gather information on stalking cases before submitting its re-
port to Congress. Area OffidIals Praise U.S. Support for Anti-Stalking Laws, supra note 9. As of
the date of this publication, the model legislation and the report -to Congress are almost
complete. Telephone Interview with Charles Lauer, National Institute of Justice (Aug. 5,
1993).
11. S. 470, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Democratic Senator Robert Kreuger from
Texas, himself a stalking victim, cosponsored S. 470. See id.; Washington Briefs, DALLAS MoRN-
INo NEws, Mar. 3, 1993, at 6A. The bill defines stalking as threats and harassment that occur
on federal property such as military bases or Indian reservations and through the use of
telephones, the mail or other interstate commerce. S. 470; see Cohen, supra note 3. Penalties
range from two to five years for a first 9ffense and five to ten years for a second offense. S.
470.
12. H.R. 840, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill was introduced February 4, 1993 by
Joseph Kennedy, a Democratic Representative frofh Massachusetts, and requires all states to
enact anti-stalking legislation by September 30, 1994 or lose 25% of their Crime Act Funding.
Id. Given that 49 states have already passed anti-stalking laws, Kennedy's goal seems well
within reach.
H.R. 840 also requires the Bureau ofJustice to establish a national database on stalking
and domestic violence to permit tracking stalkers from state to state and improve communi-
cations between jurisdictions. Id. This provision seems particularly helpful for enforcement
of restraining orders against stalkers who follow their victims into other states where officials
are unaware of existing restraining orders. See Penny Bender, Biden. Chastises Delaware on Ac-
tions in Stalking Cases, Gannett News Serv., Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
GNS File.
13. Illinois Governor Signs Anti-Stalking Bill, UPI, July 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
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200,000 people each year.' 4 Although stalking incidents against men do
occur, most victims are women stalked either by strangers or even more
likely, by former husbands or boyfriends.' 5 In 1992, 1500 women died at
the hands of their husbands or boyfriends,' 6 - ninety percent of whom
may have been stalked prior to the fatal attack. 17 Park Dietz, an expert in
clinical psychiatry, predicts that five percent of women in the general pop-
ulation will experience harassment at some time during their lives.' 8
The activity of stalking involves repeated following, harassing, or
threatening another or acting in such a way as to create a credible threat
of harm in the mind of the victim.' 9 Evidence of physical abuse is
unnecessary.
2 0
Domestic violence, however, is generally defined as any act carried
out with the intention of, or perceived intention of, physically injuring
one's spouse.2 ' Examples include, inter alia, slapping, hitting, punching,
kicking, or throwing objects,2 2 all involving an immediate physical pres-
ence between the abuser and the victim.
The insufficiency of domestic violence laws in the stalking context are
readily apparent. Domestic violence requires a physical component that
most often does not exist in stalking cases until it is too late.2 3 In addition,
stalkers may or may not know their victims, unlike domestic abuse situa-
tions.2 4 Yet, prior to 1990, the only remedies available to a stalking victim
14. Penny Bender, Survivors Ask for Federal Anti-Stalking Legislation, Gannett News Serv.,
Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File.
15. Melinda Beck et al., Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992 at 60. A tragic
example is recounted by the surviving parents of Glenn Beach and Karen Erjavec. See id.
Karen met Ken Kopecky a wedding. Id. Even though Karen was already dating Glenn Beach,
Ken Kopecky became infatuated with Karen. Id. After months of harassment and vandalism,
Ken Kopecky entered the Beaches' home and shot Glenn six times in the back and stabbed
him twice. Id. Karen was shot in the head at close range. Id.
16. Joseph Kirby, Law Enforcement Takes a New Approach to Domestic Vwlence, Cn. Tram.,
Aug. 23, 1992, at A3. A study released by the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta reported
that four to eight million women are victims of domestic violence each year and that domes-
tic abuse may be responsible for more injuries to women than minor auto accidents, rapes
and muggings combined. See id. The Justice Department reports that of all violent acts per-
petrated against women, 9% are by husbands, 35% are by ex-husbands and 32% are by boy-
friends. See Nightline: Anti-Stalking Laws, (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 3, 1992).
17. See Beck et al., supra note 15, at 60.
18. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Ten-or of Stalking, But Some Experts Say Measures
Are Vague, USA TODAY, July 21, 1992, at 9A.
19. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
20. See infra part .A.
21. See Steven M. Cook, Transition: Domestic Abuse Legislation in Illinois and Other States: A
Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 1983 U. IL. L. Ray. 261 n.2 (1983).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 15 (young couple murdered by known stalker, no
prior attempted physical injury); Obsessed Fan Gets Life in Actress'Death, supra note 4 and text
therein (actress murdered by stalker after two years of stalking and no prior attempted physi-
cal injury or contact); Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5 (police told stalking victim "[I]et
us know when he attacks you physically, and then we can get involved").
24. See Rene Riley-Adams, Can Laws Stop the Obsessed?, The Times, Feb. 22, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Times File. Stalkers typically emanate from three different scena-
rios: those who create a relationship with someone whom they have never met, usually a
celebrity;, those who exaggerate a cursory relationship into something obsessive; and, those
who cannot let go of an actual soured relationship. See id.
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came from existing domestic violence laws.2 5 These traditional remedies,
designed to rescue women from abusive boyfriends or spouses, quickly
proved inadequate to victims of stalkers.
2 6
1. Criminal Remedies
Prior to the enactment of stalking laws, virtually no criminal sanctions
existed to protect the victim. While stalkers engaged in behavior obviously
threatening to the victim, their conduct did not always rise to the level of a
criminal violation.2 7 The crime of assault, for example, requires an indi-
vidual who attempts to place or places another in reasonable apprehen-
sion of being subjected to immediate physical harm.2 8 In most instances of
stalking, unlike domestic violence, the proximity requirement for assault
does not exist.29 As long as the stalker remained far enough away from
the victim that a reasonable person would not feel immediately
threatened, no assault occurred.
Types of conduct often reported by victims of stalkers include: harass-
ing letters and threatening phone calls, repeated driving by the victim's
house, sitting in a car watching the victim, following the victim down the
street, and appearing at all times and all places.3 ° None of this conduct is
a per se violation of the law except perhaps the phone calls.3 ' Gathered
together in the mind of one person, however, these activities cause great
25. California enacted the first anti-stalking legislation in 1990. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9
(West Supp. 1993).
26. See Hearing of the SenateJudiciaiy Committee; Fed. News Serv., Mar. 10, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File. In her confirmation hearings, Janet Reno stated that
"under the laws that existed prior to the anti-stalking law, it was impossible to perfect - or
develop evidence sufficient to prosecute." Id.
27. Thomas, supra note 7, at 3.
28. RoLjN M. PERxmis & RoNA.D N. BoYcE, CRrmmNAL LAw 163 (3d ed. 1982).
29. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 15 (young couple murdered by known stalker who
mailed threatening letters, made threatening phone calls, and vandalized property).
30. See generally, Michael Matza, When Attraction Turns Obsessive It May Seem Harmless. But
to Victims, Stalking Means a Life of Fear, PHnIA. INQUmER, May 23, 1993, at Al (discussing need
for anti-stalking law where stalking occurs under similar situations); Beck, supra note 15, at 60
(discussing legislatures' responses to similar acts); Max Albright, Tired of Not Living at All;
Amarillo Woman's Plight Highlights Need for Stalking Law, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 13, 1992, at 3
(stalkers repeated phone calls, following the victim, coming to her house, and ignorance of
peace bonds highlighted need for anti-stalking legislation in Texas); Sonya Live: Stalker Laws,
supra note 5 (discussing California's stalking law); Sonya Live: Stalking, (CNN television broad-
cast, Oct. 2, 1992) (discussing whether stalking should be a crime).
One stalking victim is Tammy Acker, now 19, who received numerous letters and gifts
over the last four years from a man she knew casually through a church group. Matza, supra
One note, written to Tammy's sister when Tammy was fifteen, requested explicit information
about Tammy. Id. The note read, "I need numbers (example 36-24-36) so that I can buy her
nice things and maybe a few naughty things for a honeymoon," and was eventually traced to
a man who drove a gold Chevrolet Beretta repeatedly past Tammy's house. Id. Tummy was
unable to get a restraining order against her harasser because they were never romantically
involved. Id.
31. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993). In Texas, telephone harassment
is a Class B misdemeanor punishable by six months in jail and a $1500 fine. TEx. PENAL
CoDE ANN. § 12.22 (West 1993); See also Albright, supra note 31, at 3. A federal violation may
result in up to $50,000 in fines or six months imprisonment, or both. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)
(1988).
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fear and intimidation.3 2 Such fear certainly acts to infringe upon one's
individual freedoms.
3 3
Those who did violate the law, perhaps under telephone harassment
laws, usually committed only misdemeanors and ended up with' fines or
probation.3 4 The resulting arrest without subsequent prosecution or in-
carceration often served to aggravate the circumstances for the victim.
3 5
Mr. Dietz found "as a general rule, [the arrest] is perceived by the mentally
ill stalker as a confirmation of the relationship, and by the less seriously ill
stalker as an angering challenge." 6 Under previous criminal laws, the
stalker who continued to haunt, harass, or frighten a victim in full view of
a police officer committed no crime.
3 7
2. Civil Remedies
The primary civil remedy available to a stalking victim, and the only
basis upon which an individual can prevent another from approaching
her, her home or her work, is a protective order.38 A court will order
someone to maintain a certain distance from another upon sufficient
proof of a rational fear of imminent harm in the mind of the victim.
3 9
Violations of the order generally result in contempt proceedings with pen-
alties ranging from six months to a year in jail.40 In some states, a viola-
tion constitutes a misdemeanor and/or contempt or, a felony and/or
contempt.
4 1
32. See e.g., Sonya Live, supra note 5. Fifteen year-old Erin Tavegia reported to the police
every time she was followed home from school by a 49 year old man over a 14 month period.
Id. He offered her money and rides home. Id. The police had an eight-inch thick file on the
stalker but he had not broken any laws, and all the police could tell Erin's mother was to
protect her. Id. Erin's mother said of the stalking, "It was absolutely terrifying." Id.
33. A stalker's actions may violate certain fundamental constitutional rights because of
the constant following and spying. Freedom to associate and privacy are constitutionally pro-
tected rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 462 (1957).
34. Thomas, supra note 7, at 3-4.
35. See Puente, supra note 18.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5. The police had a video tape of the
stalker on three separate occasions offering fifteen year old Erin Tavegia money, speaking to
her, always bordering on being sexual. Id. Despite the existence of an eight inch thick file
on the stalker, the police refused to act and merely warned her mother to "protect her." Id.
38. Thomas, supra note 7, at 3-4. Other remedies may include common law actions for
damages grounded in trespass, invasion of privacy, assault, or intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Robert A. GuyJr., The Nature and Constitutionaliy of Staling Laws, 46 VA~N. L
REv. 991, 997 (1993).
39. See Thomas, supra note 7, at 3-4. A typical restraining order prevents the stalker
from coming within two hundred yards of the victim. See, e.g., George LardnerJr., The Stah-
ing of Kristin; The Law Made It Easy for My Daughter's Killer, WASH. PoST, Jan. 22, 1992, at Cl.
40. Cook, supra note 21, at 272, 272 n.78 and statutes cited therein.
41. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 14-4-105, 18-1-106, -6-803.5 (Supp. 1993) (sentences
range from six months to eighteen months in duration and may constitute a misdemeanor or
felony and also permits recourse under civil or criminal contempt); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3110 (1983) (no sentence stated for contempt); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-01, 14-07.1-06
(1985 & Supp. 1993) (sentences range from one year to five years and violation is both a
misdemeanor and contempt or felony and contempt).
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Protective order legislation was initially enacted to provide immediate
relief to victims of domestic abuse.42 Thought to be the perfect solution,
such orders offered victims physical protection aswell as ordering the of-
fender to provide financial support where the offender previously pro-
vided the household income.43 Problems quickly surfaced, however,
which made the effectiveness of protective orders in stalking situations
clearly inadequate. 44
First, unlike criminal remedies that place the burden on the criminal
justice system to seek out violators and prosecute them, civil protection
orders require the victim to come up with sufficient evidence of an immi-
nent threat.45 The victim must keep track of constant "violations" by the
stalker and be able to present enough evidence to satisfy the court to issue
a restraining order.
46
In domestic violence cases, the plaintiff must show the defendant at-
tacked, beat, molested, or otherwise threatened bodily harm.47 Often
times the plaintiff wears her evidence to court as a black eye or a swollen
lip. No similar physical evidence exists for stalking victims upon which to
base the need for protection.48 Many stalking victims resort to keeping
track of letters received, phone calls or visits from the stalker in order to
capture the court's attention.49 Sometimes the victim's word against the
stalker's offers the only proof available. The victim's word alone may be
unconvincing if a judge or prosecutor harbors any 'lingering attitudes
about unnecessary domestic violence claims.50
A second and perhaps greater problem involves the enforcement of
restraining orders, sometimes referred to as "paper shields."5 1 According
to a federal study done by the Urban Institute in'Washington, D.C., only
twenty percent of restraining orders violated result in arrests. 52 All too
42. Cook, supra note 21, at 272.
43. Id. at 273-74. Typical relief includes support payments.for any children and restitu-
tion for out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the victim. Id. Because each state's legislation
varies significantly'in its scope of relief, the reader should review her own applicable state
statute. Id. at 274 n.84.
44. Thomas, supra note 7, at 4.
45. Id.
46. See id. Senator Robert Krueger and his wife endured visits, calls in the middle of the
night, and threatening notes for four years before the police could arrest the man respohsi-
ble. Bender, supra note 14. Senator Krueger has a "pile of letters and answering machine
tapes... many with threats that were obscene and graphic." Id.
47. See Rebecca S. Bromley, Injunctive Rmedies for Interpersonal Violence, 18 CoLo. LAw.
1743 (1989); Cook, supra note 21, at 261 n.2, 272.
48. See supra notes 21, 28-29 and accompanying text.
49. Nightline, supra note 16; see e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text.
50. See Cook, supra note 21, at 269; see genera/!y, GuyJr., supra note 38, at 999 ("Prosecu-
tors sometimes are hesitant to press for harassment convictions because the punishment is
too light to effect deterrence."). Manyjudges, when faced with domestic abuse cases, do not
feel the court should get involved in family arguments, and believe that reconciliation within
the family is preferred to criminal punishment of the husband. See Cook, supra, at 269.
These same judges, when presiding over the case of a woman being stalked by her ex-hus-
band, may also refuse to get the courts involved. See id.
51. See Kevin Fagan, New Focus onDeadly Sta/hers, S.F. CHRoN, Jan. 11, 1993,at Al.
52. Fawn Germer, Arrests Rare for Abusers Who Violate Orders, Roczv MTN. NEws, Aug. 29,
1993, at 4A.
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often enforcement happens too infrequently and too late. 53 Most stalkers
know that restraining orders are rarely enforced.54 Others discover that
some protective orders only last for a limited period of time, and simply
wait them out.
55
In the minds of those desperate for attention from their prey, re-
straining orders present no real barrier. To those victims of stalking des-
perate for some relief from the incessant fear, the orders prove similarly
meaningless.
III. A SuRvEY OF STATE STALKING LEGISLATION
In response to the murder of four young women in California within
a month and a half, California enacted the first anti-stalking law in order
to bridge the gap between existing domestic violence remedies and the
needs of stalking victims.5 6 Each had obtained temporary restraining or-
ders against her attacker; each communicated with her family, her friends,
and the police that she thought she was going to be killed.5 7 Despite all
the resources available to protect these women, they all died.
5 8
As of August 1993, forty-eight other states have followed California's
lead.5 9 Oregon's statute, the only one yet to be enacted, is currently pend-
ing in committee. 60 Sadly, the approval for these statutes often came only
after a violent and brutal attack on a member of that community.6 1 Some
53. See Beck et al., supra note 15, at 60. Kristin Lardner, whose death motivated Senator
Cohen to propose federal anti-stalking legislation, sought and received a one-year protection
order against her ex-boyfiend in mid-May 1992. Heafings, supra note 1, at 15. He shot and
beat her to death on a Boston street on May 30, 1992. Id.
54. See Cook, supra note 21, at 275; Thomas, supra note 7, at 5. When originally written,
most domestic abuse legislation did not provide police with proper procedures for enforce-
ment of civil protective orders. See Cook, supra, at 275 nn.94-95. Some statutes did not pro-
vide any authority to enforce them and, as a result, police officers either felt or were
powerless to arrest the violator. See id. In addition, police officers, like some judges, were
traditionally more concerned with making peace in the household than in making an arrest.
See Kirby, supra note 16, at A3. These attitudes have changed more recently. See id.
55. See Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5. Temporary restraining orders generally
last about 48 hours. Id.; see generally Cook, supra note 22, at 273 n.81 for citations to various
state statutes.
56. CA. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 172 for full text of
statute.
57. Sonya Live: Stalker Laws, supra note 5.
58. See id. One woman had been stalked for ten years. Id. The stalker followed her
from Germany and threatened to kill her if she ever got married. Id. The stalker murdered
her even though she had obtained a temporary restraining order against him. Id.
59. See statutes cited supra note 6..
60. Or. S. 833, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993).
61. See, e.g., Illinois Governor Signs Anti-Stalking Bill, supra note 13. Steven Johnson alleg-
edly stalked his estranged wife, then shot her in the parking lot of a suburban Chicago store
on July 7, 1992. Id. Illinois' anti-stalking law passed onJuly 12, 1992. ILl. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
Colorado's legislature approved a bill to discourage stalkers in response to the shooting
of a Fort Collins woman by her ex-husband on the steps of the police station where she
sought refuge. Peggy Lowe; Bracelet Designed to Deter Stalkers of Women, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1992, at B6. Wisconsin acted after a stalking victim was fatally stabbed 19 times and Virginia
responded to a mother's account of a stalker who murdered then burned her daughter's
body. Beck et al., supra note 15, at 60.
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states passed laws which took immediate or emergency effect. 62 This sec-
don presents a general survey of the types of statutes passed and the issues
they address.
A. "Stalking" Defined
Typically, the offense of stalking involves a particular course of con-
duct coupled with the requisite intent. Most statutes define the conduct as
willful, malicious and repeated following or harassing of another person.63
The intent requirement usually includes either a credible threat of vio-
lence towards the victim,6 or knowingly placing the victim in fear of death
or bodily injury.
65
Some states use broader language to define both elements of stalk-
ing,66 while others are more specific.. 7 Initially, West Virginia had the
most narrowly drawn provision, requiring the defendant to:
intentionally and closely follow, lie in wait,; or make repeated
threats to cause bodily injury to any person with whom that per-
son formerly resided or cohabited or with whom that person for-
merly engaged in a sexual or intimate relationship, with the
intent to cause said person emotional distress or place said per-
son in fear of his personal safety.6
The previous relationship requirement presented some concerns in rela-
tion to prosecution under this statute because the stalker and victim often
62. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp. 1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 711.1106.5 (Supp.
1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4
(Smith-Hurd 1993) OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 21 § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Laws 28;
TEx. PENAL CODE ANNm. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993).
63. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 43;
1992 Ohio Laws 234; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993).
64. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 649.9. "Credible threat" is most often defined as a threat
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person
who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. See id. Many states also
protect the immediate family members subject to any credible threat by the defendant. See,
e.g., id.; IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173(A) (West Supp.
1993); Wvo. STAT. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). Hawaii broadens the definition to include harm
to the victim or "another." HAw. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992).
65. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90 (Supp. 1993). New Hampshire requires the stalker to
threaten death or bodily injury. 1993 N.H. Laws 173.
66. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130 (Mchie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992) (defining
the offense of stalking as engaging in an intentional course of conduct directed at a specific
person(s) which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates or harasses the person, and which
serves no legitimate purpose); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315(a)(1) (Supp. 1992) (stalking
occurs when a person "[i]ntentionally and repeatedly follows a specific person; . . . or
[i]ntentionally commits a series of other acts evidencing a continuity of purpose to seriously
alarm, annoy or harass a specific person... . "). Virginia's statute reaches further to one who
"engages in conduct with intent to cause emotional distress to another person by placing that
person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury.. . . "VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie
Supp. 1993).
67. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90 (Michie Supp. 1993) (outlining the type of threat
required and specifying that the suspect must physically appear near the victim somewhere
other than at the defendant's home); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (same). Illinois also requires the appearance to occur on more than one occasion. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3.
68. W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9a (1992).
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times do not know one another.69 West Virginia has since adopted a more
victim-favorable statute. 70 Some states, such as Minnesota, specifically pro-
vide that the relationship between the stalker and victim does not
matter.
7 1
A minority ofjurisdictions provide that the mere occurrence of partic-
ular conduct under the statute, without any threat or intent to harm, con-
stitutes stalking.72 Both Florida and Mississippi define stalking as willfully,
maliciously and repeatedly following or harassing another person or mak-
ing a credible threat.73 Statutes, like Florida's, present particular potential
constitutional dilemmas with regard to vagueness.
74
The harshest stalking law to date exists in Michigan where the victim
need only establish a reasonable fear of harm to meet the statute's require-
ment.75 In order to avoid some of the enforcement concerns raised about
other states' laws, the Michigan State Legislature chose to focus on the
harm to the victim rather than the mind of the defendant.76 This elimi-
nates the need for victims to convince authorities that the stalker intends
to harm them.
77
Other states, including Arizona,78 Maine, 79 Minnesota,8 0 and New
York,8 ' passed laws which do not specifically address stalking, but essen-
69. See Puente, supra note 18, at 9A; Riley-Adams, supra note 24; Hearings, supra note 1, at
34 (statement of Sandra Poland).
70. 1993 W. Va. Acts 30 (to be codified at W. VA CODE § 61-2-9a). The amendment to
the stalking statute, in pertinent part, provides:
Any person who knowingly, willfully and repeatedly follows and harasses another
person and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be incarcerated in the countyjail for not more
than six months or fined more than one thousand dollars, or both.
Id.
71. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748(1) (West Supp. 1993).
72. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048
(West. Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992). Kansas, while not requiring any threat from the stalker, nar-
rowly defines the conduct necessary to commit stalking as "willful, malicious and repeated
following and barassment... ." 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298 (emphasis added).
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (Supp. 1993); 1992 Miss. Laws 532.
74. See discussion infra part III.A.
75. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.411h (West Supp. 1993).
76. Hearings, supra note 1, at 64 (statement of Michigan State Representative Perry Bul-
lard). Statutes that require an intent to harm rely on the mental state of the defendant. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). The victim must convince the authorities
that the requisite intent existed in the stalker's mind. See, e.g., id. Michigan's legislature
decided to ease the burden on the victim by relying instead on the victim's "reasonable fear."
See CNN News: Michigan Legal System Takes Stalking Very Seriously (CNN television broadcast,
Jan. 1, 1993).
77. CN News, supra note 76.
78. Asuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993).
79. 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West).
80. MnNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
81. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993). The New York statute, in perti-
nent part, states:
A person is guilty of harassment in the first degree when he or she intentionally
and repeatedly harasses another person by following such person in or about a pub-
lic place or places by engaging in a course of conduct or by repeatedly committing
acts which places such person in reasonable fear of physical injury.
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dally apply to the same type of conduct. For example, Minnesota's "har-
assment" law involves repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words or
gestures intended to adversely affect the safety, security or privacy of an-
other.8 2 Maine's legislature expanded their harassment law to prohibit
engaging in behavior associated with stalking after a warning by any "sher-
iff, deputy sheriff, constable, police officer or justice of the peace," or by
court order.
83
B. Types of Conduct
Generally the conduct involved includes some type of pattern over a
period of time with a specific continuity of purpose.8 4 Some statutes re-
quire the conduct to occur on more than one occasion.8 5 Some excep-
tional provisions include harassment by telephone,8 6 fax,8 7 or "placing an
object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased or occupied
by that person."88 Due to potential constitutional vagueness or First
Amendment issues,8 9 most statutes highlight specific areas of activity not
included, most importantly "constitutionally protected conduct."90 Unfor-
tunately, this phrase alone does little to offset any vagueness concerns. 9 1
Other types of conduct explicitly excluded from prosecution under anti-
stalking laws include: labor picketing;92 that in furtherance of law en-
forcement;93 of a reporter;94 of a private detective;95 of a process server;
96
or, during the course of a lawful business activity.
9 7
Id. The New York law is designed to address "the repetitive type of stalking conduct" previ-
ously unrecognized. Gary Spencer, State Tightens PenaltiesforStalking, N.Y. .J., Aug. 20, 1992,
at 1.
82. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
83. 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West).
84. See, eg., CAI.. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (West Supp. 1993).
85. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); Mcm. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 750.411h (West Supp. 1993).
86. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-509
(Supp. 1993).
87. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40; WYo. STAT. §16-2-509.
88. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40.
89. See discussion infra part MI.A
90. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992). Michigan State Representative Perry Bullard, testifying
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, believed that his legislature drafted an anti-stalking
law which was both enforceable and constitutional. Hearings, supra note 1, at 64. See MicH.
Comp. Laws ANN. § 750.411h (West Supp. 1993). Although conduct previously legal would
now be illegal under the law, Bullard stressed that the legislature included a detailed set of
definitions which focus on the harm to the victim rather than the specific mental intent of
the stalker. Id. See n.97 infra and accompanying text.
91. See discussion infra part IHA'
92. CAI. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); DE. CODE ANN tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp.
1992) (creates a rebuttable presumption against stalking if during labor activity); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720, Para. 5/12-7.3, 7.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-311.05 (Supp.
1992).
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A.
94. 1993 Nev. Stat. 233.
95. Id.
96. 1993 Ark. Acts 379.
97. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-92 (Michie Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-315
(Supp. 1992).
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C. Penalties
1. Jail and Fines
Thirty-six out of the forty-nine states with stalking laws provide both
misdemeanor and felony classifications. 98 A first offense may draw up to
one year in jail and a $1000 fine. 9 Subsequent offenders sometimes incur
higher penalties ranging from two to five years1 00 in jail and $1,000 to
$10,000 in fines.10 1 The range of subsequent penalties depends on such
factors as: whether a protective order was violated,' 0 2 the victim's age, 10 3
or whether a deadly weapon was involved.
10 4
Nine states provide only misdemeanor classifications,' 0 5 with Utah re-
quiring only six months in jail per offense.' 0 6 In contrast, Alabama, Ar-
kansas, Delaware, and Illinois maintain felony classifications with penalties
ranging from six months to twenty years.
10 7
Few statistics exist regarding prosecutions and convictions under
stalking laws because they are so new. The Judicial Council of California
98. 1993 Alaska Sess. Laws 40; CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 532-181c to -181d; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 784.048(2), (3) (West Supp. 1993). GA.
CODE. ANN. §§ 16-5-90 to -91 (Michie Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-7905 (Supp. 1992);
1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 242 (West) (to be codified at IND. CODE § 35-45-10); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 708.11 (West 1993); Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 508-130-150 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992);
L.A. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 14:40.2 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); MAss.
ANN. LAWs. ch. 265, § 43 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1993); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i
(West Supp. 1993); MmN. STAT. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1993); 1992 Miss. Laws 532; 1993 Mo.
Legis. Serv. 194 (Vernon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-311.03
to -311.04 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Nev. Stat. 233; 1993 N.H. Laws 173; 1993 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-
3A-3 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 120.13-.15, 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1993);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3 (Supp. 1992); 1993 N.D. Laws 120; 1992 Ohio Laws 234; OnA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 28 (Purdon); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 11-59-1 to -3 (Supp. 1992); S.D. CODn a LAws ANN. § 22-19A (Supp. 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1992); Tmx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1993); 1993 Vt. Laws 95; WASH. Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 6-
2-506 (Supp. 1993).
99. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 18-7905(b), 1992 S.C. Acts 417.
100. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAws'ch. 265, § 43.
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.46.110
102. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 532-181c, 181d; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130.
103. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 532-181c. Connecticut upgrades stalking in the sec-
ond degree, a misdemeanor, to a first degree felony offense if the victim is under sixteen
years of age. Id.
104. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.130.
105. Am. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2921 (Supp. 1993); COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-9-111 (Supp.
1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); 1992 Kan. Sess. Laws 298; 1993 Md. Laws
205 (to be codified at MD. CODE § 27-121B); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-10 (West Supp. 1993);
1992 S.C. Acts 417; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-91
(Supp. 1993).
106. UTAH CODE ANN. § 765-106.5 (1992).
107. SeeAi.A. CODE §§ 13-A-690 to -91 (Supp. 1993); 1993 Ark. Acts 379; DEL- CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1312A (Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3 to -7.4 (Smith-Hurd
1993). Illinois created a higher level of felony for "aggravated stalking" committed by a
stalker who causes bodily harm, confines or restrains a victim or violates a court order. Id. A
second or subsequent conviction for aggravated stalking may result in up to seven years of
imprisonment. See Donna Hunzeker, Stalking L.aws, 17 ST. LEGIS. REP. 19, Oct. 1992, at 1.
Alabama also has an aggravated stalking statute. AL&. CODE § 13-A-6-91. A violation consti-
tutes a class B felony punishable for up to twenty years in prison. Id. at § 13-A-5-6 (1975).
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reports that through December 31, 1991 ten persons received convictions
and sentences under California's 1990 stalking law.108 In November 1992,
Chicago sentenced its first defendant under the new Illinois law to two
years in prison after he pled guilty.1 9
In December 1992, the first trial under Illinois' statute resulted in the
defendant's acquittal. 110 The jury's verdict confirmed some critics' fears
about the filing of false claims."' The defendant's wife accused him of
telephoning and threatening to kill her and intimidating her at her place
of employment. 1 2 The defense argued that she was angry that her ex-
husband failed to appear at their divorce proceedings. 113 Thejury delib-
erated for less than an hour. 1 4 By that time, the defendant had already
spent 132 days in jail."15
2. Bail Provisions
In some states, a judge protects alleged or potential victims through
the bail process by increasing the likelihood of the defendant's deten-
tion.116 In Ohio, courts must consider certain factors before establishing
bail such as: the alleged perpetrator's history of violence, mental health,
history of violating court orders, the level of the threat, and how detention
interferes with treatment or counseling for the alleged perpetrator." 17
In Illinois, a court may deny bail if the release of the defendant "poses
a real and present threat to the physical safety of the alleged victim of the
offense, and denial of release on bail or personal recognizance is neces-
sary to prevent fulfillment of the threat upon which the charge is
based."118 These provisions present unique problems regarding the de-
fendant's due process rights. 1 9 In Georgia, as a condition of bail the
court may prohibit the defendant from appearing at the victim's school,
work or other location where the victim may be present.' 20
108. Hunzeker, supra note 107, at 3. The first person sentenced in California, Mark
David BleakIey, received probation and was ordered to serve time in a psychiatric facility.
Beck et aL., supra note 15, at 60. He wandered away from the facility and appeared outside
the victim's health club where police apprehended him. Id. His subsequent conviction
yielded three years in prison. Id.
109. Terry Wilson, Stalking Law Sees First Conviction; Man Gets 2-Year Sentence for Tenorizing
Ex-Girlfriend, Cmn. Tim., Nov. 25, 1992, at 3.
110. Curtis Lawrence, Frst Stalking TialResults in Acquittal CI. Tam., Dec. 19, 1992, at 6.






116. See, e.g., I.t. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, Para. 5/110-6.3 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
117. 1992 Ohio Laws 536.
118. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para. 5/110-6.3(a); seealso GA. CoDEANN. § 17-6-1(b) (3) (B)
(Michie Supp. 1993) ("the judge of a court of inquiry'may impose such conditions on the
defendant which may be necessary to deter further stalking of the victim, including but not
limited to denying bail or pretrial release"). These types of provisions may give victims the
courage to file charges against a stalker. See Nightline supra note 16.
119. See discussion infra part M.D.
120. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(b) (3) (A).
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3. Warrantless Arrest
A number of states allow police to arrest alleged stalkers without a
warrant as long as the officer has probable cause to believe the stalking
occurred. 12 1 New Hampshire requires the officer to believe the stalking
incident occurred within six hours in order to arrest without a warrant.
1 22
Many states like Maine and Minnesota also provide for arrest without a
warrant where the stalker violates a restraining order already in place.
123




If the offense of stalking occurs in violation of a protection order in
Massachusetts, the defendant must serve the mandatory sentence with no
eligibility for probation, parole, furlough, work release, or sentence reduc-
tion for good conduct.' 2 5 Under Michigan's law, a misdemeanor convic-
tion yields a maximum of five years probation while a felony conviction
results in a mandatory five years probation.126 Texas prohibits the grant-
ing of any furloughs to defendants convicted of stalking.
127
5. Other Provisions
Michigan, in focusing on the needs of the victim, provides for a rebut-
table presumption that stalking occurred where the defendant's actions
took place after the victim asked the defendant to discontinue any con-
tacts.128 In addition, victims in Michigan may file a civil suit for damages
against their stalkers.
2 9
Colorado's law creates an express duty for peace officers to respond
to stalking complaints and to cooperate with the victim.' 30 This provision
could prove very useful given the number of restraining orders that are
not enforced.' 3 '
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.084 (West Supp. 1993) ("Any law enforcement officer
may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated
the provisions of this section"); 1992 Ohio Laws 234 (allowing for specified peace officers to
arrest and detain, pending a warrant, any person believed to be guilty of committing menac-
ing by stalking or aggravated trespass). See also 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 242 (West) (to be
codified at INn. CoDE § 35-45-10); 1993 Md. Laws 205 (to be codified at MD. CODE § 27-
121B); 1993 Pa. Legis. Serv. 28 (Purdon).
122. 1993 N.H. Laws 173.
123. E.g., 1993 Me. Legis. Serv. 475 (West); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West Supp.
1993).
124. See discussion infra part III.C.
125. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1993).
126. MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 771.2 (West 1982).
127. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993).
128. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993).
129. Id. at § 600.2954.
130. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 18-9-111(6) (Supp. 1993). This provision should address any
concerns similar to those expressed in Lardner, supra note 38.
131. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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Colorado also recently began an experimental program to decrease
the number of domestic violence offenders.' 32 In Arapahoe County, a
known offender wears an electronic bracelet that sounds an alarm if the
offender goes near the person who filed the harassment complaint.' 33
The device broadcasts a simultaneous signal to the police through a com-
munications center.1 34 The victim, knowing the police are on the way,
receives training in how to handle the offender should he come near.1 5
At pretrial and upon conviction, the offender is given the option of
wearing the bracelet, going to jail, or posting bond.'3 6 In addition, of-
fenders receive treatment while wearing the bracelet to discourage any
further obsessive behavior.1
t 7
Some states require the court to notify the victim at certain junctures
during sentencing or incarceration.13 8 Georgia provides notice to any
stalking victim of: 1) any bail hearing scheduled for the defendant; 2) the
defendant's release from custody; and 3) the defendant's escape from
prison. 139 These provisions permit a stalking victim to appear at the bail
hearing to argue for higher bail and also provide the victim notice when
the stalker is back on the streets.
Other provisions empower the court to request a psychiatric evalua-
tion or some type of counseling for the defendant. 140 Montana even
holds the defendant liable for all medical, counseling, or other costs in-
curred by the victim as a result of being stalked.14 1
I. ARE STALKING LAWS CONSTITUTIONAL?
The wide variety of statutes passed by state legislatures raises concerns
about the differing provisions, penalties, and effects. Critics of the legisla-
tion primarily voice concern over the constitutionality and effectiveness of
these statutes.1 4 2 Four main constitutional issues exist to date: 1) are the
statutes void because they are unconstitutionally vague; 2) do the statutes
criminalize conduct otherwise protected by the First Amendment thereby
making them overbroad; 3) do warrantless arrest provisions such as Flor-
ida's violate the Fourth Amendment; and, 4) do some statutes contain pro-
visions which violate the defendant's due process rights?






138. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-108 (1993); TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (West
Supp. 1993).
139. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-93 (Michie Supp. 1993).
140. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-835.3
(Michie Supp. 1993); HAW. REv. STAT. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730,
para. 5/3-14-5 (Smith-Hurd 1993); MrCu. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.411h-.411i (West Supp.
1993); 1992 Ohio Laws 234.
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220 (1993).
142. Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1009-22. See generally Nightline supra note 16 (discussing
the pros and cons of recent anti-stalking legislation towards the accused).
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A. Vagueness
Under the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, federal and state statutes must be written with sufficient
clarity or they will be declared unconstitutionally vague.143 As articulated
by the Supreme Court, "a statute which either forbids or requires the do-
ing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due pro-
cess of law."144 Two primary issues are analyzed to determine if a particu-
lar statute is vague: whether the statute provides adequate notice to the
individual so that she may conform her conduct to the requirements of
the law;14 5 and more importantly as viewed by the Supreme Court,




The concept of notice is grounded in notions of fairness, 147 and
holds a constitutionally-protected status in relation to the individual.
148
Conduct must be defined by the government as criminal before the gov-
ernment treats it as such.' 4 9 Otherwise, any law enforcement agent could
declare anyone's conduct a crime at any time. 150 Such discretionary
power would wreak havoc on any civilized or organized society.151
Notice requirements are realistic, however, in that the Court does not
place specificity requirements on the legislature that are impossible to
143. Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.").
144. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
145. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); see generaly John C.
Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 205
(1985).
146. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162, 168-171; see alsoJeffries, supra note 145, at 215.
147. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). "Notice is essential to fairness.
Crimes must be defined in advance so that individuals have fair warning of what is forbidden:
lack of notice poses a 'trap for the innocent' and 'violates the first essential of due process of
law." Id. See alsoJeffries, supra note 145, at 205 (footnote omitted).
148. See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544-46 (1971) (per curiam) (statute that
failed to provide notice to an ordinary citizen that "discharging a friend at an apartment
house and then talking on a car radio while parked on the street" was prohibited as unconsti-
tutionally vague).
149. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163; see alsoJeffries, supra note 145, at 205.
150. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 165, 170.
151. The Supreme Court shunned arbitrary power under the Due Process clause as early
as 1884. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884) ("Arbitrary power, enforcing its
edicts to the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested
as the decree of a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude."). See also Coates v. City
of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (conviction depended on "whether or not a police-
man is annoyed"); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) ("To let a policeman's
command become equivalent to a criminal statute comes dangerously near making our gov-
ernment one of men rather than laws.").
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meet.15 2 The Court considers the difficulties in drafting a statute in order
to meet both sides of the balancing test in any vagueness challenge. 153
2. Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement
The Supreme Court historically disfavors unjustified law enforcement
power.154 In relation to the vagueness doctrine, the Court recently high-
lighted the prevention of arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement as
the primary goal of the doctrine.' 55 Kolender'5 6 involved a California stat-
ute which required persons suspected of loitering on the street to present
identification when asked by a peace officer. 15 7 The Court found the stat-
ute vested complete discretion in the officer to determine whether or not
the identification presented was "credible and reliable," thereby making
the provision unconstitutionally vague. 15 8 The government argued the
need for stronger law enforcement to combat the increase in crime.' 59
The Court, however, refused to permit such broad legislation which "nec-
essarily 'entrusted lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of the
policeman on his beat.'"160
3. Potential Outcomes to Vagueness Challenge
In deciding whether or not a statute is unconstitutionally vague, the
court must undergo a balancing test between securing the defendant's
rights of notice and proper enforcement against providing enough flexi-
bility for the law to operate. 161 Realistically, the analysis focuses on the
type of conduct the legislature wants to prevent and whether the statute is
152. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("[W]e can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language.").
153. See Colten, 407 U.S. at 110.
154. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876).
155. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). In his commentary, Jeffries high-
lights the Court's rationale in Kolender regarding the susceptibility of the law in question to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as "the most persuasive justification for vagueness
review generally." Jeffries, supra note 145, at 218.
156. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
157. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353. CAL. PENAL- CODE. ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970) at that time
provided:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct,
a misdemeanor... (e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to
place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and
to account for his presence when requested by a peace officer so to do, if the sur-
rounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public
safety demands such identification.
Kokender, 461 U.S. at 353 n.1.
158. Id. at 358.
159. Id. at 361.
160. Id. at 360 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)).
161. See, e-g., Coton, 407 U.S. at 110.
The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea offairness. It is not a principle
designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical difficulties in draw-
ing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human
conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of con-
duct are prohibited.
Id. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). "The degree
of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates-as well as the relative importance offair notice
and fair enforcement-depends in part on the nature of the enactment." Id.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
likely to produce the particular results intended.' 6 2 Statutes that regulate
activity within the expected reign of government usually survive vagueness
challenges, 163 while statutes which extend governmental control too far
usually fail.1
6 4
When a court finds that the statute does not meet proper notice re-
quirements or subjects the public to arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment, it declares the law either facially vague or partially vague.165 A
facially vague law implies that the conduct demanded by the statute can-
not be readily ascertained from its language. The court upholds a facial
challenge only if the law is "impermissibly vague in all of its
applications."'
66
A partially vague statute involves "a hard core of circumstances to
which the statute unquestionably applies and as to which the ordinary per-
son would have no doubt as to its application." 167 Under these circum-
stances, the court finds the law unconstitutional only as applied to a
particular defendant.'6 The law will not be struck down in its entirety.'6 9
Instead, the court will attempt to "cure" the statute either through judicial
interpretation or a scienter requirement 70
162. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960). Amsterdam believes that the vagueness doctrine "is a means for
securing the Court's control over the methods by which governmental compulsion may be
brought to bear on the individual." Id. at 115.
163. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988) (picketing at foreign embassies);
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (interfering with police activity); Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1968) (picketing at courthouse).
164. See, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292-93 (1963) (rejecting conviction of six
black men under breach of the peace statute for playing basketball in a public park); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-36 (1963) (invalidating statue regulating solicitation of legal
clients).
165. Amsterdam, supra note 162, at 109-10.
166. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495. See also Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
611 n.1 (1971) (holding facially invalid a municipal ordinance making it a crime "to assem-
ble.., on any of the sidewalks... [and to] conduct [oneself] in a manner annoying to
persons passing by.. .).
167. Rex A. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty - An Appraisa4 40 CoRNM.L L.Q.
195, 206 (1955). See U.S. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
168. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, 503.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 498-99.
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Three types of representative stalking laws are -analyzed below for
vagueness: California's narrow law,17 1 Florida's broad law, 172 and Michi-
gan's intermediate provision. 173
171. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). The statute currently reads:
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses
another person and who makes a credible threatwith the intent to place that per-
son in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury or to place that person in
reasonable fear of the death or great bodily injury of his or her immediate family is
guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year of by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or
by both that fine and imprisonment.
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) -when there is a temporary re-
straining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibiting the behav-
ior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, is punishable by
imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by
imprisonment in the state prison.
(c) A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a prior
conviction under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and'involving an act of
violence or a "credible threat" of violence, as defined in subdivision (f), is punish-
able by imprisonment in a countyjail for not more than one year, or by a fine of not
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment,
or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(d) Every person who, having been convicted of a felony under this section,
commits a second or subsequent violation of this section against the same victim
and involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in
subdivision (f), is punishable in state prison, for 16 months, two or three years and a
fine up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
(e) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, ha-
rasses, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. The course
of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the per-
son. "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitu-
tionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of
conduct."
(f) For the purposes of this section, "a credible threat" means a threat made
with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the
person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the
safety of his or her immediate family. The threat must be against the life of, or a
threat to cause great bodily injury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7.
(g) This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during labor
picketing.
(h) If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence is
suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a condition of
probation that the person participate in counseling, as designated by the court.
However, the court, upon a showing of good cause, may fined that the counseling
requirement shall not be imposed.
(i) The court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the defendant
from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined
by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that the length of any restraining
order be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of
future violations, and the safety of the victim and his or her immediate family. The
duration of the restraining order may be longer than five years only in an extreme
case, where a longer duration is necessary to protect the safety of the victim or his or
her immediate family.
Id.
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 180 for full text of
Florida's statute.
173. MicH. COmp. LAws ANN. § 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993). See infra note 193 for
full text of Michigan's statute.
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a. California
In California, stalking requires the conduct of willful, malicious, and
repeated following or harassing of a person, plus a credible threat with
intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury.174
The law links the conduct of following or harassing with a "credible
threat"-behavior otherwise punishable under criminal law.175 Given that
the underlying offense of making threats does not violate vagueness re-
quirements, the inclusion of willful following or harassing with making
threats should satisfy constitutional standards of notice.'
7 6
In addition, California's statute defines relevant terminology such as
"to harass" and "a credible threaL" 177 Therefore, those charged with en-
forcement of the law can refer to the definitions to determine whether
specific conduct is prohibited. This should prevent arbitrary or discrimi-




Florida's law, on the other hand, criminalizes the act of willfully, mali-
ciously, and repeatedly following or harassing another person. 180 This
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9.
175. See CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 701-703 (West 1985).
176. See Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1014. The threat requirement makes it possible to
distinguish innocent conduct from criminal conduct. Id. This is an example of how addition
of a scienter requirement mitigates against vagueness. See id. ("The threat provision strongly
mitigates against vagueness in the statute because it requires that the stalker demonstrate a
tangible intent to cause emotional harm.").
177. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993). "'[Hlarasses' means a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, ha-
rasses or terrorizes the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose." Id. at § 649.9(e)
"'[A] credible threat' means a threat made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry
out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for
his or her safety...." Id. at § 649.9(f).
178. See Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1015-16. This article contains an analysis of all poten-
tially vague terms in the California statute, resolving that California's statute should survive
any vagueness challenges. Id.
179. Id.
180. FLA- STAT. ANN. § 784.048(2) (West Supp. 1993). Florida's law currently provides:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Harasses" means to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legiti-
mate purpose.
(b) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of
acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Con-
stitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of "course of con-
duct." Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other
organized protests.
(c) "Credible threat" means a threat made with the intent to cause the person
who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety. The threat
must be against the life of, or a threat to cause bodily injury to, a person.
(2) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses an-
other person commits the offense of stalking, a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(3) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses an-
other person, and makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of aggravated stalk-
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raises two concerns. First, no threat or intent to harm is required, thus
punishing the mere presence of a person. This makes distinguishing legal
from illegal behavior difficult. 81 For example, an investigative reporter
following the subject of his story on more than one occasion engages in
proscribed conduct under this statute.
1 8 2
Second, while the statute does define "to harass," no definition of "fol-
lowing" exists.I8 3 What then constitutes following? How far must one "fol-
low" to break the law? How closely must one follow? Could trailing
behind a person for a few blocks to get a better view because she looked
familiar constitute stalking? One commentator noted that even a football
player chasing an opponent may satisfy "willful, malicious and repeated
following." 18 4 This ambiguity suggests the statute fails to meet the
Supreme Court's standard of definiteness and clarity.'
85
Florida's law also leaves room for arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement. The statute's ambiguity forces police to rely on the perception
of the person stalked because the statute fails to provide adequate criteria
for determining the alleged stalker's intent. Under this law, a distraught
victim escaping from a stalker who has repeatedly followed her may enlist
the aid of a beat cop nearby. So too may an over sensitive woman com-
mand the sympathies of the same police officer against someone who in-
nocently walked behind her for some distance. This latter example clearly
does not meet the legislature's intention to protect from the "needless
torment caused by stalking." 18 6
Moreover, Florida's law provides for police officers to arrest stalking
suspects without a warrant,' 87 compounding the discretion given to the
police. This gives the officer the power to arrest someone based purely on
his own suspicions or on the word of the victim. The Supreme Court ex-
plicitly prohibits such unbridled discretion through the vagueness doc-
ing, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or
s. 775.084.
(4) Any person who, after an injunction for protection against repeat violence
pursuant to s. 784.046, or an injunction for protection against domestic violence
pursuant to s. 741.30, or after any other court-imposed prohibition of conduct to-
ward the subject person or that person's property, knowingly, willfully, maliciously,
and repeatedly follows or harasses another person commits the offense of aggra-
vated stalking, a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or's. 775.084.
(5) Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or
she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section.
FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048.
181. See Nightline, supra note 16. Accord Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1017.
182. SeeFLA STAT. ANN. § 784.048(1)(a).
183. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048.
184. Thomas, supra note 7, at 9.
185. See also, Guy, Jr., supra note 38, at 1017. "[P]olice officers, prosecutors, and juries
have no standards by which to determine that [a defendant] has violated the stalking statute.
Whether certain conduct constitutes stalking becomes a matter of discretion." Id. Cf.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring
persons who loitered on the streets to identify themselves and account for their presence to a
police officer upon request).
186. See FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048, pmbl.
187. Id. at § 784.048(5).
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trine.188 Ultimately, Florida's anti-stalking law does not clarify what
activities as a whole are prohibited, 18 9 and its ambiguity allows for arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, this law will most likely
fall to a facial attack.190
c. Michigan,
Michigan's law, more similar to California's than Florida's, involves a
"willful course of conduct" that would cause reasonable fear in the victim
and does cause such fear.' 9 ' While California's law focuses on the actions
188. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,
162-70 (1972).
189. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
190. At least three Florida judges have ruled Florida's law is unconstitutionally vague. Jill
J. Spitz, Deciion Delivers Blow to FKoridazs Anti-StalkingLaw, ORLANo SENTn, Aug. 3, 1993, at
1; Judge Anti-Stalking Law Unconstitutional, Mri HEALDm, May 21, 1993, at B5; Defense Wins
Challenge to State's Anti-Stalking Law, Mmsir HERALD, Mar. 9, 1993, at 2. But see Guy, Jr., supra
note 38, at 1017-19. The author found that Florida's statute is unconstitutionally vague
where it proscribes malicious following, but survives vagueness challenges where it proscribes
harassment. Id. He also determined that Florida's aggravated stalking provision is sufficient.
Id.
Other states facing constitutional challenges to their stalking laws include Georgia, Illi-
nois, and Virginia. See Macon Morehouse, New Anti-Stalking Law Questioned byjudgefor Lack of
Guidelines, ATLkrrAJ. AND CoNsr., June 4, 1993, at G3; Charles Mount, Stalking Law Survives
1st Test CHI. Twa., June 18, 1993, at 4; Cathryn Creno, Victims of Abuse Call for Legal Help,
Aluz. REPuBLIc, May 18, 1993, at El.
191. MICH. Con. LAws ANN. § 750.411h-.411i (West Supp. 1993). These sections state:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2
or more separate noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
(b) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that
may, but does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or
counseling.
(c) "Harassment" means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but
is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact, that would cause a
reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the vic-
tim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment does not include coustitutionally pro-
tected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.
(d) "Stalking" means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or contin-
uing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to fell
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that ac-
tually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested.
(e) "Unconsented contact" means any contact with another individual that is
initiated or continued without that individual's consent, or in disregard of that indi-
vidual's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Uncon-
sented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following.
(i) Following or appearing within the sight of that individual.
(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public or on a pri-
vate property.
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of that individual.
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occu-
pied by that individual.
(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
leased, or occupied by that individual.
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(f) "Victim" means an individual who is the target of a willful course of con-
duct involving repeated or continuing harassment.
(2) An individual who engages in stalking is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable
by imprisonment for not more than I year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or
both.
(3) The court may place an individual convicted of violating subsection (2) on
probation for a term of not more than 5 years. If a term of probation is ordered,
the court may, in addition to any other lawful condition of probation, order the
defendant to do any of the following.
(a) Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation.,
(b) Refrain from having any contact with the victim of the offense.
(c) Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or so-
cial counseling and, if determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric,
psychological, or social counseling at his or her own expense.
(4) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant
continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented con-
tact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the
same or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further
unconsented contact with the victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(5) A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addi-
tion to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from
the same conduct or for any contempt of court arising from the same conduct.
Section 750.411i, Aggravated stalking provides:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of 2
or more separate noncontinuous acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.
(b) "Credible threat" means a threat to kill another individual or a threat to
inflict physical injury upon another individual that is made in any manner or in any
context that causes the individual hearing or receiving the threat to reasonably fear
for his or her safety or the safety of another individual.
(c) "Emotional distress" means significant mental suffering or distress that
may, but does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or
counseling.
(d) "Harassment" means conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but
is not limited to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact, that would cause a
reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress, and that actually causes the vic-
tim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment doeg not include constitutionally pro-
tected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose.
(e) "Stalking" means a willful course of conduct involving repeated or contin-
uing harassment of another individual that would cause a reasonable person to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested, and that ac-
tually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested.
(f) "Unconsented contact" means any contact with another individual that is
initiated or continued without that individual's consent, or in disregard of that indi-
vidual's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued. Uncon-
sented contact includes, but is not limited to, any of the following.
(i) Following or appearing within the sight of that individual may, but
does not necessarily require, medical or other professional treatment or counseling.
(ii) Approaching or confronting that individual in a public place or on
private property.
(iii) Appearing at the workplace or residence of that individual.
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occu-
pied by that individual.
(v) Contacting that individual by telephone.
(vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that individual.
(vii) Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
leased, or occupied by that individual.
(g) "Victim" means an individual who is the target of a willful course of con-
duct involving repeated or continuing harassment.
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of the stalker in making a credible threat,192 Michigan's law focuses more
on the perspective of the victim in feeling some "reasonable fear."' 9 3 Reli-
ance on the subjective feelings of the victim, however, makes it difficult for
the defendant to predict what behavior will be found threatening. The
statute compensates for this subjective element by including a list of repre-
sentative contacts which qualify as violative behavior in order to put a po-
tential defendant on notice.19 4 That list includes: approaching or
confronting the person in a public or private place, following or appear-
ing within sight of the person, or appearing at the person's workplace.' 9 5
The sufficient notice requirements are therefore satisfied because a per-
son is able to ascertain whether his conduct violates the statute.
In addition, the law requires two or more separate noncontinuous
acts evidencing a continuity of purpose on the part of the defendant.
196
While following someone to get a closer look may cause fear in the mind
of the person being followed, no violation occurs if it happens only
once. 19 7 Plus, arrest comes only after two events within the same scheme,
significantly narrowing the circumstances under which enforcement oc-
(2) An individual who engages in stalking is guilty of aggravated stalking if the
violation involves any of the following circumstances:
(a) The actions constituting the offense are in violation of a restraining order
and the individual has received actual notice of that restraining order, or the ac-
tions are in violation of an injunction or preliminary injunction.
(b) The actions constituting the offense are in violation of a condition of
probation, a condition of pretrial release, or a condition of release on bond pend-
ing appeal.
(c) The course of conduct includes the making of 1 or more credible threats
against the victim, a member of the victim's family, or another individual living in
the victim's household.
(d) The defendant has been previously convicted of a violation of this section
or section 411h. [FN1]
(3) Aggravated stalking is a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 5 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.
(4) The court may place an individual convicted of violating this section on pro-
bation for any term of years, but not less than 5 years. If a term of probation is
ordered, the court may, in addition to any other lawful condition of probation,
order the defendant to do any of the following:
(a) Refrain from stalking any individual during the term of probation.
(b) Refrain from any contact with the victim of the offense.
(c) Be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric, psychological, or so-
cial counseling, and, if determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric,
psychological, or social counseling at his or her own expense.
(5) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, evidence that the defendant
continued to engage in a course of conduct involving repeated unconsented con-
tact with the victim after having been requested by the victim to discontinue the
same or a different form of unconsented contact, and to refrain from any further
unconsented contact with the victim, shall give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the continuation of the course of conduct caused the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.
(6) A criminal penalty provided for under this section may be imposed in addi-
tion to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising from
the same conduct or for contempt of court arising from the same conduct.
192. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
193. Mans. Com. LAws ANN. § 750.411h(c), (d).
194. Id. at §§ 750.411h(e)(i)-(vii), 411i(f)(i)-(vii).
195. Id.
196. Id. at §§ 750.411h(a), 411i(a).
197. See id.
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curs. 198 This precludes arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Michi-
gan's law, therefore, should not fail for vagueness. 199
B. Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine is one exception to the rule requiring that
in order for a statute to be facially vague it must be vague under every
applicable application. 20 0 Overbreadth concerns enactments with "a gov-
ernmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulation [which] may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of [constitutionally] pro-
tected freedoms." 20 1 The Supreme Court demands a higher standard of
precision in drafting legislation affecting individual rights because citizens
will "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.., than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked.'"
20 2
A defendant's challenge to this type of enactment, even if her con-
duct clearly violates it, will go forward due to the court's sensitivity to is-
sues such as First Amendment freedoms.20  In order to win a facially
overbroad attack, the plaintiff must show: 1) the protected activity is a
significant part of the law's target, and 2) that no satisfactory method ex-
ists of severing the law's unconstitutional applications from its constitu-
tional ones.204 If a court finds the statute infringes upon constitutionally
protected freedoms beyond necessity and no feasible means of severing
the unconstitutional language exists, the law will be struck down even if
enacted for a legitimate state purpose.205
Clearly the government's purpose in enacting anti-stalking legislation
is legitimate. In order to address concerns regarding the statute's effect
on activities protected by the First Amendment, most stalking laws provide
exceptions for applications to "constitutionally protected conduct."206
Some laws go further and specify what conduct is exempt from prosecu-
tion.20 7 Are these exceptions enough? Or do they subsequently make the
laws unconstitutionally vague? Could a legislature draft these provisions
more narrowly?208
The phrase "constitutionally protected conduct" by itself seems re-
dundant.20 9 If the activity falls under constitutional protection, the statute
198. See id.
199. For similar analysis regarding Connecticut's stalking statute, see Guy, Jr., supra note
38, at 1020-22.
200. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).
201. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
202. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372
(1964)).
203. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
204. LARamcE H. TRIBE, AM ElCAN CONsTrrUoTONAL Lw, § 12-24 (1978).
205. See NAACP, 377 U.S. at 307-08.
206. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
208. For an example of one author's proposed stalking statute, see GuyJr., supra note 38,
at 1022-27.
209. Thomas, supra note 7, at 10.
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cannot change that. Additionally, the Supreme Court requires only stat-
utes which regulate conduct in a substantially overbroad manner to be
struck down. 210 If the statute only affects occasional unconstitutional ap-
plications while maintaining a close nexus between the legislative intent
and the allowable level of enforcement, the statute may not be
invalidated.
2 11
The concerns raised about civil liberties and stalking laws, 21 2 assum-
ing these laws do not fail for other vagueness reasons, seem exaggerated
given the requirements for overbreadth. Any false claims against the in-
vestigative reporter, or the father who watches from his parked car the
children he lost custody of, will most likely be struck as individual uncon-
stitutional applications. But, ultimately the nexus between government in-
terests and the interests of the legislature to protect from stalking behavior
should prove strong enough to survive.
C. Fourth Amendment
Civil rights experts fear that anti-stalking laws such as Florida's, which
authorize arrests without a warrant, may violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 13 Florida's stalking law provides, "an officer may arrest without a
warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe violated the
act."2 14 Critics argue the provision allows police to falsely arrest a suspect
merely upon an alleged victim's word.2 15 Under the statute, an angry wife
may conceivably file stalking charges against her cheating husband solely
to see him get arrested.
Circumstances do exist, however, where a suspect may be legitimately
arrested without a warrant. 216 Under common law, either a misdemeanor
committed in the presence of an officer 2 17 or a felony committed in or
outside the presence of an officer justifies a warrantless arrest.
2 18
In addition, because the requirement that the violation occur in front
of an officer originates from common law and not the Fourth Amend-
210. Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[O]verbreadth... must not
only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.").
211. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (statute prohibiting picketing "near"
courthouse upheld against overbreadth challenge).
212. See Nightline supra note 16; Gary Spencer, State Tightens Penaltiesfor Stalking, N.Y. LJ.,
at 1, Aug. 20, 1992. According to Phil Gutis, spokesman for the ACLU, his organization will
watch to make sure that anti-stalking laws are not being implemented by overeager prosecu-
tors to violate individual constitutional rights. Id.
213. See Nightline, supra note 16. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
214. FA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048(5) (West Supp. 1993).
215. See Nightline, supra note 16.
216. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975).




ment, the Supreme Court held that the states may expand the power to
arrest without a warrant through statute or Constitutional amendment.
2 1 9
Therefore, as long as the warrantless arrest provision does not violate the
Constitution, its validity rests upon the law of the state where the arrest
occurred.22 0 In most states, an arrest will not require a warrant as long as
the officer can establish probable cause.
2 21
No specific guidelines exist to define probable cause. The Supreme
Court labelled it as "a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules."222 When a police officer receives
knowledge or information regarding facts 'and circumstances sufficient to
cause a reasonable belief that an offense occurred, the officer may arrest
the suspect without a warrant.
223
Some states currently provide for warrantless arrests upon probable
cause within their domestic abuse statutes.2 2 4 Other states provide for
warrantless arrests at the scene of the incident with probable cause that an
offense was committed, or if a protective order was violated.2 25 Constitu-
tional challenges to these statutes have failed.2 26 The courts held that the
states' interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of abused wo-
men outweighed the individual defendant's right to privacy.
2 27
A similar argument exists under anti-stalking legislation that the
state's interests outweigh the alleged stalker's right to liberty although the
balance of the scales appear much closer because the proscribed conduct
is more difficult to ascertain.2 28 Support for the mandatory arrest provi-
sion in domestic abuse legislation exists in everyjurisdiction.2 29 Given the
rapid response of the states in passing anti-stalking legislation, and the
states' broad power to enact laws to protect the general health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens, support for mandatory arrest provisions in anti-stalk-
ing legislation may soon follow and should survive Fourth Amendment
challenges.
219. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., with Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
220. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963).
221. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 421-22 (1976); Fields v. City of S. Houston, Tex., 922 F.2d
1183, 1189 (5th Cir. 1991).
222. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
223. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
224. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GE.N.
STAT. § 50B-4 (Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(1) (1989 & Supp. 1993).
225. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(B) (1989 & Supp. 1992); FLA. STA. ANN.
§§ 901-15(6)-(7) (West 1984 & Supp. 1993); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West 1983 & Supp.
1993).
226. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Errington, 310 N.W.2d 681, 682 (Minn. 1981) (holding the
Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act constitutional); Missouri ex teL Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d
223, 236 (Mo. 1982) (holding the Missouri Adult Abuse Act constitutional).
227. See, e.g., Williams, 626 S.W.2d at 230.
228. See supra part III.A.
229. Greg Anderson, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police That Liability Looms for
Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAeI L. REv. 333, 353 (1985).
1993]
DENVER UN!VERS!TY LAW REVIEW
D. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents state
governments from depriving individuals of "life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law."230 What is meant by "life" is unquestionable. The
definition of property has developed through case law over the years.
23 1
The definition of liberty, however, remains somewhat obscure.2 32 Tradi-
tional notions of liberty include one's right to be free from restraint of
physical liberty along with those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
233
Once an individual's liberty interest is at issue, the court determines
what procedural process is due before the individual can be deprived of
that interest. 23 4 In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Court weighed three factors to
determine whether any process was due: 1) the importance of the individ-
ual interest; 2) the reliability of the current process or the risk of errone-
ous deprivation; and 3) the importance of the government interest.
23 5
With regard to anti-stalking laws, the procedural due process analysis
arises in two important contests - ex parte restraining orders and the de-
nial of bail.
236
1. Ex Parte Restraining Orders
In some states, the court can issue a protective order without notice to
the offending party upon the presentment of evidence of abuse or immi-
nent danger of abuse.23 7 One domestic violence case argued that ex parte
orders violated the defendant's due process rights because the defendant
was not given timely notice or an opportunity to be heard before being
denied access to his property and his children. 23 8 Although the ex parte
order in this case enjoined the defendant from his home, the court held
his rights were subordinate to the abused spouse's right to immediate pro-
tection from harm.2 3 9 The court found the government's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens outweighed the individual's Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights.
24
The analysis under anti-stalking legislation involves similar interests
and should obtain similar results. Whether or not there is a personal rela-
tionship between the victim and the stalker, the victim's right to be free
230. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
231. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (plaintiff's interest in being
rehired after one year contract expired did not equal property interest); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare payments deemed a property interest protected by constitution
against arbitrary withdrawal).
232. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) ("In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed.").
233. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
234. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See, e.g., Mica. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 600.2950a (West Supp. 1993); MnN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
238. Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa.D & C.3d 767 (1979).
239. Id. at 773.
240. Id. at 774.
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from harassment militates against the defendant's rights to due process.
Each of the anti-stalking laws with ex parte provisions requires the victim
to demonstrate the immediacy of potential harm before the order will be
granted. 24 1 Additionally, because ex parte orders are issued only tempo-
rarily,242 the potential for erroneous deprivation is eliminated. 243 Overall,
the government's interest in protecting its citizens from harm outweighs
the defendant's right to notice and extensive procedures in the short
term. Therefore, these provisions for ex parte restraining orders should
not raise constitutional concerns.
2. No-Bail Provisions
As noted previously, both Illinois and Georgia allow judges to deny
bail to alleged stalkers in order to protect the victim.244 Although the due
process analysis requires the balancing of the same interests here as with
ex parte orders, the argument on behalf of the, defendant is somewhat
stronger due to the extent of liberty infringed.
245
One critic has identified the difficulty in denying bail in anti-stalking
situations.24 6 Susan Hillenbrand of the American Bar Association found
twenty-eight states allow the denial of bail only for capitol offenses while
eighteen states hold the purpose of bail is to secure the defendant's ap-
pearance in court, not to protect the community.2 47 In fact, Illinois' no-
bail provision was recently held unconstitutional under the Illinois
Constitution.
2 4 8
It seems likely that no-bail provisions will have a more difficult time
withstanding constitutional challenges than ex-parte restraining order
provisions due to the degree of liberty withheld. In order to serve the
purpose of protecting the victim from future harm, legislatures may have
to re-write existing policies behind the denial of bail to meet constitutional
241. See, e.g., MicH. Comp. IAws ANN. § 600.2950a (West Supp. 1993); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.748 (West Supp. 1993).
242. See, e.g., MmnN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748(4).
243. See Boyle, 12 Pa.D & C.3d at 774..
244. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1(b) (3) (B) (Michie Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 725, para.
5/110-6.3 (Smith-Hurd 1992). See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
245. The Eighth Amendment provides in part that "excessive bail shall not be required."
U.S. CoNsT. amend VIII. In certain situations, a defendant has a right to affordable bail. See
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
Like the ancient practice of securing oaths of responsible persons to stand as sure-
ties for the accused, the modem practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of
a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence
of the accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to
fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
246. George Lardner, Jr., Anti-Stalking Laws ProMliferate,. Several Face Court Challenges, WASH.
Posr, Apr. 30, 1993, at A2.
247. Id. In recent years, however, detention to prevent further criminal acts has become
permissible under certain circumstances. See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). "We
have repeatedly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individuals liberty interest." Id.
248. David Bailey, CircuitJudgeFinds No-BailPMvisin of StalkingLaw to Be Unconstitutional,
Cm. DAi.Y L. Buu., Feb. 5, 1993, at 1.
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Anti-stalking legislation offers additional recourse for victims of stalk-
ers where prior criminal and civil remedies proved insufficient. Ultimately,
the issue remains whether or not anti-stalking legislation will prove effec-
tive in preventing stalking. The likely answer is both yes and no. As with
any other criminal law designed to punish and deter unacceptable behav-
ior, some will obey the laws and some will not. Especially in circumstances
where the stalker suffers from mental disturbance, the prospect of fines or
short jail sentences may only serve to heighten the frenzy.
Additionally, the specific concerns relative to the constitutionality of
these provisions need to be addressed. The need for protection of the
victims must be weighed against the rights of the accused. Some states
have begun to make the arguments and refine the language in their provi-
sions. Other states will undoubtedly follow. Perhaps the proposed federal
model legislation will assist in the discussion. Meanwhile, the recognition
must be made that in the interim, a definite number of lives will be saved.
Julie Miles Walker
249. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748.
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